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Lived Nationality: Policy and Practice in Soviet Georgia, 1945-1978
Abstract
This dissertation asks how nation-ness “happens” at the level of experience. Although the Soviet state was
founded on principles of Marxism-Leninism, which sought ultimately to transcend national distinctions, the
experience of the Soviet project constructed and consolidated rather than dissolved nationality among its
multiethnic population. Existing scholarship on Soviet nationality policies has largely focused on the interwar
era from Moscow’s perspective, when the state’s distinctive approach toward managing ethnic difference was
conceived and initially implemented. Relying on archival materials in Georgian and Russian, this dissertation
examines nationality from the viewpoint of the post-World War Two Georgian SSR, when early Soviet nation-
building policies gained traction among its multiethnic citizenry.
By the late Stalin era (1945-1953), internal understandings of Georgian national identity were closely
intertwined with pride in Stalin as a co-national. Newly endowed Soviet institutions of nation-building from
this period gave form to nationalizing aspirations of local- and republic-level actors in Georgia, from Party
cadres to academics. I refer to these processes as productive and excisional institutions of nation-building. The
aftermath of Khrushchev’s revelations in 1956 of Stalin’s crimes marked a crucial turning point in Georgia, yet
for different reasons than the resistance, confusion, or hope expressed elsewhere in the USSR. The violent
suppression in 1956 of demonstrations in Tbilisi against Khrushchev’s perceived denigration of Stalin as a
Georgian national figure compelled a reevaluation of what it meant to be Soviet and Georgian in a post-Stalin
society. This reevaluation took place among republic leaders and “ordinary citizens” alike, as a new national-
social contract emerged that facilitated the hegemony of the entitled nationality by the late 1970s. From the
nationalization of the republic’s capital to negotiation of cultural practices to political mobilization toward
national interests, citizens in Georgia increasingly inhabited nationality through – rather than in spite of –
Soviet institutions and collectives. This study sheds new light on shifting imperial, republican, and local
center-periphery dynamics in the postwar Soviet Union and situates the subtleties of the Georgian case within
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ABSTRACT	  	   LIVED	  NATIONALITY:	  POLICY	  AND	  PRACTICE	  IN	  SOVIET	  GEORGIA,	  1945-­‐1978	  	  Claire	  Pogue	  Kaiser	  Peter	  Holquist	  	   This	  dissertation	  asks	  how	  nation-­‐ness	  “happens”	  at	  the	  level	  of	  experience.	  Although	   the	   Soviet	   state	  was	   founded	   on	   principles	   of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,	  which	  sought	   ultimately	   to	   transcend	   national	   distinctions,	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   the	  Soviet	   project	   constructed	   and	   consolidated	   rather	   than	   dissolved	   nationality	  among	  its	  multiethnic	  population.	  Existing	  scholarship	  on	  Soviet	  nationality	  policies	  has	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  interwar	  era	  from	  Moscow’s	  perspective,	  when	  the	  state’s	  distinctive	  approach	  toward	  managing	  ethnic	  difference	  was	  conceived	  and	  initially	  implemented.	   Relying	   on	   archival	   materials	   in	   Georgian	   and	   Russian,	   this	  dissertation	   examines	   nationality	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   the	   post-­‐World	  War	   Two	  Georgian	  SSR,	  when	  early	  Soviet	  nation-­‐building	  policies	  gained	  traction	  among	  its	  multiethnic	  citizenry.	  	  By	   the	   late	   Stalin	   era	   (1945-­‐1953),	   internal	   understandings	   of	   Georgian	  national	   identity	   were	   closely	   intertwined	   with	   pride	   in	   Stalin	   as	   a	   co-­‐national.	  Newly	  endowed	  Soviet	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building	  from	  this	  period	  gave	  form	  to	  nationalizing	   aspirations	   of	   local-­‐	   and	   republic-­‐level	   actors	   in	  Georgia,	   from	  Party	  cadres	   to	   academics.	   I	   refer	   to	   these	   processes	   as	   productive	   and	   excisional	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building.	  The	  aftermath	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  revelations	  in	  1956	  of	  Stalin’s	  crimes	  marked	  a	  crucial	   turning	  point	   in	  Georgia,	  yet	   for	  different	  reasons	  than	  the	  resistance,	  confusion,	  or	  hope	  expressed	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR.	  The	  violent	  
vii	  suppression	   in	   1956	   of	   demonstrations	   in	   Tbilisi	   against	   Khrushchev’s	   perceived	  denigration	  of	  Stalin	  as	  a	  Georgian	  national	  figure	  compelled	  a	  reevaluation	  of	  what	  it	  meant	   to	  be	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	   in	  a	  post-­‐Stalin	   society.	  This	   reevaluation	   took	  place	  among	  republic	  leaders	  and	  “ordinary	  citizens”	  alike,	  as	  a	  new	  national-­‐social	  contract	  emerged	  that	  facilitated	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  by	  the	  late	  1970s.	   	  From	  the	  nationalization	  of	   the	  republic’s	  capital	   to	  negotiation	  of	  cultural	  practices	   to	   political	   mobilization	   toward	   national	   interests,	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	  increasingly	   inhabited	   nationality	   through	   –	   rather	   than	   in	   spite	   of	   –	   Soviet	  institutions	   and	   collectives.	   This	   study	   sheds	   new	   light	   on	   shifting	   imperial,	  republican,	   and	   local	   center-­‐periphery	   dynamics	   in	   the	   postwar	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  situates	  the	  subtleties	  of	  the	  Georgian	  case	  within	  a	  broader	  trajectory	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  Eurasian	  nation-­‐building	  practices.	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A	  Note	  on	  Names	  and	  Spellings	  	   Georgian	   and	   Russian	   transliterations	   follow	   their	   respective	   Library	   of	  Congress	   systems,	   with	   exceptions	   made	   for	   more	   common	   English-­‐language	  spellings,	  such	  as	  Georgia	  rather	  than	  sak’art’velo,	  Tbilisi	  rather	  than	  t’bilisi,	  Ajaria	  rather	  than	  Ačara,	  or	  Shevardnadze	  rather	  than	  Ševardnaże.	  The	  Georgian	  language	  does	  not	  use	  capital	   letters,	  which	  I	  retain	   in	  citations	   for	  accuracy.	   I	  do,	  however,	  capitalize	  proper	  nouns	   in	   the	  main	   text	   for	  readers’	  ease.	   I	   transliterate	  Georgian	  names	   and	   places	   into	   their	   Georgian	   variants,	   and	   Russian,	   Abkhaz,	   Ossetia,	  Armenian,	  etc.	  names,	  in	  the	  Russian	  transliteration	  style.	  In	  cases	  where	  I	  am	  citing	  a	  Georgian	  author	  of	  a	  Russian-­‐language	  work,	  I	  transliterate	  the	  name	  from	  Russian	  in	  the	  citation.	  	  Because	  the	  archival	  trail	  and	  its	  protagonists	  tell	  their	  stories	  in	  a	  mixture	  of	  Russian	  and	  Georgian,	   I	  use	   translated	  acronyms	  of	  Soviet	   institutions	  rather	   than	  Russian	  or	  Georgian	  versions	  (e.g.	  CC	  for	  Central	  Committee	  rather	  that	  TsK	  or	  c’k;	  MFA	  for	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  rather	  than	  MID	  or	  sss).	  Notable	  exceptions	  are	  the	   security	   services	   (NKVD/MGB/KGB)	   and	   the	   All-­‐Union	   Society	   for	   Cultural	  Relations	  with	  Foreign	  Countries	  and	  its	  Georgian	  branch	  (VOKS/GOKS),	  for	  which	  I	  use	   the	   more	   commonly	   known	   Russian	   acronyms.	   I	   also	   use	   the	   Obkom	  abbreviation	  (for	  district	  committee	  –	  oblastnyi	  komitet)	  with	  regard	  to	  Abkhazia,	  as	  the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Communist	  Party	  was	  the	  highest	  Party	  organ	  in	  the	  autonomous	  republic.	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
xiii	  
Archival	  Abbreviations	  Used	  	  	  Gosudarstvennyi	  Arkhiv	  Rossiiskoi	  Federatsii	  	   	   	   	   	   GARF	  (State	  Archive	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation)	  	  	  Rossiiskii	  Gosudarstvennyi	  Arkhiv	  Noveishoi	  Istorii	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  RGANI	  (Russian	  State	  Archive	  of	  Contemporary	  History)	   	  	  	  Rossiiskii	  Gosudarstvennyi	  Arkhiv	  Sotsial’no-­‐Politicheskoi	  Istorii	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  RGASPI	  (Russian	  State	  Archive	  of	  Socio-­‐Political	  History)	  	  	  	  sak’art’velos	  mecnierebat’a	  erovnuli	  akademiis	  ark’ivi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  smeaa	  (Georgian	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  Archive)	  	  	  sak’art’velos	  šinagan	  sak’met’a	  saministros	  ark’ivi	  (I)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sšssa	  (I)	  (Archive	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  of	  Georgia:	  Security	  Archive)	  	  	  sak’art’velos	  šinagan	  sak’met’a	  saministros	  ark’ivi	  (II)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sšssa	  (II)	  (Archive	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  of	  Georgia:	  Party	  Archive)	  	  	  t’bilisis	  c’entraluri	  ark’ivi	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t’c’a	  (Tbilisi	  Central	  Archive)	  	  	   	  	  uaxlesi	  istoriis	  c’entraluri	  ark’ivi	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  uic’a	  (Central	  Archive	  of	  Contemporary	  History)	  	  	  	  xelnac’ert’a	  erovnuli	  c’entri	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  xec’	  (National	  Centre	  of	  Manuscripts)	  	   	  
	  	  	  
	   1	  
Introduction	  
K’art’l-­‐Kaxet’i,	  Imeret’i,	  Guria	  and	  Samegrelo,	  
Glorious	  Rača-­‐Lečxum-­‐Javaxeti	  and	  Mesxet’i;	  
Xevi,	  T’uš-­‐P’šav-­‐Xevsuret’i,	  Svanet’i	  and	  Ap’xazet’i;	  
Fairytale-­‐like	  Mtiulet’i	  and	  Ačara’s	  sea	  and	  grassland;	  
All	  is	  my	  homeland	  (samšoblo),	  
beloved	  Sak’art’velo!	  	   	  This	   short	   poem,	   written	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   by	   Dutu	   Megreli	  (1867-­‐1938)	   captures	   the	   regional	   diversity	   of	   what	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Georgian	  intelligentsia	  imagined	  fell	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  a	  Georgian	  ethnoterritorial	  nation.	  Georgians	   were	   a	   “historic	   nation”	   with	   religion	   as	   the	   key	   marker	   of	   ethnic	  identification	  in	  the	  premodern	  period,	  and	  not	  until	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  did	  a	   developing	   national	   intelligentsia,	   epitomized	   by	   writer	   and	   politician	   Ilia	  Čavčavaże	   (1837-­‐1907),	   recognize	   that	  a	  Georgian	  nation	  centered	  around	  culture	  and	   language	   needed	   to	   be	   actively	   constructed	   among	   the	   territory’s	   peasant	  populace,	  as	  signaled	   in	   the	   lyrics	  above.1	  Yet	   it	  was	  ultimately	  Soviet	  policies	   that	  produced	  a	  “Georgian”	  Georgia	  (sak’art’velo)	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  modern	  history.	  	  As	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny	  argues,	  the	  “re-­‐formation”	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nation	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  150-­‐year	  project,	  which	  crystallized	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  era.2	  	  The	  entity	  that	  would	  become	  the	  Georgian	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic	  (SSR)	  in	  1921	   and	   its	   entitled	   nationality,	   the	   Georgians,	   hail	   from	   the	   Caucasus	   region,	  nestled	  among	  Russian,	  Turkish,	  and	  Iranian	  imperial	  peripheries	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  sense,	  a	  “historic	  nation”	  was	  a	  nation	  with	  a	  history	  of	  self-­‐rule,	  if	  only	  in	  the	  distant	  past. 2	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  296.	  
	   2	  The	  Georgian	  language	  (k’art’uli	  ena)	  belongs	  to	  the	  Kartvelian	  group	  of	  languages,	  a	  completely	  autonomous	  linguistic	  group	  with	  a	  unique	  alphabet,	  unrelated	  to	  Indo-­‐European	   languages	   or	   any	   languages	   outside	   the	   Caucasus.3	  Written	   Georgian	  emerged	   around	   430	   AD	   as	   the	   language	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Orthodox	   Church,	   and	  modern	  Georgian	  is	  largely	  recognizable	  from	  that	  initial	  form.4	  	  At	   its	  height	   in	   the	   eleventh	  and	   twelfth	   centuries,	   the	  Kingdom	  of	  Georgia	  extended	  throughout	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  what	  is	  today	  northeastern	  Turkey;	  at	  other	  points	   in	   its	   long	  history,	   the	  kingdoms	  and	  principalities	   of	  what	  was	   and	  would	  become	   Georgia	   were	   sacked	   and	   occupied	   by	   Arab	   conquest	   (seventh-­‐eighth	  centuries),	  Mongols	  and	  Tamerlane	  (1235,	  1386),	  and	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Safavid	  and	   Ottoman	   empires	   (sixteenth-­‐eighteenth	   centuries).	   Georgians	   proved	   useful	  imperial	  subjects,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  to	  encounter	  Georgians	  in	  the	  court	  of	  the	   Shah	   or	   Sultan,	   or	   among	   the	   most	   valued	   commodities	   in	   the	   Ottoman	   and	  Safavid	   slave	   trades.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   for	   much	   of	   its	   history,	   rival	   Georgian	  principalities	  undermined	  and	  fought	  against	  one	  another	  as	  imperial	  proxies.5	  The	  
longue	  durée	  narrative	  of	  Georgian	  history,	  as	  told	  by	  Soviet-­‐era	  and	  contemporary	  historians	   alike,	   is	   one	   of	   unification	   and	   re-­‐unification	   of	   a	   Georgian	   state	   amid	  imperial	  conquest	  and	  internecine	  conflict.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The	  only	  other	  Kartvelian	  languages	  are	  Svan,	  Laz,	  and	  Mingrelian,	  Donald	  Rayfield,	  The	  Literature	  
of	  Georgia:	  A	  History,	  2nd.	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2000). 
4 Caucasian	  Iberia’s	  King	  Mirian	  III	  converted	  to	  Christianity	  in	  the	  early	  fourth	  century	  AD.	  While	  the	  date	  had	  been	  estimated	  around	  343,	  Rayfield	  suggests	  that	  the	  conversion	  occurred	  earlier,	  in	  317	  AD,	  Donald	  Rayfield,	  Edge	  of	  Empires:	  A	  History	  of	  Georgia	  (London:	  Reaktion	  Books,	  2012),	  39. 5	  On	   medieval	   and	   feudal-­‐era	   Georgia,	   see	   David	   Marshall	   Lang,	   The	   Last	   Years	   of	   the	   Georgian	  
Monarchy,	   1658-­‐1832	   (New	   York:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1957);	   Suny,	   The	   Making	   of	   the	  
Georgian	  Nation;	  Rayfield,	  Edge	  of	  Empires:	  A	  History	  of	  Georgia.	  
	   3	  By	   the	   late	   eighteenth	   century,	   after	   numerous	   conflicts	   with	   Turks	   and	  Persians,	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  began	  a	  more	  earnest	  push	  for	  incorporation	  of	  lands	  of	   the	   lesser	   Caucasus	   (that	   is,	   territories	   south	   of	   Chechnya,	   Dagestan,	   and	  Cherkessia)	  into	  its	  growing	  imperiia.6	  The	  leader	  of	  the	  Kingdoms	  of	  K’artl'i-­‐Kaxet’i,	  Erekle	   II,	   signed	   the	  Treaty	   of	   Georgievsk	  with	   Catherine	   II	   in	   1783,	   a	   treaty	   that	  placed	  the	  kingdom	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire,	  but	  the	  agreement	  was	   re-­‐negotiated	   in	   1801,	   following	   the	   sacking	   of	   Tbilisi	   by	   Persians	   in	   1795.	  Between	   1801	   and	   1828,	   the	   Russian	   Empire	   “gathered,”	   through	   treaty	  agreements,	  the	  kingdoms	  of	  Samegrelo	  (1803),	  P’oti,	  Sukhum-­‐kale,	  and	  Axalk’alak’i	  (1806-­‐1812),	   Abkhazia	   (1809),	   and	   Guria	   (1811).7	  Following	   the	   Russo-­‐Turkish	  War	   of	   1828-­‐1829,	   the	   khanates	   of	   Yerevan,	   Ganja,	   and	   Baku	   were	   likewise	  incorporated	  into	  the	  empire.8	  The	  Tbilisi	  that	  was	  destroyed	  in	  1795	  reemerged	  as	  Tiflis,	   the	   cosmopolitan	   administrative	   center	   of	   the	   Russian	   Viceroyalty	   of	   the	  Caucasus.	  The	   long	   nineteenth	   century	   saw	   two	   important	   trends	   in	   Georgia:	   the	  incorporation	   of	   Georgians	   into	   imperial	   service	   in	   the	   Russian	   Empire	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On	  Russian	  entry	  into	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  subsequent	  annexations,	  see	  Muriel	  Atkin,	  Russia	  and	  Iran,	  
1780-­‐1828	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1980);	  Muriel	  Atkin,	  “Russian	  Expansion	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  1813,”	  in	  Russian	  Colonial	  Expansion	  to	  1917,	  ed.	  Michael	  Rywkin	  (New	  York:	  Mansell	  Publishing,	   1988),	   139–87;	   and,	   for	   earlier	   forays,	  Michael	   Khodarkovsky,	  Russia’s	  Steppe	  Frontier:	  
The	  Making	  of	  a	  Colonial	  Empire	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2002). 7	  On	   the	   Russian	   annexation	   of	   Georgian	   kingdoms	   and	   principalities,	   see	   Nikolas	   K.	   Gvosdev,	  
Imperial	  Policies	  and	  Perspectives	  towards	  Georgia,	  1760-­‐1819	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2000).	  8	  On	  the	  “gathering”	  of	  emirates	  further	  south,	  see	  R.G.	  Hovannisian,	  “Russian	  Armenia:	  A	  Century	  of	  Tsarist	  Rule,”	  Jahrbücher	  für	  Geschichte	  Osteuropas	  19	  (1971):	  31–48;	  Alexander	  Bitis,	  Russia	  and	  the	  
Eastern	   Question:	   Army	   Government,	   and	   Society,	   1815-­‐1833	   (New	   York:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  2006);	   and	   Eva-­‐Maria	   Auch,	   Muslim-­‐Untertan-­‐Bürger:	   Identitätswandel	   in	   Gesellschaftlichen	  
Transformationsprozessen	   der	   muslimischen	   Ostprovinzen	   Südkaukasiens	   (Ende	   18.-­‐Anfang	   20.	  
Jahrhunderts.	  Ein	  Beitrag	  zur	  vergleichenden	  Nationalismusforschung	  (Wiesbaden:	  Reichert,	  2004).	  
	   4	  ethnicization	   of	   Georgians	   as	   a	   nation.	   The	   Georgian	   Orthodox	   Church	   was	  subsumed	  into	  the	  Moscow	  Patriarchate	  after	  1811,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  decrease	  in	  church	  authority	  left	  greater	  room	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  primordial	  vision	  of	  Georgian	  nationhood	  that	  emphasized	  language	  and	  shared	  culture	  –	  a	  project	  taken	  up	  by	  three	  generations	  of	  Georgian	  national	   intelligentsia,	   the	  so-­‐called	  (and	  self-­‐anointed)	   pirveli,	   meore,	   and	   mesame	   dasebi	   (first,	   second,	   and	   third	   groups)	  beginning	  in	  the	  1860s.9	  The	  imperial	  Georgian	  society	  that	  gave	  birth	  to	  these	  early	  national	   thinkers	   was	   stratified	   according	   to	   ethnic	   group,	   such	   that	   in	   practice	  Armenians	   and	   Russians	   dominated	   urban	   areas	   in	   the	   spheres	   of	   business	   and	  government	   administration,	   respectively.	   Georgians,	   meanwhile,	   largely	   lived	   in	  rural	   areas;	   those	   in	   urban	   areas	   comprised	   the	   intellectual	   elite.10	  As	   part	   of	  Georgian	   imperial	   incorporation,	   the	   extensive	   lineages	   of	   Georgian	   nobility	  were	  permitted	  to	  keep	  their	  noble	  statuses	  –	  much	  like	  among	  the	  Polish	  szclachta	  –	  and	  many	   nobles	   remained	   on	   rural	   family	   estates	   in	   lieu	   of	   residing	   in	   urban	   areas.	  Georgian	   nobles	   and	   intellectual	   elites	   found	   common	   cause	   with	   imperial	  administrators	   as	   fellow	   Orthodox	   Christians	   among	   a	   diverse	   Caucasian	   Muslim	  populace,	  as	  demonstrated	  through	  projects	  with	  a	  mission	  civilisatrice,	  particularly	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Crimean	  and	  Caucasian	  Wars.11	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Stephen	  F.	   Jones,	  Socialism	  in	  Georgian	  Colors:	  The	  European	  Road	  to	  Social	  Democracy,	  1883-­‐1917	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2005). 
10 Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  114-­‐116. 
11 On	  the	  interplay	  of	  Georgian	  nationalism	  and	  Russian	  mission	  civilisatrice	  in	  the	  imperial	  Caucasus,	  see Austin	   Jersild,	   Orientalism	   and	   Empire:	   North	   Caucasus	   Mountain	   Peoples	   and	   the	   Georgian	  
Frontier,	  1845-­‐1917	  (Montreal:	  McGill-­‐Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Oliver	  Reisner,	  Die	  Schule	  der	  
georgischen	   Nation:	   eine	   sozialhistorische	   Untersuchung	   der	   nationalen	   Bewegung	   in	   Georgien	   am	  
Beispiel	   der	   “Gesellschaft	   zur	   Verbreitung	   der	   Lese-­‐	   und	   Schreibkunde	   unter	   den	   Georgiern”	   (1850-­‐
	   5	  By	  the	  late	  1870s,	  the	  Georgian	  intelligentsia	  had	  begun	  to	  fracture	  into	  three	  strands:	  the	  gentry-­‐centric	  nostalgic	  nationalism	  of	  Ilia	  Čavčavaże	  (pirveli	  dasi);	  the	  reformist	   liberalism	   of	   Niko	   Nikoladże	   and	   Giorgi	   Ceret’eli	   (meore	   dasi);	   and	  adherents	  of	  the	  emerging	  Marxist	  movement	  (mesame	  dasi).12	  Noe	  Jordania,	  P’ilipe	  Maxaraże,	  and	  other	  Georgians	  educated	  in	  Russia	  were	  first	  exposed	  to	  Marxism	  in	  Warsaw,	   and	   they	   brought	   this	   critique	  with	   them	   upon	   return	   to	   Georgia	   in	   the	  1890s.	   By	   that	   time,	   the	   beginnings	   of	   industrialization	   and	   urbanization	   had	  brought	   a	   nascent	   Georgian	   working	   class	   to	   the	   cities	   from	   the	   countryside.	  Through	   Marxism,	   Jordania	   and	   his	   compatriots	   could	   address	   the	   perceived	  constraints	   of	   the	   territory’s	   ethno-­‐economic	   makeup	   (that	   is,	   Russian	  administrators	   and	   Armenian	   bourgeoisie	   in	   positions	   of	   power	   over	   Georgian	  workers	   and	   peasants)	   with	   something	   other	   than	   a	   nationalist	   ideology. 13	  Jordania’s	  Marxism	  was	  modeled	  on	  German	  social	  democracy,	  and	  though	  it	  aimed	  to	   unite	   Georgian	   nobles,	   peasants,	   and	   workers	   in	   a	   common	   cause,	   Georgian	  Marxism	  remained	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  Russian	  social	  democratic	  movement.	  In	  the	  1903	   schism	   of	   the	   Russian	   Social	   Democratic	   Workers’	   Party	   (RSDRP),	   the	  Georgians	   sided	  with	   the	  Mensheviks,	   and	   henceforth	   Georgia	   became	   one	   of	   the	  greatest	   Menshevik	   strongholds	   in	   the	   Russian	   Empire.	   Bolshevism,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  was	  driven	  out	  or	  underground,	  as	  young	  Bolshevik	  revolutionaries	  like	  Ioseb	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1917)	   (Wiesbaden:	   Reichert,	   2004);	   and	   Paul	   Manning,	   Strangers	   in	   a	   Strange	   Land:	   Occidentalist	  
Publics	  and	  Orientalist	  Geographies	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Georgian	  Imaginaries	   (Brighton:	  Academic	  Studies	   Press,	   2011).	   On	   the	   Caucasus	   as	   a	   destination	   for	   religious	   dissenters,	   see	   Nicholas	  Breyfogle,	   Heretics	   and	   Colonizers:	   Forging	   Russia’s	   Empire	   in	   the	   South	   Caucasus	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  .	   
12 Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  132. 
13 Ibid,	  145. 
	   6	  Juġašvili	   migrated	   from	   Tiflis	   and	   Batumi	   to	   Baku.14	  Georgian	   social	   democracy	  proved	  appealing	  to	  broader	  swaths	  of	  the	  Georgian	  populace	  and	  was	  soon	  able	  to	  be	   measured	   (to	   some	   extent,	   at	   least)	   by	   strong	   Georgian	   Menshevik	  representation	  in	  the	  Duma.	  One	  of	  the	  by-­‐products	  of	  Russia’s	  “continuum	  of	  crisis”	  between	  1914-­‐1921,	  in	  which	  the	   lands	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  endured	  the	  Great	  War,	   two	  revolutions,	  and	   a	   civil	  war,	  was	   the	   emergence	  of	   independent	   states	   (influenced	  by	  German,	  Turkish,	   and	   British	   geopolitical	   interlocutors)	   along	   the	   empire’s	   former	  peripheries.15	  As	   the	   Bolshevik	   Revolution	   erupted	   in	   in	   Petrograd	   in	   late	   1917,	  Georgia,	   Armenia,	   and	   Azerbaijan	   declared	   their	   independence	   from	   the	   fledgling	  revolutionary	   state,	   first	   as	   a	   short-­‐lived	   Transcaucasus	   Federation,	   then	   as	   three	  discrete	  states.	  The	  Republic	  of	  Georgia,	  declared	  on	  26	  May	  1918,	  was	  the	  world’s	  first	   social	   democratic	   state,	   and	   only	   by	   invasion	   from	  without	   by	   the	  Red	  Army	  was	  Georgia	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Bolshevik	  polity	  on	  25	  February	  1921.16	  Georgia	  was	   the	   final	   piece	   of	   the	   puzzle	   to	   fall	   to	   Bolshevik	   power	   at	   this	   initial	   stage	   of	  Soviet	  gathering	  of	  lands.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 On	   Juġašvili’s	   early	   years,	   see	   Stephen	   Kotkin,	   Stalin,	   Volume	   I:	   Paradoxes	   of	   Power,	   1878-­‐1928	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2014). 15	  The	   "continuum"	   phrasing	   comes	   from	  Peter	  Holquist,	  Making	  War,	  Forging	  Revolution:	  Russia’s	  
Continuum	  of	  Crisis,	  1914-­‐1921	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  On	  perspectives	  of	  the	  revolution	   and	   civil	   war	   from	   the	   empire's	   edges,	   see	   Willard	   Sunderland,	   The	   Baron’s	   Cloak:	   A	  
History	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  in	  War	  and	  Revolution	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2014);	  Adeeb	  Khalid,	   The	   Politics	   of	   Muslim	   Cultural	   Reform:	   Jadidism	   in	   Central	   Asia	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	  California	   Press,	   1998);	   and	   in	   the	   Caucasus,	   Firuz	   Kazemzadeh,	   The	   Struggle	   for	   Transcaucasia,	  
1917-­‐1921	  (New	  York:	  Philosophical	  Library,	  1951);	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  The	  Baku	  Commune,	  1917-­‐
1918:	  Class	  and	  Nationality	  in	  the	  Russian	  Revolution	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1972);	  and	   Michael	   A.	   Reynolds,	   Shattering	   Empires:	   The	   Clash	   and	   Collapse	   of	   the	   Ottoman	   and	   Russian	  
Empires,	  1908-­‐1918	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  	  16 	  Jones,	   Socialism	   in	   Georgian	   Colors;	   Stephen	   Jones,	   “The	   Establishment	   of	   Soviet	   Power	   in	  Transcaucasia:	  The	  Case	  of	  Georgia	  1921-­‐1928,”	  Soviet	  Studies	  40,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1988):	  616–39.	  
	   7	  Georgia	  may	  have	  been	  the	  least	  willing	  member	  of	  the	  new	  Soviet	  polity.	  Yet	  Georgians	  (and	  Caucasians	  more	  generally)	  quickly	  rose	   to	  prominent	  positions	   in	  the	   all-­‐Union	   Party	   and	   state	   structures,	   most	   famously,	   Sergo	   Orjonikiże,	   Avel	  Enukiże,	  Armenian	  Anastas	  Mikoyan,	  and	  Ioseb	  Juġašvili,	  more	  commonly	  known	  by	  his	  revolutionary	  nom	  de	  guerre,	  Iosif	  Stalin.	  The	  Caucasus	  region	  likewise	  proved	  a	  productive	  arena	  in	  which	  to	  build	  a	  Soviet	  career,	  as	  the	  examples	  of	  Sergei	  Kirov,	  Lavrenti	  Beria,	   and	   (later)	  Eduard	  Shevardnadze	   show.	   In	   spite	   of	  Georgia’s	   small	  population	   (between	   three	   and	   five	   million	   in	   the	   Soviet	   period)	   and	   compact	  territory	   (slightly	   larger	   than	   West	   Virginia),	   Georgian	   culture	   and	   Georgian	  individuals	  made	   noticeable	   contributions	   to	   Soviet	   politics	   and	   society.	   Georgian	  wine,	  citrus,	  tea,	  mineral	  waters,	  and	  tobacco	  were	  regarded	  as	  luxury	  goods	  within	  the	   USSR,	   and	   only	   the	   most	   highly	   valued	   workers	   in	   the	   USSR	   earned	   coveted	  vacations	   on	  Georgia’s	   Black	   Sea	   coastal	   resorts.17	  Moreover,	   as	   Jeremy	   Smith	   has	  shown,	  the	  question	  of	  Georgian	  nationalism	  proved	  fundamental	   in	  the	  formation	  of	  early	  Soviet	  nationality	  policy.	  18	  At	   first	   glance,	   Georgia	   might	   seem	   a	   strange	   choice	   for	   a	   case	   study	  examining	   the	   longer-­‐term	   trajectory	   of	   the	   Soviet	   approach	   toward	   managing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 On	  the	  cultivation	  and	  proliferation	  of	  Georgian	  cuisine	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  see	  Erik	  R.	  Scott,	  “Edible	  Ethnicity:	  How	  Georgian	  Cuisine	  Conquered	  the	  Soviet	  Table,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  
and	  Eurasian	  History	  13,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2012):	  831-­‐858.	  18	  The	   so-­‐called	   “Georgian	   Affair,”	   which	   drew	   in	   Lenin,	   Stalin,	   Trotsky,	   Felix	   Dzerzhinsky,	   Sergo	  Orjonikiże,	  and	  P’ilip’e	  Maxaraże,	  was	  a	  debate	  over	  whether	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  new	  Soviet	  state	   should	  make	   concessions	   (on	   Lenin’s	   instruction)	   to	   Georgian	   nationalism	   to	   gain	   a	   greater	  foothold	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  debate,	  coinciding	  with	  Lenin’s	  incapacitation	  and	  “final	  testament,”	  had	  implications	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Soviet	  Federative	  Socialist	  Republic,	  the	  USSR,	  Caucasian	   border-­‐making,	   and	   approaches	   toward	   nation-­‐building	   in	   the	   Caucasus,	   Jeremy	   Smith,	  “The	   Georgian	   Affair	   of	   1922	   -­‐	   Policy	   Failure,	   Personality	   Clash	   or	   Power	   Struggle?,”	   Europe-­‐Asia	  
Studies	  50,	  no.	  3	  (1998):	  519–44.	  
	   8	  ethnonational	  diversity.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  Soviet	  power	  in	  Georgia	  in	   1921,	   Georgians	   already	   boasted	   a	   distinct	   language	   and	   church;	   a	   historically	  defined	   territory;	  a	  premodern	  and	  modern	  history	  of	   statehood,	  most	  recently	  as	  the	   independent	   social	  democratic	  Republic	  of	  Georgia	   from	  1918-­‐1921;	   a	  prolific	  and	   multigenerational	   national	   intelligentsia,	   active	   since	   the	   1860s;	   and	   a	   rich	  literary	  and	  cultural	  tradition.	  	  By	   contrast,	   the	   Soviet	   nation-­‐building	   apparatus	   actively	   constructed	  languages,	   drew	   borders,	   and	   invented	   nationalities	   in	   Central	   Asia	   even	   as	   it	  worked	   through	   Ukrainian	   national	   leaders	   to	   appropriately	   indigenize	   linguistic	  and	   territorial	   Ukrainianness	   among	   the	   population,	   for	   both	   local	   and	   foreign	  policy	   purposes.	   This	   was	   the	   so-­‐called	   “affirmative	   action	   empire,”	   which	  would	  “maximally	  support	  those	  ‘forms’	  of	  nationhood	  that	  did	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  unitary	  central	   [Soviet]	   state.	   This	   meant	   a	   commitment	   to	   support…national	   territories,	  national	   languages,	  national	  elites,	  and	  national	  cultures.”19	  This	  policy,	  elaborated	  in	   1923	   and	   soon	   known	   as	   korenizatsiia	   (indigenization),	   aimed	   to	   cultivate	   and	  institutionalize	   national	   distinctions	   in	   order	   to	   accelerate	   the	   process	   of	  overcoming	  them.	  The	  Soviet	  approach	  toward	  managing	  ethnic	  difference	  not	  only	  promoted	   and	   subsidized	   national	   elites,	   languages,	   and	   territorial	   boundaries;	  sometimes,	  it	  even	  invented	  new	  nations.	  Top-­‐down	   studies	   from	  Moscow	   and	   local	   studies	   of	   Central	   Asia,	   Ukraine,	  the	   Far	   North,	   and	   Azerbaijan	   served	   as	   the	   main	   foci	   for	   the	   initial	   wave	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Terry	  Martin,	  The	  Affirmative	  Action	  Empire:	  Nations	  and	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  1923-­‐
1939,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  9-­‐10.	   
	   9	  “nationality	  policy”	  scholarship	  after	  the	  so-­‐called	  “archival	  turn”	  in	  Soviet	  history.20	  Moreover,	   the	   historiography	   of	   Soviet	   nationality	   policy	   has	   overwhelmingly	  focused	   on	   the	   interwar	   period,	   when	   this	   policy	   was	   explicitly	   articulated	   by	  Moscow	   at	   the	   height	   of	   Soviet	   “ethnophilia,”	   as	   Yuri	   Slezkine	   has	   coined	   the	  
korenizatsiia	   era	   and	   ethos.21	  This	   body	   of	   research	   set	   the	   terms	   of	   scholarly	  inquiry	   on	   the	   Soviet	   approach	   toward	   nationality,	   emphasizing	   how	   the	   Soviet	  empire	   was	   a	   maker	   (rather	   than	   breaker)	   of	   nations. 22 	  It	   also	   tested	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 	  The	   historiography	   of	   Soviet	   nationality	   policy	   from	   the	   1990s/2000s	   is	   substantial,	   so	   I	  emphasize	   especially:	   for	   Moscow-­‐based	   perspectives,	   Martin,	   The	   Affirmative	   Action	   Empire;	  Francine	   Hirsch,	   Empire	   of	   Nations:	   Ethnographic	   Knowledge	   and	   the	   Making	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Yuri	  Slezkine,	  “The	  USSR	  as	  a	  Communal	  Apartment,	  or	  How	  a	   Socialist	   State	   Promoted	   Ethnic	   Particularism,”	   Slavic	  Review	   53,	   no.	   2	   (Summer	   1994):	   414–52;	  Ronald	   Suny,	  The	  Revenge	  of	   the	  Past:	  Nationalism,	  Revolution,	  and	   the	  Collapse	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  Ronald	  Suny	  and	  Terry	  Martin,	  eds.,	  A	  State	  of	  Nations:	  
Empire	  and	  Nation-­‐Making	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Lenin	  and	  Stalin	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  and	   Jeremy	  Smith,	  The	  Bolsheviks	  and	  the	  National	  Question,	  1917-­‐23	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin's	  Press,	  1999).	  For	  regional	  studies,	  see	  Yuri	  Slezkine,	  Arctic	  Mirrors:	  Russia	  and	  the	  Small	  Peoples	  of	  the	  North	  (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1994);	   Jörg	   Baberowski,	   Der	   Feind	   ist	   Überall:	   Stalinismus	   im	  
Kaukasus	   (Munich:	   Deutsche	   Verlags-­‐Anstalt,	   2003);	   Bruce	   Grant,	   In	   the	   Soviet	  House	  of	   Culture:	  A	  
Century	   of	   Perestroikas	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	   1995);	   Adeeb	   Khalid,	   Islam	   After	  
Communism:	   Religion	   and	   Politics	   in	   Central	   Asia	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	   Press,	   2007);	  Douglas	  Northrop,	  Veiled	  Empire:	  Gender	  &	  Power	  in	  Stalinist	  Central	  Asia	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	   2004);	   Adrienne	   Lynn	   Edgar,	   Tribal	   Nation:	   The	  Making	   of	   Soviet	   Turkmenistan	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Kate	  Brown,	  A	  Biography	  of	  No	  Place:	  From	  Ethnic	  Borderland	  to	  
Soviet	  Heartland	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   2004);	   and	   Amir	  Weiner,	  Making	   Sense	   of	  
War:	   The	   Second	  World	  War	   and	   the	   Fate	   of	   the	   Bolshevik	   Revolution	   (Princeton	   University	   Press,	  2002).	  For	  this	  dissertation,	  Suny’s	  books	  on	  Armenia	  and	  Georgia	  have	  provided	  illuminating	  longue	  
durée	  narratives	  of	  Armenian	  and	  Georgian	  history,	  yet	  their	  chronological	  scale	  (thousands	  of	  years)	  and	  limited	  engagement	  with	  archival	  sources	  for	  the	  Soviet	  period	  (due	  both	  to	  the	  period	  in	  which	  they	  were	  written	  –	  the	  late	  1980s/early	  1990s	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  works)	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  the	  more	   archivally-­‐based	   monographs	   named	   above,	   Ronald	   Grigor	   Suny,	   Looking	   Toward	   Ararat:	  
Armenia	  in	  Modern	  History	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1993);	   Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  
Georgian	  Nation.	  	  
21 Slezkine,	   “The	  USSR	   as	   a	   Communal	   Apartment.”	   	   Notable	   exceptions	   to	   the	   initial	   focus	   on	   the	  interwar	   era	   include	   Slezkine,	   Arctic	   Mirrors	   and	   Yuri	   Slezkine,	   The	   Jewish	   Century	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Grant,	  In	  the	  Soviet	  House	  of	  Culture;	  and	  Weiner,	  Making	  Sense	  of	  
War. 
22 The	   “breaker	   of	   nations”	   narrative	   was	   prominent	   among	   Cold	   War-­‐era	   scholars	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   including	   Richard	   Pipes,	   The	   Formation	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union:	   Communism	   and	   Nationalism,	  
1917-­‐1923	   (rev.	   ed.)	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1997);	   Robert	   Conquest,	   The	   Nation	  
Killers:	   The	   Soviet	   Deportation	   of	   Nationalities	   (London:	   Macmillan,	   1970)	   and	   Harvest	   of	   Sorrow:	  
Collectivization	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Terror-­‐Famine	   (New	   York:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   1986);	   and	  
	   10	  applicability	  of	  imperial	  frames	  for	  this	  rather	  peculiar	  Soviet	  case,	  an	  anti-­‐imperial	  empire.23	  	  Yet	   the	   scale,	   products,	   and	   durability	   of	   Soviet	   nation-­‐building	   in	   Georgia	  demonstrate	  how	  such	  an	  active,	  institutionalized	  approach	  to	  managing	  difference	  can	   take	   hold	   among	   the	   broader	   population	   across	   generations	   even	   in	   the	  unlikeliest	   of	   locales.	   Nation-­‐building	   is	   not	   only	   a	   process	   of	   construction	   and	  categorization:	   it	   requires	   an	   acceptance	   over	   time	   by	   individuals	   to	   inhabit	  nationality	  and	  national	  identity.	  It	  is	  this	  more	  gradual	  process,	  and	  the	  events	  that	  inspire	  it,	  that	  I	  explore	  in	  depth	  among	  Georgia’s	  residents	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  ask	  how	  those	  individuals	  or	  groups	  who	  never	  sought	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  project	  –	  violent,	  worldwide	  revolution	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	   proletariat	   –	   came	   to	   engage	   with	   and	   become	   a	   part	   of	   the	   postwar	   Soviet	  project	   –	   active,	   participatory	   citizens	   living	   in	   developed	   socialism.	  24	  The	   Soviet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Aleksandr	  M.	  Nekrich,	  The	  Punished	  Peoples:	  The	  Deportation	  and	  Fate	  of	  Soviet	  Minorities	  at	  the	  End	  
of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1978).	  By	  the	  1980s,	  this	  narrative	  had	  shifted	  to	  emphasize	  national	  and	  religious	  dissent	  as	  threats	  to	  the	  Soviet	  polity,	  Gerhard	  Simon,	  Nationalism	  
and	   Policy	   Toward	   the	   Nationalities	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union:	   From	   Totalitarian	   Dictatorship	   to	   Post-­‐
Stalinist	   Society	   (Boulder:	   Westview	   Press,	   1990);	   Bohdan	   Nahaylo	   and	   Victor	   Swoboda,	   Soviet	  
Disunion:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Nationalities	  Problem	  in	  the	  USSR	   (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	   1989);	   and	  Helene	   Carrere	   d'Encausse,	   Decline	   of	   an	   Empire:	   the	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republics	   in	   Revolt,	   Martin	  Sokolinsky	  and	  Henry	  A.	  LaFarge,	  trans.	  (New	  York:	  Newsweek	  Books,	  1979).. 23	  On	   the	   question	   of	   imperial	   continuity,	   see	   Andreas	   Kappeler,	   Russland	   als	   Vielvölkerreich:	  
Entstehung,	   Geschichte,	   Zerfall,	   2nd	   ed.	   (Munich:	   Beck,	   1993);	   Ronald	   Grigor	   Suny,	   “The	   Empire	  Strikes	  Out:	  Imperial	  Russia,	  'National'	  Identity,	  and	  Theories	  of	  Empire,"	  in	  Suny	  and	  Martin,	  eds.,	  A	  
State	   of	   Nations,	   23-­‐66;	   Alfred	   J.	   Rieber,	   "Persistent	   Factors	   in	   Russian	   Foreign	   Policy,"	   Hugh	  Ragsdale,	   ed.	   Imperial	  Russian	  Foreign	  Policy	   (New	   York:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   1993):	   315-­‐359;	   and	   Mark	   R.	   Beissinger,	   “Soviet	   Empire	   as	   ‘Family	   Resemblance,’”	   Slavic	   Review	   65,	   no.	   2	  (Summer	  2006):	  294–303.	  	  24	  The	   Georgian	   SSR	   was	   the	   only	   republic	   that	   had	   been	   invaded	   and	   forcibly	   incorporated	   (in	  February	  1921)	  into	  the	  developing	  Bolshevik	  state	  from	  without,	  by	  the	  Red	  Army,	  rather	  than	  by	  Bolshevik	   cells	   operating	  within	   the	   country,	   as	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   neighboring	   Azerbaijan	   and	  Armenia.	   On	   the	   transition	   from	   “Bolshevik”	   to	   “Soviet”	   discourse,	   see	   Anna	   Krylova,	   "On	   'Being	  Soviet'	  and	   'Speaking	  Bolshevik':	  Disentangling	  Histories	  and	  Historiographies	  of	   the	  Socialist	  Self,"	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  experiment	   provided	   a	   peculiar	   environment	   in	   which	   to	   experience	   a	   national	  birth,	   and	   such	   conditions	   necessarily	   influenced	   the	   senses	   of	   belonging	   and	  understandings	  of	  the	  Soviet	  project	  experienced	  by	  the	  experiment’s	  children	  and	  grandchildren.	   If	   the	   “ethnophilia”	   of	   the	   interwar	   period	   was	   a	   crucible	   of	  nationalities,	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  –	  and	  especially	  after	  1956	  –	  that	  we	  can	  actually	   see	  what	  kinds	  of	  nations	   emerged	   from	   this	   crucible	   among	   second-­‐	  and	  third-­‐generation	  Soviet	  citizens.	  Historians	   are	   only	   beginning	   to	   explore	   the	   spectrum	   of	   national	  experiences	   of	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   the	   postwar	   era,	   and	   this	   dissertation	   is	   the	   first	  among	   these	   to	   examine	   such	   postwar	   developments	   on	   the	   territory	   of	   the	  Georgian	   SSR.25 	  The	   spectrum	   of	   national	   experiences	   in	   the	   post-­‐Stalin	   USSR	  revealed	   by	   this	   evolving	   body	   of	   work	   likewise	   contributes	   to	   a	   wider	   scholarly	  interest	   in	   types	   and	   variations	   of	   Soviet	   communities	   after	   Stalin,	   including	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  paper	   presented	   at	   Penn	   Russian	   History	   and	   Culture	   Workshop,	   15	   September	   2014.	   On	   the	  individual’s	  experience	  of	  becoming	  “Bolshevik,”	  see	  Jochen	  Hellbeck,	  Revolution	  On	  My	  Mind:	  Writing	  
a	  Diary	  under	  Stalin	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  
25 This	   growing	  body	  of	  work	  has	   already	   revealed	  many	   regional	   distinctions	   of	   the	  postwar	   and	  post-­‐Stalin	   nationality	   experience	   between	   the	   Caucasus,	   Ukraine,	   and	   Central	   Asia,	   in	   particular:	  Krista	  A.	   Goff,	   “‘Why	  Not	   Love	  Our	   Language	   and	  Our	   Culture?’	  National	   Rights	   and	   Citizenship	   in	  Khrushchev’s	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Nationalities	  Papers	  43,	  no.	  1	   (January	  2015):	  27–44;	  Maike	  Lehmann,	  
Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation:	  Nationale	  Sozialismusinterpretationen	  in	  Armenien	  seit	  1945,	   (Frankfurt	   am	  Main:	  Campus,	  2012);	  William	  Risch,	  The	  Ukrainian	  West:	  Culture	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Empire	  in	  Soviet	  Lviv	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  Sergei	  Zhuk,	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  in	  the	  Rocket	  City:	  The	  West,	  
Identity,	   and	   Ideology	   in	   Soviet	   Dniepropetrovsk,	   1960-­‐1985	   (Washington,	   DC:	   Woodrow	   Wilson	  Center	  Press,	  2010);	  Serhy	  Yekelchyk,	  Stalin’s	  Empire	  of	  Memory:	  Russian-­‐Ukrainian	  Relations	  in	  the	  
Soviet	   Historical	   Imagination	   (Toronto:	   University	   of	   Toronto	   Press,	   2004);	   Zbigniew	   Wojnowski,	  “De-­‐Stalinization	   and	   Soviet	   Patriotism:	   Ukrainian	   Reactions	   to	   East	   European	   Unrest	   in	   1956,”	  
Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  13,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2012):	  799–829;	  Adrienne	  Edgar,	  “Marriage,	  Modernity,	  and	  the	  ‘Friendship	  of	  Nations’:	  Interethnic	  Intimacy	  in	  Postwar	  Soviet	  Central	  Asia	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective,”	  Central	  Asian	  Survey	  26,	  no.	  4	  (December	  2007):	  581–600.	  See	  also	  the	   special	   issue	   of	  Nationalities	  Papers,	   Zbigniew	  Wojnowski,	   ed.,	   devoted	   to	   “The	   Soviet	   People:	  National	  and	  Supranational	  Identities	  in	  the	  USSR	  after	  1945,	  Nationalities	  Papers	  43,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2015),	   1-­‐101.	   For	   a	   new	  overview	  of	   the	   Soviet	   approach	   to	   nationality	   that	   devotes	   considerable	  attention	   to	   the	   postwar	   years,	   see	   Jeremy	   Smith,	  Red	  Nations:	  The	  Nationalities	  Experience	   in	  and	  
after	  the	  USSR	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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  religious,	   urban	   and	   rural,	   professional,	   youth,	   dissident,	   veteran,	   and	   disabled,	  among	  others.	  26	  This	  recent	  research	  tests	  the	  applicability	  of	  extending	  the	  frames	  and	  discourse	  for	  analyzing	  high	  Stalinism	  to	  the	  Khrushchev	  era	  and	  beyond.	  Such	  frames	  reach	  from	  the	  totalitarian/revisionist	  debates	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  and	  questions	   of	   modern	   and	   neo-­‐traditional	   paradigms	   of	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   to	  explain	  the	  Soviet	  experiment.27	  New	  research	  likewise	  tackles	  the	  ability	  to	  extend	  questions	  of	  Stalinist	  subjectivities,	  the	  tactic	  of	  “speaking	  Bolshevik,”	  and	  issues	  of	  periodization	   to	   the	   post-­‐Stalin	   USSR.28	  Moving	   beyond	   the	   implicit	   or	   explicit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  vast	  field,	  as	  scholars	  examine	  post-­‐Stalinist	  or	  late	  socialist	  experiences	  through	   the	   lenses	   of	   generation,	   decade,	   political	   agenda,	   faith,	   locale,	   or	   lifestyle.	   For	   a	   recent	  overview	  of	  this	  body	  of	  work,	  see	  the	  forum	  “Redefining	  Community	  in	  the	  Late	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Maike	  Lehmann,	   ed.,	   Slavic	   Review	   74,	   no.	   1	   (Spring	   2015):	   1-­‐103. See	   also	   Vladislav	   Zubok,	   Zhivago’s	  
Children:	  The	  Last	  Russia	  Intelligentsia	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Miriam	  Dobson,	  
Khrushchev’s	   Cold	   Summer:	   Gulag	   Returnees,	   Crime,	   and	   the	   Fate	   of	   Reform	   after	   Stalin,	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	   University	   Press,	   2011);	   Miriam	   Dobson,	   “The	   Social	   Scientist	   Meets	   the	   ‘Believer’:	  Discussions	  of	  God,	  the	  Afterlife,	  and	  Communism	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐1960s,”	  Slavic	  Review	  74,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  2015):	  79–103;	  Polly	   Jones,	  Myth,	  Memory,	  Trauma:	  Rethinking	  the	  Stalinist	  Past	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  
1953-­‐70,	   (New	  Haven:	   Yale	  University	   Press,	   2013);	   Victoria	   Smolkin-­‐Rothrock,	   “The	  Ticket	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Soul:	  Science,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Spiritual	  Crisis	  of	  Late	  Soviet	  Atheism,”	  Russian	  Review	  73,	  no.	  2	   (April	  2014):	  171–97;	  and	  Emily	  B.	  Baran,	  Dissent	  on	  the	  Margins:	  How	  Soviet	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  
Defied	  Communism	  and	  Lived	  to	  Preach	  About	  It	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014).	  Much	  of	  this	   scholarship	   has	   used	   Oleg	   Kharkhordin,	  The	  Collective	   and	   the	   Individual	   in	  Russia:	  A	   Study	   of	  
Practices	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	   Press,	   1999)	   and	   Alexei	   Yurchak,	   Everything	   Was	  
Forever,	   Until	   It	  Was	   No	  More:	   The	   Last	   Soviet	   Generation,	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	  2006)	   as	   entry	   points	   to	   complicate	   or	   diversify	   Kharkhordin’s	   and	   Yurchak’s	   portrayals	   of	   a	   late	  Soviet	  community.	  On	  this	  specific	  critique,	  see	  Kevin	  M.F.	  Platt	  and	  Benjamin	  Nathans,	  “Socialist	  in	  Form,	   Indeterminate	   in	   Content:	   The	   Ins	   and	  Outs	   of	   Late	   Soviet	   Culture,”	  Ab	   Imperio	   2011,	   no.	   2	  (2011):	  301-­‐324.	  For	  a	   contemporary	  perspective	  on	  unifying	  political,	   generational	   aspects	  of	   the	  Soviet	  community,	  see	  P.	  Vail’	  and	  A.	  Genis,	  60-­‐e.	  Mir	  sovetskogo	  cheloveka,	  2nd.	  Ed.	  (Moscow:	  Novoe	  literaturnoe	  obozrenie,	  1998).	   
27 For	   overviews	   and	   examples	   of	   these	   historiographical	   trends, see	   Martin	   Malia,	   The	   Soviet	  
Tragedy:	   A	   History	   of	   Socialism	   in	   Russia,	   1917-­‐1991	   (New	   York:	   The	   Free	   Press,	   1994);	   Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	   “New	   Perspectives	   on	   Stalinism,”	   Russian	   Review	   45,	   no.	   4	   (October	   1986):	   357–73;	  Ronald	   Grigor	   Suny,	   “Toward	   a	   Social	   History	   of	   the	   October	   Revolution,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  
Review	   88,	   no.	   1	   (February	   1983):	   31–52;	   Ronald	   Grigor	   Suny,	   “Revision	   and	   Retreat	   in	   the	  Historiography	  of	  1917:	  Social	  History	  and	   Its	  Critics,”	  Russian	  Review	  53,	  no.	  2	   (April	  1994):	  165–82.Michael	  David-­‐Fox,	   “Multiple	  Modernities	  vs.	  Neo-­‐Traditionalism:	  On	  Recent	  Debates	   in	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  History,”	  Jahrbücher	  Für	  Geschichte	  Osteuropas	  54,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  535–55.	   
28 Stephen	  Kotkin,	  Magnetic	  Mountain:	  Stalinism	  as	  a	  Civilization	   (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1995),	  has	  served	  as	  the	  fulcrum	  for	  much	  of	  this	  discussion;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Igal	  Halfin	  and	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  assumption	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  Stalinism	  (by	  focusing	  on	  the	  1930s)	  exposes	  the	   surprising	   variation	   in	   community	   and	   experience	   possible	   in	   the	   Soviet	   half-­‐century	  after	  Stalin.	  Nationality	   was	   a	   –	   if	   not	   the	   most	   –	   important	   marker	   of	   social	  categorization	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  From	  early	  debates	  about	  nationality	  policy	  and	  its	   ethnoterritorial	   implications	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   (singular)	   nationality	  category	  on	  Soviet	  passports,	  over	  time,	  nationality	  supplanted	  class	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  status	   and	   entitlement	   in	   the	   world’s	   first	   workers’	   state.	  What	   Rogers	   Brubaker	  describes	  as	  the	  “dual	  –	  and	  unprecedentedly	  thoroughgoing	  –	  institutionalization	  of	  nationhood	  and	  nationality	  on	   the	   sub-­‐state	   level”	  via	  a	   system	  of	  ethnoterritorial	  federalism	   and	   personal	   nationality	   entailed	   a	   tension	   between	   these	  simultaneously	   promoted	   definitions	   of	   nationhood.29	  This	   produced	   important	  relationship	   dynamics	   between	   national	  majority	   and	  minority	   populations	   at	   the	  republic	   and	   sub-­‐republic	   levels.	   I	   use	   the	   term	   “entitled”	   (rather	   than	   the	   more	  customary	  “titular”)	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  status	  of	  Georgians	  in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  (and	  the	  Abkhaz	  in	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR,	  etc.).	  The	  “entitlement”	  terminology	  embraces	  both	  the	  statistical	   and	   legal	   implications	   of	   living	   in	   “one’s	   own”	   territory,	   endowing	   such	  individuals	  with	  special	  rights	  and	  privileges	  to	  which	  they	  could	  appeal	  in	  a	  variety	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Jochen	   Hellbeck,	   “Rethinking	   the	   Stalinist	   Subject:	   Stephen	   Kotkin’s	   ‘Magnetic	   Mountain’	   and	   the	  State	  of	  Soviet	  Historical	  Studies,”	  Jahrbücher	  für	  Geschichte	  Osteuropas	  44,	  no.	  3	  (1996):	  456–63;	  and	  Hellbeck,	  Revolution	  On	  My	  Mind.	   For	   an	   example	   of	   a	   new	   scholar	  who	   tests	   the	   longevity	   of	   the	  subjectivity	  approach,	  see	  Anatoly	  Pinsky,	  “The	  Diaristic	  Form	  and	  Subjectivity	  under	  Khrushchev,”	  
Slavic	  Review	  73,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  2014):	  805–27.	  On	  periodization,	  see	  Stephen	  Kotkin,	  “1991	  and	  the	  Russian	  Revolution:	  Sources,	  Conceptual	  Categories,	  Analytical	  Frameworks,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  
History	  70,	  no.	  2	  (June	  1998):	  384–425. 
29 Rogers	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed:	  Nationhood	  and	  the	  National	  Question	  in	  the	  New	  Europe	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  30-­‐40. 
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  of	   ways.	   “Entitled”	   nationals	   not	   only	   enjoyed	   such	   privileges	   in	   theory;	   they	  likewise	  demanded	  these	  rights	  in	  practice.	  	  Soviet	   definitions	   of	   nationality,	   which	   described	   the	   nation	   as,	   in	   Stalin’s	  words,	  “an	  historically	  constituted,	  stable	  community	  of	  people,	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   a	   common	   language,	   territory,	   economic	   life,	   and	   psychological	   make-­‐up	  manifested	  in	  a	  common	  culture,”	  did	  not	  guarantee	  that	  official	  ascriptions	  of	  this	  category	  would	  be	  experienced	  by	  citizens	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  30	  Moreover,	  nationality	  and	   its	   variants	   (nation,	   nationalism,	   nationalist)	   remain	   contested	   categories	   in	  their	   own	   right,	   whether	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   nation-­‐builders	   (Soviet	   or	  otherwise),	   scholars	  and	   theorists,	  political	   leaders,	  or	   citizens.	  Toward	   this	  end,	   I	  look	  at	  nation	  anthropologically,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Katherine	  Verdery:	  	  …as	   a	   basic	   operator	   in	   a	  widespread	   system	  of	   social	   classification.	  Systems	   of	   social	   classification	   not	   only	   classify;	   in	   institutionalized	  form,	  they	  also	  establish	  groups	  for	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  through	  the	   categories	   they	   set	   down	   and	   they	   make	   their	   categories	   seem	  both	   natural	   and	   socially	   real.	   Nation	   is	   therefore	   an	   aspect	   of	   the	  political	  and	  symbolic/ideological	  order	  and	  also	  of	  the	  world	  of	  social	  interaction	  and	  feeling.31	  	  Viewing	  the	  nation	  as	  both	  symbolic	  and	  social	  permits	  us	  to	  more	  effectively	  “lodge	  agency	   back	   in	   human	   beings.”32	  While	   Verdery	   qualifies	   this	   human	   agency	   as	  “constrained	   by	   social	   structures,”	   following	   Rogers	   Brubaker,	   I	   emphasize	   how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 	  I.V.	   Stalin,	   Marksizm	   i	   natsional’nyi	   vopros	   (Moscow:	   Politizdat,	   1950),	   51.	   In	   the	   Georgian	  translation,	   “community/obshchnost’”	   is	   translated	  as	  ert’oba,	  which	   in	  addition	   to	   community	  also	  means	  unity	  and	  appears	  frequently	  in	  part	  one	  of	  Stalin’s	  work,	  on	  “nation.”	  31	  Katherine	  Verdery,	  “Whither	  ‘Nation’	  and	  ‘Nationalism’?,”	  Daedalus	  122,	  no.	  3	  (Summer	  1993):	  37.	  32	  Ibid.,	  39.	  	  
	   15	  such	   social	   structures	   and	   institutions	   can	   also	   enable	   actors	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   nation,	  nationalism,	  and	  nation-­‐building	  projects.33	  	  Second,	   I	   look	  at	  nationalism	  and	  nation-­‐ness	  not	  necessarily	   as	   something	  that	   simply	   develops	   –	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   Ernest	   Gellner,	   Benedict	   Anderson,	   or	  Miroslav	  Hroch	  –	  but	  rather	  as	  something	  that	  happens	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	  nation-­‐ness	  as	  event.34	  Following	  Brubaker	  and	  Frederick	  Cooper,	  viewing	  the	  nation	  as	  “a	  category	   of	   practice”	   and	   “contingent	   event”	   rather	   than	   a	   “category	   of	   analysis”	  permits	   us	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   nation	   “can	   crystallize,	   at	   certain	  moments,	  as	  a	  powerful,	  compelling	  reality”35	  and	  “come	  to	  structure	  perception,	  to	  inform	   thought	   and	   experience,	   to	   organize	   discourse	   and	   political	   action.”36	  	   The	  case	  of	  postwar	  Georgia	  shows	  just	  how	  nation-­‐ness	  and	  nationalism	  as	  events	  can	  come	   to	   occur,	   even	   if	   suddenly,	   somewhat	   unexpectedly,	   and	   at	   particular	   (and	  multiple)	  points	  of	  conjecture.	  	  Building	  upon	  a	  question	  posed	  by	  Bruce	  Grant	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  Nivkh,	  an	  ethnic	   group	   on	   Sakhalin	   Island,	   I	   argue	   that	   emphasizing	   the	   difference	   between	  Soviet	   and	   Georgian	   identities	   eschews	   “the	   very	   mechanisms	   that	   enabled	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  24.	  34	  Ibid.,	   19.	   Though	   the	   modernist	   approach	   to	   nationalism	   comprises	   a	   vast	   literature,	   I	   refer	  especially	   to	   Ernest	   Gellner,	   Nations	   and	   Nationalism,	   2nd	   Ed.	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	  2006);	   Benedict	   Anderson,	   Imagined	   Communities:	   Reflections	   on	   the	   Origin	   and	   Spread	   of	  
Nationalism,	  New	  Edition	   (Verso,	  2006);	  Miroslav	  Hroch,	  Social	  Preconditions	  of	  National	  Revival	   in	  
Europe:	   A	   Comparative	   Analysis	   of	   the	   Social	   Composition	   of	   Patriotic	   Groups	   Among	   the	   Smaller	  
European	  Nations	   (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985);	  and	  E.	   J.	  Hobsbawm,	  Nations	  and	  
Nationalism	  since	  1780:	  Programme,	  Myth,	  Reality,	  2nd	  ed.,	   (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992).	  By	  contrast,	  for	  an	  ethno-­‐symbolist	  approach	  to	  nationalism,	  see	  especially	  Anthony	  D.	  Smith,	  
Nationalism:	  Theory,	  Ideology,	  History,	  2nd.	  ed.,	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2010).	  35	  Rogers	  Brubaker	  and	  Frederick	  Cooper,	  “Beyond	   ‘Identity’”,	  Theory	  and	  Society	  29:1	  (Feb.	  2000),	  5.	  36	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  7.	  
	   16	  Soviet	   administration	   to	   recruit	   a	   patriotic”	   Georgian	   “collective.”37	  	   Thus,	   rather	  than	   speaking	   of	   identity	   formation	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR,	   I	   investigate	   identity	  negotiation	   –	   between	   Soviet	   and	   Georgian,	   between	   that	   of	   Georgians	   and	   those	  non-­‐ethnic	  Georgians	  who	  also	   inhabited	   the	  republic,	  between	  national	  and	   local,	  and	   between	   Soviet	   understandings	   of	   nationality	   and	   preexisting	   currents	   of	  Georgian	  national	  sentiment.	  Nation-­‐building	  policies	  produced	  among	  second-­‐	  and	  third-­‐generation	  Soviet	  citizens	  a	  particularly	  Georgian	  variant	  of	  Soviet	  experience	  in	   late	   socialism,	   or	   “Georgian	   Sovietness.”	   I	   use	   the	  phrase	   “Georgian	   Sovietness”	  (rather	   than	   “Soviet	   Georgianness”)	   to	   emphasize	   that	   the	   processes	   examined	   in	  this	  dissertation	   illustrate	  Georgian	  perspectives	  of	   “the	  Soviet”	   rather	   than	  Soviet	  variants	   of	   a	   broader	   spectrum	   of	   Georgianness.	   These	   are	   related,	   yet	   distinct,	  ideas.	  	  Put	  simply,	  I	  show	  how	  nation-­‐ness	  “happens”	  at	  the	  level	  of	  experience.	  By	  the	  late	  Stalin	  era	  (1945-­‐1953),	  understandings	  of	  Georgian	  national	   identity	  were	  closely	   intertwined	  with	  pride	  in	  Stalin	  as	  a	  co-­‐national	  (Part	  I:	  Chapters	  1	  and	  2).	  Newly	  endowed	  Soviet	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building	  from	  this	  period	  gave	  form	  to	  nationalizing	   aspirations	   of	   local-­‐	   and	   republic-­‐level	   actors	   in	  Georgia,	   from	  Party	  cadres	  to	  academics.	  Even	  in	  the	  tumult	  of	  World	  War	  Two	  and	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Cold	   War,	   Stalin	   and	   Beria	   remained	   actively	   involved	   in	   Georgian	   nationalizing	  projects	  and	  their	  foreign	  and	  geopolitical	  implications	  (Part	  II:	  Chapter	  5).	  I	  refer	  to	  these	   processes	   as	   productive	   and	   excisional	   institutions	   of	   nation-­‐building.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Grant,	  In	  the	  Soviet	  House	  of	  Culture,	  14.	  	  
	   17	  aftermath	  of	  revelations	  at	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (CPSU)	  in	  1956	  marked	  a	  crucial	  turning	  point	  in	  Georgia,	  yet	  for	  different	  reasons	  than	  the	  resistance,	  confusion,	  or	  hope	  expressed	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR	   (Part	   II:	   Chapter	   3).	   The	   violent	   suppression	   in	   1956	   of	   demonstrations	   in	  Tbilisi	   against	   Khrushchev’s	   perceived	   denigration	   of	   Stalin	   as	   a	   national	   figure	  compelled	  a	  reevaluation	  of	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	  in	  a	  post-­‐Stalin	  society.	  This	  reevaluation	  took	  place	  among	  republic	  leaders	  and	  “ordinary	  citizens”	  alike,	  as	  a	  new	  national-­‐social	  contract	  emerged	  that	  facilitated	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  entitled	   nationality	   by	   the	   late	   1970s.	   	   From	   the	   nationalization	   of	   the	   republic’s	  capital	   to	   negotiation	   of	   cultural	   practices	   (Part	   II:	   Chapter	   4)	   to	   political	  mobilization	   toward	   national	   interests	   (Part	   II:	   Chapter	   6),	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	  increasingly	   inhabited	   nationality	   through	   –	   rather	   than	   in	   spite	   of	   –	   Soviet	  institutions	  and	  collectives.	  This	  story	  interrogates	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	  after	  World	  War	  Two,	  and	  therefore	   it	   takes	  seriously	  the	  notion	  that	   it	  was	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	   also	   advantageous	   for	   members	   of	   the	   entitled	   nationality	   to	   inhabit	   these	  identity	   categories	   simultaneously.	   Yet	   it	   is	   important	   to	   emphasize	   that	   to	   be	  “Soviet”	   did	   not	   mean	   to	   be	   “Russian”	   or	   “Russified,”	   as	   it	   did	   in	   some	   other	  republics:	   the	   post-­‐Stalin	   national-­‐social	   contract	   in	   Georgia	   and	   increasing	  hegemony	  of	  the	  entitled	  nationality	   in	  the	  postwar	  period	  meant	  that	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  –	  that	  is,	  Georgians	  –	  had	  the	  most	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  republic	  that	  Soviets	  built.	  And	  gain	  they	  did.	  	  	  
	   18	  The	  contours	  and	  peculiarities	  of	   inhabiting	  Georgian	  Sovietness	   reveal	   the	  value	  of	  adopting	  perspectives	  that,	  in	  a	  sense,	  “provincialize	  Moscow,”	  in	  a	  similar	  vein	   as	  Dipesh	   Chakrabarty	   called	   for	   “provincializing	   Europe”	   among	   scholars	   of	  and	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  experience.	  As	  Chakrabarty	  notes,	  	  Insofar	   as	   academic	   history	   is	   concerned,	   Europe	   remains	   the	  sovereign,	  theoretical	  subject	  of	  all	  histories,	  including	  the	  ones	  we	  call	  “Indian,”	   “Chinese,”	   “Kenyan,”	   and	   so	   on.	   There	   is	   a	   peculiar	   way	   in	  which	  all	  these	  other	  histories	  tend	  to	  become	  variations	  on	  a	  master	  narrative	   that	   could	   be	   called	   the	   “history	   of	   Europe.”	   In	   this	   sense,	  “Indian”	   history	   itself	   is	   in	   a	   position	   of	   subalternerity;	   one	   can	   only	  articulate	  subaltern	  subject	  positions	  in	  the	  name	  of	  this	  history.38	  	  	  Narratives	   that	   assume	   a	   Moscow/Leningrad	   or	   more	   broadly	   Russocentric	  dominance	   continue	   to	   prevail	   in	   scholarly	   and	   popular	   portrayals	   of	   the	   Soviet	  experience.	   While	   the	   “imperial	   turn”	   demonstrated	   that	   there	   was	   more	   to	   the	  Soviet	  populace	  than	  Russians,	  Ukrainians,	  and	   Jews,	  much	  of	   this	  scholarship	  still	  adhered	   to	   narratives	   of	   Moscow’s	   policy	   prescriptions,	   a	   top-­‐down	   political	  narrative,	  and	  a	  centralized	  political	  chronology,	  whereby	  the	  history	  of	  any	  locale	  still	   told	   the	   story	   through	   a	   periodization	   and	   normativity	   dictated	   by	   central	  rather	  than	  local	  conditions.	  “Provincializing	  Moscow,”	  as	  a	  metaphor	  and	  project,	  is	  not	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   demonstrating	   local	   agency	   or	   highlighting	   local	   voices,	  though	   those	   do	   play	   a	   role.	   The	   project	   more	   broadly	   aims	   to	   illustrate	   the	  spectrum	  of	  what	  Soviet	  peripheries	  –	  territorial	  and	  otherwise	  –	  actually	  produced,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Dipesh	   Chakrabarty,	   Provincializing	   Europe:	   Postcolonial	   Thought	   and	   Historical	   Difference	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  See	  also	  Partha	  Chatterjee,	  Nationalist	  Thought	  and	  the	  
Colonial	  World:	  A	  Derivative	  Discourse,	  2nd	  ed.	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  1993). 
	   19	  along	   the	   lines	   of	   Mayhill	   Fowler’s	   recent	   recognition	   of	   Soviet	   “internal	  transnationalism.”39	  	  	   This	  is	  primarily	  a	  Soviet	  story,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  Soviet	  story.	  The	  story	  of	  national	   experience	   in	   postwar	   Georgia	   also	   provides	   a	   lens	   into	   three	   other	   key	  arenas.	   First,	   it	   shows	   the	   local	   and	   lived	   implications	  of	   geopolitics	   and	   ideology.	  Second,	  it	  enriches	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  empire	  and	  capacity	  for	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  centers	  and	  peripheries.	  Early	  Soviet	  approaches	  toward	  nationality	  were	   more	   indicative	   of	   a	   “modern	   mobilizational	   state”	   or	   “nationalizing	   state,”	  comparable	   to	   contemporary	   Turkey,	   Iran,	   or	   interwar	   Poland. 40 	  The	   Soviet	  ethnofederal	   structure	   equipped	   members	   of	   the	   entitled	   nationality	   with	   the	  institutional	  tools	  of	  a	  “nationalizing	  state”	  to	  construct	  their	  republics	  through	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  empire	  –	  a	  process	   that	  came	   to	   fruition	  most	   fully	   in	   the	  postwar	  years.	  And	  third,	  it	  reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  inhabiting	  nationality	  which,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  European	  origins	  in	  the	  long	  nineteenth	  century,	  gained	  wider	  currency	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  the	  international	  system	  organized	  into	  nation-­‐states.	  	  The	  narrative	  and	  conclusions	  I	  present	  here	  are	  the	  products	  of	  over	  fifteen	  months	  of	   archival	   research	   in	  Tbilisi	   and	   in	   central	   Soviet	   collections	  held	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Mayhill	   C.	   Fowler,	   “Mikhail	   Bulgakov,	   Mykola	   Kulish,	   and	   Soviet	   Theater:	   How	   Internal	  Transnationalism	   Remade	   Center	   and	   Periphery,”	   Kritika:	   Explorations	   in	   Russian	   and	   Eurasian	  
History	  16,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2015):	  263–90. 
40  Adeeb	   Khalid,	   “Backwardness	   and	   the	   Quest	   for	   Civilization:	   Early	   Soviet	   Central	   Asia	   in	  Comparative	   Perspective,”	   Slavic	   Review	   65,	   no.	   2	   (Summer	   2006):	   231–51;	   Edgar,	   Tribal	   Nation;	  Beissinger,	   “Soviet	  Empire	   as	   ‘Family	  Resemblance.”	  On	   interwar	  Poland	   as	   a	   “nationalizing	   state,”	  see	   Brubaker,	   Nationalism	   Reframed,	   Chapter	   4.	   The	   arguments	   about	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	   modern,	  mobilizational	  state	  go	  against	  that	  of	  Northrop,	  Veiled	  Empire,	  which	  portrays	  Soviet	  policies	  toward	  Uzbekistan	  in	  the	  Stalin	  era	  as	  a	  type	  of	  traditional	  colonial	  rule. 
	   20	  United	  States	  between	  2011	  and	  2015.	  The	  main	  archival	  collection	  for	  the	  project	  was	  the	  fond	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  but	  other	  central,	  republic,	  and	  local	  collections	  included:	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  the	  Georgian	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  the	  Tbilisi	  Party	  Committee,	  the	   Tbilisi	   City	   Archive,	   academics’	   personal	   papers,	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   Central	  Statistical	   Administration,	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	  Soviet	   Union,	   the	   Hoover	   Institution’s	   “Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   on	  Trial”	   series,	   and	   the	   Fourth	   Special	   Department	   of	   the	  USSR	  Ministry	   of	   Internal	  Affairs.	  I	  also	  draw	  from	  parts	  of	  the	  remaining	  Georgian	  security	  services	  archive,	  which	  was	   largely	  destroyed	   in	  a	   fire	  during	   the	  civil	  war	   in	  Tbilisi	   in	  1992-­‐1993;	  and	  published	  archival	  documents	  from	  Abkhazia,	  as	  the	  main	  Soviet-­‐era	  collections	  in	  Sukhumi	  were	  destroyed	  during	  the	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  war.41	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  archival	   sources,	   I	   incorporate	   materials	   from	   Tbilisi-­‐	   and	   Moscow-­‐based	  periodicals	   and	   journals	   and	   a	   number	   of	   memoirs	   written	   by	   citizens	   in	   Soviet	  Georgia.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Party	  and	  government	  reports,	  memoranda,	  communiqués,	  stenogramms,	   and	   decrees	   that	   help	   construct	   the	   political	   narrative	   of	   Soviet	  Georgian	   history,	   I	   use	   letters	   and	   petitions	   (Georgian	   ganc’xadebebi	   or	   Russian	  
zhaloby	  and	  prosheniia)	  from	  citizens	  to	  better	  convey	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  experience	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The	  vast	  majority	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  archives	  were	  destroyed	  during	  the	  1992-­‐1993	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  war,	  so	  scholars	  mostly	  rely	  upon	  edited	  collections	  in	  addition	  to	  materials	  culled	  from	  Tbilisi	  and	  Moscow	  archives.	  For	  the	  story	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  archives,	  see	  Tom	  de	  Waal,	  “Abkhazia:	  Cultural	  Tragedy	  Revisited,”	  Institute	  for	  War	  and	  Peace	  Reporting,	  28	  March	  2002,	  available	  http://iwpr.net/report-­‐news/abkhazia-­‐cultural-­‐tragedy-­‐revisited.	  Last	  accessed	  6	  September	  2013.	  
	   21	  of	  nationality	  in	  the	  postwar	  Georgian	  SSR.	  42	  As	  historical	  sources,	  such	  letters	  bear	  specific	  merits	  and	  caveats.	  Though	  a	  letter	  conveys	  opinions	  of	  an	  individual	  writer	  or	  group	  of	  writers,	  the	  authors	  were	  politically	  engaged	  enough	  to	  send	  a	  letter	  in	  the	   first	   place,	   making	   it	   somewhat	   difficult	   to	   tell	   just	   how	   representative	   such	  opinions	  were	  within	  the	  broader	  populace.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  similarities	  between	  several	   letters	   –	   in	   diction,	   appeal,	   argumentation,	   or	   location	   –	   suggest	   the	  existence	  of	  more	  commonly	  held	  beliefs	  and	  signal	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  a	  Soviet	   Georgian	   culture	   and	   worldview.	   Signed	   letters	   that	   frequently	   included	  detailed	  contact	   information	  suggest	   that	   letter	  writers	  did	  not	  view	  this	  action	  as	  an	  act	  of	  dissent	  but,	  rather,	  one	  that	  was	  firmly	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  duties	  as	  engaged	   citizens.43	  Anonymous	   letters,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   suggested	   a	   fear	   of	  reprisal	  due	  to	  the	  sensitivities	  of	  the	  opinions	  expressed.	  	  The	  several	  hundred	  letters	  I	  analyzed	  addressed	  a	  diversity	  of	  issues,	  citizen	  positions,	  and	  agendas:	   from	  deportees	  advocating	  return	   to	  complaints	  about	   the	  housing	   list;	   from	  defenses	  of	  Stalin’s	  Georgian	  reputation	   to	  appeals	   to	  repatriate	  co-­‐ethnics	  from	  abroad;	  and	  from	  protesting	  a	  constitutional	  change	  about	  language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	  practice	  of	  writing	  letters	  and	  petitions	  (zaiavleniia	  and	  zhaloby	   in	  Russian,	  ganc’xadebebi	   in	  Georgian)	   has	   a	   long	   and	   rich	   genealogy	   in	   Soviet	   history,	   though	   scholarly	   examination	   of	   such	  practices	  largely	  focuses	  on	  the	  Stalin	  era.	  See	  especially	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Supplicants	  and	  Citizens:	  Public	  Letter-­‐Writing	  in	  Soviet	  Russia	  in	  the	  1930s,”	  Slavic	  Review	  55,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  1996):	  78–105;	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	  Everyday	  Stalinism:	  Ordinary	  Life	  in	  Extraordinary	  Times:	  Soviet	  Russia	  in	  the	  1930s	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  and	  Golfo	  Alexopoulos,	  “The	  Ritual	  Lament:	  A	  Narrative	  of	  Appeal	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,”	  Russian	  History/Histoire	  Russe	  24,	  no.	  1–2	  (Spring-­‐Summer	  1997):	  117–29.	  Dobson,	  Khrushchev’s	  Cold	  Summer	  and	  Jones,	  Myth,	  Memory,	  Trauma	  have	  begun	  to	  examine	  grievance	  and	  petitioning	  practices	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  era,	  though	  this	  remains	  an	  area	  ripe	  for	  further	  research.	  43	  On	  Soviet	  citizenship,	  see	  Eric	  Lohr,	  Russian	  Citizenship:	  From	  Empire	  to	  Soviet	  Union	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	   University	   Press,	   2012);	   and	   Golfo	   Alexopoulos,	   Stalin’s	   Outcasts:	   Aliens,	   Citizens,	   and	   the	  
Soviet	  State,	  1926-­‐1936	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  	  
	   22	  to	  complaints	  about	  violations	  of	  minority	  rights.	  Writers	  were	  Georgians	  and	  non-­‐Georgians,	   urban	   and	   rural,	   young	   and	   old,	   male	   and	   female,	   and	   their	   letters	  spanned	   the	   entire	   period	   covered	   in	   this	   dissertation.	  While	   I	   do	   not	   claim	   that	  these	   letters	  represent	  public	  opinion	  writ	   large	  or	   the	  viewpoint	  of	  an	  “ordinary”	  citizen,	  they	  still	  permit	  us	  to	  chart	  changes	  over	  time	  in	  the	  vocabulary,	  narrative,	  and	  argumentation	  mobilized	  by	  diverse	  citizens	  attempting	  –	  and	  succeeding	  -­‐-­‐	  to	  negotiate	  Soviet	  and	  national	  forms	  of	  belonging.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  helps	  us	  to	  see	  not	   just	   how	   policymakers	   approached	   nationality,	   but	   how	   citizens	   themselves	  actually	  deployed	  and	  lived	  nationality	  in	  Soviet	  Georgia.	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Part	  I:	  Institutions	  of	  Nation-­‐Building	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Chapter	  1:	  Census,	  Historiography,	  Map	  	  The	   Georgian	   nation	   is	   composed	   of	   diverse	   brotherly	   tribes.	   The	  main	   Georgian	  tribes	  are:	  Karts,	  Mingrelian-­‐Čans,	  and	  Svans.	  These	  tribes	  were	  in	  turn	  divided	  into	  separate	   communities.	   The	   Kart	   (k’art’ebi)	   communities	   were	   Georgians	  (k’art’velebi),	  Kaxet’ians,	  P’šav-­‐Xevsuret’ians,	  Mt’iulmoxevians,	  Imeret’ians,	  Gurians,	  Račans,	   Leč’xumians,	   Ajarians,	  Mesxet’ians,	   Javaxet’ians,	   Šavšians,	   Klarjet’ians	   and	  others.	  44	  	  
sak’art’velos	  istoria	  (History	  of	  Georgia),	  Volume	  I	  (1943)	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Regions	  of	  Georgia	  
These	  names	  correspond	  to	  many	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “brotherly	  Georgian	  tribes”	  described	  by	  Soviet	  
Georgian	  historians,	  above.	  
Source:	  Wikimedia	  Commons	  
	  In	   his	   landmark	   treatise	   on	   nationalism,	   Benedict	   Anderson	   observed	   that	  official	  nationalism	   in	   the	   colonized	  world	  had	  a	  direct	   link	   to	   the	   “imaginings”	  of	  the	   colonial	   state,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   anti-­‐nationalist	   proclivities	   of	   colonial	  administrations.	   The	   “grammar”	   that	   facilitated	   this	   relationship	   worked	   through	  three	  crucial	   “institutions	  of	  power”:	   the	  census,	   the	  map,	  and	  the	  museum,	  which	  “profoundly	  shaped	  the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  colonial	  state	   imagined	   its	  domain	  –	   the	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  Ivane	  Javaxišvili,	  Nikoloz	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Simon	  Janašia,	  eds.,	  sak’art’velos	  istoria:	  użvelesi	  droidan	  
XIX	  saukunis	  damdegamde	  (Tbilisi:	  Saxelgami,	  1943),	  5.	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  nature	  of	  the	  human	  beings	  it	  ruled,	  the	  geography	  of	  its	  domain,	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	   its	   ancestry.”45	  Somewhat	   contrarily,	   the	   ostensibly	   anti-­‐imperial	   Soviet	   Union	  employed	  these	  same	  modern	  “colonial	  technologies	  of	  rule”	  as	  cultural	  institutions	  of	   nation-­‐building	   in	   the	   early	   decades	   of	   the	   Soviet	   experiment,	   providing	   the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  a	  system	  of	  developed,	  entitled	  Soviet	  nationalities	  would	  be	  constructed	  and	  elaborated.46	  	  At	   first	   glance	   the	   Soviet	   use	   of	   technologies	   of	   rule	   toward	   the	  institutionalization	  of	  difference	  –	  perhaps	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  an	  empire	  –	  seems	  to	  resemble	   in	   form	   its	   paradigmatic	   application	   in	   mid-­‐	   to	   late	   nineteenth-­‐century	  European	   overseas	   empires.47	  Yet	   the	   Soviet	   application	   was	   distinguished	   by	   its	  ideological	   aim:	   to	   cultivate	   and	   institutionalize	   national	   distinctions	   in	   order	   to	  accelerate	  the	  process	  of	  overcoming	  them.	  The	  tools	  of	  institutionalizing	  difference	  may	  have	  been	  borrowed	  from	  a	  French,	  British,	  or	  Dutch	  colonialist’s	  toolbox,	  but	  the	   impetus	   behind	   their	   application	   made	   early	   Soviet	   approaches	   toward	  nationality	   more	   indicative	   of	   a	   “modern	   mobilizational	   state”	   or	   “nationalizing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Anderson,	   Imagined	   Communities,	   163-­‐164.	   For	   this	   conceptual	   framework,	   Anderson	   draws	  extensively	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Thongchai	  Winichakul,	  Siam	  Mapped:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Geo-­‐Body	  of	  a	  Nation	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  1994).	  46	  On	  “colonial	  technologies	  of	  rule,”	  see	  Nicholas	  B.	  Dirks,	  Castes	  of	  Mind:	  Colonialism	  and	  the	  Making	  
of	  Modern	  India	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  and	  Bernard	  S.	  Cohn,	  Colonialism	  and	  
Its	  Forms	  of	  Knowledge:	  The	  British	  in	  India	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  
47 I	   employ	   Anderson's	   framework	  with	   the	   understanding	   that	   empire	   as	   a	   system	   of	   rule	   had	   a	  much	   deeper	   history	   than	   the	   "new	   imperialism"	   of	   the	   mid-­‐	   to	   late	   nineteenth	   century.	   This	  genealogy	  has	  been	  instructively	  conveyed	  in	  Jane	  Burbank	  and	  Frederick	  Cooper,	  Empires	  in	  World	  
History:	  Power	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	  University	  Press,	   2010).	   See	   also	  Frederick	   Cooper	   and	   Ann	   Laura	   Stoler,	   eds.,	   Tensions	   of	   Empire:	   Colonial	   Cultures	   in	   a	   Bourgeois	  
World	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	   Press,	   1997),	   and	   Ann	   Laura	   Stoler,	   Along	   the	   Archival	  
Grain:	  Epistemic	  Anxieties	  and	  Colonial	  Common	  Sense	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2009). 
	   26	  state,”	  comparable	  to	  contemporary	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  or	  interwar	  Poland.48	  In	  short,	  the	  Soviet	   “affirmative	   action	   empire”	   equipped	   members	   of	   the	   entitled	   nationality	  	  with	  the	  institutional	  tools	  of	  a	  “nationalizing	  state”	  to	  construct	  their	  republics.	  	  	   	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  trace	  the	  elaboration	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  census,	  the	  map,	  and	  historiography	  as	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building	  in	  the	  Stalin-­‐era	  Georgian	  SSR.	   I	   tell	   a	   roughly	   chronological	   story	   of	   the	   amalgamation	   of	   disparate	   census	  categories	   into	   a	   single,	   entitled	   Georgian	   nationality;	   the	   creation	   by	   prominent	  historians	  of	  the	  first	  textbook	  of	  Georgian	  history;	  and	  Georgian	  irredentist	  claims	  to	   territories	   in	   northeastern	   Turkey.	   Far	   from	   being	   inert	   recipients	   of	   central	  policy,	  local	  and	  republic-­‐level	  officials	  in	  Georgia	  and	  their	  academic	  collaborators	  used	  the	  developing	  institutions	  of	  nationality	  to	  both	  establish	  the	  local	  dimensions	  of	  Soviet	  power	  and	  advance	  agendas	  that	  did	  not	  always	  coincide	  with	  Moscow’s.	  The	   ideological	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   Soviet	   nationality	   regime	   meant	   that	   the	  process	  of	  categorizing	  peoples,	  delimiting	  territory,	  and	  creating	  histories	  likewise	  included	  an	  intentional,	  multi-­‐layered	  engagement	  with	  local	  actors,	  members	  of	  the	  entitled	   nationality.	   Such	   “imperial	   intermediaries”	   were	   common	   features	   of	  empire	  in	  both	  its	  landed	  and	  overseas	  iterations,	  yet	  again	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  behind	  such	   activities	   and	   their	   audience	   distinguished	   in	   particular	   what	   Georgian	  “intermediaries”	  could	  undertake	  and	  (aspire	  to)	  achieve.	  “Intermediaries”	  were	  not	  merely	   Party	   members	   answering	   to	   the	   all-­‐Union	   hierarchy	   that	   peaked	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Adeeb	   Khalid,	   “Backwardness	   and	   the	   Quest	   for	   Civilization";	   Edgar,	   Tribal	   Nation;	   Beissinger,	  “Soviet	  Empire	  as	  ‘Family	  Resemblance.”	  On	  interwar	  Poland	  as	  a	  “nationalizing	  state,”	  see	  Brubaker,	  
Nationalism	  Reframed,	  Chapter	  4.	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  Moscow.49	  They	   also	   served	   local	   agendas	   and	   communities	   that	   revealed	   the	  complexities	  of	   constructing	  an	  entitled	  nationality	   in	  Georgia.	   In	  practice,	   census,	  map,	  and	  museum	  as	  institutions	  of	  Soviet	  nation-­‐building	  could	  be	  as	  much	  about	  local	  and	  republic-­‐level	  imperial	  imaginations	  as	  those	  of	  a	  Moscow	  center.	  To	   fit	   Anderson’s	   paradigm	   to	   conditions	   in	   Soviet	   Georgia,	   I	   make	   three	  important	  adaptations.	  First,	   I	  broaden	  the	  “museum”	  to	   include	  a	  more	  expansive	  examination	   of	   historiography	   as	   nation-­‐building	   institution.	   Georgian	   historical	  writing	   was	   professionalized	   in	   this	   generation,	   and	   history,	   ethnography,	   and	  archaeology	  as	  disciplines	  were	   intimately	   linked	  in	  Stalin-­‐era	  Georgia.	   In	  order	  to	  emphasize	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  these	  processes,	  I	  highlight	  the	  careers	  of	  two	  Georgian	   scholars	   –	   Simon	   Janašia	   and	  Nikoloz	   Berżenišvili	   -­‐-­‐	   whose	  work	   in	   the	  fields	  of	  history,	  ethnography,	  and	  archaeology	  inspired	  or	  legitimized	  claims	  made	  and	  policies	  undertaken	  in	  the	  name	  of	  these	  three	  facets	  of	  Soviet	  Georgian	  nation-­‐building.	   Second,	   Anderson’s	   discussion	   of	   census,	   map,	   and	   museum	   depicts	  colonial	   deployment	   of	   these	   technologies	   as	   simultaneous	   endeavors,	   while	   in	  Georgia,	  a	  rough	  chronology	  emerged	  in	  which	  the	  census	  preceded	  historiography	  and	  map.	  Therefore,	  I	  discuss	  the	  nation-­‐building	  institutions	  in	  that	  order.	  Third,	  in	  the	  Stalin	  era,	  productive	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building	  (i.e.	  census,	  historiography,	  and	   map)	   were	   deployed	   alongside	   related	   excisional	   counterparts,	   discussed	   in	  Chapter	   2,	   whereby	   those	   individuals	   and	   groups	   deemed	   incompatible	   with	   the	  homogenizing	  Soviet	  Georgian	  collective	  were	  excised	  via	  expulsion	  to	  Central	  Asia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 On	  Party	  members	  as	  Soviet	  “imperial	  intermediaries,”	  see	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper,	  Empires,	  397. 
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  or	   Siberia	   and	   replaced	   by	   ethnic	   Georgians	   forcibly	   resettled	   to	   newly	   available	  lands	  in	  southern	  and	  western	  Georgia.	  	  The	  development	   of	   a	   vocabulary	   of	   nationality	   in	   the	  Russian	  Empire	   and	  the	  Soviet	  state	  had	   important	   implications	   for	  how	  early	  Soviet	  nationality	  policy	  functioned.	  From	  the	   inorodtsy	  and	  plemena	   chronicled	  by	   imperial	  ethnographers	  and	   census-­‐takers	   to	   the	   status	   as	   narodnosti	   and	   natsional’nosti	   to	   which	   all	  peoples	  of	  the	  empire,	  large	  and	  small,	  should	  purportedly	  aspire,	  the	  architects	  of	  Soviet	   nationality	   policy	   took	   great	   care	   to	   endow	   and	   mobilize	   these	   imperial	  categories	  with	   socialist	   content.50	  The	  categorized	  had	  stakes	   in	  where	   “they”	   fell	  on	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   Soviet	   nationalities	   due	   to	   a	   nationality’s	   associated	  entitlements.51	  In	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	   1926	   First	   All-­‐Union	   Census,	   for	   example,	  Georgian	   and	   Ukrainian	   representatives	   argued	   against	   using	   the	   (ultimately	  prevailing)	   term	   narodnost’	   for	   the	   census	   questionnaire,	   preferring	   the	   term	  
natsional’nost’	   due	   to	   their	   belief	   that	   Georgians	   and	   Ukrainians	   were	   already	  developed	  nations.52	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1937	  census,	  natsional’nost’	  had	  become	  the	  dominant	   term	   for	   labeling	   the	   major	   national	   groups	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   an	  effort	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   ethnohistorical	   progress	   made	   since	   the	   first	   all-­‐Union	  census.	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  John	  W.	  Slocum,	   “Who,	  and	  When,	  Were	   the	   Inorodtsy?	  The	  Evolution	  of	   the	  Category	   ‘Aliens’	   in	  Imperial	  Russia,”	  Russian	  Review	  57,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1998):	  173–90;	  Slezkine,	  Arctic	  Mirrors;	  Suny,	  The	  
Revenge	  of	  the	  Past;	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations.	  	  51	  A	  similarly	  significant	  hierarchy	  emerged	  with	  the	  ascription	  of	  class	  identity,	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Ascribing	  Class:	  The	  Construction	  of	  Social	  Identity	  in	  Soviet	  Russia,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History	  65,	  no.	  4	  (December	  1993):	  745–70.	  52	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  116.	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  Translating	  the	  newly	  forming	  Soviet	  bureaucratic	  lexicon	  of	  nationality	  into	  the	  Georgian	  language	  likewise	  confronted	  a	  preexisting	  Georgian	  vocabulary	  about	  nation,	  language,	  and	  territory.	  Of	  this	  vocabulary,	  eri	  –	  typically	  translated	  as	  nation	  –	  served	  as	  an	  important	  focal	  point.	  Tracing	  the	  meaning	  of	  eri	  over	  time	  likewise	  shows	   how	   the	   Georgian	   concept	   of	   a	   national	   community	   developed	   around	   this	  terminology.	  While	   prior	   to	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   eri	   carried	   connotations	   of	   a	  community	   united	   by	   faith	   (in	   Georgian	   Orthodoxy),	   as	   a	   Georgian	   national	  intelligentsia	   came	   into	   being	   from	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century,	   eri	   acquired	   a	  meaning	  closer	  to	  the	  European	  notion	  of	  “nation.”	  Thus	  eri	  saw	  a	  transition	  from	  a	  community	  of	   language	  and	   faith	   to	   an	  ethnic	   category,	   centered	  on	   language	  and	  custom.53 	  	   By	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century,	   Georgian	   writer	   and	   politician	   Ilia	  Čavčavaże	   and	  his	   followers	   further	   grounded	   the	  eri	   not	   only	   in	   language,	   but	   in	  territory,	  rooted	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  mica-­‐cqali	  (literally	  earth-­‐water,	  but	  translated	  as	  homeland)	   and	   mamuli	   (fatherland).54	  Ivane	   Javaxišvili,	   the	   founder	   of	   Georgian	  history	   as	   a	   discipline	   and	   of	   Georgia’s	   first	   university,	   wrote	   his	   History	   of	   the	  
Georgian	  Nation	   (k’art’veli	   eris	   istoria)	   in	   1908	   and	   granted	   eri	  an	   explicit	   history	  and	   territory	   –	   work	   that	   his	   students,	   Simon	   Janašia	   and	   Nikoloz	   Berżenišvili,	  would	  continue	  in	  a	  Soviet	  guise	  in	  the	  Stalin	  era	  and	  beyond.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Oliver	  Reisner,	   “Zur	  Geschichte	  des	  Begriffs	   ‘Eri’	   in	  der	  modernen	  georgischen	  Historiographie,”	  
Georgica	  35	  (2012):	  62–77.	  54	  Ibid.;	  Jones,	  Socialism	  in	  Georgian	  Colors.	  
55 Ivane	   Javaxišvili	   (1876-­‐1940)	   was	   a	   Georgian	   historian	   and	   linguist	   who	   graduated	   from	   St.	  Petersburg	  University’s	  Faculty	  of	  Oriental	  Studies	  in	  1899,	  under	  the	  mentorship	  of	  fellow	  Georgia	  native	  Nikolai	  (Nikoloz)	  Marr.	  On	  Marr’s	  influential	  imperial	  and	  Soviet	  careers,	  see	  Yuri	  Slezkine,	  “N.	  Ia.	  Marr	   and	   the	  National	   Origins	   of	   Soviet	   Ethnogenetics,”	   Slavic	  Review	   55,	   no.	   4	   (Winter	   1996):	  826-­‐862;	  Vera	  Tolz,	  Russia’s	  Own	  Orient:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Identity	  and	  Oriental	  Studies	  in	  Late	  Imperial	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  In	   addition	   to	   the	   notion	   eri	   (and	   its	   variants	   –	   erovneba	   [nationality],	  
erovnuli	   [national]),	   Georgian	   terms	   such	   as	   samšoblo	   (motherland),	   deda-­‐ena	  (mother	  tongue),	  and	  mica-­‐cqali	  appeared	  frequently	  in	  both	  Imperial-­‐	  and	  Soviet-­‐era	   Georgian	   discourse,	   from	   academic	   writing	   to	   poems	   to	   speeches	   to	   citizen	  petitions.	  Appeals	  to	  k’art’veloba	   (the	  Georgians,	  as	  a	  collective	  entity),	  sak’art’velo	  (Georgia),	  k’art’veli	  xalxi	   (the	  Georgian	  people),	  k’art’veli	  eri	   (the	  Georgian	  nation),	  or	   k’art’uli	   ena	   (Georgian	   language)	   likewise	   provide	   important	   benchmarks	   for	  understanding	   how	   Georgian	   speakers	   engaged	   with	   the	   developing	   Soviet	  structures	   and	   institutions	   of	   nation-­‐building	   across	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   Soviet	  experiment.	  For	   instance,	   the	   translation	   of	   Stalin’s	   foundational	   essay	   on	   nationality	  issues,	  Marxism	   and	   the	   National	   Question	   (1913),	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   Soviet-­‐Russian	  institutional	  language	  of	  nationality	  would	  be	  rendered	  into	  Georgian.	  The	  Georgian	   translation	   of	   this	   work,	   mark’sizmi	   da	   nac’ionaluri	   sakit’xi,	   does	   not	  include	   such	   native	  Georgian	   terms	   as	   erovnuli,	   samšoblo,	  deda-­‐ena,	   or	  mica-­‐cqali,	  but	  rather	  nac’ionaluri,	  teritoria,	  and	  ena.56	  In	  lieu	  of	  rendering	  the	  Russian	  cognate	  
natsiia	  as	  a	  cognate	  into	  Georgian	  (nac’ia),	  eri	  is	  used	  instead.	  This	  example	  presents	  an	   incongruity	   in	   application	   between	   such	   indigenous	   Georgian	   terminology	   and	  the	   internationalist	   language	   of	   Marxism	   (or,	   for	   that	   matter,	   nationalism),	  exemplified	  by	  the	  more	  neutral	  teritoria	  and	  ena	  (rather	  than	  mica-­‐cqali	  and	  deda-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	   Soviet	   Periods	   (New	   York:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2011);	   and	   Katerina	   Clark,	   Petersburg,	  
Crucible	  of	  Cultural	  Revolution	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  Chapter	  9.  56	  Ioseb	  besarionis-­‐że	  Stalini,	  mark’sizmi	  da	  nac’ionaluri	  sakit’xi	  (Tbilisi:	  saxelgami,	  politliteraturis	  sek’tori,	  1951).	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ena).	   Just	   as	   ethnographers	   and	   statisticians	   grappled	   with	   the	   implications	   of	  distinguishing	   between	   natsional’nosti,	   narodnosti,	   plemena,	   natsional’nye	   gruppy,	  and	   others,	   Soviet	   Georgian	   nation-­‐builders	   were	   faced	   with	   a	   challenge	   in	   how	  precisely	  to	  reconcile	  their	  national	  forms	  with	  socialist	  content.	  
	  
Census	  	  	   For	   all	   the	   census’s	   significance	   in	   assisting	   empires	   and	   states	   in	   the	  decidedly	   modern	   aspiration	   to	   fully	   “count”	   and	   “know”	   their	   inhabitants,	  Anderson	  registers	  the	  irony	  that,	  “The	  fiction	  of	  the	  census	  is	  that	  everyone	  is	  in	  it,	  and	  that	  everyone	  has	  one	  –	  and	  only	  one	  –	  extremely	  clear	  place.	  No	  fractions.”57	  With	  this	  caveat	  in	  mind,	  who,	  exactly,	  was	  considered	  a	  Georgian	  in	  the	  developing	  Soviet	   state?	  How	  did	  Georgian	   actors	   themselves	   deploy	   this	   question?	  And	  what	  did	  census	  architects	  aim	  to	  achieve	  through	  the	  census	  with	  regard	  to	  nationality?	  Debates	  over	  these	  issues	  emerged	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Censuses	  of	  1926,	  1937,	   and	   1939.	   The	   process	   of	   developing	   and	   implementing	   census	   projects	  revealed	   tensions	   among	  Moscow	   planners,	   Georgian	   bureaucrats,	   and	   academics	  involved	   in	   census	  development,	   as	  well	   as	  between	  census	   takers/categories	  and	  the	  surveyed	  populations.58	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  166.	  On	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  census,	  see	  especially	  Bernard	  S.	  Cohn,	  "The	  Census,	  Social	  Structure	  and	  Objectification	  in	  South	  Asia,"	  in	  An	  Anthropologist	  Among	  
the	  Historians	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  224-­‐254.	  58	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations;	  Juliette	  Cadiot,	  “Kak	  uporiadochivali	  raznoobrazie:	  Spiski	  i	  klassifikatsii	  natsional’nostei	  v	  Rossiiskoi	  Imperii	   i	  v	  Sovetskom	  Soiuze	  (1897-­‐1939	  gg.),”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2002,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  2002):	  177–206;	  David	  W.	  Darrow,	  “Census	  as	  a	  Technology	  of	  Empire,”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2002,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  2002):	  145–76.	  
	   32	  More	   importantly,	   the	   outcome	   of	   these	   debates	   –	   the	   categorical	  amalgamation	   of	   Kartvelian	   populations	   (speakers	   of	   all	   languages	   related	   to	  Georgian)	   into	  a	   single,	   entitled	  Georgian	  nationality	  –	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   the	  ethnic	  consolidation	  policies	  that	  would	  define	  the	  postwar	  era	   in	  Georgia.	   In	  the	  shorter	  term,	   the	   institutionalization	   of	   unitary	   and	   entitled	   Georgian	   nationality	   would	  support	   national	   historical	   research	   agendas	   and	   territorial	   expansion	   goals,	  explored	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	   The	   first	   All-­‐Union	   Census	   of	   the	   Population	   in	   1926	   had	   an	   important	  precursor	   in	   the	   First	   General	   Census	   of	   the	   Population	   of	   the	   Russian	   Empire	   in	  1897.	   In	   the	   1897	   census,	   imperial	   subjects	  were	   categorized	   according	   to	   native	  language,	  estate	   (soslovie),	  and	  religion:	   imperial	   statisticians	  used	  comparisons	  of	  these	  three	  census	  categories	  to	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  empire’s	  ethnic	  composition	  without	   explicitly	   asking	   respondents	   to	   state	   their	   nationality	   or	   ethnicity.59	  For	  example,	  the	  entire	  Caucasus	  region	  was	  administered	  as	  a	  single	  viceroyalty,	  with	  its	   administrative	   center	   in	   Tiflis	   (Tbilisi’s	   name	   until	   1936).	   In	   the	   Caucasus	  viceroyalty,	  the	  relevant	  linguistic	  categories	  included:	  	   Kartvelian	  dialects	  (narechiia):	  Georgian,	  Imeretian,	  Mingrelian,	  Svan	  	   Other	  Indo-­‐European	  dialects:	  Armenian,	  Persian,	  Tat,	  Talysh,	  Greek,	  	  Ossetian	  	   Dialects	  of	  the	  Caucasian	  mountaineers:	  	  Cherkess	  dialects	  –	  Kabardin,	  Cherkess,	  Abkhaz	  Chechen	  dialects	  –	  Chechen,	  Ingush,	  Kist	  	   Turk-­‐Tatar	  dialects60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Juliette	   Cadiot,	   “Searching	   for	   Nationality:	   Statistics	   and	   National	   Categories	   at	   the	   End	   of	   the	  Russian	  Empire	  (1897-­‐1917),”	  Russian	  Review	  64,	  no.	  3	  (July	  2005):	  442. 60 	  As	   categorized	   in	   “Pervaia	   vseobshchaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   Rossiiskoi	   Imperii	   1897	   g.:	  Raspredeleniie	  naseleniia	  po	  rodnomu	  iazyku,	  guberniiam	  i	  oblastiam:	  Kavkaz,”	  Available	  via	  Institut	  
	   33	  The	   “dialects”	   listed	   in	   the	   Kartvelian	   group	   appear	   equal	   and	   distinct	   from	   one	  another,	   yet	   related	   linguistically	   due	   to	   the	   unique	   mexedruli	   alphabet	   and	  Kartvelian	   structure	   which	   bears	   no	   relationship	   to	   other	   linguistic	   groups	   (i.e.	  Indo-­‐European,	  Turkic,	  etc.).	  In	  this	  schema,	  Mingrelian	  or	  Svan	  are	  distinct	  dialects	  as	  is	  Georgian,	  which	  would	  have	  implications	  for	  later	  Soviet	  censuses.	  The	  religion	  categories	   of	   the	   1897	   census	   included	   Orthodox	   (pravoslavnaia	   tserkov’),	  Armenian-­‐Gregorian,	   Armenian	   Catholic,	   Jewish,	   and	   Muslim.	   The	   “Orthodox”	  category	  comprised	  both	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  Orthodox	  believers	  because,	  unlike	  the	   Armenian	   church,	   which	   until	   1898	   maintained	   its	   autocephaly,	   Georgian	  Orthodox	  institutions	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Russian	  Orthodox	  Patriarchate	  in	  1811,	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  annexation	  of	  Georgian	  lands.61	  	  	   In	   accordance	  with	   the	   “ethnophilia”	   of	   early	   Soviet	   nationality	   policy,	   the	  process	   of	   developing	   a	   list	   of	   nationalities	   for	   the	   First	   all-­‐Union	   Census	   of	   the	  Population	   in	   1926	   proved	   a	   daunting	   task	   that	   elicited	   help	   not	   only	   from	  Bolshevik	   ideologists,	  but	  also	  ethnographers	  and	  other	  experts	   from	  the	   imperial	  academy,	  as	  Francine	  Hirsch	  has	  carefully	  described.62	  With	  regard	   to	  Georgia,	   the	  developing	   list	   posed	   several	   points	   of	   dispute	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   among	  groups	  in	  Georgia	  whose	  languages	  fell	  under	  the	  Kartvelian	  language	  family.	  These	  included	  Mingrelians,	  Svans,	  Ajarians,	   and	  Laz,	   all	  who	   traditionally	   resided	   in	   the	  western	  parts	  of	  the	  Georgian	  territory	  (and	  northeastern	  Turkey,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  demografii	   Natsional’nogo	   issledovatel’skogo	   universiteta	   “Vysshaia	   shkola	   ekonomiki,”	  http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php?reg=3	  .	  	  61	  On	  Russian	  acquisition	  of	  Georgian	  kingdoms	  and	  institutional	   incorporation	  into	   its	  empire,	  see	  Gvosdev,	  Imperial	  Policies	  and	  Perspectives	  towards	  Georgia.	  62	  On	  Soviet	  “chronic	  ethnophilia,”	  see	  Slezkine,	  “The	  USSR	  as	  a	  Communal	  Apartment.”	  
	   34	  Laz),	  and	  the	  Georgian	  entitled	  nationality,	  whose	  language	  more	  closely	  resembled	  dialects	  in	  the	  central	  and	  eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  territory.	  	  Reflecting	   the	   “ethnophilia”	   ethos,	   an	   early	   draft	   list	   of	   nationalities	  “appearing	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR”	   for	   the	   1926	   census	   included	   Abkhaz,	   Ajarians,	  Armenians,	   Greeks,	   Georgian	   Ajarians,	   Georgian	   Muslims,	   Georgian	   Svans,	  Georgians,	   Georgian	   Jews,	   Kartvelians,	   Kartlians,	   Kists,	   Kurds,	   Laz,	   Lezgins,	  Mingrelians,	   Ossetians,	   Persians,	   Svans,	   Tatars,	   Osman	   Turks,	   Turks,	   Khashurians,	  Khemshins,	   and	   Chans,	   among	   others.63	  This	   partial	   list	   contains	   a	   number	   of	  potentially	   redundant,	   conflicting,	   or	   simply	   unclear	   categories	   –	   what	   was	   the	  difference	   between	   an	   Ajarian,	   a	   Georgian	   Ajarian,	   and	   a	   Georgian	   Muslim,	   for	  instance?	  Or	  a	  Georgian	  and	  a	  Kartvelian?	  Were	  Laz	  and	  Chan	  not	  synonyms?	  Why	  did	  Khashurians	  and	  Kartlians	  appear	  on	  this	  list,	  yet	  Imeretians	  not?	  	  The	   actual	   list	   of	   nationalities	   used	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1926	   census	   in	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  included	  Georgians,	  Ajarians,	  Mingrelians,	  Svan,	  Laz,	  Abkhaz,	  Georgian	  Jews,	  Ossetians,	  Russians,	  Jews,	  Turks,	  Persians,	  Greeks,	  others,	  and	  foreign	  subjects,	  taken	   from	   an	   overall	   list	   of	   191	  narodnosti	   throughout	   the	  USSR.64	  Most	   notably,	  Georgians,	   Ajarians,	   Mingrelians,	   Svans,	   and	   Laz	   all	   appeared	   as	   separate	  nationalities	  when	   the	   census	  was	   taken.	   	   Yet	   debates	   persisted	   about	   how	   these	  groups	   were	   to	   be	   considered	   and	   tabulated	   in	   the	   final	   results	   of	   the	   census.	  Indeed,	   Francine	  Hirsch	   cites	   the	   classification	   of	   the	   peoples	   of	   Transcaucasia	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  “Spisok	  narodnostei	   (v	  1926	  g.	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi),	  kotoryi	  vyiavlen	  v	  Gruz.	  SSR,”	  uic’a,	   f.	  334,	  op.	  12,	  d.	  10.	  Laz	  and	  Chan	  are	  synonyms,	  with	  Laz	  as	  the	  Russian	  term	  and	  Chan	  as	  the	  Georgian.	  64	  “Naselenie	   Gruzii	   po	   narodnosti:	   Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1926	   goda	   (predvaritel’nye	  itogi),	  31	  August	  1927,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  3,	  d	  438,	  l.	  22.	  
	   35	  “the	  most	   controversial	   topic	   in	   discussions	   about	   the	   official	   list	   of	   nationalities”	  because	   the	   “national-­‐political	   stakes	   gave	   these	   discussions	   a	   high	   emotional	  pitch.”65	  Whereas	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Central	  Statistical	  Administration	  (CSA)	  endeavored	  to	   adhere	   to	   the	   categories	   as	   executed	   by	   census-­‐takers	   –	   that	   is,	   by	   treating	  Georgians,	   Mingrelians,	   et	   al.	   as	   distinct	   nationalities	   –	   representatives	   from	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  branch	  of	  the	  CSA	  argued	  for	  a	  different	  approach.	  	  The	   1926	   all-­‐Union	   census	  was	   carried	   out	   in	   Georgia	   between	   23	   and	   31	  December	   1926.	   Georgian	   CSA	   chief	   A.	   Ruxaże	   boasted	   that	   his	   team	   of	   census-­‐takers,	   comprised	   mostly	   of	   pupils	   and	   students,	   had	   even	   managed	   to	   reach	  communities	   in	   very	   remote	   mountain	   regions	   such	   as	   Svanet’i,	   Xevsuret’i,	   and	  T’ušet’i.	   In	  Svanet’i,	   residents	   themselves	  reportedly	  supported	  the	  census	  process	  by	  shoveling	  snow	  and	  making	  a	  path	  to	  move	  census-­‐takers	  from	  one	  house	  to	  the	  next.66	  While	   Ruxaże	   reported	   that	   the	   actual	   administration	   of	   the	   census	   had	  surpassed	  logistical	  expectations,	  once	  the	  tabulation	  and	  analysis	  of	  results	  began,	  several	  concerns	  emerged.	  	  In	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   Georgian	   Central	   Committee	   (CC)	   and	   Georgian	   CSA	   in	  September	   1927,	   A.	   Ruxaże,	   Odišaria,	   and	   Bregvaże	   sent	   their	   preliminary	  calculations	   for	   the	   national	   composition	   of	   Georgia’s	   population	   according	   to	   the	  1926	  all-­‐Union	  census	  materials	  yet	  advised	  against	  publicizing	  these	  figures	  due	  to	  their	   preliminary	   nature.	   They	   likewise	   made	   three	   important	   suggestions	   that	  distinguished	   “their”	   project	   from	   that	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   “center.”	   First,	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  132.	  
66 “Doklad	  ob	  okonchanii	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  po	  Gruzii,”	  A.	  Ruxaże,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  168,	  l.	  74. 
	   36	  section	  on	  population	  composition	  by	  literacy,	  they	  noted	  that	  for	  “Georgian	  tribes:	  Mingrelians,	   Laz,	   and	   Svans,”	   the	  written	   language	   is	   only	   the	   Georgian	   language,	  therefore	  Mingrelians,	   Laz,	   and	   Svans	   should	   be	   assessed	   for	   literacy	   in	   Georgian	  and	   should	   be	   counted	   as	   part	   of	   the	   category	   “literate	   in	   the	   language	   of	   one’s	  nationality.”	   Second,	   while	   the	   “center”	   described	   the	   options	   for	   population	  composition	  by	  native	  language	  as	  Georgian,	  Mingrelian,	  Laz,	  and	  Svan,	  Ruxaże	  and	  his	  colleagues	  suggested	  these	  be	  rephrased	  as	  “Georgian	  languages,	  which	  consist	  of:	  proper	  Georgian,	  Mingrelian,	  Laz,	  Svan.”	  Finally,	  they	  proposed	  a	  similar	  change	  regarding	  the	  population	  composition	  by	  narodnost’:	  while	  the	  “center”	  designated	  Georgians,	   Ajarians,	   Mingrelians,	   Laz,	   and	   Svans	   as	   distinct	   narodnosti,	   Ruxaże	  recommended	  instead	  that	  it	  read	  “Georgians,	  which	  includes:	  Ajarians,	  Mingrelians,	  Laz,	  Svans.”67	  Ruxaże	  elaborated	  his	  reasons	  for	  these	  changes	  in	  a	  report	  to	  the	  Georgian	  CC	   later	   that	   month.68	  While	   it	   was	   too	   late	   to	   change	   the	   census	   categories	  themselves,	  as	  the	  census-­‐taking	  process	  had	  already	  concluded,	  Ruxaże	  urged	  that	  Mingrelians,	   Ajarians,	   Laz,	   and	   Svans	   be	   counted	   in	   the	   published	   results	   of	   the	  census	  as	  “Georgian	  tribes.”	  As	  planned	  by	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  Commission,	  the	  results	  would	   be	   distinguished	   by	   nationality,	   yet	   “the	  whole	   sum	   of	   all	   Georgian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  A.	  Ruxaże,	  Odišaria,	  and	  Bregvaże	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  1	  September	  1927,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  438,	  ll.	  20-­‐28.	  68	  “sakavširo	   aġceris	   k’art’vels	   tomt’a	   šesaxebi	   masalebis	   gamok’veynebis	   gamo,”	   A.	   Ruxaże	   to	  Georgian	   CC,	   12	   November	   1927,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   3,	   d.	   438,	   ll.	   29-­‐33.	   Also	   analyzed	   in	   part	   in	  Maqvala	   Nat’melaże,	   “mosaxleobis	   1926	   clis	   sakavširo	   aġceris	   ert’i	   aspektis	   gamo,”	   analebi,	   no.	   1	  (1999):	  85–90.	  
	   37	  tribes	   will	   not	   be	   mentioned.”	   This	   problem	   had	   practical	   and	   ideological	  implications.69	  	  First,	  Ruxaże	  argued,	  “the	  idea	  of	  an	  Ajarian,	  Mingrelian,	  Svan,	  and	  others	  is	  absolutely	   not	   contradictory	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   Georgian	   (k’art’veli).	   Consider	   that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “Georgian”	  includes	  all	  the	  others	  just	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  [composed	  of,	  CK]	  separate	  parts.”	  Self-­‐description	  as	  a	  Svan	  or	  Mingrelian	  was	  due	  merely	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  “provincial	  posterity”	  and	  could	  still	  contribute	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Georgian.	  In	  fact,	  these	   “tribes”	   made	   up	   “an	   indivisible	   part	   of	   the	   national	   consciousness	   of	   one	  Georgian	  nation.”	  The	  Academy	  of	  Sciences’	  classification,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  “does	  not	   recognize	   this	   one	   Georgian	   nationality	   (erovneba).	   According	   to	   this	  classification,	  “Georgian/k’art’veli”	  was	  a	  separate	  national	  group	  (erovnuli	  jgup’i),	  a	  separate	  people	  (xalxi),	  a	  narodnost’,	  and	  Svan,	  Mingrelian,	  and	  Ajarian	  –	  these	  are	  yet	  other	  separate,	  independent	  narodnost-­‐ebi…A	  national	  consciousness	  before	  all	  else	  creates	  a	  nationality	  (erovneba).”70	  Second,	   argued	   Ruxaże,	   the	   census	   results	   had	   significance	   beyond	   the	  Georgian	   SSR	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   As	   only	   the	   second	   census	   of	   its	   kind	   in	   the	  region	  (after	  1897),	   the	  results	  of	   the	  census	  should	  convey	   to	   the	  “wider	  cultural	  world”	   a	   “real	   picture”	   of	   the	   Caucasus.	   Separating	   Georgians	   into	   Mingrelians,	  Svans,	   etc.	  would	   therefore	   portray	   an	   incomplete	   picture	   because	   the	   number	   of	  Georgians	  would	  appear	  20	  to	  25	  percent	  lower	  than	  in	  reality.	  Third,	  separating	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  “sakavširo	   aġceris	   k’art’vels	   tomt’a	   šesaxebi	   masalebis	   gamok’veynebis	   gamo,”	   A.	   Ruxaże	   to	  Georgian	  CC,	  12	  November	  1927,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  438,	  l.	  29.	  70	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  29-­‐30.	  “ebi”	  is	  the	  plural	  ending	  for	  Georgian	  nouns,	  so	  in	  this	  usage,	  Ruxaże	  uses	  a	  Georgian	  plural	  of	  the	  Russian	  term	  “narodnost’”.	  
	   38	  Georgian	  groups	  per	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  schema	  presented	  a	  political	  risk	  as	  it	  could	   permit	   enemies	   of	   the	   Soviet	   government	   (i.e.	   Georgian	   émigrés	   from	   the	  Menshevik	   government)	   to	   say	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   was	   “anti-­‐Georgian	   and	  restoring	   the	   old	   epoch	   of	   Russification	   through	   division	   of	   Georgians.”	   The	   fixity	  and	  magnanimity	  of	   the	   census	   results	   as	   official	   statistics	   –	   and	   the	   foundational	  statistics,	  at	   that	   -­‐-­‐	  provided	  a	   fourth	  source	  of	  concern	  because,	   in	  Ruxaże’s	  view,	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  Georgians	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  results.71	  Finally,	   Ruxaże	   explained	   a	   further	   source	   of	   incongruity	   related	   to	  nationality	   and	   language.	   The	   census	   categories	   on	   this	   point	   were	   structured	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  reflect	  whether	  a	  member	  of	  a	  nationality	  spoke	  “his	  own”	  language	  and,	   if	   not,	  which	   other	   language	  was	   his	   primary	   language.	   Therefore,	   as	  Ruxaże	  detailed,	  a	  Mingrelian	  who	  declared	  himself	  to	  be	  Mingrelian	  and	  his	  mother	  tongue	  as	  Georgian	  would	   be	   categorized	   as	   a	   “resident	  who	  does	   not	   speak	   his	   national	  language.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  Svans	  and	  Mingrelians	  reportedly	  claimed	  their	  nationality	  as	  Georgian	  but	  spoken	  language	  as	  Mingrelian,	  which	  placed	  them	  in	  the	  “other”	  category	  rather	  than	  Georgian,	  Mingrelian,	  or	  Svan.	  In	  the	  latter	  example	  of	  the	  Mingrelian-­‐speaking	  Georgian,	   this	   resident	  would	   likewise	   count	   as	  neither	   a	  Georgian	   nor	   Mingrelian	   but	   as	   a	   “resident	   who	   does	   not	   speak	   his	   national	  language.”	  Because	  his	  spoken	  language	  did	  not	  match	  his	  nationality,	  he	  would	  be	  counted	  in	  the	  census	  totals	  as	  “other.”	  Moreover,	  only	   five	   language	  options	  were	  offered	  in	  this	  instance	  –	  Georgian,	  Russian,	  Turkish,	  Armenian,	  and	  other	  –	  and	  did	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   39	  not	   include	   Mingrelian,	   Svan,	   or	   Laz	   languages.	   This	   rather	   circuitous	   thought	  exercise	   shows	   that,	   according	   to	   Ruxaże,	   this	   massive	   case	   of	   incongruence	  between	  nationality	  and	  language	  meant	  that	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Georgians	  were	  in	  fact	  concealed	  within	  the	  “other”	  category.72	  	  	   In	  short,	  for	  actors	  engaged	  in	  the	  census	  process	  in	  both	  Moscow	  and	  Tbilisi,	  it	  was	  vital	  to	  maintain	  congruence	  between	  nationality	  and	  language.	  However,	  as	  Ruxaże	  demonstrated,	  it	  remained	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  the	  center’s	  ethnophilia	  with	  the	   design	   of	   the	   census	   and	   with	   individual	   understandings	   of	   one’s	   own	  nationality	   and	   language	   use.	   Ruxaże’s	   proposed	   solution	   was	   to	   simplify	   the	  process	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  single	  Georgian	  nationality	  with	  designated	  Ajarian,	  Mingrelian,	  Laz,	  and	  Svan	  subgroups.	  Ruxaże	  stated	  quite	  explicitly	   that	  he	  and	  his	  colleagues’	  project	   was	   to	   “unify	   the	   total	   number	   of	   Georgians”	   as	   depicted	   in	   census	  publications.	  	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Moscow-­‐based	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   ethnographers	  questioned	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  Mingrelian	  count	  because	  over	  half	  of	  their	  estimate	  for	   the	  Mingrelian	   population	   registered	   as	   Georgian	   in	   the	   census.	   This	   could	   be	  due	   to	   individual	   respondents’	   self-­‐definition,	   the	   persuasiveness	   of	   local	   census-­‐takers,	   or	   some	   combination	   thereof,	   but	   central	   ethnographers	   and	   statisticians	  suspected	  a	  heavy	  tilt	  toward	  the	  latter	  explanation.73	  It	  seems	  that	  a	  Moscow-­‐based	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  ll.	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  Hirsch,	  Empire	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   40	  cohort	  sought	  to	  retain	  the	  separate	  nationality	  category	  for	  each	  smaller	  Kartvelian	  group	  in	  order	  to	  leave	  room	  to	  “champion	  their	  national	  rights”	  later.74	  	   In	   the	   end,	   central	   and	   local	   census	   organs	   struck	   a	   compromise:	   separate	  census	  data	  was	  tabulated	  for	  Mingrelians,	  Ajarians,	  Laz,	  and	  Svans,	  but	  they	  would	  be	   counted	   as	   subgroups	   of	   the	   Georgian	   nationality,	   per	   Ruxaże’s	   schema.	   As	  collected	  (with	  discrete	  Kartvelian	  categories),	  the	  total	  population	  by	  narodnost’	  in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  for	  the	  1926	  census	  was:	  Georgians:	  1,461,349	   	   Armenians:	  306,376	  Ajarians:	  71,538	   	   	   Russians:	  95,922	  Mingrelians:	  243,244	   	   Jews:	  9,675	  Svans:	  12,155	  	   	   	   Turks:	  129,456	  Laz:	  660	   	   	   	   Persians:	  2,220	  Abkhaz:	  56,983	   	   	   Greeks:	  54,044	  Georgian	  Jews:	  18,435	   	   Other	  nationalities:	  68,115	  Ossetians:	  113,099	   	   	   Undeclared:	  1,438	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Foreign	  subjects:	  21,695	  
TOTAL:	  2,667,44075	  	  The	  numbers	  listed	  above	  reflect	  Ajarians,	  Mingrelians,	  Svans,	  and	  Laz	  as	  their	  own	  
narodnosti	   (that	   is,	   not	   as	   sub-­‐groups	   of	   Georgians),	   per	   Moscow’s	   original	   plan.	  According	   to	   the	   final	   distribution,	   in	  which	  Ajarians,	  Mingrelians,	   Svans,	   and	   Laz	  were	  listed	  as	  Georgian	  subgroups,	  Georgians	  of	  all	  stripes	  comprised	  just	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  republic’s	  population.76	  	  	   Yet	   the	   compromise	   solution	   still	   left	   room	   for	   further	   questions	   of	  categorization	   in	   the	   subsequent	   decade	   between	   censuses.	   In	   the	   interim,	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  peculiarities	  of	  the	  Ajarian,	  Laz,	  and	  Mingrelian	  issues	  emerged	  in	  discrete	  ways	  as	  these	   groups	   responded	   to	   early	   Soviet	   policies	   of	   korenizatsiia.	   Moreover,	   the	  related	  emergence	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  entitled	  nationalities,	  major	  nationalities,	  and	  national	  minorities	  raised	  the	  stakes	  for	  advocates	  of	  a	  single	  Georgian	  nationality.	  	  	   Perhaps	   the	  most	   perplexing	   issue	   was	   that	   of	   the	   Ajarians.	   The	   Ajaristan	  Autonomous	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republic	   (ASSR)	   was	   one	   of	   three	   autonomous	  territories	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   (in	   addition	   to	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR	   and	   the	   South	  Ossetian	   Autonomous	   Oblast’).77	  As	   subjects	   of	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   until	   1878,	  Ajarians	   were	   Sunni	   Muslims	   who	   spoke	   Georgian.	   Thus	   rather	   than	   autonomy	  based	   on	   national	   distinctions	   –	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   Abkhaz	   or	   Ossetian	  example	   –	   Ajarian	   autonomy	  was	   based	   on	   religious	   difference	   (between	  Muslim	  Ajarians	   and	   Orthodox	   Georgians).	   This	   peculiarity	   was	   a	   result	   of	   diplomatic	  compromise	   rather	   than	   ethnographic	   research,	   however,	   as	   Atatürk	   granted	   this	  territory	  to	  Lenin	  in	  March	  and	  October	  1921	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Treaties	  of	  Moscow	  and	  Kars	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  Ajaria’s	  inhabitants	  would	  enjoy	  autonomy	  based	  on	  this	  religious	  distinction.	  Even	  with	  the	  intensification	  of	  Soviet	  anti-­‐religious	  campaigns	  from	  the	   late	  1920s,	  Ajarian	  autonomy	  remained	   intact.	  As	  a	  result,	  Ajaria	  became	  an	   institutional	   outlier	   in	   a	   Soviet	   state	  with	   an	   ideologically-­‐grounded	   system	   of	  ethnoterritorial	  autonomy	  and	  entitlements.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  religious	  distinction,	  what	  made	  Ajarians	  Ajarian?	  Or,	  whom	  did	  Soviet	  census-­‐takers	  and	  policymakers	  want	  to	  categorize	  as	  Ajarian?	  In	  preparations	  for	  the	  1939	  census,	  Nikolai	  Iakovlev,	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   42	  head	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Archaeology	  and	  Ethnography’s	  (IAE)	  Caucasus	  detachment,	  acknowledged	   that	   Ajarians	   were	   Georgians	   “in	   the	   ethnographic	   sense”	   yet	  maintained	   that	   Ajarians	   should	   retain	   a	   separate	   census	   category	   as	   the	   entitled	  core	   of	   the	   Ajarian	   ASSR.78	  Meanwhile,	   Lavrenti	   Beria	   and	   Valerian	   Bak’raże,	   the	  respective	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	  and	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  Chairman,	  argued	  that	  distinguishing	   between	   Ajarians	   and	   Georgians	   directly	   contradicted	   Stalin’s	  definition	   of	   a	   nation	   because	   Ajarians	   and	   Georgians	   were	   united	   “by	   common	  language,	  territory,	  economic	  life,	  and	  culture.”79	  	   The	  Ajarian	  question	  was	  geographically	  linked	  to	  concerns	  about	  the	  Laz.	  Of	  the	  Kartvelian	   nationalities/Georgian	   subgroups,	   the	   Laz	  were	   by	   far	   the	   smallest	  group	  according	  to	  the	  1926	  census,	  with	  only	  660	  registered	  in	  the	  results.	  Unlike	  the	   Mingrelians,	   Svan,	   and	   Ajarians,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   Laz	   population	   resided	  outside	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  in	  northeastern	  Turkey.	  Known	  as	  Lazistan,	  this	   region	   had	   an	   estimated	   300,000	   Laz	   inhabitants	   in	   the	   early	   1930s	   and	  presented	   a	   potentially	   receptive	   audience	   in	   Turkey	   for	   Soviet	   propaganda	   and	  outreach	   based	   on	   cross-­‐border	   ethnic	   ties.	   However,	   it	   seems	   that	   promises	   of	  national,	  indigenizing	  institutions	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  early	  1930s	  created	  the	  opposite	  effect	  for	  the	  Laz	  residing	  in	  Georgia.	  The	  former	  editor	  of	  a	  Soviet	  Laz	  newspaper	  claimed	   that	   in	   the	   past	   five	   years	   (1929-­‐1934),	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   Laz	  residents	   had	   fled	   Abkhazia	   and	   Ajaria	   (where	   most	   Laz	   in	   Georgia	   resided)	   for	  Turkey,	   diminishing	   the	   Laz	   population	   in	   these	   autonomous	   republics	   by	   more	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  than	  half.80	  Interestingly,	  N.A.	  Tsitashi,	  the	  author	  of	  this	  report,	  cited	  a	  current	  (ca.	  1935)	  Laz	  population	  in	  Georgia	  of	  5,000,	  which	  had	  allegedly	  been	  reduced	  by	  half	  since	  1929.	  These	  numbers	  are	  considerably	  larger	  than	  the	  660	  Laz	  reported	  in	  the	  1926	   census,	   which	   lends	   some	   support	   to	   the	   suspicions	   of	   Moscow-­‐based	  ethnographers	  that	  Georgian	  census-­‐takers	  perhaps	  “Georgified”	  responses	  of	  some	  of	   the	   Kartvelian	   populations.	   Alternatively,	   Kartvelian	   respondents	   may	   have	  “Georgified”	   themselves	  when	   faced	  with	   census-­‐takers.	   In	   any	   case,	   not	   only	   had	  local	  authorities	  failed	  to	  support	  specifically	  Laz	  linguistic,	  cultural,	  and	  economic	  institutions	   in	  practice,	   they	   also	  had	  yet	   to	  devise	   a	  plan	   to	  work	   among	   the	  Laz	  population	  of	  Turkey	  for	  propaganda	  purposes.	  In	  the	  end,	  Tsitashi’s	  prediction,	  that	  development	   of	   Soviet	   Laz	   institutions	  would	   be	   rendered	   obsolete	   due	   to	   heavy	  outmigration,	   proved	   prescient	   due	   to	   concurrent	   migration	   to	   Turkey	   and	  consolidation	   of	   Laz	   into	   a	   larger	   Georgian	   nationality	   category.	   Interest	   in	   the	  larger	   Laz	   population	   in	   Turkey,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   would	   be	   revisited	   a	   decade	  later,	  as	  I	  discuss	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	   Of	   the	  Kartvelian	  narodnosti	   tabulated	   for	   the	  1926	  census,	   the	  Mingrelians	  had	   the	   largest	   population	   by	   far	   (243,244).	   This	   included	   not	   only	   residents	   of	  Mingrelia	   (samegrelo	   in	   Georgian),	   in	   northwest	   Georgia,	   but	   also	   much	   of	   the	  “Georgian”	  population	  of	  neighboring	  Abkhazia.	  Like	  Laz	  and	  Svan,	   the	  Mingrelian	  language	  (megruli)	  was	  primarily	  an	  oral	   form	  of	  communication	  and,	   though	  part	  of	  the	  Kartvelian	  language	  family,	  was	  not	  mutually	  comprehensible	  with	  Georgian.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  N.	  A	  Tsitashi	  to	  F.	  Makharadze,	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d	  529,	  ll.	  1-­‐3.	  
	   44	  Like	   the	  Laz,	   the	  ethnophilia	  ethos	  of	   the	  mid-­‐1920s	   inspired	  some	  Mingrelians	   to	  call	  for	  institutional	  support	  for	  Mingrelian	  language	  and	  cultural	  rights,	  which	  were	  granted	   in	   the	   form	  of	  newspapers	   and	  Mingrelian-­‐language	   education.	  Moreover,	  from	  1925,	  a	  movement	   for	  Mingrelian	  autonomy	  emerged,	  based	  on	  comparisons	  to	  the	  numerically	  smaller	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetians,	  who	  had	  “their	  own”	  autonomous	  republic	   and	   oblast’,	   respectively.	   The	   so-­‐called	   “Mingrelian	   question”	   –	   which	  entailed	  determining	   the	  extent	  of	  Party-­‐state	   support	  of	  Mingrelian	   institutions	  –	  acquired	  a	  greater	  urgency	  than	  similar	  issues	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Laz	  populations	  due	  to	  the	  larger	   size	   of	   the	   Mingrelian	   population	   and	   the	   involvement	   of	   key	   Mingrelian	  actors,	   such	   as	   Lavrenti	   Beria,	   who	   became	   the	   face	   of	   the	   campaign	   against	  Mingrelian	   autonomy	   and	   used	   his	   rising	   career	   to	   advocate	   for	   amalgamation	   of	  Mingrelian	   and	   other	   subgroups	   into	   the	   Georgian	   nationality.	   Though	   efforts	   to	  promote	  Mingrelian	   institutions	   continued	   into	   the	   1930s,	   with	   the	   promotion	   of	  Beria	  to	  First	  Secretary	  in	  1931,	  the	  newspaper	  and	  educational	  apparatus	  initiated	  in	  the	  1920s	  was	  gradually	  dismantled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Georgian	  language,	  as	  support	  for	   a	   single	   Georgian	   nationality	   overtook	   early	   korenizatsiia	   goals	   to	   nationalize	  smaller	  collectives.81	  	  	   The	   discrete	   Kartvelian	   groups	   subordinated	   to	   the	   Georgian	   “major	  nationality”	  created	  an	  ambiguous	  situation:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  “Georgians,”	   they	  enjoyed	   privileges	   as	   members	   of	   the	   entitled	   Georgian	   nationality,	   such	   as	  preferential	  status	  for	  jobs,	  education,	  Party	  membership,	  and	  institutional	  support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Timothy	  K.	  Blauvelt,	   “The	   ‘Mingrelian	  Question’:	   Institutional	  Resources	  and	   the	  Limits	  of	  Soviet	  Nationality	  Policy,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  66,	  no.	  6	  (July	  2014):	  993–1013.	  
	   45	  for	  Georgian	  language	  and	  culture	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Mingrelians,	   Svans,	   and	  Laz	   in	  many	   instances	   sought	   to	  mobilize	   the	  ethnophilic	   institutions	   of	   korenizatsiia	   to	   advance	   their	   own	   languages	   and	  reinforce	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  collectives	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  hegemonic	  Georgian	  major	  nationality.	   The	   latter	   behavior	   was	   more	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   national	  minorities,	  which	  comprised	  approximately	  a	  third	  of	  Georgia’s	  population.	  	  As	   part	   of	   the	   “affirmative	   action”	   policies	   designed	   to	   privilege	   entitled	  nationalities	   in	   “their”	   territory,	   statisticians	  and	  others	  engaged	   in	   the	  process	  of	  national	   categorization	   began	   to	   amalgamate	   all	   non-­‐Georgians	   (as	   non-­‐entitled	  nationalities)	  as	  “national	  minorities”	  (Russian	  abbreviation	  natsmeny).	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  the	  highly	  ethnically	  diverse	  populace	  depicted	  in	  the	  raw	  data	  from	  the	  1926	  census,	   a	   Georgian	   CC	   sub-­‐commission	   on	   national	   minorities	   amalgamated	   the	  Kartvelian	  groups	  as	  Georgians	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  populace	  simply	  as	  natsmeny.	  In	  Georgia,	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  national	  minorities	  were	  Armenians	  (11.6%	  of	  total	  GSSR	  population),	   “Turks”	   (5%),	   Ossetians	   (4.3%),	   “Russians,	   with	   Ukrainians	   and	  Beloussians”	   (4%),	   Abkhaz	   (2.1%),	   and	   Greeks	   (2%). 82 	  Even	   this	   seemingly	  straightforward	  list	  reveals	  much	  about	  how	  Georgian	  planners	  understood	  national	  distinctions	   and	   ethnoterritorial	   consolidation.	   First,	   Abkhaz	   and	   Ossetians	   were	  regarded	   as	  natsmeny	   even	   though	   the	   vast	  majority	   resided	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR	  and	  South	  Ossetian	  AO,	  respectively,	  where	  they	  were	  the	  entitled	  nationalities.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  “Zakliuchenie	  po	  glave	  obshchego	  obzora	  rasseleniia	  natsmenov	  po	  territorii	  SSRGruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  117,	  ll.	  177-­‐183.	  The	  “Turk”	  category	  refers	  to	  those	  groups	  who	  would	  be	  classified	  as	  “Azerbaijani”	   in	   later	   Soviet	   censuses.	   In	   the	   1926	   census,	   this	   iteration	   of	   “Turk”	   appears	   as	   a	  “nationality	  of	  the	  Transcaucasus,”	  unlike	  the	  diaspora	  nationality	  “Osman	  Turk”	  of	  Turkey.	  
	   46	  Russian	   group	   is	   phrased	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   “Georgians,	   with	   Mingrelians	   and	  Svans,”	   which	   suggests	   a	   similar	   understanding	   of	   ethnic	   amalgamation	   and	  hierarchy	  among	  the	  dominant	  Georgian	  and	  Russian	  nationalities.83	  The	  particular	  national	  distinctions	  among	  these	  groups	  mattered	  less	  than	  their	  collective	  status	  as	  non-­‐Georgians.	  	  The	   question	   of	   national	   minorities	   likewise	   had	   important	   geographic	  ramifications,	  as	  certain	  regions	  in	  the	  south,	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,	  and	  in	  Tbilisi	  had	  particularly	  high	  concentrations	  of	  non-­‐Georgians.	  For	  example,	   in	  Axalk’alak’i	  and	  Borčalo	  districts,	  natsmeny	   comprised	  94.3/90.2	  percent	  and	  98/89.6	  percent	  of	  the	  urban/rural	  populations,	  respectively.	  Due	  to	  their	  proximity	  to	  the	  borders	  of	   the	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	  SSRs,	   these	  areas	  had	  (and	  have)	   large	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	  populations.84	  In	  Tbilisi,	  Georgia’s	  capital	  and	  largest	  city,	  natsmeny	  made	  up	  over	  59	  percent	  of	  the	  population:	  34.4	  percent	  of	  Tbilisi’s	  residents	  were	  Armenian	   by	   nationality,	   according	   to	   the	   1926	   census,	   and	   16.4	   percent	   were	  Russian.85	  The	   prevalence	   of	   non-­‐Georgians	   in	   the	   republic	   was	   therefore	   not	  merely	  an	  issue	  of	  border	  or	  coastal	  regions,	  but	  one	  that	  was	  readily	  visible	  in	  the	  national	  capital.	  	  The	  Second	  All-­‐Union	  Census	  of	   the	  Population,	  and	  the	   first	  census	  “under	  socialism,”	  the	  achievement	  of	  which	  Stalin	  announced	  in	  a	  speech	  in	  1936,	  was	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  The	  “national	  majority”	  was	  described	  in	  this	  manner	  in	  “Gorodskoe	  i	  sel’skoe	  naselenie	  SSR	  Gruzii	  po	  priznaku:	  natsmen	  i	  nats.bol’sh.,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  268,	  ll.	  186-­‐187.	  This	  description	  reflects	  the	  tiny	  number	  of	  Laz	  and	  recognition	  already	  that	  Ajarians	  and	  Georgians	  were	  one	  and	  the	  same	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  majority/minority	  classification.	  84	  “Prilozhenie	  k	  glave	  obshchego	  obzora	  rasseleniia	  natsmen’shinstv	  na	  territorii	  SSR	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  117,	  l.	  179.	  85	  Ibid.,	  l.	  183.	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  take	  place	  in	  1937.	  Two	  five-­‐year	  plans	  after	  its	  predecessor,	  the	  1937	  census	  was	  supposed	   to	   demographically	   and	   statistically	   depict	   the	   progress	   made	   in	   the	  development	  of	   “socialism	   in	  one	   country”	   in	   all	   spheres,	   from	  population	  growth	  and	   literacy	   to	   national	   development.	   	   As	   early	   as	   1934,	   census	   officials	   expected	  that	   the	   list	  of	  191	  narodnosti	   of	   the	  1926	  census	  would	  need	   to	  be	   condensed	   in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  “ethnohistorical	  evolution	  of	  the	  population”	  into	  a	  smaller	  number	   of	   developed	   nationalities. 86 	  As	   the	   USSR	   IAE	   and	   the	   Institute	   of	  Nationalities	  began	  to	  refine	  their	  lists,	  however,	  Stalin	  mentioned	  in	  a	  speech	  about	  the	   1936	   constitution	   that	   “there	   are	   about	   sixty	   nations,	   national	   groups,	   and	  
narodnosti	   in	   the	   Soviet	  Union.”87	  While	   the	   IAE	   and	   Institute	   of	  Nationalities	   had	  already	  cut	  their	  lists	  to	  around	  100	  natsionalnosti	  (the	  choice	  of	  category	  reflecting	  progress	   purportedly	  made	   in	   ethnohistorical	   development),	   cutting	   a	   further	   40	  groups	  would	  prove	   challenging.	  Many	  of	   the	   “cuts”	   they	  already	  made	  dealt	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “diaspora	  nationalities,”	  or	  nationalities	  with	  “homelands”	  outside	  the	  USSR	  (such	  as	  Germans,	  Poles,	  or	  Koreans).	   	  These	  would	  become	  a	  category	  unto	  themselves	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  World	  War	  Two,	  as	  such	  populations	  were	  considered	  a	  security	   threat,	   particularly	   in	   border	   regions.	   With	   regard	   to	   Kartvelian	  populations,	   the	   1937	   list	   amalgamated	   Mingrelians,	   Svans,	   and	   Laz	   into	   the	  “Georgian”	  category	  yet	  retained	  a	  separate	  position	  for	  Ajarians,	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  Ajarian	  autonomous	  status	  (in	  the	  Ajarian	  ASSR).88	  The	  1937	  census	  did	  not	  live	  up	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  276. 
87 Quoted	  in Ibid.,	  283.	  See	  also	  Slezkine,	  “The	  USSR	  as	  a	  Communal	  Apartment.” 
88 Iu.	  A.	  Poliakov,	  ed.,	  Vsesoiuznaia	  perepis’	  naseleniia	  1937	  goda:	  Obshchie	  itogi:	  Sbornik	  dokumentov	  i	  
materialov	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2007),	  207. 
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  to	   its	   task,	  however,	  as	   it	  depicted	  a	  decrease	   in	   the	  overall	  Soviet	  population	  and	  likewise	   reflected	   sharp	   drops	   among	   Ukrainians	   and	   Kazakhs,	   victims	   of	  collectivization-­‐induced	  famine.	  For	  these	  and	  other	  reasons,	  the	  data	  from	  the	  1937	  was	   deemed	   “defective,”	   was	   not	   released	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   the	   census	   was	   re-­‐administered	  in	  1939.89	  	   The	  1939	  “Second”	  All-­‐Union	  Census	  of	  the	  Population	  adopted	  a	  simplified	  and	   consolidated	   vocabulary	   of	   nationality	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   likewise	   presented	   a	  smaller	   number	   of	   consolidated,	   indigenous	   Soviet	   nationalities	   (62	   “nations,	  national	  groups,	  and	  narodnosti”)	  and	  their	  diaspora	  nationality	  counterparts	  (30).	  Census-­‐takers	   still	   needed	   to	   be	   prepared	   to	   encounter	   self-­‐designations	   that	   did	  not	   correspond	  with	   the	   current	   Soviet	   nationality	   nomenclature,	   however.	  While	  Georgians,	  Abkhaz,	  and	  Ossetians	  appeared	  on	   the	  official	   list	  of	   “nations,	  national	  groups,	   and	   narodnosti,”	   census-­‐takers	   in	   the	   field	   could	   encounter	   the	   following	  terms	  as	  listed	  in	  the	  	  “systematic	  dictionary”	  provided	  by	  the	  CSA:	  GEORGIANS:	  Kartveli	  (Vratsi,	  Giurdzhi,	  Pshavy,	  Khevsury,	  Tushiny,	  Ingiloi)90	  	   	   Mingrelians	  (Megreli,	  Margali,	  Mintrel’tsy,	  Mingrely)	  	   	   Svans	  (Shvanar,	  Mushvan,	  Ebze)	  	   	   Laz	  (Lazi,	  Atintsy,	  Chani)	  	   	   Batsbii	  (Batsbiy,	  Batsav,	  Batsoi,	  Batsuo,	  Tushi,	  Tsova/Tushiny)	  	   	   Ajarians	  (Adzhareli)	  ABKHAZ:	  (Apkhazi,	  Apsatsva,	  Apsua,	  Azega,	  Bzyby,	  Bzybtsi,	  Abzhuitsy)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid.,	  22. 90 	  For	   example,	   Kartveli,	   Vratsi,	   and	   Giurdzhi	   mean	   Georgian	   in	   Georgian,	   Armenian,	   and	  Turkish/Azerbaijani,	   respectively,	   whereas	   Pshavy,	   Khevsuri,	   Tushiny,	   and	   Ingiloi	   refer	   to	   specific	  territories	   in	  which	  Georgian-­‐speakers	   reside	   (the	   first	   three	  are	   in	   the	  mountainous	  northeastern	  region	  of	  Georgia,	  whereas	  the	  Ingilo	  are	  in	  the	  Zaqatala,	  Balakan,	  and	  Qax	  districts	  of	  the	  Azerbaijan	  SSR	  I	  examine	  the	  Ingilo	  case	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  This	  list	  was	  in	  Russian,	  so	  I	  retain	  the	  Russian	  system	  of	  transliteration	  here	  instead	  of	  Georgian.	  	  
	   49	  The	   terms	   in	   parentheses	   comprise	   words	   for	   Georgian,	   Abkhaz,	   and	   designated	  subgroups	   in	   local	   languages	   and	   dialects.	   Other	  major	   nationalities	   and	   national	  minorities	   also	   contained	   the	   Georgian	   terminology	   for	   those	   groups,	   including	  Armenians	  (somexi)	  and	  Greeks	  (berżeni).91	  	  	   The	   results	   of	   the	   1939	   all-­‐Union	   census	   reflected	   the	   processes	   of	  
categorical	  ethnonational	  consolidation	  in	  favor	  of	  major	  nationalities	  –	  and	  above	  all,	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nationality	  –	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  preceding	  decade.	  	  
Table	   1:	   Georgian	   SSR	   Population	   by	   Nationality	   according	   to	   the	   1939	   All-­‐Union	  
Census92	  









AO	  (%)	  Georgian	   2,173,922	  (61.4)	   228,394	  (44)	   91,967	  (29.5)	   127,542	  (63.7)	   27,525	  (26)	  Armenian	   415,013	  (11.7)	   137,331	  (26.4)	   49,705	  (15.9)	   14,085	  (7)	   -­‐	  Russian	   308,684	  (8.7)	   93,337	  (18)	   60,201	  (19.3)	   30,535	  (15.3)	   -­‐	  Azerbaijani	   188,058	  (5.2)	   5,874	  (1.1)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Ossetian	   147,677	  (4.2)	   9,328	  (1.8)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   72,266	  (68)	  Greek	   84,636	  (2.4)	   -­‐	   34,621	  (11.1)	   7,959	  (4)	   -­‐	  Abkhaz	   57,805	  (1.6)	   -­‐	   56,197	  (18)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Ukrainian	   45,595	  (1.3)	   7,415	  (1.4)	   8,593	  (2.8)	   6,866	  (3.4)	   -­‐	  Jewish	   42,300	  (1.2)	   13,915	  (2.7)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  German	   20,527	  (0.6)	   5,528	  (1.1)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Other	   55,806	  (1.7)	   13,587	  (2.6)	   10,601	  (3.4)	   6,706	  (3.4)	   6,327	  (6)	  
TOTAL	   3,540,023	   519,220	   311,885	   200,106	   106,118	  	  With	   the	   simplification	   and	   reduction	   of	   Georgian	   and	   non-­‐Georgian	   categorical	  distinctions	   via	   the	   1939	   census,	   the	   geographic	   distribution	   of	   nationalities	  likewise	  became	  clearer.	  Of	  the	  fifty-­‐three	  districts	  in	  Georgia	  proper,	  forty-­‐one	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  “PERECHEN’	   natsional’nosti,	   vydeliaemykh	   pri	   razrabotke	   vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	   1939	  goda”	  and	  “Sistematicheskii	  slovar’”,	  uic’a,	  f.	  334,	  op.	  12,	  d.	  127,	  ll.	  1-­‐9.	  92	  Vsesoiuznaia	  perepis’	  naseleniia	  1939	  goda:	  Osnovye	  itogi	  (Moscow:	  Nauka,	  1992),	  71-­‐72.	  
	   50	  “Georgian”	   majority	   populations	   (or,	   in	   many	   cases,	   almost	   exclusively	   Georgian	  populations).	  The	  remaining	   twelve	  districts,	  however,	  had	  either	  exclusively	  non-­‐Georgian	  inhabitants	  or	  a	  non-­‐Georgian	  population	  that	  was	  between	  twice	  and	  ten	  times	   higher	   than	   the	   Georgian	   one.93	  Of	   particular	   note	   are	   Adigeni,	   Aspinża,	  Axalk’alak’i,	  Axalc’ixe,	  and	  Bogdanov	  districts,	  from	  which	  90,000	  “Turks,	  Kurds,	  and	  Khemshins”	  (Armenian	  Muslims)	  would	  be	  expelled	  in	  1944,	  as	  detailed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	   Borčalo	   and	   Calka	   districts	   likewise	   had	   considerable	   Azerbaijani,	  Armenian,	   and	   Greek	   populations	   with	   almost	   no	   Georgians	   reported,	   yet	   later	  expulsion	   operations	   seem	   to	   have	   avoided	   these	   areas.	   Tbilisi	   remained	   divided	  among	  Georgians,	  Armenians,	  Russians,	  and	  Azerbaijanis	  (with	  adult	  populations	  of	  139,444;	   118,160;	   48,805;	   and	   17,779	   respectively).	   In	   Abkhazia,	   most	   Abkhaz	  residents	  lived	  in	  the	  Gudauta	  and	  Ochamchire	  districts,	  and	  Georgians,	  Armenians,	  and	  Greeks	  in	  Sukhumi	  and	  its	  environs.	  The	  Gali	  district,	  which	  bordered	  Mingrelia,	  was	  the	  most	  Georgian	  by	  nationality	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  districts.94	  	  In	   short,	   the	   consolidation	   of	   Georgian	   categories	   for	   the	   1939	   all-­‐Union	  census	   allowed	   nation-­‐building	   statisticians	   and	   officials	   alike	   to	   find	   what	   they	  were	  looking	  for	  –	  a	  more	  “Georgian”	  Georgia	  -­‐-­‐	  by	  limiting	  the	  official	  discourse	  of	  available	   options	   for	   expressing	   one’s	   nationality.	   However,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  ethnonational	   consolidation	  was	   experienced	   in	   practice	   remained	   a	   considerable	  work	  in	  progress	  that	  would	  continue	  for	  subsequent	  decades.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  uic’a	  f.	  334,	  op.	  12,	  d.	  137,	  l.	  7.	  94	  Ibid.	  
	   51	  	   The	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  conduct	  another	  all-­‐Union	  census	  until	  1959	  –	  two	  decades	   and	   a	  world	  war	   away	   from	   the	  most	   recent	   one	   in	   1939.	   As	   a	   result,	   it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  account	  for	  the	  enormous	  changes	  among	  Soviet	  inhabitants	  in	  the	   interim	   years.	  War	   casualties,	   voluntary	   resettlement,	   and	   forced	   deportation	  certainly	   altered	   the	   ethnonational	   composition	   of	   Soviet	   republics,	   yet	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   census	   the	   specifics	   of	   such	   trends	   remain	   challenging,	   if	  impossible,	   to	   track.	   	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   census	   nationality	   categories	   in	   the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  however,	  the	  1959	  categories	  (as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  the	  1970	  and	  1979	  censuses)	   remained	   the	   same	   as	   those	   in	   1939.	   The	   consolidation	   of	   “Georgian	  tribes”	   into	  a	   single	  Georgian	  nationality,	  which	  over	   time	   increasingly	   reaped	   the	  benefits	  of	  its	  entitled	  status,	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  conceptual,	  historical	  conquest	  of	  Georgian	   territories	   and	   peoples	   in	   the	   1940s.	   Not	   only	   would	   there	   be	   “no	  fractions”	   at	   the	   individual/personal	   level	   of	   nationality	   (that	   is,	   one	   could	   claim	  only	  one	  nationality),	  there	  would	  be	  no	  ethnolinguistic	  distinctions	  –	  or	  “fractions”	  –among	   Kartvelians	   in	   contemporary,	   Soviet	   Georgia.95 	  Such	   distinctions	   were	  historical	   rather	   than	   a	   living	   feature	   of	   the	  modern	  Georgian	  nationality	   built	   by	  Soviet	  institutions.	  	  
Historiography	  	  	   The	   categorization	   and	   enumeration	   of	   Georgia’s	   populace	   went	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  a	  search	  for	  a	  usable	  past	  for	  the	  entitled	  Georgian	  nationality.	  Because,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  The	  “fraction”	  terminology	  is	  again	  adapted	  from	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  166.	  
	   52	  Stalin’s	   formulation,	   the	  nation	  must	  be	   “historically	   constituted,”	  determining	   the	  narrative	   and	   parameters	   of	   such	   a	   history	   presented	   a	   task	   of	   existential	  significance	   for	   academic	   nation-­‐builders	   and	   their	   policymaking	   counterparts.	  Though	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  Georgian	  history,	  Ivane	  Javaxišvili,	  wrote	  his	  most	   influential	   works	   during	   the	   tsarist	   and	   independent	   periods,	   a	   form	   of	  Georgian	   academic	   nationalism	   came	   into	   being	   in	   practice	   via	   the	   dual	   Soviet	  institutional	   infrastructure	   of	   national	   Academies	   of	   Sciences	   and	   the	   enabling	  mechanisms	   of	   korenizatsiia	   and	   ethnic	   consolidation.	   I	   tell	   the	   story	   of	   the	  development	  and	  propagation	  Georgian	  academic	  nationalism	  through	  a	  three-­‐way	  biography	  of	   its	  most	  prominent	  protagonists:	  Simon	   Janašia,	  Nikoloz	  Berżenišvili,	  and	   their	   eventual	   institutional	   home,	   the	   Ivane	   Javaxišvili	   Institute	   of	   History,	  Archaeology	  and	  Ethnography	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  	   Simon	  Nikolozis	  że	  Janašia	  was	  born	  in	  1900	  in	  Ozurget’i	  district,	  in	  western	  Georgia.	   He	   was	   the	   son	   of	   prominent	   Georgian	   ethnographer	   and	   teacher	   N.S.	  Janašia.	  He	  attended	  secondary	  school	   in	  Sukhumi	   (Abkhazia)	  and,	   in	  1918,	  began	  his	   studies	   in	   the	   departments	   of	   history	   and	   linguistics	   at	   the	   newly	   established	  Tbilisi	  State	  University.	  Upon	  his	  graduation	  in	  1922,	  he	  entered	  the	  department	  of	  history	   at	   TSU	   as	   a	   graduate	   student	   under	   the	   supervision	   of	   Ivane	   Javaxišvili,	  focusing	  on	  ancient	  Georgian	  history.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  his	  graduate	  studies,	  he	  lectured	  at	  TSU	  and	  at	  the	  Tbilisi	  Pedagogical	  Institute	  on	  the	  history	  of	  Georgia,	  the	  Abkhaz	   language	   (in	  which	  he	  was	   fluent),	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Caucasian	  mountain	  tribes,	   and	   source	   studies	   in	  Georgian	   history,	   and	   led	   seminars	   on	   the	   history	   of	  
	   53	  Georgia.	  In	  1932,	  Janašia	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CEC’s	  Committee	  for	  the	  Protection	   of	   Ancient	   Monuments	   and,	   in	   1934,	   was	   invited	   as	   a	   scholar	   to	   the	  Institute	   of	   Caucasus	   Studies	   (Kavkazovedenie)	   at	   the	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   of	   the	  USSR	   In	   1936,	   he	   was	   appointed	   director	   of	   the	   new	   Nikolai	   Marr	   Institute	   of	  Language,	   History,	   and	   Material	   Culture	   of	   the	   Georgian	   branch	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Academy	   of	   Sciences.	   After	   defending	   his	   doctoral	   dissertation	   on	   “The	   Feudal	  Revolution	   in	  Georgia”	  at	   the	   (renamed)	  Stalin	  Tbilisi	   State	  University	   in	  1938,	  he	  became	   a	   member	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   branch	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Academy	   of	  Sciences.96	  	  	   Janašia	  was,	  by	  all	  measures,	  a	  prolific	  scholar	  and	  writer.	  He	  published	  over	  fifty	   academic	  works,	  mostly	   about	   the	   ancient	   history	   of	   Georgia.	   Underlying	   his	  research	  lay	  a	  new	  conception	  of	  history	  that	  argued	  that	  “ancient”	  Georgia	  was	  an	  organic	   yet	   original	   part	   of	   the	  wider	  world,	   including	   not	   only	   the	   Caucasus,	   but	  also	   the	   larger	   region	   comprising	   the	  Near	  East.	  Moreover,	   Janašia	   incorporated	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines	  and	  methodologies	  in	  his	  work,	   from	  linguistics,	  archaeology,	  and	  history	  to	  ethnography	  and	  anthropology.	  Some	  of	  the	  main	  ideas	  and	  themes	  explored	  by	  Janašia	  included:	  the	  genetic	  link	  between	  Georgian	  tribes	  and	  peoples	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  the	  ancient	  Near	  East;	  ancient	  social	  structures	  among	  Georgian	  tribes;	   the	  historical	   geography	  of	  Georgia,	   the	  Caucasus,	   and	   the	  Near	  East;	   state	  formation	   in	   Georgia	   and	   the	   Caucasus;	   and	   the	  movement	   of	   populations	   on	   the	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  “Avtobiografiia	  S.N.	  Dzhanashiia,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  20,	  ll.	  3-­‐4.	  
	   54	  territory	  of	  Georgia.97	  In	  addition	  to	  writing	  and	  teaching,	  he	  led	  numerous	  scholarly	  expeditions	   throughout	   Georgia	   and	   the	   Caucasus,	   including	   an	   Abkhaz-­‐language	  expedition	   in	   Abkhazia	   (1921),	   archaeological	   expeditions	   around	   K’art’li	   (1922-­‐1923),	   Axalc’ixe	   district	   (1924),	   and	   Upper	   Imeret’i	   and	   Javaxet’i	   (1932),	   and	  ethnographic	   and	   linguistic	   expeditions	   in	   Adigei,	   Ossetia,	   Kabarda,	   and	   Dagestan	  (1929).98	  	   Later	   in	   his	   career,	   he	   directed	   the	  Georgian	  Academy	   of	   Sciences’	   first	  major	   archaeological	   expedition,	   in	   Mc’xet’a,	   from	   1940.	   As	   his	   academic	   and	  professional	   profile	   expanded,	   Janašia	   became	   increasingly	   involved	   in	   state	   and	  Party	  structures.	  Highlights	  included	  membership	  in	  the	  Institute’s	  Party	  committee	  and	  in	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Communist	  Party	  in	  1940.	  He	  was	  awarded	  the	  Order	  of	  Lenin	  (1941),	  the	  Stalin	  Prize	  (1943),	  a	  second	  Order	  of	  Lenin	  (1944),	  and	  the	  medal	  “For	  the	  Defense	  of	  the	  Caucasus”	  for	  work	  during	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	  (1945).	  	   Nikoloz	  Aleksandres	  że	  Berżenišvili	  was	  born	  in	  1895	  into	  a	  peasant	   family	  in	  Č’oxatauri	  district	  (western	  Georgia).	  He	  attended	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school	  in	  Batumi,	  but	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  Russian	  revolution	  and	  civil	  war	  (in	  his	  words)	  prevented	   him	   from	   accepting	   admission	   into	   Moscow	   University’s	   philosophy	  department.	   In	   1920,	   he	   began	   studying	   in	   Tbilisi	   State	   University’s	   philosophy	  faculty,	  but	  soon	  transferred	  to	  history.	  From	  1926,	  Berżenišvili	  began	  his	  doctoral	  work	  on	  Georgian	  history	  under	   the	  guidance	  of	   Javaxišvili.	  Beginning	   in	  1929,	  he	  lectured	  at	  TSU	  on	  Georgian	  history,	  source	  studies,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  Georgian	  law,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  “Zhizn’	   i	  deiatel’nost’	  S.N	  Dzhanashia,	  18/11/1900-­‐15/11/1947	  g.,”	   smeaa,	   f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  20a,	   ll.	  145-­‐159	   and	   N.	   Berżenisvili,	   “prop’	   simon	   nikolozis	   że	   janašias	   samec’niero	   moġvaeobis	  daxasiat’eba,”	  April	  1941,	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  20a,	  ll.	  85-­‐89.	  98	  For	  his	  field	  diary	  from	  the	  1929	  Cherkess	  expedition,	  see	  Simon	  Dzhanashia,	  Cherkesskie	  dnevniki	  (Tbilisi:	  Kavkazskii	  Dom,	  2007).	  
	   55	  the	  topic	  of	  his	  doctoral	  dissertation.99	  His	  research	  interests	  focused	  on	  Georgia	  in	  the	   era	   of	   feudalism	   (ca.	   thirteenth-­‐eighteenth	   centuries)	   and	   Marxist	  interpretations	  of	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  history	  of	  Georgia	  in	  the	  middle	  ages,	   including	   questions	   of	   state	   formation.	   Within	   these	   topics,	   Berżenišvili	  examined	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people	  against	  foreign	  conquest,	  the	  history	  of	   Russo-­‐Georgian	   relations,	   and	   the	   development	   of	   culture	   and	   the	   national	  liberation	  movement.	  	  Like	  Janašia,	  he	  incorporated	  historiography,	  source	  studies,	  archaeology,	   and	   historical	   geography	   into	   his	   scholarship.100	  In	   addition	   to	   his	  research	   and	   publications,	   Berżenišvili	   taught	   at	   universities	   and	   pedagogical	  institutes	   in	  Tbilisi	   and	  K’ut’aisi	   and	   co-­‐authored	  or	   edited	   textbooks	  on	  Georgian	  history.	   He	   also	   served	   as	   the	   primary	   Georgian	   contributor	   to	   the	   Moscow-­‐led	  series,	  Ocherki	   istorii	   SSSR.	   Berżenišvili	   led	   TSU’s	   department	   of	   Georgian	   history	  from	   1946-­‐1956	   and,	   from	   1948	   to	   his	   death	   in	   1965,	   served	   as	   director	   of	   the	  Javaxišvili	  Institute.101	  He	  served	  as	  a	  deputy	  to	  the	  Tbilisi	  City	  Soviet	  and	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Communist	  Party	  in	  1944.	  102	  	   Janašia’s	   and	  Berżenišvili’s	  professional	   lives	   intertwined	   in	  many	  ways:	   as	  contemporaries	   and	   colleagues	   splitting	   their	   time	   between	   Georgia’s	   flagship	  university	  and	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  they	  collaborated	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  projects	  in	  the	   1930s	   and	   1940s.	   Both	   historians	   shared	   an	   academic	   “father”	   in	   Ivane	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  “Avtobiografiia	  N.	  Berdzenishvili,”	  16	  May	  1938,	  smeaa	  f.	  9,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  51a,	  l.	  30.	  100	  “Uchenyi,	  pedagog,	  grazhdanin:	  Pamiati	  Nikolaia	  Aleksndrovicha	  Berdzenishvili,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  9,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  51a,	  ll.	  224-­‐228.	  101	  Ibid.	  102	  “Kratkaia	  nauhchnaia	  i	  delovaia	  kharakteristika,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  9,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  51a,	  ll.	  117-­‐126.	  
	   56	  Javaxišvili,	  who	  supervised	  their	  dissertations	  at	  TSU.	  The	  establishment	  in	  Tbilisi	  of	  the	  Nikolai	  Marr	  Institute	  of	  Language,	  History,	  and	  Material	  Culture	  in	  1936	  as	  an	  affiliate	   of	   the	   USSR	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   initiated	   the	   institutionalization	   of	  interdisciplinary	   and	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   approaches	   toward	   Georgian	   history	  advocated	  by	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili.103	  On	  22	  February	  1941,	  coinciding	  with	  the	  twentieth	  anniversary	  of	  Soviet	  power	  in	  Georgia,	  the	  Georgian	  Council	  of	  People’s	  Commissars	  established	   the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	   the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  and	   Janašia	  was	   chosen	   as	   the	   Academy’s	   vice-­‐president.104	  The	   concurrent	   trends	   of	   greater	  academic	   decentralization	   and	   rising	   interest	   in	   nationalism	   (with	   regard	   to	   the	  war)	  emanating	  from	  Moscow-­‐	  and	  Leningrad-­‐based	  institutes	  not	  only	  allowed,	  but	  enabled	   the	   new	   republic	   academies	   of	   sciences	   to	   pursue	   research	   agendas	   in	  accordance	  with	  local	  and	  national	  interests.105	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  reorganization,	   the	   aforementioned	  Marr	   Institute	  was	   reestablished	   as	   the	   Ivane	  Javaxišvili	   Institute	   of	   History,	   Archaeology	   and	   Ethnography	   in	   1943	   (Javaxišvili	  died	  in	  1940),	  and	  Janašia	  was	  named	  as	  its	  director.	  Berżenišvili	  succeeded	  Janašia	  as	  director	  in	  1948,	  following	  Janašia’s	  death.	  From	   their	   inception,	   the	   scholars	   of	   the	   Marr	   and	   Javaxišvili	   Institutes	  pursued	   such	   diverse	   projects	   as	   ethnographic	   expeditions	   in	   rural	   regions	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103 	  The	   first	   USSR	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   branch	   in	   the	   Caucasus	   was	   established	   as	   the	  Transcaucasian	   branch	   in	   1931,	   which	   split	   into	   the	   three	   Azerbaijan,	   Armenian,	   and	   Georgian	  branches	   in	   1935,	   from	   which	   the	   Marr	   Institute	   developed,	   Alexander	   Vucinich,	   Empire	   of	  
Knowledge:	   The	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   of	   the	   USSR	   (1917-­‐1970)	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	  Press,	  1984),	  145.	  104	  The	   Georgian	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   was	   the	   first	   republic-­‐level	   academy	   established,	   followed	  shortly	  thereafter	  by	  Uzbekistan	  (1943),	  Armenia	  (1943),	  Azerbaijan	  (1945),	  and	  Kazakhstan	  (1945).	  The	  final	  republic	  academy	  to	  be	  established	  was	  Moldova	  (1963).	  105	  Vucinich,	  Empire	  of	  Knowledge,	  202.	  
	   57	  Georgia,	   studies	   in	   Abkhaz	   linguistics	   and	   history,	   and	   historical	   research	   on	  Georgian	   communities	   in	   Turkey.	   Ethnographic	   expeditions	   focused	   not	   only	   on	  gathering	  objects	  of	  material	  culture,	  but	  also	  on	  documenting	  so-­‐called	  “survivals”	  of	   older	   Georgian	   traditions	   in	   the	   more	   remote	   areas,	   from	   pagan	   religious	  practices	   to	   family	   structures.	   Additionally,	   Marr	   Institute	   scholars	   prepared	  textbooks	  for	  teaching	  Georgian	  as	  a	  foreign	  language	  to	  Armenian,	  Abkhaz,	  Russian,	  and	  Ossetian	   speakers	   and	  developed	   a	   new	  orthographic	   system	   for	  Abkhaz	   and	  Ossetian	   based	   on	   the	   Georgian	   alphabet. 106 	  This	   latter	   project	   would	   be	  implemented	   in	   1945,	   when	   the	   Abkhaz	   and	   Ossetian	   languages	   were	   officially	  converted	  to	  a	  Georgian	  alphabet.107	  In	   its	   Javaxišvili	   Institute	  iteration	  from	  1943,	  the	  Institute	  continued	  to	  study	  “the	  Georgian	  nation	  and	  history	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  since	  antiquity”	  and	  “ethnography	  and	  archaeology	  of	  Georgia	  and	  the	  Caucasus.”	   In	   conjunction	  with	   the	  Great	   Patriotic	  War,	   the	   Institute	   introduced	   a	  research	   theme	   in	   1943	   on	   “the	   Georgian	   people’s	   struggle	   against	   foreign	  invaders.”108	  Scholarly	   and	  political	   goals	  were	   fused	   as	   the	  work	  of	   the	   institutes	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  S.N.	   Dzhanashia,	   “O	   rabote	   Institute	   Iazyka,	   Istorii	   i	   Material’noi	   Kul’tury	   im.	  Marra	   Gruz.	   FAN	  SSSR	  s	  1936	  goda	  po	  avgust	  1939	  goda,”	  smeaa	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  79,	  ll.	  1-­‐24.	  107	  On	  the	  switch	  to	  Georgian	  orthography	  for	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetian	  languages	  from	  1938-­‐1954	  and	  increased	  teaching	  of	  Georgian	  in	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetian	  schools,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  21,	  d.	  298,	  ll.	  1-­‐128;	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  133,	  l.	  9;	  and	  RGASPI,	  f.	  558,	  op.	  11,	  d.	  882,	  ll.	  51-­‐54.	  This	  occurred	  at	  the	   time	   (from	   1938)	   of	   increased	   Russian-­‐language	   education	   and	   closure	   of	   national	   minority	  schools	  (e.g.	  German,	  Estonian,	  Finnish)	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  RGANI,	  f.	  89,	  op.	  62,	  d.	  8.	  108 	  “sak’art’velos	   ssr	   mec’nierebat’a	   akademia	   istoriis	   instituti	   angariši:	   1943	   cels	   č’atarebuli	  mušaobisa,”	  uic’a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  7100,	  ll.	  67-­‐71.	  
	   58	  became	   increasingly	   tied	   to	   nation-­‐building	   efforts	   and	   political	   projects	   –	   an	  appropriately	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  symbiosis.109	  	  The	  projects	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Marr	  and	  Javaxišvili	  Institutes	  under	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili’s	  tutelage	  helped	  apply	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  framework	  to	  the	  study	  of	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  Georgian	  history	  and	  cast	  Georgian	  national	  development	  within	   the	   rubric	   of	   Stalin’s	   definition	   of	   nation.	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1940s,	   Janašia’s	  research	   in	  particular	  had	   led	   the	   conceptual	   territorialization	  of	   the	  nation	  as	   an	  ethnos	   in	   Soviet	   Georgian	   history.110	  One	   of	   the	  most	   prominent	   avenues	   for	   this	  endeavor	  was	  in	  Soviet	  Georgia’s	  first	  major	  archaeological	  expedition	  of	  the	  ancient	  Georgian	   capital	   of	   Mc’xet’a,	   which	   Janašia	   led	   from	   its	   inception	   in	   1936	   to	   his	  death	   in	   1947.111	  Yet	   for	   all	   the	   scholarly	   and	   public	   significance	   of	   the	   Mc’xet’a	  excavation,	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili’s	  most	  influential	  and	  ambitious	  project	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  authoritative	  textbook	  of	  Georgian	  history	  –	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  –	  to	  be	  used	   in	  high	   schools	   throughout	   the	   republic.	   The	  project	  was	   initiated	  under	   the	  guidance	  of	  Georgian	  First	   Secretary	  Lavrenti	  Beria	   in	  1936.	  With	   Javaxišvili,	  who	  wrote	  his	  contributions	  prior	  to	  his	  death	  in	  1940,	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	   led	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109 	  See,	   for	   example,	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   scholarly	   council	   of	   the	   Marr	   Institute	   regarding	  antireligious	  propaganda	  efforts	  and	  studying	  pagan	  religious	  traditions	  among	  Georgian	  mountain	  communities,	   “Stenogramma:	   Rasshirennogo	   zasedaniia	   Uchenogo	   Soveta	   IIaIMK	   im.	   Marra	   ot	  26/7/1938	  goda,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  71,	  ll.	  31-­‐32.	  110	  Reisner,	  “Zur	  Geschichte	  des	  Begriffs	  ‘Eri’	  in	  der	  modernen	  georgischen	  Historiographie.”	  111	  On	   the	   Mc’xet’a	   archaeological	   expedition,	   see	   mc’xet’a:	   ark’eol.	   kvleva-­‐żiebis	   šedegeba,	   vol.	   1	  (Tbilisi:	  sak’art’velos	  ssr	  mec’n.	  akad.,	  1955);	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  12,	  d.	  195,	  ll.	  74-­‐75;	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  13,	  d.	  284,	  ll.	  6,	  42-­‐50;	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  184,	  ll.	  97,	  100;	  uic'a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  6969,	  l.	  158;	  uic'a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  7100,	  ll.	  121-­‐122;	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  dela	  88-­‐91;	  and	  smeaa,	  f.	  15,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  320.	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  textbook	   project	   from	   inception	   to	   its	   publication,	   in	   Georgian,	   in	   1943.112	  The	  result,	   sak’art’velos	   istoria	   (History	   of	   Georgia),	   Volume	   I	   (from	   antiquity	   to	   the	  nineteenth	   century),	   would	   be	   the	   first	   in	   a	   proposed	   three-­‐volume	   series	   that	  treated	   Georgia	   under	   Russian	   imperial	   rule	   and	   Georgia	   under	   Soviet	   power	   in	  subsequent	  volumes.	  Unlike	   Javaxišvili’s	   k’art’veli	   eris	   istoria	   (History	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation),	  which,	   albeit	   unfinished	   in	   toto,	   was	   published	   between	   1908	   and	   1914,	   the	  
sak’art’velos	  istoria	  project	  applied	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  historical	  and	  developmental	  framework	   to	   the	   longue	   durée	   story	   of	   Georgian	   nation-­‐	   and	   state-­‐building.113	  Javaxišvili’s	   earlier	  work	  was	  a	  history	  of	  Georgians	   as	   a	  nation,	  whereas	   the	  new	  textbook	   elaborated	   and	   territorialized	   a	   history	   of	   Georgia	   as	   a	   political-­‐cultural	  entity. 114 	  Drawing	   from	   their	   own	   scholarly	   writings	   and	   involvement	   in	  ethnographic	   and	   archaeological	   expeditions,	   Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili	   set	   out	   in	  their	  textbook	  to	  “construct	  primordialism,”	  in	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny’s	  evocative	  turn	  of	   phrase,	   for	   a	   Georgian	   ethnoterritorial	   community	   that	   emphasized	   Georgians’	  antiquity,	   rootedness	   in	   a	   territorial	   homeland,	  prominent	   and	  distinct	   role	   in	   the	  histories	   of	   the	   Caucasus	   and	   the	   Near	   East,	   and	   perpetual	   struggle	   for	   survival	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  To	  my	  knowledge,	   the	   initial	  1943	  edition	  of	   sak’art’velos	  istoria	  was	  not	  published	   in	  Russian,	  unlike	  the	  later	  editions.	  113	  The	  authors	  divided	  the	  work	  along	  chronological	  lines:	  Janašia	  wrote	  introductory	  material	  and	  chapters	   from	   antiquity	   up	   to	   the	   tenth	   century	   AD;	   Javaxišvili	   wrote	   chapters	   on	   the	   eleventh	  through	  fifteenth	  centuries;	  and	  Berżenišvili	  wrote	  from	  the	  sixteenth	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  centuries.	  	  114	  In	   practice,	   there	   was	   considerable	   overlap	   in	   the	   broad	   ethnonational	   imaginings	   of	   the	   two	  projects,	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   Javaxišvili’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   textbook	   project.	   But	   the	  statehood	   focus	   and	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   framework	   still	   differentiated	   the	   latter	   project	   from	   the	  former.	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  among	  hostile	  neighbors	  and	  invaders.115	  This	  goal	  allowed	  the	  authors	  to	  integrate	  the	   ancient	   and	   historical	   kingdoms	   of	   Hittites	   and	   Urartu	   (ca.	   1000	   BC),	   Iberia	  (sixth	   to	   first	   century	   BC),	   Colchis	   (first	   and	   second	   centuries	   AD),	   Egrisi	   (sixth	  century	   AD),	   Abkhazia	   (ninth-­‐tenth	   centuries	   AD),	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	   (eighth-­‐tenth	  centuries	   AD),	   K’art’li,	   and	   Kaxet’i,	   into	   a	   teleological	   consolidation	   of	   disparate	  “Georgian	   tribes”	   –	   including	   Mingrelians,	   Laz,	   and	   Svan	   -­‐-­‐	   into	   a	   national	   core	  exemplified	   by	   K’art’li,	   a	   region	   located	   at	   the	   territorial	   center	   of	   the	   Georgian	  SSR116	  	  
	  
	   Figure	  2:	  “Georgian	  (k’art’uli)	  Kingdoms	  and	  Principalities	  in	  the	  Tenth	  Century”117	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  “Constructing	  Primordialism:	  Old	  Histories	  for	  New	  Nations,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Modern	  History	  73,	  no.	  4	  (December	  2001):	  862–96.	  Suny	  chronicled	  a	  similar	  process	  of	  historical	  construction	   among	   Armenian	   scholars	   in	   the	   mid-­‐	   to	   late-­‐twentieth	   century,	   which	   at	   times	  contradicted	  or	  challenged	  the	  developing	  Georgian	  narrative.	  116	  For	   Janašia’s	   view	   on	   the	   etymological	   development	   around	   K’art’li	   into	   Georgian	   national	  vocabulary,	   see	   “k’art’veli	   eris	   carmošobis	   šesaxeb,”	   in	   Simon	   Janašia,	   šromebi,	   vol.	   6	   (Tbilisi:	  Mec’niereba,	  1968),	  172-­‐190.	  117	  Javaxišvili,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Janašia,	  sak’art’velos	  istoria,	  144-­‐145.	  This	  map	  depicts	  the	  Kingdom	  of	   Abkhazia,	   Č’anet’i,	   Ačara,	   K’art’li,	   T’rialet’i,	   and	   “Kingdoms	   of	   Georgians	   (k’art’velt’a).”	   The	   final	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Figure	  3:	  “Georgia	  (sak’art’velo)	  and	  the	  Near	  East	  in	  the	  Thirteenth	  Century”118	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  “Georgia	  (sak’art’velo)	  and	  its	  Neighboring	  Regions	  	  
in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century”119	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  group	  extends	   from	  what	   is	   today’s	   central	  and	  northeastern	  Turkey	   into	  southern	  Georgia.	  Simon	  Janašia	  covered	  this	  period	  in	  the	  textbook.	  118	  Ibid.,	   208-­‐209.	   This	  map	   introduces	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   and	   “Iran”.	   Across	   today’s	   Georgia	   is	  written	  “All	  Georgia	  (qoveli	  sak’art’velo).”	  	  Ivane	  Javaxišvili	  covered	  this	  period	  in	  the	  textbook.	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   This	   was	   history	   as	   epic,	   complete	   with	   enemies	   and	   traitors,	   heroes	   and	  martyrs,	  and	  a	  defense	  of	  civilization	  against	  savagery.	  The	  theme	  and	  language	  of	  struggle	   (brżola)	   pervades	   the	   textbook’s	   narrative,	   as	   various	   Georgian	   tribes	  struggled	   for	   independence,	   unification,	   and	   reunification	   against:	   “Persians,”	  “Arabs,”	   “Mongols,”	   “Tamerlane,”	   “Iran,”	   and	   the	   “Ottoman	   Empire,”	   in	   rough	  chronological	  order.	  In	  his	  section,	  Janašia	  wrote	  about	  “sak’art’velo”	  as	  early	  as	  the	  sixth	  century	  BC,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Greek	  encounters	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,	  and	  he	  used	  the	  terms	  “Iberia”	  and	  “K’art’li”	  interchangeably	  for	  the	  BC	  period	  and	  “K’art’li”	  and	  “Georgia”	  interchangeably	  from	  the	  seventh	  century	  AD.	  Janašia’s	  contribution,	  which	  covered	  over	  a	  millennium	  of	  Georgian	  history,	   conveyed	  a	  broad	  narrative	  about	   struggle	   for	  Georgia’s	   unification.	  The	   “unified	  Georgia”	   of	   the	   eleventh	   and	  twelfth	   centuries,	   chronicled	   by	   Javaxišvili,	   not	   only	   marked	   a	   golden	   age	   of	  Georgian	   literature,	   cultural	  development,	   and	  state-­‐building	  under	   the	   leadership	  of	  Davit’	  Aġmašenebeli	   and	  T’amar-­‐Mep’e,	  but	   also	  of	   foreign	  policy	  achievements	  which	   made	   Georgia	   “the	   Near	   East’s	   most	   powerful	   state.” 120 	  Invasion	   and	  occupation	   by	   the	   forces	   of	   the	   Mongols	   and	   Tamerlane	   rendered	   unification	  ephemeral,	   however,	   as	   the	   Georgian	   kingdom	   had	   dissolved	   entirely	   by	   the	  fifteenth	  century.	  From	  there,	  in	  Berżenišvili’s	  narrative,	  the	  struggle	  resumed	  –	  this	  time	   for	   independence	   and	   liberation	   –	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   through	   eighteenth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid.,	   352-­‐353.	   This	   map	   includes	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire,	   Iran,	   and	   numerous	   principalities	   and	  regions	  of	  Georgia,	  including:	  Abkhazia	  (ap’xazet’i),	  Ossetia,	  Imeret’i,	  Ačara,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Axalc’ixe,	  K’art’li,	  Kaxet’i,	  Odiši	  (Mingrelia),	  Svanet’i,	  Guria,	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kars.	  While	  Cherkessian	  tribes	  and	  Kabarda	  are	   labeled,	  Russia	   is	  not	  written	  anywhere	  on	   the	  map.	  Nikoloz	  Berżenišvili	   covered	  this	  period in the textbook. 120	  Javaxišvili,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Janašia,	  sak’art’velos	  istoria,	  177-­‐188.	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  centuries,	  when	  the	  kingdoms	  of	  K’art’li	  and	  Kaxet’i	  unified	  to	  form	  a	  new	  Georgian	  core	  under	  Iranian	  and	  Ottoman	  rule.	  Uprisings	  (ajanqebebi)	  and	  shifting	  alliances	  in	  the	  context	  of	  wars	  between	  Iran,	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  and	  Russia	  ultimately	  led	  King	  Erekle	   II	   of	  K’art’li-­‐Kaxet’i	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   treaty	   agreement	  with	   the	  Russian	  Empire	  in	  1783	  and	  1801,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  kingdom	  was	  incorporated	  into	  Russia.	  The	   textbook	   ends	   on	   a	   high	   note,	   explaining	   that	   the	   dawn	   of	   the	   nineteenth	  century	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  stage	  in	  Georgia’s	  long	  history,	  in	  which	  it	  embarked	  on	  a	  European	  developmental	  path.	  	  The	  story	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  “Georgian	  tribes”	  into	  a	  Georgian	  nation	  on	  a	   Georgian	   territory	   as	   told	   in	   sak’art’velos	   istoria	   mirrored	   the	   amalgamation	   of	  Kartvelian	   census	   categories	   in	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s.	   In	   short,	   as	   stated	   in	   the	  textbook:	  The	   remains	   of	   this	   division	   [among	   “Georgian	   tribes,”	   CK]	   are	  preserved	   to	   this	  day,	  but	   they	  are	  gradually	  disappearing.	  Georgian	  tribes	   were	   close	   to	   one	   another	   even	   in	   antiquity.	   The	   drawing	  together	   in	   the	   middle	   centuries	   contributed	   to	   the	   unification	   of	  Georgian	   tribes	   into	   one	   state	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Georgian	  language	  as	  the	  common	  national	  written	  language.	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	   particularly	   in	   its	   second	   half,	   the	   Georgians	   (k’art’veloba)	  bound	   together	   even	   more	   closely,	   as	   the	   common	   economic	   and	  cultural	   life	  became	  more	  alive	  and	  strong.	  But	   the	  economic,	   social,	  and	  cultural	  ties	  in	  our	  country	  have	  never	  been	  so	  close	  and	  solid	  as	  they	   are	   today,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   Soviet	   power.	   That	   is	   why	   literary	  language	   is	   now	   diffusing	   even	   faster	   and	   takes	   the	   place	   of	   local,	  provincial	   dialects.	   Old,	   provincial,	   outdated	   customs	   disappear	   as	  well,	  which	  clears	  the	  way	  for	  a	  new,	  socialist	  life.121	  	  Moreover,	   the	   search	   for	   links	   among	   the	   ancient	   peoples	   of	   the	   Caucasus	   and	  migration	   patterns	   reflected	   contemporary	   political	   agendas	   that	   expanded	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Ibid.,	  6-­‐7.	  
	   64	  geographic	   and	   cultural	   footprint	   of	   Georgianness.	   Nikolai	   Marr’s	   theory	   of	   a	  Japhetic	   (Iberian-­‐Caucasian)	   language	   family	   linked	  Georgian	   and	  other	  Caucasian	  languages	   (such	   as	  Abkhaz,	   Adyghe,	   and	  Chechen),	  which	   allowed	  nation-­‐building	  historians	  to	  expand	  the	  terrain	  of	  greater	  Georgia	  to	  the	  north	  and	  incorporate	  the	  components	   of	   the	   histories	   of	   north	   Caucasian	   peoples	   as	   Georgian	   history.122	  Similarly,	  while	  the	  textbook	  presented	  the	  medieval	  kingdom	  of	  Abkhazia	  as	  a	  vital	  force	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Georgia,	   Japhetic	   theory	   provided	   grounds	   for	   integrating	  Abkhaz	  and	  Abkhazia	  into	  a	  broader	  Georgian	  story.	  Janašia	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Abkhazian	  kingdom	  as	  the	  “west	  Georgian	  state,”	  which	  was	  a	  descendant	  of	  the	   “west	  Georgian	   tribe”	  of	  Colchis.123	  In	   the	   textbook,	   the	  key	   turning	  point	  with	  regard	   to	   Georgian	   unification	   –	   a	   prominent	   theme	   –	   came	  with	   the	   kingdom	   of	  Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   Bagrationi	   dynasty	   in	   “southern	   Georgia.”124	  Yet	  while	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	   provided	   the	   administrative	   form	   for	   Georgian	   unification,	   the	  Georgian	   language,	   alphabet,	   and	   literary	   tradition	   spread	   from	   the	   medieval	  Kingdom	  of	  K’art’li	  to	  other	  kingdoms	  and	  principalities,	  including	  Abkhazia.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  roots	  of	  the	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  conflict,	  Victor	  Shnirelman	  notes	   the	   “rich	   repertoire	  of	   symbols,	   legends,	   and	  historical	   accounts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Victor	  A.	  Shnirelman,	  The	  Value	  of	  the	  Past:	  Myths,	  Identity	  and	  Politics	  in	  Transcaucasia	   (Osaka:	  National	  Museum	  of	  Ethnology,	  2001),	  233-­‐240.	  Shnirelman	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Iberian-­‐Caucasian	   linguistic	   theory	   provided	   an	   “ideological	   grounds”	   for	   the	   transfer	   districts	   from	   the	  Checheno-­‐Ingush	   ASSR	   to	   Georgia	   following	   the	   1944	   deportation	   of	   Chechens	   and	   Ingush	   to	  Kazakhstan.	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  find	  decisive	  evidence	  connecting	  this	  “historiographic	  expansion”	  with	  the	  deportations	   and	   territorial	   transfer,	   however.	  On	  Nikolai	  Marr,	   see	  Slezkine,	   “N.	   Ia.	  Marr";	  Hirsch,	  
Empire	   of	   Nations;	   and	   Kevin	   Tuite,	   "The	   Reception	   of	   Marr	   and	   Marrism	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Georgian	  Academy,"	  in	  Florian	  Mühlfried	  and	  Sergey	  Sokolovskiy,	  eds.,	  Exploring	  the	  Edge	  of	  Empire:	  Soviet	  Era	  
Anthropology	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asia	  (Berlin:	  LitVerlag,	  2011):	  197-­‐214.	  	  123	  Javaxišvili,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Janašia,	  sak’art’velos	  istoria,	  133-­‐134.	  124	  Ibid.,	  134.	  
	   65	  with	  which	   to	   construct	   a	  modern	   national	   consciousness”	   and	   “sense	   of	   national	  danger”	  present	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  sak’art’velos	  istoria	  despite	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Georgian	   entitled	   nationality	   within	   the	   Georgian	   SSR125	  Yet	   even	   if	   Georgians	  enjoyed	  the	  benefits	  of	  Soviet	  affirmative	  action	  policies	  as	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  within	  the	  republic,	  in	  the	  1940s	  this	  was	  still	  very	  much	  a	  work	  in	  progress,	  as	  the	  ethnodemographic	   makeup	   of	   the	   republic	   demonstrated.	   Rather,	   the	   eventual	  hegemony	  of	   the	  Georgian	  nationality	   and	  national	  narrative	  within	   the	   republic’s	  borders	   was	   a	   postwar	   phenomenon	   that	   reflected	   the	   particular	   imaginings	   of	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	  as	  enshrined	  in	  the	  sak’art’velos	  istoria	  textbook.	  	   sak’art’velos	  istoria,	  Volume	  I	  was	  published	  in	  Tbilisi	  in	  1943.	  At	  the	  height	  of	   the	  war,	   however,	   Stalin	   did	   not	   have	   the	   time	   to	   read	   the	  work	   (according	   to	  Georgian	  First	   Secretary	  Kandid	  Č’arkviani,	  who	   succeeded	  Beria	   in	   the	  post	   after	  1938)	   and	   when	   he	   eventually	   got	   around	   to	   the	   task	   in	   mid-­‐1945,	   he	   sought	   a	  meeting	   with	   the	   authors.126	  In	   October	   1945,	   Stalin	   asked	   Č’arkviani	   to	   invite	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	  to	  a	  Black	  Sea	  dacha	  in	  Sochi	  where	  he	  was	  vacationing	  at	  the	  time	  to	  discuss	  his	  suggestions	  for	   improving	  future	  iterations	  of	  the	  textbook.	  	  According	   to	   Berżenišvili,	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   three-­‐day	   visit,	   Stalin	   and	   the	  historians	   discussed	   in	   particular:	   the	   origins	   of	   Georgians	   and	   their	   links	   to	  cultures	  of	  ancient	  peoples	  of	  the	  East;	  the	  character	  of	  Georgia’s	  feudal	  monarchy,	  especially	   Davit’	   Aġmašenebeli;	   Georgia	   in	   the	   late	   feudal	   era	   and	   Georgians’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Shnirelman,	  The	  Value	  of	  the	  Past,	  236-­‐239.	  126	  Kandid	  Č’arkviani,	  ganc’dili	  da	  naazrevi:	  1906/1994	  (Tbilisi:	  Merani,	  2004),	  381-­‐394.	  The	  episode	  described	   here	  was	   chronicled	   by	   both	   Č’arkviani	   in	   his	  memoir	   and	   Berżenišvili	   in	   a	   note	   in	   his	  personal	  papers.	  I	  draw	  from	  both	  accounts	  in	  my	  version.	  
	   66	  struggle	   of	   encirclement	   by	   “less	   cultured	   peoples”	   (Ottomans	   and	   Qizilbash,	   the	  predecessors	  to	  the	  Safavids	  of	  Iran);	  Erekle’s	  struggle	  to	  save	  Georgia	  and	  his	  role	  in	   the	   overthrow	   of	   Georgian	   statehood;	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Georgian	  community	  and	  period	  of	  struggle	  against	  tsarism.	  Berżenišvili	  noted,	  “We	  returned	  [to	  Tbilisi]	   loaded	  with	  gifts	   from	  Stalin,	  with	  opinions	   for	   the	   textbook	  about	   the	  history	  of	  Georgia,	  Georgian	  culture,	  literature,	  literary	  language,	  and	  the	  prospects	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nation.”	  Indeed,	  Berżenišvili	  wondered	  “where,	  when,	  and	  how	  Stalin	  found	  time	  to	  specialize	  in	  these	  issues”	  and	  marveled	  at	  the	  breadth	   of	   conversations	   with	   this	   “genius.”127	  Even	   Č’arkviani	   remarked	   in	   his	  memoir	  at	   the	   “pathetic”	  and	   “grotesque”	  manner	   in	  which	  Berżenišvili	   interacted	  with	   Stalin.128 	  Following	   their	   meeting,	   the	   historians	   returned	   to	   Tbilisi	   and	  immediately	   began	   incorporating	   Stalin’s	   “suggestions”	   into	   the	   revised	   edition	   of	  
sak’art’velos	   istoria,	   which	  was	   published	   in	   1946	   in	   Georgian	   and	   Russian.129	  For	  their	  efforts,	  the	  textbook	  was	  awarded	  the	  Stalin	  Prize.	  	   The	  initial	  run	  of	  sak’art’velos	  istoria	  coincided	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  several	  other	   republics’	   histories:	   The	   History	   of	   the	   Kazakh	   SSR	   (1943),	   The	   History	   of	  
Ukraine	  (1943),	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Armenian	  People	  (1944),	  and	  The	  Tajik	  People	  in	  the	  
Struggle	   for	   Freedom	   and	   Independence	   of	   its	   Motherland	   (1944).130	  All	   of	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  “es	  iqo	  1945	  clis	  ok’tomberši,”	  December	  1945,	  xec’,	  f.	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  d.	  1676,	  ll.	  1-­‐5.	  128	  Č’arkviani,	  ganc’dili	  da	  naazrevi,	  389.	  129	  Ibid.,	  393-­‐394.	  130	  M.	  Abdykalykov	  and	  A.	  Pankratova,	  eds.,	  Istoriia	  kazakhskoi	  SSR.	  S	  drevneishikh	  vremen	  do	  nashikh	  
dnei	   (Alma-­‐Ata,	   1943);	   N.N.	   Petrovskii,	   et	   al.,	   ed.,	   Istoriia	  Ukrainy	   (Ufa,	   1943);	   K.G.	   Kafadarian	   and	  M.T.	   Nersisian,	   eds.,	   Istoriia	   armianskogo	   naroda,	   vol.	   1	   (Yerevan,	   1944);	   and	   B.	   Gafurov	   and	   N.	  Prokhorov,	   Tadzhikskii	   narod	   v	   bor’be	   za	   svobodu	   i	   nezavisimost’	   svoei	   rodiny.	   Ocherki	   iz	   istorii	  
	   67	  histories	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   greater	   academic	   freedom	   and	   appeals	   toward	  Soviet	  and	  national	  patriotisms	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  war	  environment	  and,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  Georgian	  case,	  the	  sponsorship	  of	  the	  new	  republic	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  Yet	  the	  works	   themselves	   saw	   very	   different	   fates:	  most	   famously,	  The	  History	   of	   the	  
Kazakh	   SSR	   faced	   especially	   grave	   criticism	   for	   its	   treatment	   of	   Kazakh	   revolts	  against	  Russian	  rule	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  Russian	  imperialism.131	  The	  Georgian	  textbook,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   enjoyed	   favorable	   reviews	   from	   the	   outset,	   and	   directions	   for	  revisions	   in	  subsequent	  editions	  seemed	  to	  come	   from	  Stalin	  himself,	  which	  could	  account	   for	   the	   distinct	   reception	   history.	   Unlike	   many	   of	   their	   scholarly	  counterparts	   elsewhere	   during	   the	   Zhdanovshchina	   and	   the	   campaign	   against	  bourgeois	   nationalism	   in	   Georgia	   in	   1952,	   Georgian	   historians	   remained	   largely	  unaffected	  by	  these	  trends	  in	  their	  individual	  careers	  and	  scholarship.	  	  Berżenišvili,	   Janašia,	   and	   their	   colleagues	   “constructed	   primordialism”	   of	   a	  Georgian	  nation	  and	  Georgian	  state	  through	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  sak’art’velos	  istoria	  textbook.	  This	  was	  the	  advent	  of	  a	  new,	  Stalin-­‐era	  “Georgian	  academic	  nationalism”	  that	  held	  more	  strongly	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  Georgian	  territory	  as	  historical	  property	  than	  to	  earlier,	  nineteenth-­‐century	  variants	  of	   religious	  and	  populist	  nationalisms.132	  In	  doing	   so,	   the	   historians	   not	   only	   elaborated	   a	   peculiarly	   Georgian	   “imagining	   of	  history	   and	   power”	   through	   a	   Soviet	   lens,	   but	   also	   “created	   a	   historical	   depth	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tadzhikov	  i	  Tadzhikistana	  (Stalinabad,	  1944).	  On	  the	  Ukrainian	  history	  textbooks,	  see	  also	  Yekelchyk,	  
Stalin’s	  Empire	  of	  Memory,	  Chapter	  Five.	  131	  Lowell	   Tillett,	   The	   Great	   Friendship:	   Soviet	   Historians	   on	   the	   Non-­‐Russian	   Nationalities	   (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1969),	  83.	  See	  also	  Reginald	  E.	  Zelnik,	  Perils	  of	  Pankratova:	  
Some	  Stories	  from	  the	  Annals	  of	  Soviet	  Historiography	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  2005).	  132	  Reisner,	  “Zur	  Geschichte	  des	  Begriffs	  ‘Eri’	  in	  der	  modernen	  georgischen	  Historiographie.”	  
	   68	  field”	   that	   provided	   legitimacy	   for	   nationalizing	   pursuits	   throughout	   the	   postwar	  era.133	  Reconstituting	  Georgia’s	   historical	   geography,	   as	   elaborated	   in	   the	   national	  narrative	  they	  crafted,	  would	  provide	  a	  final	  opportunity	  for	  collaboration	  between	  Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili	   that	   propelled	   the	   scholars	   and	   Georgian	   territorial	  ambitions	  to	  a	  world	  stage.	  	  
Map	  	  	   In	  1945,	  Stalin’s	  Soviet	  Union	  achieved	  arguably	  its	  greatest	  feat:	  victory	  over	  Nazi	  Germany.	  With	  this	  geopolitical	  apex,	  Soviet	  leaders	  sought	  to	  extract	  as	  much	  territorial	  and	  political	  capital	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  climate	  of	  postwar	  settlements	  and	  reparations.	   In	   the	   “bloodlands”	   of	   eastern	  Europe,	   this	  meant:	   a	   Soviet	   sphere	   of	  influence	   that	   quickly	   hardened	   into	   the	   Stalinist	   “people’s	   democracies”;	   an	  expansion	   of	   Soviet	   borders	   to	   include	   Moldova,	   western	   Ukraine,	   the	   Baltic	  republics,	   and	  Kaliningrad;	  and	  expulsions	  and	  population	   transfers,	  most	  notably	  between	  Poles	  and	  Ukrainians.134	  The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  southern	  periphery	  likewise	  presented	  opportunities	  for	  territorial	  and	  political	  gain,	  particularly	  in	  the	  developing	  climate	  of	  the	  early	  Cold	  War,	  as	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  and	  Greece	  ultimately	  aligned	  with	  the	  western	  powers.	  In	  the	  Caucasus,	   such	   opportunities	   took	   the	   form	   of	   Georgian	   and	   Armenian	   claims	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Paraphrased	  from	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  185.	  134	  See	   especially	   Timothy	   Snyder,	  Bloodlands:	   Europe	   between	  Hitler	   and	   Stalin	   (New	   York:	   Basic	  Books,	  2010);	  Anne	  Applebaum,	  Iron	  Curtain:	  The	  Crushing	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  1945-­‐1956	  (New	  York:	  Doubleday,	   2012);	   and	   Jan	  Tomasz	  Gross,	   “War	   as	  Revolution,”	   in	  The	  Establishment	  of	  Communist	  
Regimes	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   1944-­‐1949,	   ed.	   Norman	   Naimark	   and	   Leonid	   Gibianskii	   (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  17–40.	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  territory	   in	  northeastern	  Turkey;	   “repatriation”	  of	  Armenians	   and	  Georgians	   from	  Iran	   and	   elsewhere;	   support	   for	   Iranian	   Azerbaijan	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Azerbaijan	  crisis”;	   and	   population	   expulsions	   and	   exchanges	   of	   minority	   groups.	   In	   a	  conversation	  with	  Marshal	  F.I.	  Tolbukhin	  at	  a	  seaside	  dacha	  in	  Novyi	  Afon,	  Abkhazia,	  in	  mid-­‐1945,	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  head	  Ak’ak’i	  Mgelaże	  claimed	  (in	  his	  own	  account),	  	  In	  the	  early	  morning,	  on	  a	  clear	  day,	  from	  here	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  our	  Georgian	   lands,	   all	   of	  which	   are	   located	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  Turkey,	   and	  that	  has	  lasted	  for	  several	  centuries…Stalin	  knows	  best,	  but	  just	  now	  we	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   correct	   this	   injustice.	   It	   turned	   out	  well	  with	  Ukraine,	  Belarus,	  but	  Georgian	  lands	  are	  still	  not	  gathered	  into	  a	  unified	  national	  state.	  Let’s	  hope	  that	  it	  will	  come	  true.135	  	  This	   section	   examines	   Soviet	   Georgian	   attempts	   to	   claim	   the	   territory	   in	   Turkey	  described	  by	  Mgelaże,	  and	  the	  prominent	  roles	  of	  Berżenišvili,	  Janašia,	  and	  Georgian	  People’s	   Commissar	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Giorgi	   Kiknaże	   in	   this	   effort	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	  how	  this	  (ultimately	  unsuccessful)	  scheme	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  centrally	  managed,	  geopolitical	  gambit,	  but	   rather	  advanced	   local	   interests	  among	  Georgian	  nation-­‐builders.136	  	  As	  the	  war	  in	  Europe	  ended,	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister	  Vyacheslav	  Molotov	  and	  Turkish	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  USSR	  Selim	  Sarper	  began	  to	  attempt	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  Soviet-­‐Turkish	  Treaty	  of	  Kars	  of	  1921.	  Turkey’s	  liaisons	  with	  Germany	  during	  World	  War	   Two	   gave	   the	   ostensibly	   neutral	   power	   an	   incentive	   to	   curry	   favor	  with	   the	  Allied	   victors	   in	   the	   postwar	   order.	   Soviet	   leaders,	   meanwhile,	   viewed	   this	   as	   an	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  As	   recounted	   in	  Akaki	  Mgeladze,	  Stalin:	  Kakim	  ia	  ego	  uznal,	   (Tbilisi:	  No	  publisher	  given,	  2001),	  61-­‐62.	  136	  The	  related	  expulsions	  and	  repatriation	  schemes	  are	  explored	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  5,	  respectively.	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  opportunity	   for	   strategic	   gains	   in	   the	   region.137	  As	   part	   of	   this	   process,	   Molotov	  proposed:	   granting	   the	  USSR	   guarantees	   for	   basing	   rights	   and	   joint	   control	   of	   the	  Dardanelle	  and	  Bosporus	  Straits	  in	  the	  event	  of	  war;	  and	  transferring	  territory	  from	  Kars,	  Ardahan,	  and	  Artvin	  districts	  of	  northeastern	  Turkey	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Turkish	   ambassador	   rejected	   both	   demands,	   leading	  Molotov	   to	   reiterate	   them	   in	  June,	  adding	  this	  time	  that	  the	  Armenian	  SSR	  in	  particular	  needed	  the	  territories	  in	  northeastern	  Turkey.	  In	  spite	  of	  repeated	  refusals	  from	  Turkey,	  Molotov	  continued	  to	  press	   the	   issue,	  mentioning	   it	  again	  at	   the	  Potsdam	  Conference	   in	  August	  1945.	  Initially,	   this	   exchange	   appeared	   to	   be	   an	   effort	   to	   entice	   Turkey	   to	   align	   more	  closely	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  (and	  therefore	  distance	   itself	   from	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  US)	  by	  making	  a	  Soviet-­‐Turkish	  treaty	  of	  cooperation	  and	  alliance	  and	  access	  to	  the	  straits	  more	  palatable	  than	  outright	  territorial	  transfer.138	  This	   issue	  was	  not	  among	  the	  many	  resolved	  at	  Potsdam,	  and	  Western	  and	  Turkish	  leaders	  remained	  openly	  opposed	  the	  proposal	  of	  territorial	  transfer	  from	  Turkey	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Yet	   shortly	   thereafter,	  Molotov	  enlisted	  new	  republic-­‐level	   foreign	   policy	   organs	   to	   build	   cases	   for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Soviet	   claims	   to	  Turkish	  territory.	  As	  the	  Allied	  victors	  began	  to	  redraw	  the	  postwar	  map	  of	  Europe,	  the	   Soviet	   Union	   established	   republic-­‐level	   ministries	   of	   foreign	   affairs	   (People’s	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  Vladislav	   Zubok	   and	   Constantine	   Pleshakov,	   Inside	   the	   Kremlin’s	   Cold	   War:	   From	   Stalin	   to	  
Khrushchev	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1996),	   92-­‐94.	   On	   earlier	   Russo/Soviet-­‐Turkish	  negotiations,	   see	  Reynolds,	  Shattering	  Empires;	   Samuel	   J.	  Hirst,	   “Anti-­‐Westernism	  on	   the	  European	  Periphery:	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Soviet-­‐Turkish	  Convergence	  in	  the	  1930s,”	  Slavic	  Review	  72,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  2013):	  32-­‐53;	  and	  Samuel	   J.	  Hirst,	   “Transnational	  Anti-­‐Imperialism	  and	   the	  National	  Forces:	  Soviet	  Diplomacy	  and	  Turkey,	  1920-­‐1923,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  33,	  no.	  2	  (Summer	  2013):	  214-­‐226.	  138	  	  Suny,	  Looking	  Toward	  Ararat,	  164-­‐177.	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  Commissariat	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   [PCFA]/	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   [MFA])	  ostensibly	   to	   gain	   a	   larger	   representation	   at	   the	   new	   United	   Nations.	   Though	  ultimately	   only	   the	   Ukrainian	   and	   Belarusian	   SSRs	   gained	   their	   own	   UN	  representations,	  Georgia	  and	  other	  republics	  retained	  their	  MFAs	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Soviet	  period.	  From	  1944,	  when	  the	  Georgian	  PCFA	  was	  formed,	  this	  institution	  provided	   the	   main	   avenue	   through	   which	   to	   pursue	   Georgian	   interests	   abroad,	  largely	   due	   to	   the	   proactive	   efforts	   of	   Georgian	   People’s	   Commissar	   for	   Foreign	  Affairs	  Giorgi	  Kiknaże	  (in	  office	  1944-­‐1953).	  	  In	  September	  and	  October	  1945,	  Kiknaże	  penned	  notes	  to	  Beria	  and	  Molotov	  during	   a	   trip	   to	   Moscow	   describing	   the	   issue	   of	   Georgian	   claims	   to	   territories	   in	  Turkey.139	  In	  Kiknaże’s	  telling,	  the	  issue	  of	  Georgian	  territorial	  claims	  emerged	  from	  the	   13	   October	   1921	   agreement	   between	   the	   RSFSR	   and	   the	   Kemalist	   Turkish	  government,	   in	   which	   the	   southern	   sector	   of	   the	   former	   Batumi	   okrug	   and	   the	  entirety	   of	   the	   Artvin,	   Ardahan,	   and	   Oltu	   okrugs	   were	   “sawn	   off”	   of	   Georgia	   and	  granted	  to	  Turkey,	  which	  occupied	  the	  regions	  at	  that	  time,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Kars.	  However,	  Kiknaże	  argued	   that	  Turkey	  violated	   the	   terms	  of	   this	   “friendship”	  treaty	   during	   World	   War	   Two	   by	   promoting	   “pan-­‐Turkist”	   organizations	   on	   its	  territory,	  advocacy	  for	  a	  “greater	  Turkey”	  comprising	  Crimea	  and	  the	  Caucasus,	  and	  activities	   as	  German	  agents.	  As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   alleged	   treaty	   violations,	  Kiknaże	  recommended	   that	   the	   USSR	   denounce	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Kars	   and	   raise	   the	   issue	   of	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   evident	   that	  Kiknaże,	   at	   least,	   saw	   the	  Turkey	   (territorial	   claims)	  and	   Iran	   (repatriation	  of	  Fereydan	   Georgians,	   see	   Chapter	   5)	   issues	   as	   linked	   at	   this	   time,	   as	   he	   noted	   to	   Č’arkviani	   in	   his	  description	  of	  activities	  undertaken	  during	  a	  recent	  trip	  to	  Moscow,	  where	  he	  met	  with	  Molotov	  and	  Beria	  on	  those	  topics,	  Kiknaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  26	  October	  1945,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  19,	  d.	  209,	  ll.	  52-­‐53.	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  “returning	  territory	  to	  the	  Soviet	  republics	  of	  the	  Transcaucasus	  that	  had	  originally	  belonged	  to	  them.”140	  	  Kiknaże	   noted	   that	   Armenian	   Commissar	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   S.I.	   Kavtaradze	  had	  already	  raised	   these	   issues	  with	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Commissar	  Molotov.141	  Kavtaradze	   argued	   that	   the	   territory	   under	   question	   comprised	   26,000	   square	  kilometers,	   of	   which	   20,500	   square	   kilometers	   should	   be	   transferred	   to	   the	  Armenian	  SSR	  and	   the	   remaining	  5,500	  square	  kilometers	   to	   the	  Georgian	  SSR.	   In	  Kavtaradze’s	   schema,	   the	   former	   Ardahan	   and	   Oltu	   okrugs	   would	   be	   joined	   to	  Armenia.	   Kiknaże,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   argued	   that	   Ardahan	   and	   Oltu	   okrugs	  (designated	  for	  Armenia	  in	  Kavtaradze’s	  plan)	  should	  be	  joined	  to	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  southern	  part	  of	   the	   former	  Batumi	  okrug	  and	  the	  Artvin	  okrug,	  which	  both	   foreign	  affairs	   commissars	   assigned	   to	  Georgia.	  The	   revised	   territorial	  distribution	   according	   to	   Kiknaże	   would	   therefore	   make	   Armenian	   and	   Georgian	  territorial	   claims	  more	   equal	   (12,760	   sq.	   km	   to	   Georgia	   and	   13,190	   to	   Armenia),	  with	  the	  former	  Batumi,	  Ardahan,	  Artvin,	  and	  Oltu	  okrugs	  to	  Georgia	  and	  the	  former	  Kars	  and	  Kağızman	  okrugs	  and	  Surmali	  uezd	  to	  Armenia.142	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Kiknaże	  to	  Beria,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  19,	  d.	  209,	  ll.	  49-­‐51.	  141	  Kavtaradze	   had	   also	   already	   approached	   D.	   Zavriev,	   a	   senior	   Georgian	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	  historian,	  in	  May	  1945	  about	  writing	  a	  scholarly	  work	  titled	  “National	  districts	  of	  Turkey	  under	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Kemalists,”	  uic’a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  623,	  l.	  2.	  142	  Ibid.	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Figure	  5:	  “Armenian	  and	  Georgian	  Claims	  to	  Turkish	  Territory”	  (blue	  line)	  
Source:	  Research	  Department,	  (British)	  Foreign	  Office,	  May	  1946,	  	  
Wikimedia	  Commons	  	  The	   violation	   of	   the	   1921	   Treaty	   of	   Kars	   provided	   the	   immediate	   legal	  justification	   for	   Georgian	   and	   Armenian	   territorial	   claims	   to	   these	   districts	   of	  northeastern	  Turkey,	  yet	   this	   rather	  hollow	  argument	  about	   the	   legality	  of	  Soviet-­‐Turkish	   friendship	   provided	   a	   convenient	   cover	   for	   more	   ambitious	   arguments	  about	   authenticity	   and	   historical	   geography.	   Kiknaże	   acknowledged	   as	  much	   in	   a	  September	  1945	  report	  to	  Beria	  and	  Molotov,	  in	  which	  he	  described	  the	  territories	  in	  question	  as	  “Georgian	  lands	  since	  ancient	  times	  and	  her	  native	  population	  closely	  linked	   to	  Georgians	   in	   national,	   ethnographic,	   and	   linguistic	   relationships.”143	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Kiknaże	   to	  Molotov	   and	   Beria,	   “K	   voprosu	   o	   gruzinskikh	   territoriiakh,	   vkliuchennykh	   v	   sostav	  Turtsii,”	  4	  September	  1945,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  19,	  d.	  209,	  ll.	  54-­‐57.	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  area,	   he	   reminded	   them,	   was	   the	   site	   of	   the	   twelfth-­‐century	   cultural	   and	  administrative	  capital	  Artanuji,	  of	  the	  medieval	  Georgian	  state	  of	  Tao-­‐Klarjet’i.144	  	  Moreover,	   Kiknaże	   called	   Beria	   and	   Molotov’s	   attention	   to	   the	   plight	   of	  Georgian	  populations	  in	  areas	  of	  Turkey	  adjacent	  to	  claimed	  territories	  (in	  so-­‐called	  Southwest	   Mesxet’i),	   where	   “Turks	   completely	   denationalized	   the	   old	   Georgian	  population”;	  and	  of	  the	  Laz	  population	  of	  Turkey	  which	  had	  likewise	  experienced,	  in	  Kiknaże’s	  telling,	  forced	  Turkification.145	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  Kiknaże	  raised	  the	  idea	  of	  promoting	  autonomy	  for	  the	  Laz	  –	  as	  a	  “Georgian	  people	  who	  speak	  a	  dialect	  of	  the	  Georgian	   language”	   –	   within	   Turkey.	   Yet	   the	   presence	   of	   historically	   Georgian	  populations	  in	  Southwest	  Mesxet’i	  and	  Lazistan	  likewise	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  wider	  territorial	  claims,	  as	  Kiknaże	  explained,	  that	  would	  expand	  Georgia	  to	  its	  “natural	  border”	   from	  the	  Çoruh/Čoroxi	  River	  basin	   to	   the	  Arax	  River	  basins.	  This	  “natural	  border”	  would	  arguably	  provide	  greater	  security	  to	  southern	  Georgia	  and,	  more	   importantly,	   protect	   the	   Black	   Sea	   port	   of	   Batumi. 146 	  Indeed,	   Kiknaże’s	  expanded	   geography	   combined	   claims	   to	   “the	   southern	   provinces	   of	   Georgia,	  transferred	  to	  Turkey	  according	  to	  the	  treaties	  of	  16	  March	  and	  13	  October	  1921”	  –	  that	   is,	   territories	   that	   had	   been	   incorporated	   into	   the	   Russian	   Empire	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  In	  Georgian	  national	  historiography,	  Artanuji	  is	  one	  of	  the	  four	  historic	  capitals	  of	  Georgia,	  along	  with	  Tbilisi,	  Mc’xet’a,	  and	  K’ut’aisi.	  Artanuji	  (8th-­‐11th	  centuries)	  was	  the	  center	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	  state,	  which	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  much	  of	  Janašia’s	  research.	  
145 Meanwhile,	   Kiknaże	   neglected	   to	   mention	   the	   Laz	   population’s	   “voluntary”	   Georgification	   in	  Georgia.	   146	  Ibid.	  These	  rivers	  flow	  from	  northeastern	  Turkey	  into	  Batumi	  and	  from	  Erzurum	  to	  the	  Caspian	  Sea,	  respectively.	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  1878	  and	  1917	  –	   and	   “historical	   provinces	  of	  Georgia,	   located	  under	  Turkish	   rule	  (pod	  turetskim	  vladychestvom)”	  –	  Southwest	  Mesxet’i	  and	  Lazistan/Čanet’i.147	  	  While	   preparatory	   work	   by	   the	   Georgian	   Commissariat	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	  occurred	   in	   the	   autumn	   of	   1945,	   the	   public	   campaign	   to	   advocate	   for	   Georgian	  territorial	  claims	  began	  in	  December,	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  
komunisti	   (the	   Georgian-­‐language	   Pravda	   affiliate	   published	   in	   Tbilisi)	   on	   14	  December	   1945	   by	   historians	   Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili	   titled	   “On	   our	   legal	   claims	  toward	   Turkey”	   (t’urk’eti’sadmi	   č’veni	   kanonieri	   pretenziebis	   šesaxeb). 148 	  The	  Russian	   translation	   of	   the	   letter	   appeared	   in	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   the	   following	   day,	   in	  
Pravda	  and	  Izvestiia	  on	  20	  December,	  and	  in	  Pravda	  Ukraini	  on	  22	  December.149	  The	  staggered	   rollout	   of	   this	   piece	   and	   its	   wide	   proliferation	   in	   Union	   newspapers	  suggests	  a	  high	  level	  of	  coordination	  from	  Party	  organs	  to	  publicize	  Georgian	  claims	  not	  only	  in	  Georgia,	  but	  throughout	  the	  USSR.	  The	  letter	  was	  also	  broadcast	  by	  radio	  in	   Georgian	   and	   in	   Russian	   throughout	   the	   Union.	   The	   placement	   in	   Pravda	   and	  
Izvestiia	   likewise	   guaranteed	   a	   foreign	   press	   readership	   at	   a	   time	   when	   Soviet	  territorial	  claims	  had	  a	  particularly	  thorny	  resonance	   in	  the	  early	  days	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.150	  Moreover,	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   piece	   occurred	   in	   the	   same	   month	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Kiknaże	   to	   K.	   Č’arkviani	   and	   V.	   Bak’raże,	   “Ob	   ottorgnutikh	   Turtsiei	   gruzinskikh	   provintsiiakh	  (kratkaia	  spravka,”	  uic’a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  623,	  ll.	  23-­‐37.	  148	  S.	   Janašia	   and	   N.	   Berżenišvili,	   “t’urk’etisadmi	   č’veni	   kanonieri	   pretenziebis	   šesaxeb,”	   komunisti	  (14	  December	  1945),	  p.	  3.	  This	  public	  approach	  differed	  from	  that	  taken	  in	  connection	  to	  Armenian	  claims,	  which	  were	  made	  via	  the	  Armenian	  diaspora	  and	  church	  rather	  than	  Soviet	  Armenian	  organs.	  149	  Simon	  Dzhanashia	  and	  Nikoloz	  Berdzenishvili,	  “O	  nashikh	  zakonnykh	  pretenziiakh	  k	  Turtsii,”	  
Zaria	  Vostoka	  (15	  December	  1945),	  p.	  3.	  	  150	  Rather	   than	   enlisting	   republic	   organs	   in	   the	   Armenian	   SSR	   to	   publicly	   advocate	   for	   territorial	  claims,	  as	  Georgians	  did,	  the	  Armenian	  diaspora,	  Armenian	  Catholicos,	  and	  Armenian	  political	  parties	  in	   exile	   (i.e.	   the	   Dashnaktsutiun)	  mobilized	   to	   promote	   Soviet	   territorial	   demands.	   The	   Armenian	  
	   76	  meeting	   of	   Western	   foreign	   ministers	   with	   Stalin	   in	   Moscow,	   where	   Stalin	   once	  again	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  territorial	  demands.	  As	   its	   title	   implies,	   Janašia	   and	  Berżenišvili’s	   letter	  not	   only	   articulated	   the	  specific	   Georgian	   claims	   to	   territory	   in	   Turkey,	   but	  more	   importantly,	   established	  the	   “legally”	   and	   historically	   grounded	   bases	   of	   said	   claims.	   They	   specifically	  claimed	  Ardahan,	  Artvin,	  Oltu,	  Tortum,	  İspir,	  Bayburt,	  and	  Gümüşhane	  districts	  and	  included	   eastern	   Lazistan,	   Trabzon	   and	   Giresun	   districts	   as	   part	   of	   “our	   ancient	  homeland	   (č’veni	   żvelisżveli	  mica-­‐cqali),”	   which	   therefore	   should	   be	   “returned”	   to	  the	   “Georgian	   people	   (k’art’veli	   xalxi)”.	   Though	   Janašia	   and	  Berżenišvili	   began	   the	  letter	  by	  lauding	  Georgians’	  contributions	  to	  the	  Soviet	  victory	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  the	  project	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  their	  overall	  argument	  for	  “uniting”	  these	  territories	  with	  Georgia	  was	   grounded	   in	   a	   Georgian	   national	   historical	   narrative,	  based	   on	   language,	  material	   culture,	   historical	   geography,	   and	   archaeology	   –	   not,	  interestingly,	   on	   Turkish	   violations	   of	   the	   1921	   Treaties	   of	   Kars	   and	   Moscow.	  Indeed,	   the	  1920-­‐1921	  period	   is	  only	  briefly	  described	  as	  a	   “difficult	   time	   (mżime	  
dro),”	  when	  these	  territories	  were	  taken	  from	  Georgia.	  Instead,	  according	  to	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili,	  	  The	   issue	   at	   hand	   is	   neither	   insignificant	   territorial	   oppression,	   nor	  the	  cradle	  of	  our	  people’s	  individuality,	  which	  was	  captured	  from	  us,	  a	  crime	  which	   dissected	   the	   living	   national	   body	   in	   two.	   The	   issue	   at	  hand	  is	  the	  object	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people’s	  centuries-­‐old	  struggle	  –	  the	  return	  of	  our	  ancient	  homeland	  (mica-­‐cqali).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  campaign	  combined	  efforts	  to	  “repatriate”	  diaspora	  Armenians	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Armenian	  homeland	  and	  “return”	  historically	  Armenian	  lands	  from	  Turkey,	  Suny,	  Looking	  Toward	  Ararat;	  Maike	  Lehmann,	  “A	  Different	   Kind	   of	   Brothers:	   Exclusion	   and	   Partial	   Integration	   After	   Repatriation	   to	   a	   Soviet	  ‘Homeland,’”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2012,	  no.	  3	  (2012):	  171–210.	  
	   77	  In	  short,	  the	  historians	  confidently	  claimed	  that	  “The	  entire	  territory	  of	  southern,	  or	  more	  accurately,	   southwest	  Georgia,	   since	  ancient	   times	  was	  completely	   inhabited	  by	  Georgian	  tribes,	  who	  subsequently	  united	  as	  a	  Georgian	  nation.”151	  	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  “The	  State	  of	  Georgia	  (sak’art’velos	  saxelmcip’o)	  in	  the	  Thirteenth	  Century”	  (Red)	  
and	  areas	  of	  Georgian	  influence	  (Pink)	  152	  
	  Much	  of	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili’s	  argument	  revolved	  around	  the	  role	  of	  the	  medieval	   kingdom	   of	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i,	   with	   its	   capital	   at	   Artanuji,	   in	   the	   national	  narrative	  of	  Georgian	  state-­‐building.	  As	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  early	  medieval	  kingdom	  of	   K’art’li	   (also	   known	   as	   Caucasian	   Iberia),	   the	   principalities	   of	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	  emerged	  as	  a	  political,	   cultural,	   and	   religious	   center	  of	  Georgia	  between	   the	  ninth	  and	   eleventh	   centuries.	   The	   family	   that	   would	   come	   to	   rule	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i,	   the	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  S.	  Janašia	  and	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  “t’urk’etisadmi	  č’veni	  kanonieri	  pretenziebis	  šesaxeb.”	  
152 Javaxišvili,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Janašia,	  sak’art’velos	  istoria,	  180-­‐181. 
	   78	  Bagrationi,	  would	   remain	   the	  primary	   royal	   lineage	   in	  Georgia	   to	   the	  present	  day.	  The	   formation	   of	   Tao-­‐Klarjet’i	   in	   this	   period	   is	   regarded	   as	   the	   first	   iteration	   of	  Georgian	   unification,	   which	   was	   expanded	   upon	   in	   the	   eleventh	   and	   twelfth	  centuries	  by	  Bagrationi	   leaders	  Davit	  Aġmašenebeli	  and	  Tamar-­‐Mep’e.	   Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   this	   region	   to	   the	   development	   of	  Georgian	   statehood,	   the	   modern	   Georgian	   literary	   language,	   and	   Georgian	  ecclesiastical	  geography.153	  	  Moreover,	   the	   historians	   situated	   this	   history	  within	   a	   broader	   struggle	   of	  Georgian	  national	  development	  in	  the	  face	  of	  neighboring	  Muslim	  threats.	  In	  spite	  of	  Arab,	   Turkish,	   and	   Iranian	   conquest,	   “the	   Georgian	   people	   never	   lost	   its	   national	  self-­‐consciousness	   and	   unbreakable	   union	   with	   its	   great	   past”	   and,	   “carrying	   the	  faith	   of	   Christ...did	   their	   best”	   though	   surrounded	   by	   Turkey	   and	   Iran.	   Indeed,	   in	  Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili’s	   account,	   historical	   experience	   demonstrated	   that	  Georgians’	   strength	  was	   in	   unity:	   “K’art’li,	   Imeret’i,	   and	   Southern	  Georgia’s	   united	  struggle	  repeatedly	  taught	  invaders	  a	  bitter	  lesson.	  For	  example,	  in	  1545	  Georgians	  won	   a	   brilliant	   victory	   against	   the	   invading	  Turkish	   army	   at	   Laskarze	  Basin,	   near	  Erzurum.”	   The	   historians	   set	   up	   the	   not-­‐so-­‐subtle	   contrast	   between	   the	   sacred	  Georgian	   people	   and	   the	   Turkish	   overlords	  who	  would	   come	   to	   rule	   them	   in	   the	  subsequent	   centuries.	   The	   Turks	   “brutally	   and	   inhumanely	   persecuted	   the	   holy	  Georgian	   people	   –	   its	   language,	   its	   laws	   and	   traditions,	   its	   ancestors’	   culture	   and	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   79	  faith.	   With	   fire	   and	   sword	   they	   spread	   the	   Turkish	   language	   and	   Islam.”154	  For	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili,	  the	  reunification	  of	  “southern	  Georgia”	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  its	  homeland	   would	   therefore	   right	   a	   historic	   wrong	   for	   which	   generations	   of	  Georgians	  had	  struggled.	  The	   unambiguous	   appeals	   to	   blood,	   faith,	   territory,	   and	   primordial	  Georgianness	   put	   forth	   by	   Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili	   intertwined	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  scholars’	   academic	   work	   with	   passionate	   depictions	   of	   national	   struggle	   against	  enemies.	  Yet	  for	  a	  piece	  that	  would	  be	  disseminated	  quickly	  by	  the	  Pravda	  network	  of	   distribution	   for	   domestic	   and	   international	   audiences,	   “O	   nashikh	   zakonnykh	  
pretenziiakh	  k	  Turtsii”	   contained	  no	  mention	  of	   the	  Soviet	  project,	   communism,	  or	  Stalin.	   Moreover,	   for	   a	   piece	   highlighting	   a	   Georgian-­‐Christian	   struggle	   against	  Muslim	   neighbors,	   familiar	   odes	   to	   the	  merits	   of	   Russo-­‐Georgian	   friendship	  were	  also	   absent.	   Brief	   statements	   about	   Georgian	   contributions	   in	   the	   Great	   Patriotic	  War	  provided	  seemingly	  little	  Soviet	   justification	  for	  what	  came	  across	  as	  brazenly	  nationalist	  territorial	  claims.	  With	  the	  article’s	  tone	  in	  mind,	  what	  was	  the	  strategy	  behind	   making	   public	   the	   Georgian	   territorial	   claims	   in	   this	   way?	   Most	   other	  scholarly	   interpretations	   of	   this	   episode	   attribute	   little	   agency	   to	   Janašia	   and	  Berżenišvili	   in	   the	  matter,	  viewing	   it	   instead	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  gambit	  orchestrated	  by	   Stalin	   and/or	   Beria,	   via	   Č’arkviani.	   The	   historians’	   involvement	   and	   intentions	  are	  thus	  treated	  with	  skepticism.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  more	  nationalist	  tinge	  of	  the	  Georgian	  territorial	  claims	  conveyed	  by	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	  perhaps	  served	  as	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   80	  an	   attempt	   to	   distance	   the	   claims	   from	   their	   actual	   source	   –	   that	   is,	   Georgians	   in	  Moscow	  rather	   than	  Georgians	   in	  Tbilisi	  –	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  provide	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  justification	   for	   the	   claims.	   Indeed,	   this	   episode	   occurred	   at	   perhaps	   the	   apex	   of	  Beria’s	   political	   power	   in	   Moscow:	   as	   a	   Georgian	   who	   owed	   his	   rise	   to	   deep	  patronage	   networks	   in	   the	   Caucasus,	   he	   was	   well	   equipped	   to	   mobilize	   local	  Georgian	   resources	   to	   advance	   a	   Soviet	   geopolitical	   agenda. 155 	  Yet	   even	   if	  Berżenišvili	   and	   Janašia’s	   letter	   in	   komunisti	   was	   utterly	   political	   rather	   than	   a	  voluntary	  expression	  of	  sentiment,	  they	  still	  drew	  from	  and	  appealed	  to	  a	  Georgian	  national	   narrative	   that	   they	   themselves	   spent	   their	   careers	   actively	   constructing.	  Stalin,	   Beria,	   and	   Molotov	   likely	   surmised	   that	   this	   gave	   the	   scholars	   sufficient	  legitimacy	   to	   advocate	   for	   territorial	   claims	   on	   an	   international	   stage.	   But	   Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili’s	   lives’	  work	  was	   intimately	   tied	   to	   the	  greater	  Georgia	   for	  which	  they	   appealed	   in	   this	   letter,	  whether	   or	   not	   it	  was	   a	   cynical	   and	   over-­‐determined	  ploy	  by	  leaders	  in	  Moscow	  to	  play	  geopolitics.	  	  Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili’s	   article	   garnered	   attention	   from	   foreign	   press	  outlets,	   which	   encountered	   the	   Pravda	   iteration	   of	   the	   article.	   However,	  interpretation	  of	   the	  article’s	   significance	  varied	  by	  country	   in	   important	  ways,	   as	  emphasized	   by	   officers	   in	   the	   Georgian	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   charged	   with	  summarizing	   foreign	   reception	   of	   the	   article.	   Turkish	   papers,	   for	   example,	  connected	   the	   Georgian	   claims	   to	   efforts	   by	   the	   Armenian	   diaspora	   in	   the	   United	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Indeed,	   Suny	   suggests	   that	   the	   Georgian	   territorial	   claims	   were	   made	   by	   Stalin	   at	   Beria’s	  instigation	   and	   demonstrates	   the	   extent	   of	   Beria’s	   influence	   over	   Stalin	   in	   this	   period,	   Suny,	   The	  
Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  284-­‐285.	  Zubok	  and	  Pleshakov,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  leave	  Beria	  out	  of	  the	  equation	  entirely,	  viewing	  the	  territorial	  claims	  strategy	  as	  one	  driven	  by	  Stalin,	  which	  Molotov	  somewhat	  reluctantly	  carried	  out,	  Zubok	  and	  Pleshakov,	  Inside	  the	  Kremlin’s	  Cold	  War,	  93.	  
	   81	  States	  and	  elsewhere	  to	  “return”	  lands	  from	  Turkey	  to	  Soviet	  Armenia.	  Yet	  Turkish	  writers	   focused	  more	  on	   the	  move	  as	  one	  of	  Russian	  expansion,	  driven	  neither	  by	  Georgian	   and	  Armenian	   national	   aims	   nor	   Soviet	   ideology.	   English	   papers,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   viewed	   the	   “romantic	   demands	   of	   the	  Georgian	   scholars”	   as	   part	   of	   a	  “game	  in	  which	  the	  Georgian	  professors	  allowed	  themselves	  to	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  divert	  attention	  from	  the	  events	  in	  Azerbaijan.”156	  Moreover,	  English	  papers	  found	  it	  odd	   that	   the	   “new”	   territorial	   demands	   came	   not	   from	   “Russia,”	   but	   from	   “her	  dominion,	   Georgia.”	   Finnish	   papers	   hit	   upon	   perhaps	   the	   most	   significant	   point,	  however:	   that	   Georgia	   was	   the	   first	   of	   all	   the	   Soviet	   republics	   to	   “independently	  come	  forth	  with	  demands	  in	  international	  politics.	  This	  republic	  is	  the	  homeland	  of	  Stalin	  and	  this	  circumstance	  exacerbates	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  issue.”157	  	   Other	  than	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili’s	  December	  letter,	  the	  only	  time	  Georgian	  territorial	   claims	   were	   mentioned	   further	   in	   Union-­‐level	   newspapers	   was	   in	  Č’arkviani’s	  address	  of	  25	  February	  1946,	  in	  honor	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐fifth	  anniversary	  of	  Soviet	  Georgia,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  Pravda.158	  In	  this	  address,	  the	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	   reiterated	   claims	   to	   Ardahan,	   Artvin,	   Olti,	   Tortum,	   Ispiri,	   Bayburt,	  Gümüşhane,	   and	   Lazistan.	   In	   Georgia,	  meanwhile,	   articles	   by	   prominent	   Georgian	  scholars	   and	   public	   figures	   appeared	   in	   komunisti	   and	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	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  most	  likely	  refers	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Azerbaijan	  crisis”	  during	  the	  Soviet	  occupation	  of	  Iranian	  Azerbaijan.	  See	  Dzhamil	  Gasanly,	  SSSR-­‐Iran:	  Azerbaidzhanskii	  krizis	  i	  nachalo	  kholodnoi	  voiny	  (1941-­‐
1946	  gg.)	  (Moscow:	  Geroi	  Otechestva,	  2006).	  157	  I.	   Natrošvili	   and	   B.	   Lordkipaniże,	   of	   the	   Political	   Section	   of	   the	   Georgian	   MFA,	   prepared	   this	  report	   for	   Kiknaże,	  who	   forwarded	   it	   to	   Č’arkviani	   in	   August	   1946,	   “Otkliki	   inostrannoi	   pressy	   na	  pis’mo	   gruzinskikh	   akademikov	   S.	   Dzhanashia	   i	   N.	   Berdzenishvili	   ‘O	   nashikh	   zakonnykh	  trebovaniiakh	  k	  Turtsii,’”	  28	  April	  and	  28	  June	  1946,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  253,	  ll.	  60-­‐86.	  	  158	  K.	  Č’arkviani,	  “25-­‐letie	  Sovetskoi	  Gruzii,”	  Pravda	  (February	  25,	  1946),	  p.	  2.	  
	   82	  elaborating	  on	   the	  historical	  bases	  of	  Georgian	   territorial	   ambitions	  once	  or	   twice	  per	   month	   through	   May	   1946.	   That	   this	   editorial	   discussion	   was	   confined	   to	   a	  Georgian	   readership	   is	   telling:	   the	   forum	   devoted	   considerably	   more	   space	   to	  promoting	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   these	   territorial	   claims	   to	  Georgians	   than	   to	   a	  Union-­‐wide	  or	   foreign	  audience.	  Among	  those	  contributors	   to	   the	  public	  discussion	  were	  Arnold	   Č’ik’obava,	   a	   renowned	   Georgian	   linguist,	   Rasix	   Sulieimanis	   że	   Beriże,	   a	  member	   of	   the	   Ajarian	   branch	   of	   the	   Transcaucasian	   Muslim	   Ecclesiastical	  Authority,	  Georgian	  Orthodox	  Patriarch	  Kalistrate,	  historians	  S.	  Jik’ia,	  D.	  Zavriev,	  and	  Ek’t’ime	  T’aqaišvili,	  and	  a	  group	  of	  assistant	  professors	   from	  universities	   in	  Tbilisi	  and	   Batumi. 159 	  The	   institutional	   affiliations	   of	   these	   writers	   –	   encompassing	  multiple	  academic	  disciplines,	  religions,	  and	  locales	  (Tbilisi	  and	  Batumi)	  –	  suggest	  a	  coordinated	   and	  multifaceted	   campaign	   to	   unite	   a	   Georgian	   readership	   (in	  which	  Ajarians	  were	  Georgians	  more	  than	  they	  were	  Muslims)	  against	  a	  past	  and	  present	  Turkish	  foe	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people.	  	   The	   ensuing	   discussion	   in	   Georgian	   republic	   newspapers	   reiterated	   the	  territorial	   demands	  made	   by	   Janašia	   and	   Berżenišvili,	   yet	   the	   subsequent	   articles	  did	  not	  merely	  reproduce	  the	  original	  argument.	  Č’ik’obava,	  for	  example,	  focused	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  Lazistan	  and	  emphasized	  reuniting	  the	  Laz	  in	  Turkey	  with	  their	  fellow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Arnold	   Chikobava,	   “Neskol’ko	   zamechanii	   o	   lazakh,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka,	   (20	  December	   1945);	   Rasix	  Suleimanis	  że	  Beriże,	  “t’urk’ma	  modzaladeebma	  unda	  dagvibrunon	  č’veni	  mica-­‐cqali,”	  komunisti,	  (28	  December	   1945);	   Kalistrate,	   “cerili	   redak’c’iis	   mimart’”	   komunisti,	   (8	   January	   1946);	   S.	   Jik’ia,	  “t’urk’ebis	  mier	  mitac’ebuli	  k’art’velt’a	  mkvidri	  mica-­‐cqlis	  šesaxeb,”	  komunisti,	  (29	  January	  1946);	  D.	  Zavrievi,	   “t’urk’et’is	   nac’ionaluri	   raionebis	   mżime	   mdgomareobis	   šesaxeb,”	   komunisti,	   (3	   March	  1946);	   Nadim	   Nijaraże,	   Jemal	   Moġaideli,	   Memed	   Stambolišvili,	   Xusein	   Axvlediani,	   “movit’xovt’	  t’urk’ebis	  mier	  damonebuli	  č’veni	  debisa	  da	  żmebis	  gant’avisup’lebas,”	  komunisti,	  (7	  May	  1946);	  and	  Ek’t’ime	  T’aqaishvili,	  “t’urk’et’is	  mier	  mitac’ebul	  č’vens	  micaze,”	  komunisti,	  (25-­‐26	  May	  1946).	  
	   83	  Georgian	  tribes	  as	  a	  fundamental	  concern,	  focusing	  not	  only	  on	  the	  territory	  and	  its	  history,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  people	  who	  currently	   inhabited	  it.160	  Beriże	  and	  Kalistrate,	  meanwhile,	   wrote	   explicitly	   on	   behalf	   of	   Georgian	   Muslims	   and	   Christians,	  respectively,	  reiterating	  the	  precise	  territorial	  claims	  mentioned	  in	  earlier	  accounts	  and	  making	  corresponding	  appeals	  to	  the	  great	  achievements	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state	  –	  an	  association	   largely	   ignored	   by	   Janašia,	   Berżenišvili,	   and	   Č’ik’obava.	   Beriże	   and	  Kalistrate	   both	   maintained	   the	   theme	   of	   struggle	   against	   enemies,	   yet	   with	  important	   distinctions:	   Beriże	   insisted	   that	   Georgian	   Muslims	   and	   Georgian	  Christians	  were	  “brothers,”	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  struggled	  against	  Turks.	  Kalistrate,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   distinguished	   not	   between	   Georgian	   Muslims	   and	   Christians,	   but	  between	   “Georgia	   under	   the	   Ottoman	   yoke”	   and	   “free	   Georgia,”	   where	   after	   the	  Great	  October	  Revolution	  the	  “free	  Georgian	  nation”	  lived	  in	  a	  brotherly	  union	  with	  other	  Soviet	  peoples.161	  	  The	  group	  of	  professors	  from	  Tbilisi	  and	  Batumi	  continued	  the	  “brotherhood”	  trope	  and	  described	  the	  progressive	  achievements	  (in	  the	  fields	  of	   economics,	   culture,	   and	  women’s	   rights)	   brought	   to	   Ajaria	   by	   Soviet	   power,	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  their	  “brethren”	  in	  Turkey.	  Returning	  the	  territories	  in	  question	  would	  therefore	  bring	  “freedom”	  to	  their	  “sisters	  and	  brothers.”162	  In	  spite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Č’ikobava	  did	  not	  mention	   specific	   territorial	   claims,	   but	  he	   argued	   that	   the	  historical	   injustice	  must	   be	   corrected	   –	   that	   the	   natural	   place	   of	   the	   Laz	   was	   among	   blood-­‐related	   Georgian	   tribes,	  especially	  Mingrelians.	  Č’ikobava	  likewise	  sought	  to	  disprove	  the	  official	  Turkish	  policy	  that	  because	  Laz	  were	  Muslims,	   they	  should	  be	  counted	  as	  Turks.	  Moreover,	   in	  his	  words,	   “Islam	   is	  antinational	  and	   presents	   a	   threat	  more	   than	   any	   other	   religion	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   small	   peoples,”	   Chikobava,	  “Neskol’ko	  zamechanii	  o	  lazakh.”	  161	  Beriże,	  “t’urk’ma	  modzaladeebma	  unda	  dagvibrunon	  č’veni	  mica-­‐cqali”;	  Kalistrate,	  “cerili	  redak’c’iis	  mimart’”.	  162	  Nadim	  Nijaraże,	  Jemal	  Moġaideli,	  Memed	  Stambolišvili,	  Xusein	  Axvlediani,	  “movit’xovt’	  t’urk’ebis	  mier	  damonebuli	  č’veni	  debisa	  da	  żmebis	  gant’avisup’lebas.”	  
	   84	  of	   the	   nuances	   of	   each	   article,	   the	   komunisti	   forum	   participants	   shared	   the	   belief	  with	  Janašia	  and	  Berżenišvili	  that	  the	  territories	  in	  question	  were,	  without	  a	  doubt,	  the	  mica-­‐cqali	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people,	  using	  this	  terminology	  consistently	  in	  lieu	  of	  other	  possibilities,	  such	  as	  samšoblo	  or	  eri.	  The	  newspaper	  discourse	  on	  the	  issue	  in	  Georgia	   shifted	   in	  mid-­‐1946,	   at	   which	   point	   Georgian	  writers	   and	   poets	   took	   the	  mantel	   previously	   occupied	   by	   scholars	   to	   periodically	   publicize	   the	   romance	   of	  Georgian	  attachments	  to	  these	  territories	  and	  their	  inhabitants	  through	  1952.163	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   scholars’	   demands	   and	   public	   advocacy	   campaign	   failed	   to	  win	   any	   territorial	   concessions	   from	   Turkey.	   The	   official	   claims	   were	   withdrawn	  shortly	   after	   Stalin’s	   death	   in	   1953,	   at	   which	   point	   Molotov	   announced,	   “The	  governments	   of	   Armenia	   and	   Georgia	   deem	   it	   possible	   to	   waive	   their	   territorial	  claims	   against	   Turkey.	   The	   Soviet	   government	   consequently	   states	   that	   the	   USSR	  has	  no	  territorial	  pretensions	  against	  Turkey.”164	  Even	  in	  mid-­‐1953,	  at	  which	  point	  Turkey	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  NATO	  for	  over	  a	  year,	  Soviet	  officials	  still	  maintained	  the	   line	   that	   the	   territorial	   claims	   emanated	   from	  Yerevan	   and	  Tbilisi	   rather	   than	  Moscow.	  This	   stance	   likely	   served	   to	  distance	   the	  Soviet	   central	   government	   from	  this	  geopolitical	  failure.	  	  Yet	   using	   Armenian	   and	   Georgian	   republic-­‐level	   actors	   as	   a	   cover	   did	   not	  preclude	   their	   actual	   investment	   in	   pursuing	   national	   foreign	   policy	   goals.	   In	   the	  case	   of	   Armenia,	   “The	   coincidence	   of	   the	   local	   Armenian	   claims	   with	   the	   geo-­‐
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  Jaba	  Samušiam,	  ed.,	  ert’i	  ideologiuri	  kampaniis	  istoriidan:	  sabčot’a	  kavširis	  teritoriuli	  pretenziebi	  
t’urk’isadmi	  1945-­‐1953	  clebši	  (Tbilisi:	  Artanuji,	  2003).	  164	  As	  quoted	  in	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  285.	  
	   85	  strategic	  ambitions	  of	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  allowed	   the	  Armenian	  elite	   to	   identify	  the	   two	   positions	   together	   and	   then	   adjusted	   to	   far-­‐reaching	   interpretations	   of	  Soviet	   interests.”165	  While	   the	   territorial	   campaign	   was	   the	   first	   –	   and	   boldest	   –	  endeavor	  of	  the	  new	  Georgian	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  the	  last,	  as	  Kiknaże	  and	   his	   successors	   attempted	   to	   project	   specifically	   Soviet	   Georgian	   power	   and	  interests	   elsewhere.	   This	   postwar	   episode	   revealed	   a	   broader	   “synergy	   between	  Stalin’s	   strategic	   goals	   and	   the	   nationalist	   aspirations	   of	   Communist	   apparatchiks	  from	  the	  South	  Caucasus”	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	  cultivated	  the	   institutional	  bases	  at	  the	  national	   level	   to	   fuse	   Soviet	   and	   national	   interests	   that	   could	   outlast	   the	   Stalin	  era.166	  These	   Georgian	   bureaucratic	   and	   scholarly	   nation-­‐builders	   looked	   toward	  the	   Andersonian	   tool	   of	   “historical	  maps”	   as	   a	   political	   and	   national	   opportunity,	  which	   demonstrated	   “the	   antiquity	   of	   specific,	   tightly	   bounded	   territorial	   units.	  Through	   chronologically	   arranged	   sequences	   of	   such	   maps,	   a	   sort	   of	   political-­‐biographical	  narrative	  of	  the	  realm	  came	  into	  being,	  sometimes	  with	  vast	  historical	  depth.” 167 	  Even	   if	   Kiknaże,	   Janašia,	   Berżenišvili	   and	   their	   collaborators	   were	  ultimately	  unsuccessful	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  “unite”	  historically	  Georgian	  lands	  into	  a	  single	  nation-­‐state	  in	  Soviet	  colors,	  the	  failure	  of	  this	  ambition	  likewise	  had	  a	  lasting	  impact.	   The	   more	   limited	   map	   of	   the	   modern	   Georgian	   homeland	   –	   that	   is,	   the	  precise	   territory	   of	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   rather	   than	   the	   historical	   map	   of	   greater	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Lehmann,	  Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation,	  62.	  166	  Vladislav	  M.	   Zubok,	  A	  Failed	  Empire:	  The	  Soviet	  Union	   in	   the	  Cold	  War	   from	  Stalin	   to	  Gorbachev	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2007),	  10.	  167	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  174-­‐175.	  
	   86	  Georgia	  –	  would	   serve	  as	   the	   terrain	   for	   the	  post-­‐Stalin	  process	  of	  nationalization	  and	  ethnoterritorial	  consolidation.	  *	   *	   *	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   shown	   how	   census,	   historiography,	   and	  map	   could	   be	   as	  much	  local,	  Georgian	  institutions	  of	  nation-­‐building	  as	  Soviet	  “colonial”	  technologies	  of	   rule	   or	   geopolitical	   projections	   of	   power.	   Yet	   while	   a	   “linkage”	   described	   by	  Anderson	   existed	   between	   census,	   historiography,	   and	   map	   as	   productive	  institutions	   of	   nation-­‐building,	   their	   interconnectedness	   was	   not	   without	  “disjunctures.”168	  	  Such	   disjunctures	   were	   reflected	   in	   the	   relative	   success	   and	   failure	   of	   the	  census,	  historiography,	  and	  map	  as	  the	  nation-­‐building	  institutions	  detailed	  above.	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   Georgian	   nation-­‐builders,	   the	   initial	   subordination	   of	  Georgian	   subgroups	   to	   a	   Georgian	   nationality	   and	   eventual	   elimination	   of	  categorical	   nuances	   within	   the	   official	   Georgian	   census	   nationality	   provided	   an	  important	   achievement	   in	   the	   all-­‐Union	   transition	   from	   a	   Soviet	   ethos	   of	  “ethnophilia”	   to	   a	   consolidation	   of	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   entitled,	   developed	  nationalities.	   Accounting	   for	   historical	   distinctions	   among	   Kartvelian	   populations	  and	   tracking	   their	   consolidation	   across	   the	   centuries	   motivated	   scholarly	   nation-­‐building	  projects	  such	  as	  sak’art’velos	  istoria	  and	  other	  research	  agendas	  pursued	  by	  Janašia,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  their	  colleagues	  in	  the	  Stalin	  era.	  The	  historical	  narrative	  of	  Georgia	  that	  emerged	  expanded	  considerably	  the	  temporal	  and	  geographic	  reach	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Emphasizing	  “interconnectedness”	  and	  “disjunctures”	  comes	  from	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  13.	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k’art’veloba	  through	  the	  ages	  and	  appropriated	  histories	  and	  territories	  of	  Caucasian	  neighbors	   into	  a	  Georgian	  story	  of	  struggle	  and	  agency.	  The	  elevation	  of	  historical	  maps	   to	   foreign	   policy	   claims	   demonstrated	   the	   geopolitical	   limits	   of	   the	   nation-­‐building	   imagination,	   even	   as	   local	   Georgian	   Party	   and	   scholarly	   institutions	  continued	   to	   impart	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   larger	  mica-­‐cqali	   among	   the	   Soviet	   Georgian	  populace.	   In	   its	  most	  ambitious	   form,	   the	  map	  component	  of	   the	  Georgian	  nation-­‐building	   institutional	   agenda	   was,	   in	   the	   event,	   decidedly	   less	   successful	   than	   its	  census	   and	   historiography	   counterparts.	   Yet	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   campaigns	   for	  Georgian	  (and	  Armenian)	   territories	   in	  Turkey	  allowed	  scholars	  and	  policymakers	  in	  Georgia	  to	  concentrate	  their	  nation-­‐building	  gaze	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  proper,	  particularly	  in	  Abkhazia,	  Ajaria,	  and	  Tbilisi.	  Turning	  Kartvelian	  peasants	  into	  Soviet	  Georgians,	  to	  paraphrase	  Eugen	  Weber,	  required	  the	  mobilization	  of	  new	  nation-­‐building	   institutions	   to	   construct,	   consolidate,	   refine,	   historicize,	   and	  reinforce	  the	  ethnoterritorial	  composition	  of	  a	  modern	  Soviet	  Georgia.169	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Eugen	  Weber,	  Peasants	  into	  Frenchmen:	  The	  Modernization	  of	  Rural	  France,	  1870-­‐1914	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1976).	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Last	  “Wave”:	  	  
Expulsions,	  Ethnic	  Consolidation,	  and	  the	  Postwar	  Experience	  	  	   Alongside	   the	   productive	   institutions	   of	   nation-­‐building	   examined	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter	   –	   from	   census-­‐taking	   to	   historical	   writing	   and	   territorial	  irredentism	   –	   the	   Soviet	   state	   under	   Stalin	   pursued	   excisional	   policies	  within	   the	  population	   to	   isolate	   and	   remove	   elements	   believed	   to	   threaten	   the	   larger	   body	  politic.	  Deportation	  of	  alleged	  enemy	  elements	  was	   therefore	  a	  defining	   feature	  of	  Stalin’s	   Soviet	  Union.170	  This	  was	  as	  much	   the	   case	   in	  Georgia	   as	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  USSR.	   While	   deportation	   and	   execution	   based	   on	   nationality	   occurred	   as	   early	   as	  the	   1919	   de-­‐Cossackization	   campaigns,	   scholars	   have	   noted	   the	   “gradual	   shift”	   in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	   from	  the	  class-­‐based	  terror	  of	  collectivization	  campaigns	  and	  party	  purges	  to	  terror	  waged	  against	  specific	  nationalities.171	  The	  shift	   from	  enemy	  class	  to	   enemy	   nationality	   was	   closely	   tied	   to	   security	   concerns	   and	   perceived	   foreign	  threats,	   whether	   from	   Nazi	   Germany,	   Imperial	   Japan,	   or	   simply	   “diaspora	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  “Deportation”	  typically	  implies	  expulsion	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	  (such	  as	  the	  deportation	  of	  an	  illegal	  immigrant	  from	  the	  United	  States	  to	  his	  or	  her	  country	  of	  citizenship).	  However,	  scholars	  of	  the	   Soviet	   Union	   tend	   to	   use	   this	   word	   in	   lieu	   of	   the	   official	   Soviet	   terms	   “expulsion”	   or	   “special	  settlement”	   (vyselenie/spetsposelenie)	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   moving	   large	   groups	   from	   their	  places	   of	   origin	   to	   Central	   Asia	   or	   Siberia	   as	   punishment.	   I	   interchangeable	   employ	   the	   terms	  deportation	   and	   expulsion	   in	   this	   chapter	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   latter	   application.	   Pavel	   Polian	  argues	  that	  around	  six	  million	  people	  endured	  "internal	  forced	  migrations"	  between	  1919	  and	  1953	  in	  Against	  Their	  Will:	  The	  History	  and	  Geography	  of	  Forced	  Migrations	  in	  the	  USSR	  (Budapest:	  Central	  European	  	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  4.	  	  171	  See	   Gabor	   Rittersporn,	   “‘Vrednye	   elementy,’	   ‘opasnye	   men’shinstva’	   i	   bol’shevistskie	   trevogi:	  Massovye	  operatsii	  1937-­‐38	  gg.	  i	  etnicheskii	  vopros	  v	  SSSR,”	  in	  V	  sem’e	  edinoi:	  Natsional’naia	  politika	  
partii	   bol’shevikov	   i	   ee	   osushchestvlenie	   na	   severo-­‐zapade	   Rossii	   v	   1920-­‐1950-­‐e	   gody,	   ed.	   Timo	  Vikhavainen	  and	  Irina	  Takal	  (Petrozavodsk:	   Izd.	  Petrozavodskogo	  universiteta,	  1998),	  99–122;	  and	  Terry	   Martin,	   “The	   Origins	   of	   Soviet	   Ethnic	   Cleansing,”	   The	   Journal	   of	   Modern	   History	   70,	   no.	   4	  (December	   1998):	   813–861,	   852.	   On	   the	   de-­‐Cossackization	   campaign,	   see	   Peter	   Holquist,	  Making	  
War,	  Forging	  Revolution,	  Chapter	  6.	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  nationalities”	  that	  were	  citizens	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  yet	  had	  external	  homelands.172	  Such	   security	   imperatives	   manifested	   a	   kind	   of	   “Soviet	   xenophobia,”	   or	   “the	  exaggerated	  Soviet	  fear	  of	  foreign	  influence	  and	  foreign	  contamination”	  which	  was	  “ideological,	   not	   ethnic.” 173 	  Yet	   an	   overreliance	   on	   security	   concerns	   as	   an	  explanation	  for	  nationally-­‐based	  deportations	  underestimates	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Soviet	   nation-­‐building	   ideology	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   expulsions.	   	   While	   “diaspora	  nationalities”	  did	  present	  security	  concerns	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Soviet	   leaders,	  as	  Francine	  Hirsch	  argues,	   “Soviet	   leaders	  were	  concerned	   that	   these	  nationalities	  could	   not	   be	   ‘re-­‐invented’	   as	   Soviet	   nations	   –	   national	   in	   form,	   but	   socialist	   in	  content	  –	  because	  other	  states	  or	  class	  enemies	  had	  ‘control’	  over	  the	  histories	  and	  traditions	  that	  shaped	  their	  national	  consciousness.”174	  Several	   scholars	   have	   developed	   typologies	   of	   Soviet	   deportations	   in	   an	  effort	  to	  situate	  this	  Soviet	  practice	  along	  modern,	  imperial,	  and	  wartime	  population	  management	   strategies.	  175	  	   	   However,	  most	   studies	   focus	   on	   prewar	   and	  wartime	  deportations	  to	  develop	  such	  typologies	  and	  therefore	  struggle	  to	  effectively	  explain	  postwar	  expulsions	   and	  population	  exchanges.	   	   Pavel	  Polian,	   for	   instance,	   offers	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  On	  “external	  homelands”,	  see	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  Chapter	  3.	  173	  Martin,	  “The	  Origins	  of	  Soviet	  Ethnic	  Cleansing,”	  829.	  174	  Francine	  Hirsch,	  “Race	  without	  the	  Practice	  of	  Racial	  Politics,”	  Slavic	  Review	  61,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  2002):	  30–43,	  38.	  175	  Aleksandr	  M.	  Nekrich,	  The	  Punished	  Peoples:	  The	  Deportation	  and	  Fate	  of	  Soviet	  Minorities	  at	  the	  
End	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1978)	  was	  the	  first	  to	  provide	  an	  analytical	  framework	   for	   Soviet	   nationally-­‐based	   deportations,	   which	   was	   further	   elaborated	   by	   Robert	  Conquest,	   The	   Nation	   Killers:	   The	   Soviet	   Deportation	   of	   Nationalities	   (London:	   Macmillan,	   1970).	  Whereas	  scholars	  arguing	  for	  the	  genocidal	  components	  of	  such	  policies	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  North	  Caucasian	  and	  Crimean	  Tatar	   cases	   (1944),	   scholars	  emphasizing	   the	   security	   imperative	  highlight	  expulsion	   operations	   between	   1937	   and	   1941	   (such	   as	   Koreans,	   Germans,	   Finns).	   Other	   scholars	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  deportation	  of	  individual	  groups,	  such	  as	  Michael	  Gelb,	  “An	  Early	  Soviet	  Ethnic	  Deportation:	  The	  Far-­‐Eastern	  Koreans,”	  Russian	  Review	  54,	  no.	  3	  (July	  1995):	  389–412.	  
	   90	  useful	   distinction	   between	   “preventive”	   and	   “retributive”	   deportations	   that	   is	  instructive	  through	  1944	  but	  still	  relies	  primarily	  on	  a	  security	  explanation	  for	  the	  operations.	   Hirsch’s	   broader	   categorization	   more	   adequately	   integrates	   prewar,	  wartime,	   and	   postwar	   national	   deportations	   as	   part	   of	   a	   longer	   trend.	   In	   this	  schema,	  the	  types	  of	  nationalities	  subject	  to	  deportation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  fell	  into	  three	  main	   categories:	   “diaspora	   nationalities,”	  with	   either	   a	   nation-­‐state	   or	   large	  community	  outside	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (such	  as	  Germans,	  Finns,	  or	  Jews);	  nationalities	  that	   resisted	   Sovietization	   efforts	   (such	   as	   Chechens);	   and	   nationalities	   who	   had	  lived	  outside	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  (in	  German-­‐occupied	   lands	  during	  World	  War	  Two,	  for	   instance).176	  These	   categories	   more	   effectively	   account	   for	   changes	   over	   time	  regarding	  which	  groups	  were	   targeted	   for	  expulsion	  and	   the	  purported	  grounds	  –	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  security	  concerns	  -­‐-­‐	  for	  such	  operations.	  The	  shift	  from	  the	   wartime	   to	   the	   postwar	   period	   further	   challenges	   the	   simple	   security	  explanation	  for	  continued	  expulsions	  up	  to	  1953.	  Postwar	  deportations	  and	  population	  exchanges	  built	  upon	  Soviet	  practices	  honed	   in	   the	   prewar	   and	   wartime	   eras.177	  Yet	   unlike	   the	   prewar	   and	   wartime	  deportations,	   nationally-­‐based	   deportations	   in	   the	   postwar	   period	   remain	  understudied,	  particularly	  in	  English-­‐language	  historiography.	  Polian	  estimates	  that	  a	   total	   of	   380,000-­‐400,000	   people	  were	   deported	   in	   the	   postwar	   period.178	  While	  smaller	   in	   scale	   than	   prewar	   and	   wartime	   deportations,	   these	   numbers	   remain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  Hirsch,	  “Race	  without	  the	  Practice	  of	  Racial	  Politics,”	  38.	  177	  This	   was	   not	   a	   uniquely	   Soviet	   phenomenon,	   but	   rather	   had	   contemporary	   iterations	   across	  Europe,	   Amir	   Weiner,	   ed.,	   Landscaping	   the	   Human	   Garden:	   Twentieth-­‐Century	   Population	  
Management	  in	  a	  Comparative	  Framework	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  178	  Polian,	  Against	  Their	  Will,	  171.	  
	   91	  significant	  and	  disproportionately	  affected	  the	  Soviet	  peripheries.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  three	  deportation	  operations	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Georgia	  between	  1944	  and	  1952:	   the	   expulsion	   of	   Meskhetians,	   a	   group	   of	   Muslim	   populations	   in	   southern	  Georgia,	   in	   November	   1944;	   Operation	   “Volna”	   (wave),	   which	   was	   carried	   out	   in	  June	   1949	   against	   Greeks,	   Turks,	   and	   Armenians	   (suspected	   former	   Dashnaks)	  living	   in	  Georgia,	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  southern	  Caucasus,	  and	  on	   the	  Black	  Sea	  coast;	  and	  the	  expulsion	  of	  suspected	  Georgian	  enemy	  elements	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	   “Mingrelian	  affair”	  of	  1951-­‐1952.179	  I	   argue	   that	  postwar	  deportations	   in	  Georgia	  were	  not	  strictly	  a	  function	  of	  perceived	  external	  military	  threats,	  but	  also	  played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   more	   longue	   durée	   processes	   of	   Soviet	   territorial	   nation-­‐building.	  	  Furthermore,	   a	   comparative	   examination	   of	   postwar	   deportations	   from	  Georgia	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   peculiar	   center-­‐periphery	   dynamics	   at	   play	   between	  Tbilisi	   and	   Moscow	   in	   the	   late	   Stalin	   era.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   competing	   Georgian	  “fiefdoms,”	   it	   remains	   difficult	   to	   distinguish	   between	   center	   and	   periphery	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  I	   use	   the	   terms	   “Greek,”	   “Turk,”	   “Dashnak,”	   etc.	   in	   this	   chapter	   to	   reflect	   the	   categorization	   of	  these	   persons	   and	   groups	   in	   Soviet	   Party	   and	   Security	   archival	   documents.	   The	   categories	   often	  obscure	   the	   issues	   of	   Soviet	   citizenship	   or	   long-­‐term	   generational	   residence.	   For	   instance,	   the	  “Greek”	  community	  in	  Georgia	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Pontic	  Greek	  diaspora,	  a	  group	  that	  had	  lived	  on	  the	  Black	   Sea	   coast	   for	   hundreds	   of	   years.	   Similarly,	   the	   “Turk”	   label	   at	   various	   points	   referred	   to	  Muslims,	   Tatars,	   Azerbaijanis,	   or	   subjects	   of	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   or	   Turkey.	   The	   “Dashnak”	   label	  reflects	  an	  accusation	  rather	  than	  active	  participation.	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  show,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Soviet	   authorities	   constructed	   these	   categories	   often	   encountered	   practical	   difficulties	   during	  implementation	   of	   deportation	   operations	   and	   the	   rehabilitation	   and	   return	   processes.	   “Dashnak”	  refers	   to	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Dashnaktsutiun,	   or	   Armenian	   Revolutionary	   Federation,	   an	   Armenian	  nationalist	   party	   that	   led	   the	   independent	   Republic	   of	   Armenia	   (1918-­‐1920)	   and,	   following	   the	  Bolshevik	  takeover	  of	  the	  Transcaucasus,	  continued	  to	  exist	  among	  Armenian	  diaspora	  communities.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  “Mensheviks”	  in	  Soviet	  Georgia,	  “Dashnaks”	  remained	  a	  convenient	  enemy	  for	  Soviet	   authorities	   to	   invoke.	   On	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Dashnaktsutiun	   in	   modern	   Armenian	   history,	   see	  Suny,	  Looking	  Toward	  Ararat	  and	  Girard	   J.	   Libaridian,	  Modern	  Armenia:	  People,	  Nation,	  State	   (New	  Brunswick:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  2004).	  
	   92	  Georgia	  under	  Stalinism.	  Was	  Lavrenti	  Beria,	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	  from	  1931	  to	  1938	  and,	   from	   there,	  head	  of	   the	   state	   security	  apparatus	   in	  Moscow,	  a	  Georgian	  emissary	   representing	   his	   co-­‐ethnics’	   interests	   in	   Moscow?	   Or	   did	   Beria	   impose	  Moscow’s	  will	  on	  Georgia	  through	  his	  robust	  patronage	  network	  in	  the	  Caucasus?	  To	  what	   extent	   did	   local	   struggles	   and	   issues	   in	   Georgia	   play	   out	   in	  Moscow,	   among	  prominent	  Caucasians	  such	  as	  Beria,	  Stalin,	  and	  Anastas	  Mikoyan,	  for	  example,	  and	  vice	   versa?	   Postwar	   deportation	   campaigns	   reflected	   central	   power	   struggles	   and	  evolving	  security	  concerns	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  local	  actors	  to	  refine	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Georgian	  collective.	  	  	  
Deportations	  and	  Georgia	  	   Like	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Union,	   Georgia	   saw	  multiple	   waves	   of	   repression	   and	  deportation	  throughout	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  and	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  from	  the	  participants	  in	  a	  1924	  uprising	  against	  Soviet	  rule	  to	  ethnic	  Germans	  and	  other	  “diaspora”	   nationalities	   targeted	   in	   the	   1937-­‐38	   national	   operations	   and	   after.180	  With	   the	   outbreak	   of	   World	   War	   Two,	   Soviet	   authorities	   began	   to	   view	   Turkish	  border	   regions	   as	   potential	   areas	   of	   vulnerability	   should	   Turkey	   decide	   –	   as	   had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  World	  War	  One	  –	  to	  support	  Germany.181	  German	  military	  advances	  into	  the	  Caucasus	  in	  1942	  further	  exacerbated	  this	  sense	  of	  threat,	  though	  German	  troops	   never	   reached	   the	   lands	   of	   the	   southern	   Caucasus	   republics.	   From	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Rittersporn	  and	  Martin	  focus	  closely	  on	  these	  “national	  operations”	  to	  make	  arguments	  about	  the	  national	  dimension	  of	  the	  Terror.	  	  181	  On	   the	   geopolitical	   origins	   of	   nationalism	   in	   the	   Caucasus	   in	   the	   World	   War	   One	   period,	   see	  Reynolds,	  Shattering	  Empires.	  
	   93	  perspective	   of	   Soviet	   central	   authorities,	   the	   Turkish-­‐Georgian	   border	   therefore	  appeared	  increasingly	  vulnerable,	  in	  spite	  of	  Soviet	  military	  successes	  at	  Stalingrad	  and	   after.	   In	   particular,	   central	   authorities	   sought	   to	   preempt	   potential	   local	  collaboration	  with	   Turkish	   (and	   by	   association,	   German)	   power	   among	   “Turkish”	  populations	  residing	  in	  the	  border	  region.	  	  These	   groups,	   known	   most	   commonly	   as	   “Meskhetians”	   or	   “Meskhetian	  Turks,”	  comprised	  a	  collection	  of	  Muslim	  populations	  residing	  in	  Axalc’ixe,	  Aspinża,	  Axalk’alak’i,	  and	  Bogdanov	  (now	  Ninocminda)	  districts	  in	  southern	  Georgia	  (an	  area	  known	   as	   Mesxet’i)	   as	   well	   as	   in	   Ajaria	   ASSR. 182 	  The	   “Meskhetian	   Turk”	  nomenclature	   obscures	   the	   diversity	   of	   these	   populations,	   which	   also	   included	  Armenian	   Muslims	   (known	   as	   Khemshins	   or	   Khemshils)	   and	   Kurds.	   Further,	  Russian	  Imperial	  and	  Soviet	  nomenclature	  referred	  to	  the	  “Meskhetian	  Turk”	  group	  as,	  at	  various	  points,	  Tatars,	  Turks,	  Muslim	  Georgians,	  and	  Azerbaijanis.	  The	  1926	  census	   classified	   Meskhetians	   as	   Turks	   (including	   “Georgian	   Muslims,”	   who	  reportedly	   categorized	   themselves	   as	   Turks),	   whereas	   in	   the	   1939	   census	   most	  Meskhetians	  were	   classified	   as	  Azerbaijanis.183	  Khemshins	   and	  Kurds	   appeared	   as	  distinct	   narodnosti	   in	   the	   1926	   census	   but	   did	   not	   appear	   in	   the	   1939	   list	   of	  nationalities.	   As	   detailed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   with	   regard	   to	   “Georgian”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  More	   commonly	   known	   as	   “Meskhetian	   Turks,”	   I	   use	   the	   term	   “Meskhetian”	   here	   to	   more	  accurately	   reflect	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   deportation	   operation,	   which	   officially	   included	   “Turks”,	  “Khemshins”,	   and	   “Kurds”	   in	   this	   region.	   Today,	   this	   region	   is	   called	   Samcxe-­‐Javaxet’i.	  Deportation	  planning	  and	  orders	  did	  not	  employ	  the	  “Meskhetian	  Turk”	  terminology.	  	  183	  Georgian	  CC	  Secretary	  P.	  Kovanov	  to	  CC	  CPSU,	  September	  1957,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  32,	  d.	  219,	  ll.	  1-­‐2.	   The	   1926	   census	   listed	   “Tiurk	   (Azerbaijani	   Turk)”	   and	   “Osman	   Turk”	   as	   narodnosti,	   whereas	  “Turk”	   appeared	   only	   as	   a	   national	  minority/diaspora	   nationality	   in	   the	   1939	   list	   of	   nationalities.	  “Azerbaijani”	  appeared	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  1939	  list.	  For	  comprehensive	  lists	  for	  these	  censuses,	  see	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  327-­‐335.	  
	   94	  categories,	   reconciling	   religious	   distinctions	   with	   ethnonational	   categories	   via	  census	   technologies	   challenged	   Soviet	   planners	   and	   presented	   opportunities	   for	  local	  actors	   to	  pursue	  agendas	  according	  to	   this	   framework.184	  In	   the	  preparations	  for	   the	  Meskhetian	  deportation,	   the	  “Azerbaijani”	  category	  disappeared	   in	   favor	  of	  the	  “Turk”	  designation,	  perhaps	  to	  more	  clearly	  link	  these	  populations	  to	  Turkey.185	  	  	  Some	   Georgians’	   efforts	   to	   include	   the	  Meskhetians	   in	   the	   Georgian	   nation	  compounded	  this	  rather	  common	  Soviet	  challenge	  of	  ethno-­‐religious	  categorization.	  In	   an	   essay	   included	   in	  materials	   from	   the	  Georgian	   Central	   Committee,	   historian	  Simon	  Janašia	  linked	  Mesxet’i	  and	  Lazistan,	  two	  regions	  with	  historically	  Kartvelian	  populations	   that	   had	   been	   under	   Ottoman	   (“Turkish”)	   rule	   for	   250	   years.	   In	  “Southern	  Georgia,”	  according	  to	  Janašia,	  the	  Laz	  and	  Mesxi	  populations	  belonged	  to	  the	   Georgian	   nationality	   (narodnost’),	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   Mesxi	   spoke	   Georgian.	  Though	  Muslim	  and	  often	  Turkish-­‐speaking	  due	  to	  Ottoman	  rule,	  the	  Mesxi,	  Janašia	  insisted,	  were	  conscious	  as	  Georgians	  even	  if	  they	  avoid	  referring	  to	  themselves	  as	  such.186	  Janašia	  clearly	  mobilized	  the	  Laz	  and	  Mesxi	  examples	  for	  Georgian	  national	  purposes,	   yet	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  Meskhetian	   deportations,	   this	   insider-­‐outsider	  narrative	   of	   what	   (or	   who)	   constituted	   Georgianness	   came	   into	   conflict	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Ibid.	   Nat’melaże	   claims	   that,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1939	   census,	   the	   Meskhetian	   population	   was	  offered	   to	   register	   as	   “Georgian,”	  which	  most	   of	   them	   rejected.	   During	   the	   June	   1944	   registration,	  agents	  registered	  “old	  Georgian”	  surnames	  among	  Meskhetians	  who	  had	  previously	  been	  registered	  with	  Turkish	  names,	  Maqvala	  Nat’melaże,	  demograp’iuli	  proc'esebi	  sak’art’veloši	  XX	  saukunis	  40-­‐idan	  
clebši	  (Tbilisi:	  CIPDD,	  2002),	  34.	  185	  “Chislennost’	   i	   natsional’nyi	   sostav	   sel’skogo	   naseleniia	   pogranichnykh	   raionov	   Gruzinskoi	   SSR	  po	  dannym	  perepisi	  1939	  goda,”	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  266,	   l.	  17.	  They	  did,	  however,	  retain	  the	  “Kurd”	   category,	   though	   the	   numbers	   listed	   (3,830)	  were	   far	   below	   the	   number	   of	   Kurds	   actually	  deported	   to	   Central	   Asia	   (8,627).	   This	   perhaps	   indicates	   that	   some	   Kurds	   were	   still	   classified	   as	  Turks.	   For	   more	   on	   the	   nomenclature	   debate,	   see	   Tom	   Trier	   and	   Andrei	   Khanzhin,	   eds.,	   The	  
Meskhetian	  Turks	  at	  a	  Crossroads:	  Integration,	  Repatriation	  or	  Resettlement?	  (Berlin:	  LitVerlag,	  2007).	  186	  “Sochinenie,”	  S.	  Janašia	  (date	  unknown),	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  25,	  d.	  229,	  ll.	  33-­‐56.	  
	   95	  perceived	   wartime	   security	   imperatives.	   Therefore,	   the	   “frontier	   zone	   cleansing”	  and	   concurrent	   resettlement	   of	   entitled	   nationals	   to	   this	   region	   was	   not	   so	   tidy:	  rather,	   if	   one	   regarded	   the	   Meskhetians	   as	   Georgian	   Muslims,	   as	   Janašia	   did,	   the	  1944	  deportations	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  anti-­‐Georgian	  measure.	  Islamicization	  did	  not	  preclude	  Georgianness	  at	  this	  time,	  as	  the	  Ajarian	  and	  Laz	  examples	  show.	  	  In	  May,	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	  Kandid	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Georgian	  Council	  of	  Ministers	   Chairman	   Valerian	   Bak’raże	   calculated	   that	   77,500	   people	   (14,860	  families)	   from	   Axalc’ixe,	   Adigeni,	   Aspinża,	   and	   Axalk’alak’i	   districts’	   “Turkish	  population”	   were	   subject	   to	   resettlement.	   At	   that	   time,	   Č’arkviani	   and	   Bak’raże	  planned	  for	  resettlement	  within	  Georgia,	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  locales	  in	  the	  eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  republic	  more	  distant	  from	  the	  Turkish	  border.187	  They	  recommended	  leaving	  the	   961	   Kurdish	   families	   in	   the	   border	   districts	   in	   place,	   yet	   they	   deemed	   it	  necessary	   to	   deport	   200	   families	   of	   enemies	   of	   the	   people	   and	   emigrants	   to	  Kazakhstan.188	  In	  June,	  Č’arkviani,	  Bak’raże,	  and	  NKVD	  head	  Rap’ava	  extended	  their	  planning	   to	   include	   Bogdanov	   district	   and	   Ajaria	   ASSR.	   Rather	   than	   simply	  surveying	   the	   “Turkish”	   population,	   these	   plans	   included	   Turks,	   Kurds,	   and	  “Khemshils”	   and	   organized	   a	   “special	   resettlement”	   of	   86,000	   people	   (16,630	  households).189	  	  By	  July	  1944,	  Beria	  recommended	  resettling	  “Turks,	  Kurds,	  and	  Khemshins”	  away	   from	   the	   border	   regions,	   and	   a	   31	   July	   GKO	   resolution	   #6279	   ordered	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Č’arkviani	   and	   Bak’raże	   justified	   the	   choice	   of	   eastern	   Georgia	   for	   resettlement	   due	   to	   its	   rich	  agricultural	  production	  potential.	  188	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Bak’raże	  to	  Beria,	  May	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  266,	  l.	  3.	  This	  meant	  that	  a	  total	  14,660	  families	  were	  to	  be	  resettled	  within	  Georgia	  from	  the	  border	  districts.	  189	  Č’arkviani,	  Bak’raże,	  and	  Rap’ava	  to	  Beria,	  June	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  266,	  ll.	  20-­‐22.	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  expulsion	  of	   these	  groups	  by	   the	  NKVD	  to	   the	  Kazakh,	  Kyrgyz,	  and	  Uzbek	  SSRs.190	  The	  GKO	  order	  authorized	  the	  deportation	  of	  45,516	  people,	  which	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  expanded	  with	  a	  9	  August	  resolution	   to	   include	  Ajaria	   in	   the	  operation.	  Bugai	  and	  Gonov	  emphasize	  that	  the	  31	  July	  resolution	  drew	  purely	  on	  information	  provided	  by	   Georgian	   NKVD	   chief	   Rap’ava.191	  Between	   15	   and	   18	   November	   1944,	   NKVD	  forces	   deported	   91,095	   people	   from	   Axalc’ixe,	   Adigeni,	   Aspinża,	   and	   Bogdanov	  districts	  and	  the	  Ajarian	  ASSR.	  to	  the	  Uzbek,	  Kazakh,	  and	  Kyrgyz	  SSRs.	  The	  Georgian	  NKVD	  subsequently	  established	  a	  more	  strictly	  controlled	  border	  regime	  along	  the	  Turkish	   border. 192 	  Party	   members	   were	   among	   those	   “Turks”	   deported. 193	  According	  to	  Bugai	  and	  Gonov,	  smaller	  deportations	  continued	  under	   the	  auspices	  of	   this	   operation	   until	   June	   1948,	   though	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1944,	   94,955	   “Turks”,	  “Kurds”,	  and	  “Khemshins”	  had	  already	  been	  deported	  to	  Central	  Asia.194	  	  With	   the	   freeing	   of	   lands	   in	   the	   Turkish	   border	   region,	   Č’arkviani	   and	  Bak’raże	   recommended	   resettling	   “Georgian	  populations”	   to	   these	  newly-­‐available	  lands	   from	  other,	   land-­‐poor	  regions	  of	  Georgia	  with	   the	  (ostensible)	  hope	  that	   the	  resettled	   kolkhozniki	   could	   improve	   agricultural	   output	   in	   the	   border	   region.	  Georgian	   and	  Armenian	  populations	   already	   residing	   in	   the	   area	  would	   remain	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Nikolai	  Fedorovich	  Bugai	   and	  A.M.	  Gonov,	  Kavkaz:	  Narody	  v	  eshelonakh,	  20-­‐60-­‐e	  gody	   (Moscow:	  INSAN,	  1998),	  213-­‐214. 191	  Ibid.	  192	  Ibid.,	  217.	  193	  “Spiski	  kommunistov	  nemtsev	  i	  tiurkov	  pereselennykh	  iz	  predelov	  GSSR	  (1944),”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  626,	  ll.	  7-­‐14.	  194	  Bugai	  and	  Gonov,	  Kavkaz,	  218-­‐219.	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  place.195	  They	  planned	  to	  resettle	  7,000	  households	  (ca.	  30,000	  people)	  through	  this	  operation	   no	   later	   than	   1	  March	   1945.196	  Resettlement	   of	   Georgian	   kolkhozniki	   to	  Mesxet’i	  began	  as	  early	  as	  December	  1944,	  though	  the	  paucity	  of	  local	  men	  (due	  to	  the	  war)	  may	   have	   delayed	   some	   resettlement	   plans.	   For	   example,	   between	   8-­‐11	  December,	   526	   households	   (2,487	   persons)	   resettled	   from	   Borjomi	   district	   to	  Axalc’ixe	  district.197	  By	  April,	  2,321	  households	  (9,248	  persons)	  had	  been	  resettled	  in	   Axalc’ixe	   district.198	  Meanwhile,	   the	   4,009	   persons	   resettled	   from	   T'ušet’i	   and	  Č’xara	  districts	  did	  not	  arrive	  in	  Aspinża	  district	  until	  May	  1945.199	  I	  unfortunately	  do	  not	  know	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Georgians	  successfully	  resettled	  to	  Mesxet’i	  in	  this	  scheme,	  but	  the	  figures	  listed	  above	  provide	  some	  sense	  of	  scale.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  “Georgian	  populations”	  resettled	  through	  this	  operation	  resemble	  a	  familiar	  colonial	  policy	  of	  replacing	  suspect	  populations	  with	  “reliable	  elements”	  to	  secure	  border	  or	  other	  presumably	  vulnerable	  regions.200	  The	   November	   1944	   expulsion	   of	   Meskhetians	   was	   the	   last	   in	   a	   series	   of	  wholesale	  deportations	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Black	  Sea	  region	  that	  took	  place	  in	  1943	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Č’arkviani	   and	   Bak’raże	   to	   Beria,	  May	   1944,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   18,	   d.	   266,	   ll.	   6-­‐9.	   For	   further	  details	   about	   budget,	   timing,	   and	   construction,	   see	   “Postanovlenie	   Soveta	   Narodnykh	   Komissarov	  Gruzinskoi	   SSR	   i	   TsK	   KP	   Gruzii	   ‘Voprosy	   pereselencheskikh	   kolkhozov	   Akhaltsikhskogo,	  Aspindzskogo	  i	  Adigenskogo	  raionov	  Gruzinskoi	  SSR’”,	  10	  January	  1945,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  19,	  d.	  12,	  ll.	  75-­‐78.	  196	  Č’arkviani,	  Bak’raże,	  and	  Rap’ava	  to	  Beria,	  June	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  266,	  ll.	  20-­‐22.	  197	  “c'nobebi	   borjomis	   raionis	   sop’lebidan	   axalc'ixis	   raionis	   sop’lebši	   mosaxleobis	   gadasaxlebis	   da	  raiodenobis	   šesaxeb,”	  Borjomi	  District	  First	  Secretary	  N.	  Razmaże,	  11	  December	  1944,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	  14,	   op.	   18,	   d.	   174,	   l.	   36.	   For	   local	   reports	   about	   resettlement	   progress,	   see	   sak’art’velos	   erovnuli	  ark’ivi	  (sea),	  f.	  600,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  7208.	  198	  Nat’melaże,	  demograp’iuli	  procesebi	  sak’art’veloši,	  46.	  199	  Ibid.,	  45.	  200	  Holquist,	  Making	  War,	  Chapter	  6.	  Just	  as	  this	  was	  a	  common	  technique	  in	  Georgia	  (particularly	  in	  Abkhazia),	  importing	  “reliable	  elements”	  was	  neither	  a	  specifically	  regional	  nor	  Soviet	  innovation,	  as	  Holquist	  shows.	  
	   98	  and	  1944.	  Among	  these	  included	  Karachais	  (1943),	  Kalmyks	  (1944),	  Chechens	  and	  Ingush	  (February	  1944),	  Balkars	  (1944),	  and	  Crimean	  Tatars	  (1944).	  These	  groups	  comprised	  the	  paradigmatic	  “punished	  peoples”	  whose	  cases	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  early	  research	  on	  Soviet	  ethnic	  deportations	  and	  are	  most	  frequently	  invoked	  in	  arguments	  about	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  genocide	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.201	  While	  these	  expulsions	   ostensibly	   punished	   alleged	   collaboration	   with	   or	   support	   of	   German	  occupiers	  in	  1941-­‐1942,	  Alexander	  Statiev	  has	  more	  recently	  argued	  that	  concerns	  about	   security	   and	   resistance	   fail	   to	   explain	   why	   these	   groups	   were	   expelled	   in	  1944.	  Not	  only	  was	   the	   front	  a	   thousand	  kilometers	  away	   from	  the	  Caucasus	  (and	  Kalmykia)	   in	   1944,	   resistance	   to	   Soviet	   rule	   among	   North	   Caucasians	   declined	  considerably	   after	   spring	  1943,	   becoming	   “a	   nuisance	   rather	   than	   a	  menace,”	   and	  Crimean	   and	   Kalmyk	   resistance	  was	   nonexistent	   at	   that	   point.202	  Diverting	   scarce	  NKVD	  and	  military	  resources	  to	  facilitate	  these	  deportations,	  distant	  from	  the	  front	  lines,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  war	  still	  raged	  similarly	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  pragmatic,	  security	  necessity	  of	  the	  1944	  operations.	  Moreover,	  the	  expulsion	  of	  Meskhetians	  and	  non-­‐Tatar	  Crimean	  populations	  at	   the	   same	   time	   (including	   Bulgarians,	   Armenians,	   and	   Greeks)	   –	   groups	   not	  charged	  with	  collaboration	  with	  Germans	  and,	  in	  the	  Meskhetian	  case,	  that	  had	  not	  even	   experienced	   occupation	   –	   suggests	   more	   complex	   and	   wide-­‐reaching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  Nekrich,	  The	  Punished	  Peoples;	  Conquest,	  The	  Nation	  Killers;	  Norman	  Naimark,	  Stalin’s	  Genocides	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  202	  Alexander	  Statiev,	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Anti-­‐Soviet	  Armed	  Resistance,	  1942-­‐1944:	  The	  North	  Caucasus,	  the	  Kalmyk	  Autonomous	  Republic,	  and	  Crimea,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  6,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2005):	  285–318.	  
	   99	  motives.203 	  The	   Meskhetian	   and	   additional	   Crimean	   expulsions	   look	   more	   like	  efforts	   to	   cleanse	   frontier	   zones	   than	   attempts	   to	   punish	   real	   or	   suspected	  collaboration	   with	   Germans	   or	   resistance	   to	   Soviet	   rule.	   In	   Polian’s	   terminology,	  these	  operations	  were	   “preventive”	  –	   like	   those	   that	   targeted	  Germans,	  Finns,	  and	  others	   in	   1941	   –	   rather	   than	   “retributive,”	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   1944	   North	  Caucasian	   and	   Crimean	   Tatar	   expulsions.204	  The	   concurrent	   pursuit	   of	   these	   aims	  beginning	  in	  1944	  suggests	  a	  shift	  to	  postwar	  expulsion	  practices,	  applied	  to	  punish	  simultaneously:	  groups	  in	  newly	  acquired	  territories	  who,	  due	  to	  wartime	  deeds	  or	  past	  citizenship,	  were	  assumed	  by	  Soviet	  authorities	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  join	  the	  Soviet	  collective;	   and	   groups	   in	   territories	   that	   did	   not	   see	   German-­‐	   or	   Romanian	  occupation	  yet	  whose	  diversity	  and	  past	  citizenship	  made	  the	  Caucasus	  borderland	  potentially	  vulnerable.	  Increasingly	  entitled	  national	  republics	  in	  Georgia,	  Armenia,	  and	  Azerbaijan	  would	  allegedly	  provide	  some	  protection	  against	  foreign	  ties	  or	  anti-­‐Soviet	  inclinations	  of	  minority	  populations,	  even	  if	  such	  suspicions	  were	  ultimately	  unfounded.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  Meskhetian	  case	  fits	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  preventive	  deportation,	   even	   if	   the	   Turkish	   enemy	   had	   yet	   to	   be	   proven.	   The	   Meskhetian	  operation	   provided	   a	   template	   for	   future	   operations	   in	   the	   Caucasus	   to	   cleanse	  developing	   frontier	   zones	   in	   the	   unfolding	   Cold	   War	   and	   further	   the	   process	   of	  ethnic	   consolidation	   in	   Georgia.	  With	   the	   Soviet	   occupation	   of	   Iranian	  Azerbaijan,	  the	  territorial	  claims	  to	  Kars,	  Ardahan,	  and	  Artvin	  provinces	  made	  by	  Georgian	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Ibid.,	  317.	  204	  Polian,	  Against	  Their	  Will.	  
	   100	  Armenian	   officials	   (discussed	   in	   Chapter	   1),	   and	   the	   beginning	   of	   repatriation	  campaigns	  to	  Armenia	  and	  Georgia	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5)	  all	  occurring	  in	  1945-­‐1946,	   the	   immediate	   postwar	   environment	   provided	   new	   opportunities	   for	   local	  actors	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  pursue	  national	  agendas	  commensurate	  with	  Soviet	  goals,	  yet	  in	  some	  ways	  independent	  from	  them.	  	   	  To	  take	  a	  different	  example,	   in	  a	  December	  1947	  letter	  to	  Stalin,	  Azerbaijan	  First	  Secretary	  Bagirov	  and	  Armenian	  First	  Secretary	  Arutiunov	  suggested	  resettling	  130,000	   Azerbaijanis	   living	   in	   Armenia	   to	   Azerbaijan	   to	   purportedly	   increase	  agricultural	  production	  in	  certain	  areas	  of	  Azerbaijan.	  Moreover,	  the	  resettlement	  of	  the	  Azerbaijani	  population	  from	  Armenia	  to	  Azerbaijan	  would	  “ease	  the	  conditions	  of	   reception	   and	   organization	   of	   Armenians	   returning	   to	   the	   homeland	   from	  abroad.”205	  Comparable	  exchanges	  in	  Georgia	  did	  not	  occur,	  but	  taken	  alongside	  the	  policies	  described	  above,	  one	  senses	  the	  incredible	  mobility	  (much	  of	  it	  involuntary)	  and	   local	   maneuvering	   in	   the	   name	   of	   nation-­‐building	   and	   ethnic	   consolidation	  made	  possible	  across	  the	  Caucasus	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  Two.	  	  
Operation	  “Volna”	  	   As	  Jan	  Gross	  has	  argued,	  the	  widespread	  experience	  of	  deportations	  suggests	  a	   continuity	   between	   the	   wartime	   and	   postwar	   periods	   and,	   consequently,	   blurs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Bagirov	  and	  Artinov	  to	  Stalin,	  3	  December	  1947,	  National	  Archive	  of	  Armenia	  (NAA)	  f.	  1,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  47,	   ll.	   137-­‐138.	   I	   thank	   Svetlana	   Savranskaya	   of	   the	  National	   Security	   Archive	   for	   sharing	   this	   file	  with	  me.	  
	   101	  clear	  periodization	  between	  war	  and	  postwar	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  practice.206	  The	  postwar	  incorporation	  of	  new	  territories	  into	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  solidification	  of	  “people’s	   democracies”	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   entailed	   ambitious	   campaigns	   of	  population	  transfer	  and	  expulsion.207	  Such	  policies	  not	  only	  aimed	  to	  “excise”	  from	  the	  Soviet	  body	  politic	  those	  individuals	  who	  allegedly	  collaborated	  with	  German	  or	  Romanian	  occupation	  regimes,	  but	  also	  to	  territorially	  consolidate	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  this	  historically	  multiethnic	  region.208	  	  	  	   Following	   the	   expulsion	   of	   alleged	  Ukrainian	   nationalists,	   accomplices,	   and	  their	  families	  to	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Siberia	  in	  1947-­‐1948	  and	  operation	  “Vesna”	  (May	  1948),	   which	   expelled	   nearly	   50,000	   Lithuanians	   to	   Central	   Asia,	   expulsion	  campaigns	  spread	  to	  new	  regions	  in	  1949.	  Operation	  “Priboi”,	  between	  January	  and	  March	  1949,	  expelled	  87,000	  alleged	  kulaks,	  bandits,	  nationalists,	  accomplices,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  Gross,	  “War	  as	  Revolution.”	  Mark	  Mazower	  employs	  a	  similar	  postwar	  chronology	  (1943-­‐1949)	  in	  Dark	  Continent:	  Europe’s	  Twentieth	  Century	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1998).	  	  207	  The	   wholesale	   expulsion	   of	   ethnic	   Germans	   from	   Eastern	   Europe	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	   wide-­‐reaching	  example,	  though	  Hungarians,	  Czechs,	  Slovaks,	  Poles,	  and	  Jews	  likewise	  faced	  expulsion	  and	  population	  transfer.	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  postwar	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  people’s	   democracies,	   see	   	   Gross,	   “War	   as	   Revolution”;	   Applebaum,	   Iron	   Curtain,	   Chapter	   6;	   Tara	  Zahra,	  Kidnapped	  Souls:	  National	  Indifference	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  Children	  in	  the	  Bohemian	  Lands,	  1900-­‐
1948	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   2008);	   and	   Holly	   Case,	   Between	   States:	   The	   Transylvanian	  
Question	  and	  the	  European	  Idea	  during	  World	  War	  II	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2009);	  and	  Norman	  Naimark,	  Fires	  of	  Hatred:	  Ethnic	  Cleansing	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Europe	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  	  208	  Operations	   “Vistula”	   (April-­‐July	  1947)	  and	  “Zapad”	   (Autumn	  1947)	  are	  especially	   illustrative	   in	  this	  regard.	  Operation	  “Vistula,”	  carried	  out	  by	  Polish	  forces,	  resettled	  over	  140,000	  Ukrainians	  from	  the	  south	  and	  east	  of	  the	  country	  to	  new	  Polish	  territories	  in	  the	  north	  and	  west,	  previously	  inhabited	  by	  Germans,	   in	  an	  effort	   to	   force	  assimilation	   into	  Polish	  culture	  and	  distance	  Ukrainians	   from	  the	  shared	   Polish-­‐Ukrainian	   border	   region.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   first	   mass	   deportation	   in	   Soviet	   Ukraine,	  operation	  “Zapad,”	  expelled	  alleged	  Ukrainian	  nationalists	  and	  their	  families	  from	  western	  Ukraine	  to	  Siberia	  and	  Central	  Asia.	  On	  “ethnic	  cleansings”	  in	  postwar	  Poland	  and	  Ukraine,	  see	  Timothy	  Snyder,	  “‘To	  Resolve	  the	  Ukrainian	  Problem	  Once	  and	  for	  All’:	  The	  Ethnic	  Cleansing	  of	  Ukrainians	  in	  Poland,	  1943-­‐1947,”	  Journal	  of	  Cold	  War	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  2	  (1999):	  86–120;	  Snyder,	  Bloodlands,	  Chapter	  10.	  
	   102	  their	   families	   from	   Estonia,	   Latvia	   and	   Lithuania.209	  In	   April	   1949,	   40,850	   people	  were	  expelled	   from	  Moldova	   for	  alleged	  collaboration	  with	   fascist	  occupiers,	  work	  in	  German	  or	  Romanian	  police	  units,	  participation	   in	   illegal	  religious	  sects,	   former	  White	   Guard	  membership,	   kulak	   or	   landowner	   status,	   or	   trading.210	  These	   “thrice	  occupied”	   territories	   saw	   expulsions	   of	   entitled	   nationalities	   for	   alleged	   actions	  undertaken	  in	  the	  prewar,	  wartime,	  and	  postwar	  period	  as	  well	  as	  for	  social	  statuses	  deemed	  incompatible	  with	  membership	  in	  the	  Soviet	  collective.211	  Newly-­‐acquired	   Soviet	   territories	   in	   the	   Baltics	   and	   Ukraine	   contributed	  greatly	  to	  the	  postwar	  deportation	  waves,	  yet	  territories	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  untouched	  by	  German	  troops	  likewise	  experienced	  large	  operations	  in	  the	  postwar	  era.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	   1949,	   plans	  were	  underway	   for	   a	  new	  operation	   in	   the	   larger	  Black	   Sea	  and	   Caucasus	   region	   to	   “cleanse”	   the	   area	   of	   politically	   unreliable	   minority	  populations.	   As	   early	   as	  March,	   Abkhaz	  Obkom	   leaders	   surveyed	   the	   autonomous	  republic	  for	  individuals	  in	  three	  categories:	  Greeks	  (Greek	  subjects,	  stateless	  Greeks,	  and	   former	   Greek	   subjects	   with	   Soviet	   citizenship),	   Turks	   (Turkish	   subjects,	  stateless	   Turks,	   former	   Turkish	   or	   Ottoman	   subjects	   with	   Soviet	   citizenship,	   and	  Armenian	   former	   Turkish	   subjects),	   and	   Iranians	   (Iranian	   subjects,	   stateless	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  Nikolai	  Fedorovich	  Bugai,	  L.	  Beriia	  -­‐	  I.	  Stalinu:	  “Posle	  vashikh	  ukazaniy	  provedeno	  sleduiushchee...”	  (Moscow:	  Grif	   i	   K.,	   2011),	   350-­‐353.	  The	   total	   number	   for	   this	   operation	  may	  be	   slightly	   higher,	   as	  indicated	   in	   a	   21	   July	   1949	   letter	   from	   S.	   Kruglov	   to	  Malenkov,	  which	   stated	   that	   “In	  March-­‐April	  1949	  kulaks	  and	  their	   families	  and	   families	  of	  bandits	  and	  nationalists	  were	  expelled	   in	  perpetuity	  from	   the	  Baltic	   to	  Krasnoiarsk	  krai,	  Novosibirsk,	  Tomsk,	  Omsk,	   Irkutsk,	   and	  Amursk	  oblasts	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  30,630	  families,	  or	  94,211	  people,”	  GARF	  f.	  R-­‐9479,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  475,	  ll.	  231-­‐232,	  accessed	  via	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  reel	  3.5938.	  210	  	  Bugai,	  L.	  Beriia	  -­‐	  I.	  Stalinu,	  346.	  See	  also	  GARF	  f.	  R-­‐9479,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  476,	  ll.	  110,	  126,	  accessed	  via	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  reel	  3.5938.	  211	  	  I	  borrow	  the	  term	  “triple	  occupation”	  (Soviet-­‐German-­‐Soviet)	  from	  Snyder,	  Bloodlands,	  239.	  
	   103	  Iranians,	   and	   former	   Iranian	   subjects	   with	   Soviet	   citizenship)	   residing	   on	   the	  territory	   of	   Abkhazia,	  212 	  whereas	   other	   orders	   included	   Dashnaks	   rather	   than	  Iranians.	   Initially,	   central	   authorities	   conceived	   these	  plans	  as	  disparate	  orders.213	  Though	  as	   the	  categorization	   from	  Abkhazia	  shows,	   local	  authorities	   in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Sukhumi	  adopted	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  approach	  toward	  this	  aim.	  	  By	  late	  May,	  the	  USSR	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  combined	  these	  efforts	  as	  the	  date	  for	  implementation	  approached.	  On	  29	  May	  1949,	  a	  top	  secret	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  resolution	  signed	  by	  Stalin	  and	  M.	  Pomaznev	  instructed	  local	  and	  republic	  MGBs	  to	  “expel”	   (vyselit’)	   “Dashnaks;	   Turkish	   citizens,	   stateless	   Turks,	   and	   former	   Turkish	  citizens	  who	   have	   Soviet	   citizenship;	   Greek	   subjects,	   stateless	   Greeks,	   and	   former	  Greek	   subjects	   who	   have	   Soviet	   citizenship”	   from	   the	   Georgian,	   Azerbaijan,	   and	  Armenian	   SSRs	   and	   the	   Black	   Sea	   coast.	   The	   destinations,	   by	   nationality,	   were	  Dashnaks	   to	   Altai	   krai	   (RSFSR);	   Turks	   to	   Tomsk	   oblast’	   (RSFSR);	   and	   Greeks	   to	  Iuzhno-­‐Kazakhstan	   and	   Dzhambul	   oblasts	   in	   Kazakh	   SSR.214	  The	   deportation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  Abkhaz	   Obkom	   Secretary	   A.	   Mgelaże	   to	   Č’arkviani,	   28	   March	   1949	   and	   “Tsifrovye	   svedeniia,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  ll.	  60-­‐63.	  The	  totals	  provided	  in	  the	  report,	  for	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR,	  were	  30,245	  Greeks,	  2,597	  Turks	  (including	  43	  Armenians),	  and	  278	  Iranians.	  	  213	  For	   example,	   on	   17	   May	   1949,	   the	   All-­‐Union	   CC	   issued	   a	   report	   (protocol	   69)	   “O	   vyselenii	  grecheskikh	   poddannykh,	   ne	   imeiushchikh	   v	   nastoiashchee	   vremia	   grazhdanstva,	   i	   byvshikh	  grecheskikh	  poddannykh,	  priniatykh	  v	  sovetskoe	  grazhdanstvo,”	  which	  resolved,	  in	  order	  to	  rid	  this	  region	  of	  “politically	  unreliable	  elements,	  to	  “Oblige	  the	  MGB	  USSR	  (t.	  Abakumov)	  to	  expel	  all	  Greek	  subjects	   and	   former	   Greek	   subjects	   who	   obtained	   Soviet	   citizenship	   living	   on	   the	   Black	   Sea	   coast	  (Krasnodar	   krai,	   Crimea,	   Kherson,	   Nikolaev,	   Odessa,	   and	   Ismail	   oblasts),	   and	   in	   the	   Georgian	   and	  Azerbaijan	  S.S.R.s	  to	  permanent	  exile”	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  organs	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs,	  TsKhSD	  (now	  RGANI)	  f.	  3,	  op.	  58,	  d.	  179,	  l.	  105,	  quoted	  in	  Bugai	  and	  Gonov,	  Kavkaz,	  221-­‐222.	  Gasanly	   notes	   earlier	   orders	   to	   expel	   Dashnaks	   from	   Armenian	   and	   Azerbaijan	   S.S.R.s	   on	   4	   April	  1949;	   from	  Georgia	  on	  11	  April	  1949;	  and	  Turks	  without	   citizenship,	   former	  Turkish	   citizens	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast	  and	  Transcaucasus	  on	  4	  April	  1949,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  40,	   ll.	  140-­‐141,	  cited	   in	  Dzhamil	  Gasanly,	  SSSR-­‐Turtsiia:	  Ot	  neitraliteta	  k	  kholodnoi	  voine,	  1939-­‐1953	  (Moscow:	  Tsentr	  propagandy,	  2008),	  502-­‐503.	  214 	  “Sovet	   Ministrov	   SSSR	   postanovleniie	   ot	   29	   maia	   1949	   g.	   #2214-­‐856cc	   ‘Ob	   obespechenii	  perevozok,	   rasseleniia	   i	   trudovogo	   ustroistva	   vyselentsev	   s	   territorii	   Gruzinskoi,	   Armianskoi	  	  
	   104	  Iranians	  occurred	  through	  a	  separate	  yet	  related	  operation.	  The	  order	  for	  expulsion	  framed	   the	   targeted	   populations	   by	   subjecthood	   or	   citizenship	   rather	   than	   by	  nationality	   per	   se.	   Yet,	   Greeks,	   Turks,	   and	   Iranians	   fit	   within	   the	   official	   list	   of	  national	  minorities	   (diaspora	  nationalities)	  devised	   for	   the	  1939	  All-­‐Union	  Census	  of	  the	  Population.215	  The	  Dashnak	  label,	  while	  an	  accusation	  uniquely	  applicable	  to	  Armenians,	   entailed	   an	   explicit	   ideological	   content	   that	   allegedly	   distinguished	  nationalist	  Dashnaks	  from	  loyal	  Soviet	  Armenians.	  The	  deportation	  orders	  and	  related	  documents	  do	  not	  indicate	  a	  clear	  motive	  for	   the	  operation	   from	  central	  authorities	   in	  Moscow.	  However,	   in	  a	  16	   June	  1949	  report	   on	   attitudes	   about	   operation	   “Volna”	   among	   Tbilisi	   residents,	   Georgian	  Minister	  of	  State	  Security	  Nikolai	  Ruxaże	  noted	  to	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani	  that,	  	  According	  to	  unofficial	  material	  in	  the	  MGB	  GSSR,	  the	  vast	  majority	  [of	  the	   population,	   CK]	   treats	   this	   event	   as	   a	   measure	   to	   cleanse	   the	  frontier	  region	  of	  the	  country	  of	  a	  dubious	  element	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  supposed	  war	  coming	  in	  the	  near	  future.216	  	  If,	  as	  Peter	  Holquist	  contends,	  such	  surveillance	  materials	  served	  the	  “purpose	  not	  of	  reporting	  the	  population’s	  collective	  mood	  but	  of	  managing	  and	  shaping	  it,”	  then	  Ruxaże	  perhaps	  revealed	  the	  local	  reception	  of	  this	  operation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  republic	  authorities	  charged	  with	  implementing	  it.217	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  SSR,	  a	   takzhe	  poberezh’ia	  Chernogo	  moria,’”	   I.	  Stalin	  and	  M.	  Pomaznev,	  Svetlana	  Savranskaya,	  National	  Security	  Archive,	  personal	  collection.	  	  215	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations,	  334-­‐335.	  216	  “Spetsial’noe	  soobshchenie,”	  N.	  Ruxaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  16	  June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  l.	  83.	  I	  examine	  this	  report	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  217	  Peter	  Holquist,	  “‘Information	  Is	  the	  Alpha	  and	  Omega	  of	  Our	  Work’:	  Bolshevik	  Surveillance	  in	  Its	  Pan-­‐European	  Context,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History	  69,	  no.	  3	  (September	  1997):	  415–50,	  419.	  
	   105	  We	   may	   also	   glean	   a	   degree	   of	   local	   intent	   from	   post-­‐operation	   plans	  proposed	  by	  republic	  leaders.	  On	  7	  June	  1949	  –	  a	  week	  prior	  to	  the	  operation	  –	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  Chairman	  Č’xubianišvili	  wrote	  to	  Stalin	  about	   their	  plans	   to	   resettle	  kolkhozniki	  from	  other	  districts	  of	  Georgia	   to	   the	   tea,	  citrus,	   and	   tobacco	   plantations	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	   Ajaria	   inhabited	   by	   “Greeks	   and	  Turks”	   slated	   for	   deportation.218	  To	   replace	   the	   estimated	   3,700	   Greek	   and	   Turk	  families,	   Č’arkviani	   and	   Č’xubianišvili	   expected	   to	   resettle	   around	   14,000	   people	  from	   land-­‐poor	  districts	  and	  requested	   funds	   from	  central	   institutions	   to	   facilitate	  the	   effort.219	  The	   USSR	   Council	   of	   Ministers,	   via	   Stalin	   and	   Pomaznev,	   passed	   a	  resolution	  approving	  this	  effort	  shortly	  thereafter	  that	  also	  indicated	  that	  property	  of	  the	  special	  settlers	  would	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  newly-­‐resettled	  kolkhozniki.220	  The	  Georgian	  MGB	  began	  preparing	  for	  operation	  “Volna”	  in	  late	  March	  and	  calculated	  7,242	  families	  subject	  to	  deportation.221	  These	  included:	  Turks:	  918	  households	  Turkish	  subjects:	  213	  Stateless	  Turks:	  144	  Turkish	  subjects	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship:	  561	  Among	  calculated	  “Turks”	  were	  to	  be	  1,112	  men,	  975	  women,	  and	  770	  	  children,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  2,857.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  They	   urged	   to	   conduct	   the	   resettlement	   10-­‐15	   days	   following	   “Volna”	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	  production	  in	  these	  sectors,	  particularly	  tobacco.	  	  219	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Č’xubianišvili	  to	  Stalin,	  7	  June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  ll.	  64-­‐65.	  220 	  “Sovet	   ministrov	   SSSR	   postanovlenie	   o	   pereselenii	   2800	   khoziaistv	   kolkhoznikov	   v	  subtropicheskie	   raiony	   Gruzinskoi	   SSR,”	   June	   1949,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   27,	   d.	   252,	   ll.	   66-­‐67	   and	  Pomaznev	  to	  Č’xubianišvili	  and	  Č’arkviani,	  “Tekst	  postanovleniia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Soiuza	  SSR	  ot	  17	  iunia	  1949	  goda	  za	  #2417-­‐955,”	  18	  June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  l.	  88.	  221	  The	   earliest	   record	   I	   have	   is	   a	   penciled-­‐in	   calculation	   of	   Dashnaks	   in	   Ajaria	   and	   Abkhazia,	  prepared	   by	   Georgian	   MGB	   chief	   N.	   Ruxaże	   for	   Pitovranov	   of	   the	   USSR	   MGB	   on	   22	   March	   1949,	  followed	   a	  week	   later	   by	  Mgelaże’s	   report	   from	  Abkhazia	   noted	   above.	   The	   post-­‐operation	   report	  claims	  that	  preparations	  in	  the	  republic	  began	  on	  9	  April	  1949.	  
	   106	  Greeks:	  5,619	  households	  	   	   Greek	  subjects:	  3,989	  Stateless	  Greeks:	  1,218	  Former	  Greek	  subjects	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship:	  412	  Among	  calculated	  “Greeks”	  were	  to	  be	  7,957	  men,	  8,224	  women,	  and	  7,811	  	  children,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  23,992.	  	  Dashnaks:	  705	  households	  Among	  calculated	  Dashnaks	  were	  to	  be	  1,131	  men,	  1,132	  women,	  and	  623	  	  children,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  2,886.	  	  In	  all	  categories,	  10,200	  men,	  10,331	  women,	  and	  9,204	  children	  –	  a	  total	  of	  29,735	  people	   –	   were	   marked	   for	   deportation	   in	   operation	   “Volna”	   by	   republic	   MGB	  authorities.	  	   Ruxaże	  and	  the	  procurator	  approved	  each	  individual	  household’s	  “eviction.”	  Designated	  families	  lived	  in	  575	  localities	  in	  57	  districts	  of	  Georgia.	  To	  carry	  out	  this	  republic-­‐wide	   task,	   58	   Georgian	   SSR	   MGB	   agents	   worked	   alongside	   local	   MGB	  officials	  organized	  around	  13	  railway	  points.	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  operation,	  the	  USSR	  Ministry	  of	  Communications	  gave	  control	  of	  all	  inter-­‐city	  and	  lower-­‐level	  telephone	  lines	   to	   the	  MGB	  so	   that	   at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  operation,	   telephone	   services	   could	  be	  discontinued	  for	  all	  but	  Party	  and	  MGB	  organs.	  Five	  days	  prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  operation,	   the	  border	  guards	  of	   the	  Georgian	  district	  of	   the	  MIA	  were	  warned	  about	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   and	   strengthen	   the	   state	   border	   to	   prevent	   possible	  attempts	   to	   flee	   across	   the	   border	   by	   those	   subject	   to	   expulsion.	   In	   total,	   the	  operation	   called	   upon:	   3,945	   “operational	   workers”	   (from	   the	   Georgian	  MGB	   and	  Transcaucasus	  Military	  District);	   7,159	  MGB	  officers	   and	   soldiers;	   14,318	  persons	  from	  Soviet	  and	  Party	  actives;	  and	  3,303	  automobiles.	  
	   107	  	   The	  operation	  began	  in	  urban	  areas	  (Tbilisi,	  Sukhumi,	  Batumi,	  P’oti,	  K’ut’aisi,	  and	   Gagra)	   at	   3	   a.m.	   and	   in	   more	   provincial	   areas	   at	   4	   a.m.	   on	   14	   June	   1949.	  Deportees	   had	   been	   loaded	   onto	   wagons	   bound	   for	   Central	   Asia	   and	   Siberia	   by	  midnight	  on	  15	   June.	   In	   total,	  7,220	  households	  (31,606	  people)	  were	  deported	   in	  this	  operation.222	  The	  breakdown	  by	  category	  was	  the	  following:	  Turks……………………………………………...831	  households	  (2,508	  people)	  Greeks………………………………………..5,710	  households	  (26,332	  people)	  Dashnaks………………………………………..679	  households	  (2,766	  people)	  While	   the	  number	   of	  Turks	   and	  Dashnaks	   subject	   to	   deportation	  was	  higher	   than	  the	   number	   actually	   deported,	   the	   Georgian	   MGB	   deported	   more	   Greeks	   than	  initially	   planned.	   The	   most	   significant	   change	   occurred	   in	   Abkhazia,	   where	   some	  additional	   families	  and	  relatives	  of	   the	  deportees	  allegedly	  “voluntarily”	   joined	  the	  evicted.	   This	   required	   a	   later	   operation	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   deportation	   of	   an	  additional	   1,074	   households	   (5,099	   people),	   consisting	   overwhelmingly	   of	  Greeks.223	  At	   least	  730	  of	  these	  households	  were	  from	  Sukhumi	  district.	   In	  spite	  of	  the	   “voluntary”	  nature	  of	   their	  exile,	   at	   the	   time	  of	   their	  deportation	   the	  Georgian	  MGB	  had	   already	  begun	   to	   categorize	   these	   “dobrovol’tsy,”	   (volunteers)	  who	  were	  Soviet	   citizens,	   according	   to	   whether	   the	   MGB	   had	   any	   “compromising”	   material	  about	   them.	   In	   the	   majority	   of	   cases,	   the	   MGB	   did	   not	   manage	   to	   gather	   such	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  Consisting	  of	  10,240	  men,	  10,512	  women,	  and	  10,854	  children.	  223	  Only	  40	  Turks	  and	  5	  Dashnaks	  were	  in	  this	  additional	  group.	  
	   108	  material.224	  The	  USSR	  MGB	   did	   not	   authorize	   these	   additional	   deportations	   at	   the	  time.225	  In	   total,	   across	   the	   entire	   Georgian	   SSR,	   operation	   “Volna”	   expelled	   8,294	  households	  (36,705	  people),	  including:	  845	  Turk	  households	  (2,548	  people);	  6,769	  Greek	   households	   (31,386	   people);	   and	   680	   Dashnak	   households	   (2,771	   people).	  1,484	  wagons	   in	  25	   troop	   trains	   transported	   them	  to	   their	  destinations	   in	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Siberia.	  According	  to	   the	  official	  report,	   the	  operation	  proceeded	  without	  “excesses.”226	  	   According	   to	   General	   Major	   V.	   Kakuč’aia	   of	   the	   Georgian	   MIA,	   Operation	  “Volna”	   contributed	   to	   a	   total	   deportation	   from	   Georgia	   in	   1949-­‐1950	   of	   9,923	  households	  (43,344	  people).	  This	  included:	  	   Turkish	  subjects……………………………...…………...240	  households	  (797	  people)	  	   Stateless	  Turks…………………………….………………241	  households	  (760	  people)	  	   Former	  Turkish	  subjects	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship………426	  households	  (1,277	  	  people)	  	   Greek	  subjects………………………………………4,246	  households	  (19,531	  people)	  	   Stateless	  Greeks………………………...……………1,441	  households	  (7,088	  people)	  	   Former	  Greek	  subjects	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship…421	  households	  (1,623	  	  people)	  	   Greek	  “volunteers”…………………….………….1,059	  households	  (5,054	  people)	  	   Former	  Dashnaks………………………………………677	  households	  (2,718	  people)	  	   Iranian	  subjects…………………………………………712	  households	  (2,722	  people)	  	   Stateless	  Iranians………………………………………….226	  households	  (844	  people)	  	   Former	  Iranian	  subjects	  with	  Soviet	  citizenship….	  …..234	  households	  (930	  people)227	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  No	  title,	  1949,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  sp.	  12,	  ll.	  1-­‐186.	  225	  “Spravka	   o	   dobrovol’no	   vyekhavshikh	   na	   spetsposelenie	   grekakh,”	   Commander	   of	   Section	   “A”	  MGB	  GSSR	  Security	  Lieutenant	  I.	  Gudushauri,	  21	  March	  1953,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  sp.	  27,	  ll.	  5-­‐6.	  226	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska,”	  N.	  Ruxaże	  and	  A.	  Valis	  to	  USSR	  MGB	  officer	  N.N.	  Selivanovskii,	   June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  ll.	  72-­‐77.	  227	  Kakuč’aia	  to	  Beria,	  April	  1953,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  sp.	  27,	  ll.	  1-­‐3.	  	  
	   109	  	   The	   deportation	   of	   Iranians	   occurred	   in	   an	   operation	   following	   “Volna.”	   In	  October	  1949,	  Č’arkviani	  wrote	  to	  Stalin	  regarding	  the	  1,670	  households	  (ca.	  5,600	  people)	  with	  current	  or	  former	  Iranian	  citizenship,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  members	  were	  Soviet	  citizens.	  He	  recommended	  resettlement	  for	  approximately	  4,500	  of	  this	  group.	   According	   to	   Č’arkviani,	   many	   in	   this	   population	   maintained	   ties	   and	  correspondence	  with	   contacts	   in	   Iran,	   practiced	   speculation	   and	   other	   anti-­‐Soviet	  activities,	  and	  those	  residing	  in	  border	  regions	  presented	  a	  threat	  to	  state	  security	  due	   to	   the	   potential	   for	   espionage	   among	   them. 228 	  While	   Iranian	   citizenship	  provided	   the	   grounds	   for	   deportation,	   by	   nationality	   this	   contingent	   was	   more	  diverse:	  of	  the	  approximately	  5,600	  Iranian	  citizens	  in	  Georgia,	  most	  were	  Armenian	  or	  Azerbaijani	  by	  nationality	   (2,128	  and	  1,506,	   respectively).	   Smaller	  nationalities	  included	   Iranians,	   Jews,	   and	   Assyrians. 229 	  I	   unfortunately	   do	   not	   know	   the	  breakdown	  by	  nationality	  of	  the	  nearly	  4,500	  “Iranians”	  ultimately	  deported	  or	  have	  further	  details	  about	  the	  operation,	  but	  the	  correlation	  between	  Č’arkviani’s	  October	  proposal	   and	   the	   Iranian	   totals	   in	   the	   comprehensive	   1949-­‐1950	   list	   point	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  his	  proposal	  was	  carried	  out	  sometime	  between	  late	  1949	  and	  1950.	  	  	   The	   geography	   of	   the	   1949	   deportations	   from	   Georgia	   was	   considerably	  broader	   than	  what	  Moscow	   authorities	   ordered	   and	  what	   scholars	   and	   advocates	  have	  portrayed.	  While	  many	  of	  the	  expulsions	  took	  place	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  Ajaria,	  the	  operation	  extended	  throughout	  the	  republic.	  Persons	  subject	  to	  expulsion	  resided	  in	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  Č’arkviani	  to	  Stalin,	  October	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  25,	  d.	  229,	  ll.	  4-­‐5.	  229	  “Spravka:	  ob	  iranskikh	  grazhdanakh,	  prozhivaiushchikh	  na	  territorii	  Gruzinskoi	  SSR,”	  N.	  Ruxaże,	  29	  August	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  25,	  d.	  229,	  ll.	  11-­‐13.	  
	   110	  46	  different	  districts	  (raiony)	  in	  Georgia	  (of	  67	  total),	  including	  in	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ajaria	  ASSRs	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  AO.	  Most	  Greeks	  were	  expelled	  from	  Sukhumi,	  Gul’ripskii,	  Gudauta,	  and	  Batumi;	  Turks	  -­‐-­‐	  from	  Sukhumi	  and	  Batumi	  districts;	  and	  Dashnaks	  -­‐-­‐	  from	  Axalk’alak’i,	  Axalc’ixe,	  and	  Bogdanov	  districts	  and	  Tbilisi.	   In	  Tbilisi,	  Dashnaks	  and	  Turks	  were	   the	   largest	   groups	  of	  deportees.	   Sukhumi	   and	  Gul’ripskii	   districts	  were	   the	   largest	   total	   expulsion	   areas,	   whereas	   some	   districts	   had	   only	   a	   few	  families	  expelled.230	  Operation	  “Volna”	  largely	  took	  place	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,	  but	  not	   exclusively.	   Further,	   the	   rather	   scant	   scholarship	   on	   this	   operation	   tends	   to	  portray	   it	   as	   levied	   against	   Greeks	   or	   Armenians	   rather	   than	   a	   broader	   swath	   of	  potentially	   “unreliable	   elements”	   in	   the	   Caucasus. 231 	  Again,	   though	   “Greeks”	  comprised	  most	  of	  the	  “Volna”	  deportees,	  the	  operation	  still	  expelled	  thousands	  of	  Dashnaks,	  Turks,	  and	  later,	  Iranians	  to	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Siberia.	  	  	   Moreover,	   as	   noted	   in	   the	   USSR	   Council	   of	   Ministers'	   order,	   the	   1949	  operations	   reached	   throughout	   the	   southern	   Caucasus.	   An	   estimated	   80,000	  Armenians	   were	   deported	   from	   Armenia	   at	   this	   time	   in	   “Volna”	   and	   other	  operations,	   among	   whom	   40,000	   were	   Armenians	   who	   had	   been	   recently	  repatriated	   (1946-­‐1949)	   from	  abroad,	   a	  project	  discussed	   further	   in	  Chapter	  5.232	  Armenians	   typically	   fell	   either	   under	   the	   “Dashnak”	   or	   “former	   Turkish	   subject”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  “Statisticheskie	  dannye	  o	   sem’iakh,	  podlezhashchikh	  vyseleniiu	   iz	  Gruzinskoi	  po	  dannym	  na	  30	  aprelia	  1949	  g.,	  N.	  Ruxaże,	  30	  April	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  ll.	  109-­‐127.	  231	  On	   the	   Greek	   “Volna,”	   for	   example,	   see	   Nikolai	   Fedorovich	   Bugai	   and	   A.N.	   Kotsonis,	   “Obiazat”	  
NKVD	  SSSR...vyselit’	  grekov’	  (Moscow:	  Insan,	  1999);	  N.	  N.	  Ioanidi,	  1949	  god:	  Tekhnologiia	  prestupleniia	  (Sukhum:	  Alashara,	  2006);	  Ivan	  Dzhukha,	  Spetseshelony	  idut	  na	  vostok:	  Istoriia	  repressii	  protiv	  grekov	  
v	   SSSR,	   Deportatsii	   1940-­‐x	   gg.	   (St.	   Petersburg:	   Aleteyia,	   2008);	   and	   Violetta	   Hionidou	   and	   David	  Saunders,	  “Exiles	  and	  Pioneers:	  Oral	  Histories	  of	  Greeks	  Deported	  from	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  Kazakhstan	  in	  1949,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  62,	  no.	  9	  (November	  2010):	  1479–1501.	  232	  Lehmann,	  Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation,	  110.	  
	   111	  charge,	   as	  many	  Armenian	   refugees	   from	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire	   found	   their	  way	   to	  Armenia	  and	  Georgia	  after	  1915.233	  On	  14	  June	  1949	  alone,	  as	  part	  of	  this	  operation,	  12,000	   Armenians	   were	   expelled	   from	   the	   Armenian	   SSR	   to	   Siberia.234	  Dzhamil	  Gasanly	  credits	  Azerbaijani	  First	  Secretary	  Bagirov	  and	  (to	  a	  lesser	  extent)	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani	  with	  identifying	  the	  potential	  Dashnak	  threat	  among	  new	  repatriates	  in	  the	  south	  Caucasus	  and	  bringing	  this	  issue	  to	  Moscow’s	  attention.235	  	  The	   initial	   plan	   for	   the	   entire	   “Volna”	   operation,	   as	   estimated	   by	   USSR	  Minister	   of	   State	   Security	   S.	   Kruglov,	   anticipated	   expelling	   a	   total	   of	   12,500	  households	   from	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Black	  Sea	  coast.236	  The	  actual	  number	  expelled	  exceeded	  the	  plan,	  and	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  expulsions	  took	  place	  from	  Georgia.	  	  Expulsions	  occurred	  from:	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  On	   aid	   and	   post-­‐World	  War	   One	   repatriation	   schemes	   for	   Armenian	   refugees,	   see	   Jo	   Laycock,	  “Displacing,	   Circulating	   and	   Resettling	   Armenians:	   Transcaucasia	   and	   Transnational	   Relief	   and	  Resettlement	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐War	  Period,”	  presentation	  at	  the	  American	  Research	  Institute	  of	  the	  South	  Caucasus’	   “Caucasus	   Connections”	   Conference,	   Indiana	   University,	   5	   April	   2014	   and	   “Relief,	  Resettlement	   and	   the	   Construction	   of	   Armenian	   Identities	   in	   Early	   Soviet	   Transcaucasia,”	   paper	  presented	   at	   the	   Association	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Nationalities	   14th	   World	   Conference,	   Columbia	  University,	  26	  April	  2014.	  234	  Lehmann,	  Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation,	  110-­‐111.	  235	  Gasanly,	  SSSR-­‐Turtsiia,	   495-­‐502.	   Gasanly	   focuses	   overwhelmingly	   on	  Bagirov’s	   involvement	   via	  documentary	  evidence	   from	  Azerbaijan	  archives,	  yet	   in	  Tbilisi	   archives	   I	  did	  not	  encounter	   similar	  evidence	  regarding	  Č’arkviani	  on	  this	  issue.	  Though	  Gasanly	  also	  conducted	  research	  in	  the	  Georgian	  Party	  archive,	  his	  Č’arkviani	  source	  is	  instead	  a	  secondary	  source	  that	  I	  have	  not	  managed	  to	  find.	  236	  S.	  Kruglov	  to	  L.	  Beria,	  26	  May	  1949,	  GARF	  f.	  R-­‐9479,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  476,	  l.	  1,	  accessed	  via	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  reel	  3.5938.	  
	   112	  Odessa,	  Nikolaevskii,	  Kherson,	  and	  Izmail	  oblasts	  (Ukrainian	  SSR)…..476	  	  people	  (mostly	  Greeks)	  Krasnodar	  krai……5,233	  people	  (164	  Dashnaks,	  4394	  Greeks,	  673	  Turks)	  Azerbaijan	  SSR……3,058	  people	  (323	  Greeks,	  1,045	  Dashnaks,	  1,690	  	  Turks)237	  Armenian	  SSR….12,000	  people	  (Dashnaks)238	  Georgian	  SSR…..36,705	  people	  	  
“What	  are	  they	  doing?	  After	  all,	  we’re	  not	  Germans.”239	  	   For	   all	   their	   contributions	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   operational	  mechanisms	   of	   deportation,	   many	   studies	   of	   Soviet	   deportations	   emphasize	   the	  comprehensive	  over	  the	  individual,	  providing	  estimates	  of	  total	  numbers,	  the	  paths	  of	   deportation,	   possible	   motivations,	   and	   the	   financial	   burden	   on	   the	   country.240	  However,	  the	  experiences	  of	  those	  individuals	  and	  families	  affected	  by	  deportation	  remains	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  this	  story.241	  This	  includes	  not	  only	  deportees	  themselves,	  but	   also	   family	   and	   friends	   left	   behind,	   former	   neighbors,	   and	   newly	   resettled	  Georgians	   from	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   republic.	   Each	   group	   offered	   different	  understandings	  of	  deportation	  and	  provided	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  these	  policies,	  particularly	   in	   their	  engagements	  with	   the	   state.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	  draw	   from	  MGB	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  GARF	  f.	  R-­‐9479,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  476,	  ll.	  22,	  29,	  36,	  38,	  accessed	  via	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  reel	  3.5938.	  238	  Lehmann,	  Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation,	  110-­‐111.	  239	  Georgii	   Iakovlevich	   Chakhalian,	   a	   worker	   at	   the	   Tbilisi	   Sapurtrest,	   reported	   in	   “Spetsial’noe	  soobshchenie,”	  Ruxaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  16	  June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  l.	  85.	  240	  	  Bugai,	  L.	  Beriia	  -­‐	  I.	  Stalinu;	  Polian,	  Against	  Their	  Will;	  V.N.	  Zemskov,	  Spetsposelentsy	  v	  SSSR,	  1930-­‐
1960	  (Moscow:	  Nauka,	  2003);	  and	  Nat’melaże,	  demograp’iuli	  procesebi	  sak’art’veloši.	  	  241	  For	   an	   illuminating	   approach	   to	   understanding	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   deportation	   –	   in	   this	  instance,	  of	  Poles	  to	  Kazakhstan	  –	  see	  Kate	  Brown,	  A	  Biography	  of	  No	  Place:	  From	  Ethnic	  Borderland	  
to	  Soviet	  Heartland	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  I	  focus	  less	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  life	  as	   a	   deportee	   in	   Central	   Asia	   or	   Siberia	   than	   on	   the	   process	   of	   deportation	   and	   how	   deportees	  understood	  the	  reasons	  for	  their	  exile.	  
	   113	  case	   files,	   petitions,	   memoirs,	   and	   MGB	   svodki	   to	   convey	   the	   experience	   and	  reception	  of	  operation	  “Volna”	  among	  affected	  sectors	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  doing	  so,	  witnesses	   reveal	   how	   they	   understood	   the	   reasons	   for	   deportation,	   constructed	  their	  autobiographical	  narratives	  when	  engaging	  with	  the	  state,	  and	  protested	  their	  sentences.	  Such	  eyewitness	  perspectives	  also	  illuminate	  vernacular	  understandings	  of	   such	   concepts	   as	  nation-­‐building,	   socialism,	   citizenship,	   nationality,	   and	   foreign	  threats	  that	  pervade	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  deportations.	  	   Republic	  and	  local	  organs	  had	  been	  preparing	  for	  operation	  “Volna”	  since	  at	  least	  March	  1949.	  The	  visit	  of	  an	  MGB	  official	  to	  the	  homes	  of	  designated	  deportees	  still	   came	  as	  a	   surprise	   to	   those	   families	  affected,	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	  deportation	  remained	   unclear	   for	  many	   of	   the	   deportees.	   Arpenik	   Aleksanian,	   a	   young	   Tbilisi	  native	  who	  was	  Armenian	  by	  nationality,	  recorded	  in	  her	  diary	  that	  her	  father	  heard	  rumors	  around	  town	  on	  13	  June	  that	  “Greeks	  and	  Ajarians”	  were	  to	  be	  expelled	  and	  that	   someone	   asked	   about	   “our	  Greeks.”242	  When	   an	  MGB	   captain	   arrived	   at	   their	  home	   later	   that	   day	   and	   informed	   the	   Aleksanians	   that	   they	  were	   to	   be	   expelled	  from	   the	   city	   as	   former	   Turkish	   citizens,	   Aleksanian	   noted,	   “Not	   one	   of	   us	   could	  understand	  that	  shock.”243	  The	  captain	  gave	  the	  family	  thirty	  minutes	  to	  collect	  their	  belongings.	   Nonna	   Erifriadi,	   young	   Greek	   resident	   of	   Batumi,	   recalled	   that	   on	   13	  June,	   she	   went	   to	   a	   friend	   Ioakimidi’s	   home	   to	   borrow	   a	   book	   and	   found	   it	   in	  complete	  disarray.	  Upon	  surveying	  the	  situation,	  “With	  difficulty	  I	  realized	  that	  the	  expulsion	   was	   prepared	   for	   all	   Pontic	   Greeks.	   Returning	   home,	   I	   told	   father	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  Arpenik	  Aleksanian,	  Sibirskii	  dnevnik,	  1949-­‐1954	  gg.	  (Yerevan:	  Gitutiun,	  2007),	  57.	  	  243	  Ibid.,	  59.	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  everything.”244	  Nonna	   and	   her	   father	   surmised	   that	   rumors	   about	   expulsion	   of	  Greeks	   probably	   only	   applied	   to	   those	   Greeks	   with	   foreign	   citizenship,	   such	   as	  Ioakimidi. 245 	  Neither	   Aleksanian	   nor	   Erifriadi	   struggled	   to	   comprehend	   the	  possibility	  of	  another’s	  expulsion,	  yet	  both	  girls	  failed	  to	  understand	  why	  their	  own	  families	  –	  as	  Armenian	  and	  Greek	  Soviet	  citizens	  –	  ultimately	  faced	  deportation.	  Oral	  history	   interviews	   conducted	   among	   Greek	   deportees	   suggest	   that	   at	   least	   some	  Greeks	   with	   close	   ties	   to	   the	   Party	   had	   limited	   knowledge	   of	   an	   impending	  operation,	   but	   that	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   respondents,	   their	   expulsion	   came	   as	   a	  complete	  surprise.246	  	   Some	   deportees	   remained	   unaware	   of	   the	   reason	   for	   their	   expulsion	   long	  after	  they	  arrived	  in	  Kazakhstan	  or	  Siberia.	  Levon	  Nikolaevich	  Matinov	  claimed	  he	  only	  learned	  that	  he	  was	  sent	  to	  Altai	  krai	  as	  an	  “active	  Dashnak-­‐nationalist”	  a	  year	  after	   the	   operation	   took	   place	   (May	   1950).247	  Indeed,	   in	   an	   earlier	   petition	   from	  December	   1949,	   Matinov	   described	   how	   he	   and	   his	   family,	   “together	   with	   other	  Armenians	   were	   expelled	   from	   Tbilisi	   by	   administrative	   order	   to	   Altai	   krai	   in	  permanent	  exile.”248	  Similarly,	  Il’ia	  Semenovich	  Bidzhamov,	  an	  Assyrian	  born	  in	  the	  Ottoman	   Empire	   who	   obtained	   Soviet	   citizenship	   in	   1923	   after	   fleeing	   to	   the	  Russian	   Empire	   in	   1915,	   as	   of	   December	   1949	   did	   not	   know	   the	   reason	   for	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	  Svetlana	  Alieva,	  ed.,	  Tak	  eto	  bylo:	  Natsional’nye	  repressii	  v	  SSSR,	  1919-­‐1952	  gody,	  3	  vols.	  (Moscow:	  Insan,	   1993),	   213-­‐216.	   Erifriadi’s	   grandmother,	   “Iaia”	   Kiriaki,	   fled	   Turkey	   (from	   a	   village	   near	  Trebizond)	  with	  her	  children	  in	  1917	  and	  settled	  in	  Batumi,	  where	  she	  had	  relatives.	  245	  Ibid.	  246	  Hionidou	  and	  Saunders,	  1484.	  247	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Matinov	  Levon	  Nikolaevich	  to	  MGB	  GSSR,	  11	  July	  1952,	  sšssa	  (I),	   f.	  13,	  d.	  46,	  t.	  3,	   l.	  16.	  248	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Matinov	  Levon	  Nikolaevich	  to	  N.M.	  Shvernik,	  11	  December	  1949,	  sšssa	  (I),	   f.	  13,	  d.	  46,	  t.	  1,	  l.	  12.	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  family’s	  deportation	  to	  Tomsk	  oblast’	  from	  Tbilisi.249	  Bidzhamov	  perhaps	  suspected	  his	   expulsion	   was	   related	   to	   his	   “Turkish”	   origins	   because	   he	   emphasized	   his	  refugee	   background	   and	   enthusiasm	   for	   Soviet	   citizenship	   in	   his	   petitions	   as	   a	  means	  to	  correct	   this	  biographical	   liability.	  Matinov’s	   initial	   interpretation	  focused	  on	   nationality	   rather	   than	   citizenship	   and,	   subsequently,	   attempted	   to	   refute	  ideological	  charges.	  Confusion	  also	  existed	  among	  deportees	   regarding	  whether	   their	   expulsion	  was	  due	  to	  who	  they	  were	  (by	  nationality	  or	  citizenship)	  or	  what	  they	  allegedly	  did	  (namely,	   participated	   in	   anti-­‐Soviet	   groups	   or	   maintained	   ties	   to	   Turkey).	  Autobiographical	   statements	   of	   deportees	   provide	   contradictory	   accounts.	   As	   she	  and	  her	  family	  arrived	  in	  Avlabari	  to	  embark,	  Aleksanian	  observed	  that	  nearby	  they	  had	   gathered	   “nearly	   all	   the	   Armenians	   of	   Tbilisi,	   and	   there	   are	   even	   more	  Armenians	  in	  Tbilisi	  than	  Georgians.”250	  Upon	  further	  reflection	  during	  the	  journey,	  she	  wondered:	  We	  could	  not	  understand	   just	  why	   they	  expel	  us,	  what	  we	  had	  done	  wrong.	  If	  they	  expel	  such	  honest	  people,	  just	  why	  they	  left	  behind	  all	  gamblers,	   speculators,	   thieves,	   and	   robbers.	   They	   did	   not	   expel	   a	  single	  Georgian	  with	  us.	  Why	  did	   they	   expel	  us?	   If	   they	   expel	   us	   for	  being	  born	  in	  Turkey,	  as	  former	  Turkish	  subjects,	  then	  in	  fact	  they,	  my	  parents,	   fled	   from	   Turkey	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Armenian	   massacres	  (rezni)	  in	  1915.	  And	  Papa	  left	  Turkey	  in	  1912	  in	  search	  of	  work.	  They	  obtained	   Soviet	   citizenship	   in	   1924.	   In	   Tbilisi	   already	   for	   25	   years	  they	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  Soviet	  citizens,	  enjoy	  all	  the	  same	  rights	  as	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  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Bidzhamov	  Il’a	  Semenovich	  to	  MGB	  SSSR,	  12	  December	  1949,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  d.	  41,	  t.	  1,	  ll.	  17-­‐20.	  250	  Aleksanian.,	  67.	  Avlabari	  is	  a	  neighborhood	  in	  Tbilisi	  with	  predominantly	  Armenian	  residents.	  
	   116	  everyone	  has	  since	  1936	  [referring	  to	  the	  1936	  “Stalin	  Constitution,”	  
CK].251	  	  	  Aleksanian	  correctly	  deduced	  that	  her	  parents’	  former	  Turkish	  citizenship	  provided	  the	   grounds	   for	  deportation,	   yet	   she	   conveyed	  her	   experiences	   as	   a	  more	  broadly	  Armenian	   problem.	   Not	   all	   Armenians	   in	   Tbilisi	   had	   fled	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   in	  1915,	   yet	   in	   Aleksanian’s	   mind,	   the	   city’s	   entire	   Armenian	   population	   appeared	  subject	   to	   deportation	   in	   this	   operation.	   With	   his	   similar	   refugee	   background,	  Bidzhamov	  thanked	  the	  “wise	  Lenin-­‐Stalin	  national	  democratic	  policy”	  for	  granting	  him	   and	   his	  wife	   Soviet	   citizenship	   and	   saving	   them	   from	   “the	  wild	   and	   barbaric	  national	   oppression	   and	   persecution	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   Turkish	   powers	   in	   the	   First	  Imperialist	   War.”252	  Again,	   if	   former	   Turkish	   citizenship	   was	   the	   crime,	   lavishly	  demonstrating	  commitment	  to	  Soviet	  authorities	  and	  laws	  seemed	  a	  logical	  strategy	  for	  appeal.	  Aleksanian	  does	  not	  mention	  Dashnak-­‐nationalist	   charges	   in	   her	  diary.	   For	  Solomon	  Vartanovich	  Postoian	  and	  his	  family,	  who	  were	  deported	  to	  Altai	  krai	  from	  Tbilisi,	  the	  Dashnak	  issue	  proved	  central.	  For	  these	  charges,	  Georgian	  MGB	  officials	  relied	  upon	  testimony	  and	  accusations	  from	  1938,	  in	  which	  a	  group	  of	  witnesses	  in	  Nar-­‐Baiazet,	   Armenian	   SSR,	   claimed	   Postoian	   was	   an	   active	   member	   in	   local	  Dashnak	  party	  activities	  –	  an	  accusation	  Postoian	  completely	  denied	  in	  petitions	  to	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  Ibid.,	  69.	  The	  reference	  to	  1936	  is	  most	  likely	  regarding	  the	  Soviet	  constitution	  of	  that	  year,	  which	  also	   lifted	   restrictions	   on	   categories	   of	   citizenship	   and	   associated	   rights.	   See	   Alexopoulos,	   Stalin’s	  
Outcasts.	  252	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Bidzhamov	  Il’a	  Semenovich	  to	  MGB	  SSSR,	  12	  December	  1949,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  d.	  41,	  t.	  1,	  ll.	  17-­‐20.	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  Georgian	   authorities.253	  His	   son,	   Migran	   Solomonovich	   Postoian,	   emphasized	   his	  own	  service	   in	   the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	  as	  a	  way	  to	  distance	  himself	   from	  Dashnak	  charges	  made	  against	  his	   father.254	  Matinov	   likewise	  denied	  any	   involvement	  with	  the	  Dashnak	  party,	  claiming	  “I	  was	  never	  a	  member	  of	  this	  party,	  that	  is,	  neither	  an	  active	  nor	  passive	  Dashnak.	  And	  as	  for	  nationalism,	  is	  it	  forbidden	  to	  love	  one’s	  long-­‐suffering	  people?...After	  all,	  I	  was	  born	  and	  lived	  in	  Georgia,	  which	  is	  just	  as	  close	  to	  me	  as	  Armenia.”255	  	  	   Residents	   of	   Tbilisi	   surveyed	   by	   Georgian	   MGB	   officials	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	   of	   the	   operation	   depict	   more	   confident	   portrayals	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	  deportation.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  opinions	  highlighted	  in	  this	  report	  perhaps	  reflect	  more	   accurately	   the	   preoccupations	   and	   intentions	   of	   the	   state	   than	   genuine	  popular	   opinion.	   The	   deportations	   from	   Tbilisi	   primarily	   consisted	   of	   alleged	  Dashnaks,	   therefore	   the	   report	   focuses	  on	  Armenians.	  Writing	   to	  Č’arkviani	  on	  16	  June	  1949,	  MGB	  chief	  Ruxaże	  warned	  that,	  while	  “In	  most	  cases,	  the	  action	  to	  expel	  is	   regarded	   as	   extremely	   necessary	   in	   today’s	   international	   situation…among	   a	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  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Postoian	  Solomon	  Vartanovich	  to	  MVD	  GSSR,	  21	  April	  1953,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  d.	  47,	  t.	  2,	  ll.	  106-­‐107.	  254	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Postoian	  Migran	  Solmonovich	  to	  G.M.	  Malenkov,	  14	  April	  1953,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  d.	  47,	  t.	  2,	  ll.	  21-­‐22;	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Postoian	  Migran	  Solomonovich	  to	  Ruxaże,	  30	  September	  1951,	  sšssa	  (I)	  f.	  13,	  d.	  47,	  t.	  2,	  ll.	  79-­‐80.	  255	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Matinov	  Levon	  Nikolaevich	  to	  MGB	  GSSR,	  11	  July	  1952,	  sšssa	  (I),	   f.	  13,	  d.	  46,	  t.	  3,	   l.	  16.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  Matinov	  further	  questioned	  the	  motive	  behind	  deportation,	  noting	  that	  he	  was	  initially	   registered	   as	   an	   “active	   Dashnak-­‐nationalist”	   which	   soon	   changed	   to	   “expelled	   from	   the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,”	  a	  justification	  he	  found	  curious	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  Tbilisi	  is	  not	  located	  on	  said	  coast,	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Matinov	  Levon	  Nikolaevich	  to	  A.I.	  Mgelaże,	  17	  July	  1952,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  d.	  46,	  t.	  3,	  ll.	  21-­‐22.	  
	   118	  known	  part	  of	   the	  Georgian	  population,	   such	  a	  necessity	   is	   construed	  with	   clearly	  nationalistic	  positions.”256	  	  So-­‐called	   “characteristic”	   responses	   from	   workers	   and	   members	   of	   the	  intelligentsia	   emphasized	   the	   coming	   war	   and	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐Georgians	   in	   the	  republic.	  Šalva	  Jikia,	  a	  radio	  committee	  worker,	  remarked,	  “I	  was	  convinced	  that	  war	  will	  break	  out	   this	  summer.	  No	  wonder	  they	  continuously	  send	  trains	  of	   troops	  to	  the	   Turkish-­‐Iranian	   borders.”257	  S.I.	   Č’ik’ovani,	   a	  member	   of	   the	   Georgian	  Writers’	  Union,	  went	   further,	  noting	  “The	  action	   is	  correct	  and	  useful,	  but	   it	  created	  such	  a	  mood	  in	  the	  masses	  as	  if	  there	  would	  soon	  be	  war.	  I	  know	  that	  today,	  for	  example,	  someone,	  in	  anticipation	  of	  war,	  even	  began	  to	  stock	  up	  on	  groceries.”258	  While	   these	   observations	   tend	   toward	   the	   practical,	   other	   interviewees	  aimed	   more	   directly	   at	   the	   targeted	   populations.	   Vasili	   Kakauriże,	   an	   engineer,	  commended	  the	  action	  “to	  purge	  (ochistit’)	  Georgia	  completely	  of	  dubious	  elements.	  Among	  Georgians	  they	  scarcely	  find	  those	  who	  would	  not	  commend	  this	  action.”259	  Theatre	  historian	  S.L.	  Gersamia,	  meanwhile,	  explained,	  “There’s	  no	  need	  to	  stand	  on	  ceremony	   with	   two-­‐faced	   people.	   It	   simply	   angers	   me	   that	   many	   Armenians,	   it	  seems,	  were	  Turkish	  citizens.	  Indeed	  Turks	  hate	  Armenians,	  so	  why	  include	  [them]	  in	  their	  citizenship	  [?]…it	  seems,	  such	  individuals	  need	  this	  [Turkish	  citizenship,	  CK]	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  “Spetsial’noe	  soobshchenie,”	  Ruxaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  16	  June	  1949,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  252,	  l.	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  Ibid.,	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  in	  order	  to	  more	  easily	  speculate.”260	  Konstantin	  Ninua,	  of	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  proclaimed,	  	  Finally,	   the	   city	   is	   released	   from	   the	  Armenians.	   This	   is	   the	   positive	  side	   of	   the	   activities	   undertaken.	   The	   only	   pity	   is	   that	   this	   action	   is	  partial	   (nosit	   chastichnyi	   kharakter),	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   unburdening	  Georgia	  is	  not	  brought	  to	  a	  logical	  end,	  insofar	  as	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  the	  Armenian	  population	  still	  remains	  in	  Georgia.261	  	  	  Poet	   D.A.	   Gač’eč’ilaże	   anticipated	   that	   “under	   various	   pretexts	   nearly	   all	   non-­‐Georgians	  will	  gradually	  be	  expelled	  from	  Georgia.”262	  Furthermore,	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Armenian	   population	   that	   was	   willing	   to	  comment	   on	   the	   operation	   regarded	   it	   as	   “oppression”	   of	   Armenians.263	  Aram	  Nikitich	  Ter’ian,	   a	   senior	   scholar	  at	   the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences’	   Institute	  of	  Minerals	  observed,	   “I	   remember	   that	   the	   Mensheviks	   wanted	   to	   unburden	   Tiflis	   of	  Armenians,	  but	  even	  they	  did	  not	  take	  practical	  steps	  in	  that	  direction.	  Not	  a	  social	  moment,	   but	   a	   national	   [moment,	   CK]	   appears	   as	   the	   principle	   basis	   for	   this	  action.”264	  Georgii	   Grigorian,	   a	   technician,	   explained,	   “They	   began	   to	   pursue	   us	  Armenians	   in	  Georgia	  because	  we	  are	  smarter	  (umnee)	   than	  Georgians.	   It	   is	  a	  pity	  only	  of	  unfortunate	  people	  that	  they	  are	  sent	  elsewhere	  like	  cattle.	  It	  does	  not	  suit	  us.” 265 	  Homemaker	   Anna	   Mikhailovna	   Chitaeva	   (described	   in	   the	   report	   as	  Armenian	  by	  nationality)	  reported,	  “There	  were	  appalling	  scenes.	  One	  woman	  even	  lost	   her	   mind.	   Rumor	   has	   it	   that	   in	   Vake	   district	   Armenians	   chopped	   up	   their	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  Ibid.,	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  83.	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  belongings	  with	  an	  axe	  because	  they	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  take	  them	  with	  them.”266	  Like	   the	   Georgian	   Tbilisi	   residents	   quoted	   above,	   the	   “characteristic”	   Armenian	  respondents	  framed	  the	  Tbilisi	  expulsions	  as	  unambiguous	  national	  offenses	  against	  Armenians	   simply	   for	   being	   Armenian.	   The	   term	   “Dashnak”	   does	   not	   appear	  anywhere	  in	  Ruxaże’s	  report,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Dashnaks	  and	  Turkish	  citizens	  were	  the	  stated	  objects	  of	  the	  operation.	  The	   security	   imperatives	   and	   Georgian	   chauvinism	   offered	   by	   Tbilisi	  residents	   as	   reasons	   for	   the	   expulsion	   of	   Armenians	  were	   likewise	  mentioned	   by	  Greek	  deportees	  in	  oral	  history	  interviews.	  According	  to	  some	  respondents,	  Greeks	  were	  expelled	  from	  Georgia	  to	  clear	  the	  border	  region	  and	  make	  room	  for	  Georgian	  settlement	   in	   those	   regions.	   Others	   offered	   the	   additional	   explanation	   that	   such	  policies	  altered	  the	  ethnic	  balance	  in	  Abkhazia,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  Greeks	  in	  Georgia	  resided	  prior	  to	  expulsion,	  in	  the	  favor	  of	  ethnic	  Georgians.267	  With	   time,	   deportees	   and	   their	   families	   came	   to	   realize	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  charges	  against	  them	  as	  well	  as	  ways	  to	  appeal	  to	  authorities	  for	  amnesty,	  return	  to	  their	   places	   of	   origin,	   and	   return	   of	   property	   (or	   compensation	   for	   loss	   thereof).	  Immediately	   following	  the	  operation,	   the	  Georgian	  MGB	  began	  to	  receive	  petitions	  (zaiavleniia)	   regarding	   the	   deportees	   and	   requests	   to	   return	   to	   their	   places	   of	  residence	  in	  Georgia.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  these	  letters	  came	  from	  Tbilisi	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  Ibid.	  267	  Hionidou	  and	  Saunders,	  1483.	  The	  twenty	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  for	  this	  article	  took	  place	  between	  2006	  and	  2008.	  Hionidou	  and	  Saunders	  note	  that,	  while	  deportees	  themselves	  provided	  the	  security	  and	   ethnic	   balance	   explanations,	   their	   children	   emphasized	   the	   role	   such	   operations	   played	   in	  populating	  and	  developing	  Kazakhstan,	  a	  much	  more	  optimistic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  operation.	  	  
	   121	  (e.g.	  230	  from	  Tbilisi,	  yet	  only	  18	  “from	  the	  periphery”)	  as	  early	  as	  20	  June	  1949.268	  By	   April	   1953,	   the	   Georgian	   MIA	   processed	   1,714	   petitions	   and	   213	   cases	   about	  expulsions.269	  	  The	   petition	   campaign	   increased	   significantly	   after	   1953,	   as	   waves	   of	  amnesties	  swept	  the	  Union.270	  Among	  the	  “Volna”	  special	  settlers,	  the	  Greek	  Soviet	  citizens	  deported	  from	  Abkhazia	  lobbied	  most	  actively	  for	  the	  right	  to	  return	  and	  for	  property	   compensation.	   Given	   their	   numbers,	   this	   perhaps	   is	   not	   surprising.	  However,	   one	   particular	   group	   of	   Greek	   “Volna”	   deportees	   presented	   a	  distinguishing	   set	   of	   challenges	   for	   the	  newly-­‐installed	  Georgian	   leadership:	   those	  additional	   5,000	   Greek	   “dobrovol’tsy”	   deported	   from	   Abkhazia	   during	   the	   “Volna”	  operation	   on	   Abkhaz	   Obkom	   First	   Secretary	   Mgelaże’s	   orders.	   Arrangements	   to	  compensate	   financially	   Greek	   “dobrovol’tsy”	   for	   their	   lost	   property	   in	   Abkhazia	  began	   in	   December	   1951,	   but	   petitioners	   among	   this	   group	   continued	   to	   write	  thereafter.271	  Managing	  and	  responding	  to	  these	  claims	  fell	  to	  the	  post-­‐1953	  leader	  of	  Georgia,	  First	  Secretary	  Vasil	  Mžavanaże.	  Yet	  in	  their	  letters,	  Greek	  “dobrovol’tsy”	  brought	   to	   light	   the	   dynamics	   at	   play	   in	   postwar	  Abkhazia	   and	   the	   state	   of	   inter-­‐ethnic	  relations	  in	  the	  autonomous	  republic.	  	  Greek	   petitioners	   viewed	   the	   1949	   deportations	   as	   a	   problem	   specific	   to	  Abkhazia	   and	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   trend	   of	   alleged	   “Georgification”	   of	   the	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   122	  autonomous	  republic	  initiated	  by	  Beria	  and	  continued	  by	  Mgelaże.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  1955	   petition	   to	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   Chairman	   Bulganin,	   Dmitri	   Khristoforovich	  Mistakidi	   highlighted	   the	   spurious	   circumstances	   of	   the	   “voluntary”	   expulsion	   of	  Greek	   Soviet	   citizens	   from	   Abkhazia	   during	   operation	   “Volna.”	   For	  Mistakidi,	   this	  violation	  of	  rights	  had	  deeper	  underpinnings:	  The	  entire	  five-­‐year	  period	  of	  work	  of	  the	  racist	  Mgelaże	  prior	  to	  our	  expulsion,	  characterized	  by	  inhumane	  oppression,	  discrimination,	  and	  other	  crimes,	  took	  on	  clear	  signs	  of	  genocide,	  with	  brutal	  chauvinism,	  carried	   out	   not	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   Greeks,	   but	   also	   in	   general.	   The	  preparatory	   five-­‐year	   “work”	   of	   Mgelaże	   had	   its	   apotheosis	   in	   the	  events	  of	  14-­‐21	  June	  1949.272	  	  In	  a	  series	  of	  petitions	  to	  Moscow	  authorities	  in	  late	  1953,	  E.S.	  Makridi	  employed	  a	  similar	   discourse	   on	   race	   to	   describe	   the	   position	   of	   Greek	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	  Abkhazia,	   comparing	   the	   position	   and	   rights	   of	   Greeks	   in	   Abkhazia	   to	   that	   of	  “negroes”	   in	  America	  due	  to	  the	  policies	  carried	  out	  by	  Beria	  and	  Mgelaże.273	  Such	  petitions	  distinguished	  between	  Beria,	  Mgelaże,	  and	  their	  clients,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  broader	  Georgian	  populace.	  For	  instance,	  Mistakidi	  described	  an	  incident	  in	  which	  a	   local	  militia	   leader,	  Guguchia,	  allegedly	  organized	  a	  crowd	  of	  Georgians	  to	  interrupt	   a	   Greek	   funeral	   procession	   (two	   weeks	   prior	   to	   operation	   “Volna,”	  coincidentally	  or	  not)	  to	  signal	  the	  fact	  that	  Greeks	  did	  not	  deserve	  land	  in	  the	  area.	  According	  to	  Mistakidi’s	  account,	  This	  provocative	  attack	  was	  instigated	  by	  local	  powers	  to	  confirm	  that	  these	  Georgians	  are	  a	  “savage	  people”	  (dikii	  narod),	  that	  they	  can	  kill	  someone	   without	   hesitation	   if	   he	   asks	   for	   his	   home	   to	   be	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  “Zhaloba:	   O	   narushenii	   sotsialisticheskoi	   zakonnosti	   i	   prav	   chelovecheskoi	   lichnosti,”	  Mistakidi	  Dmitri	  Khristoforovich	  to	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  d.	  221a,	  l.	  134.	  273	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  28,	  d.	  323,	  ll.	  5-­‐16.	  
	   123	  returned…But	   it	   is	   known	   that	   there	   have	   been	   no	   savages	   on	   the	  earth	  for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  Georgians	  are	  not	  savages	  and	  not	  as	  savage	  as	   they	   [Guguchia,	   CK]	   want	   to	   present	   them,	   but	   among	   them	  [Georgians,	   CK]	   are	   savage	   nationalists	   and	   this	   is	   without	   a	   doubt	  because	  we	  are	  victims	  of	  this	  nationalism.274	  	  Mistakidi	  distinguished	  between	  “local	  powers,”	  who	  allegedly	  sought	  to	  incite	  fear	  among	   Greeks,	   and	   Georgian	   neighbors	   who	   otherwise	   lived	   alongside	   Greek	  populations	  without	  incident.	  Yet	  the	  influence	  of	  such	  “savage	  nationalists”	  –	  even	  if	   in	   the	   minority	   among	   local	   Georgians	   –	   proved	   instrumental	   in	   how	   Greeks	  comprehended	  their	  overall	  treatment	  in	  Abkhazia	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “Volna”	  operation	  specifically.	  As	  was	   the	  case	  with	  petitioners,	  memoirists,	  and	  eyewitnesses,	  many	  “dobrovol’tsy”	  interpreted	  the	  “Volna”	  deportation	  as	  an	  explicit	  attack	  on	  Greeks	  as	  
Greeks,	  made	  most	  clear	  by	  the	  expulsion	  of	  Soviet	  citizen	  and	  foreign	  citizen	  alike,	  even	  if	  this	  departed	  from	  the	  purported	  ideological	  and	  security	  imperative	  of	  the	  operation.	   Such	   grievances	   were	   sufficient	   enough	   to	   garner	   attention	   and	  involvement	   of	   Union-­‐level	   authorities	   by	   1955.275	  As	   the	   next	   chapter	   shows,	  exposing	   and	   attempting	   to	   resolve	   such	   tensions	   from	   the	   immediate	   postwar	  period	  proved	  a	  key	  part	  of	  a	  more	  complex	  process	  of	  de-­‐Stalinization	  and	  national	  re-­‐negotiation	  in	  Georgia.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  “Zhaloba:	   O	   narushenii	   sotsialisticheskoi	   zakonnosti	   i	   prav	   chelovecheskoi	   lichnosti,”	  Mistakidi	  Dmitri	  Khristoforovich	  to	  Bulganin	  N.A.,	  25	  March	  1955,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  221a,	  l.	  136.	  275	  See	  especially	  RGANI	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  25,	  ll.	  69-­‐95,	  117-­‐169.	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Deportations	  and	  Center-­‐Periphery	  Dynamics	  	   Deportations	   as	   a	   Soviet	   practice	   required	   close	   collaboration	   between	  central	   decision-­‐making	   authorities	   in	   Moscow	   and	   local	   implementers	   at	   the	  republic	  and	  district	   levels	   to	  carry	  out	   the	  operations.	  Preparations	  and	  planning	  for	   the	   Meskhetian	   and	   “Volna”	   operations	   show	   the	   important	   roles	   played	   by	  actors	   within	   Georgia,	   from	   First	   Secretary	   Č’arkviani	   and	   Abkhaz	   Obkom	   head	  Mgelaże	   to	   the	   provincial	   MGB	   agent	   or	   border	   guard.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Georgia,	  distinguishing	  between	  central	  and	  local	  agency	   is	  complicated	  by	  the	  overarching	  role	   of	   Lavrenti	   Pavles	   że	   Beria,	   his	   continued	   influence	   in	   Georgia,	   and	   the	  mechanism	  of	  his	  police	  apparatus	  in	  facilitating	  deportation	  operations.	  As	  a	  result,	  postwar	   deportations	   in	   Georgia	   remain	   intimately	   linked	   to	   cadre	   politics	   and	  power	  struggles	  in	  Georgia	  and	  in	  Moscow	  between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  and	  1953.276	  	   When	  Stalin	  promoted	  Beria	  from	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CP	  to	  head	  the	   all-­‐Union	   NKVD	   in	   1938,	   his	   replacement	   in	   Georgia,	   Kandid	   Nestoris	   że	  Č’arkviani,	   continued	   to	   foster	   the	   republic’s	   “cult	   of	   Beria”	   as	  Beria	   attempted	   to	  maintain	   Georgia	   and	   Transcaucasia	   as	   his	   “fiefdom”	   from	   Moscow	   through	   an	  extensive	  patronage	  network	  in	  Caucasian	  and	  secret	  police	  institutions.277	  Though	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  276	  Moreover,	   as	   Fairbanks	   argues,	   the	   frequent	   and	   far-­‐reaching	   purges	   of	   Georgian	   officials	  between	   1951	   and	   1953	   shows	   the	   particular	   salience	   of	   patron-­‐client	   networks	   in	   late	   Stalin-­‐era	  politics,	  Charles	  H.	  Fairbanks,	  Jr.,	  “Clientelism	  and	  Higher	  Politics	  in	  Georgia,	  1949-­‐1953,”	  in	  Ronald	  Grigor	   Suny,	   Transcaucasia,	   Nationalism,	   and	   Social	   Change:	   Essays	   in	   the	   History	   of	   Armenia,	  
Azerbaijan,	  and	  Georgia,	  Rev.	  ed	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1996):	  339-­‐368,	  344.	  277	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  277-­‐278	  and	  Fairbanks,	  “Clientelism	  and	  Higher	  Politics	  in	  Georgia,”	  339-­‐341.	  Suny	  argues	  that	  Beria	  represented	  a	  new	  type	  of	  Soviet	  leader	  in	  Georgia,	  one	  who	  built	  his	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  Cheka	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  (in	  contrast	  to	  Sergo	  Orjonikiże)	  and	  one	  who	  lacked	  a	  local	  patronage	  network	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  promotion	  to	  first	  secretary	  in	  1931.	  Instead,	   Beria’s	   power	   stemmed	   directly	   from	   Stalin.	   Suny	   proposes	   that	   Beria	   was	   an	   attractive	  option	  precisely	  because	  he	  was	  a	  local	  who	  knew	  well	  the	  environment	  yet	  was	  unencumbered	  by	  
	   125	  Č’arkviani	  managed	  to	  develop	  his	  own	  networks	  within	  Georgia	  as	  First	  Secretary,	  Beria	  (and	  Stalin)	  remained	  members	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  and	  retained	  much	  control	  over	  issues	  in	  the	  republic.278	  One	  important	  manifestation	  of	  this	  was	  the	  absence	  of	   the	  Russian	   second	  secretary	   customary	   in	  other	   republics.279	  As	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny	   has	   shown,	   Beria	   maintained	   his	   “fiefdom”	   in	   Georgia	   by	   acting	   as	   Stalin’s	  interlocutor	   on	   Georgia	   and	   managing	   the	   information	   Stalin	   received	   about	   his	  native	  land.280	  	  Beria’s	   influence	   in	   Georgia,	   however,	   remained	   contingent	   upon	   Stalin’s	  favor.	   If	   the	   postwar	   irredentist	   scheme	   for	   Kars,	   Ardahan,	   and	   Artvin	   provinces	  depicts	   the	   apex	   of	   Beria’s	   influence	   over	   Stalin,	   several	   subsequent	   maneuvers	  sought	   to	   reduce	   Beria’s	   power	   in	   Georgia	   and	   in	   Moscow.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	  Leningrad	  Affair	  and	   the	  Zhdanovshchina,	   for	   instance,	   several	  of	  Beria’s	   clients	   in	  Georgia	  were	  demoted	  between	  1946-­‐1948.281	  The	  more	  significant	  move	  came	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	   Caucasian	   Party	   elite	   and	   therefore	   could	   break	   up	   the	   prevalent	   “family	   circles”	   in	   favor	   of	  Moscow’s	   rule,	   Suny,	   The	   Making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation,	   263-­‐264.	   On	   Beria’s	   mechanisms	   of	  institutional	   patronage,	   see	   Timothy	   K.	   Blauvelt,	   “March	   of	   the	   Chekists:	   Beria’s	   Secret	   Police	  Patronage	  Network	   and	   Soviet	   Crypto-­‐Politics,”	  Communist	  and	  Post-­‐Communist	  Studies	   44	   (2011):	  73–88.	  	  278	  Indeed,	  Oleg	  Khlevniuk	  shows	  that	  this	  relationship	  worked	  both	  ways,	  as	  Georgians	  in	  Georgia	  appealed	   to	   Beria	   in	   Moscow	   on	   their	   behalf	   to	   resolve	   local	   disputes.	   Khlevniuk	   describes	   these	  relations	   as	   “political	   intimacy,”	   whereby	   citizens	   viewed	   Beria	   as	   the	   republic’s	   protector	   in	  Moscow,	  Oleg	  Khlevniuk,	  “Kreml’	  –	  Tbilisi.	  Chistki,	  kontrol’	   i	  problemy	  gruzinskogo	  natsionalizma	  v	  pervoi	  polovine	  1950-­‐x	  godov,”	  paper	  presented	  at	  workshop	  on	  “Georgian	  Nationalism	  and	  Soviet	  Power,”	  Joensuu,	  Finland,	  27	  August	  2012.	  279	  Charles	  H.	  Fairbanks	  Jr.,	  “National	  Cadres	  as	  a	  Force	  in	  the	  Soviet	  System:	  The	  Evidence	  of	  Beria’s	  Career,	  1949-­‐53,”	  in	  Jeremy	  Azrael,	  ed.,	  Soviet	  Nationality	  Policies	  and	  Practices,	  (New	  York:	  Praeger,	  1978),	  144–86.	  280	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	   the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  287.	   	   The	   institution	   of	   the	  Russian	   (or,	   occasionally,	  Slavic)	   second	   secretary	   ostensibly	   served	   to	   check	   any	   overly	   nationalistic	   tendencies	   in	   non-­‐Russian	  republics.	  Georgia	  did	  not	  have	  a	  Russian	  secretary	  until	  1956.	  281	  Bak’raże,	   Sturua,	   Šaria,	   and	   Rap’ava	  were	   all	   demoted	   or	   removed	   from	   their	   positions	   in	   this	  period.	  	  	  
	   126	  9	  November	  1951	  with	   the	   revelation	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Mingrelian	   affair,”	   a	  direct	  attempt	  orchestrated	  by	  Stalin	  to	  break	  up	  Beria’s	  patronage	  network	  in	  Georgia.282	  	  Officially	   an	   attack	   on	   corruption	   among	   officials	   of	   Mingrelian	   (megreli)	  descent	   in	   Georgia	   affiliated	   with	   Second	   Secretary	   M.I.	   Baramia,	   the	   Mingrelian	  affair	  marked	  Stalin’s	  re-­‐entry	  into	  Georgian	  affairs	  in	  a	  pronounced	  way.283	  Though	  at	  this	  time	  Beria	  himself,	  also	  a	  Mingrelian,	  was	  not	  targeted,	  the	  arrests	  and	  purges	  among	  Georgian-­‐Mingrelian	  officials	  for	  a	  time	  significantly	  reduced	  Beria’s	  political	  power	   in	   the	   republic.284	  This	   led	   to	   massive	   personnel	   changes,	   including	   the	  removal	  of	  Mingrelians	  Baramia,	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  (and	  former	  republic	  MGB	  head	  until	   1948)	  A.N.	  Rap’ava,	  Procurator	  V.	   Ia.	   Šonia,	   and	  others.	   In	  March	  1952,	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani	  (who	  was	  not	  a	  Mingrelian	  but	  was	  reprimanded	  for	  permitting	  such	   manifestations	   to	   occur	   on	   his	   watch)	   was	   replaced	   by	   Ak’ak’i	   Ivanis	   że	  Mgelaże,	  who	  had	  managed	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  since	  1943	  and	  the	  newly-­‐established	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  Cadre	   shifts	   in	   Moscow	   preceded	   the	   affair,	   in	   particular	   the	   replacement	   of	   Beria’s	   client	  Abakumov	  with	  S.D.	  Ignat’ev	  as	  head	  of	  the	  MGB.	  Ignat’ev	  played	  a	  key	  role	  with	  Stalin	  in	  conceiving	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair	  charges.	  283	  The	   resolution	   technically	   addressed	   “corruption	   in	   Georgia”	   and	   the	   “anti-­‐Party	   group	   of	  comrade	   Baramia.”	   It	   also	   explicitly	   stated	   that	   “This	   group	   consists	   of	   Mingrelian	   nationalists,”	  “Postanovlenie	   Politbiuro	   o	   vziatochnichestve	   v	   Gruzii	   i	   ob	   ‘antipartiinoi	   gruppe	   t.	   Baramiia’,”	   9	  November	  1951,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  1091,	  ll.	  72-­‐75,	  reprinted	  in	  O.	  V.	  Khlevniuk,	  ed.,	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  
VKP(b)	  i	  Sovet	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  1945-­‐1953	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2002),	  249-­‐251.	  In	  Mgelaże’s	  memoir,	  he	  describes	  (in	  an	  interrogation	  by	  Beria,	  no	  less)	  a	  conversation	  with	  Stalin	  regarding	  the	  alleged	  “Mingrelian-­‐nationalist	  group.”	  Mgelaże	  recalled	  asking	  Stalin	  how	  it	  could	  be	  a	  nationalist	  group	  if	  Mingrelians	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  distinct	  nation.	  Stalin	  reportedly	  responded	  that	  some	  Mingrelians	  do	  not	   consider	   themselves	   Georgians	   and	   that	   previously	   some	   sought	   autonomy	   for	   Mingrelia,	  Mgeladze,	  Stalin:	  Kakim	  ia	  ego	  uznal,	  252.	  I	  discussed	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  Kartvelian	  subgroups	  into	  the	  Georgian	  nationality	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  For	  more	  on	  earlier	  movements	  for	  Mingrelian	  autonomy,	  see	  Blauvelt,	  “The	  ‘Mingrelian	  Question.'"	  	  284	  Though	  easily	  labeled	  a	  Mingrelian,	  Beria	  did	  not	  exhibit	  any	  particular	  affinity	  for	  a	  Mingrelian	  identity	   and	   in	   fact	   actively	   worked	   to	   combat	   such	   policies	   in	   the	   early	   1930s.	   Instead,	   the	  “Mingrelian”	   charge	   permitted	   Stalin	   to	   attack	   Beria’s	   network	   without	   attacking	   Beria	   directly,	  Blauvelt,	  “March	  of	  the	  Chekists,”	  85.	  
	   127	  K’ut’aisi	  district	  from	  1951.285	  The	  purge	  took	  on	  several	  stages	  between	  late	  1951	  and	   early	   1953	   and	   extended	   to	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   levels	   of	   Party	   and	  government	  officials.286	  	  Though	   the	   Politburo	   resolution	   of	   9	  November	   focused	   on	   the	  Mingrelian	  group,	  it	  noted	  the	  danger	  of	  the	  potential	  rise	  of	  other	  provincial	  “bosses”	  in	  K'art’li,	  Kaxet’i,	  Imeret’i,	  Guria,	  and	  Rača	  if	  the	  so-­‐called	  “principle	  of	  Mingrelian	  patronage”	  was	   not	   rebuffed	   properly,	   leading	   to	   the	   deterioration	   of	   Georgia’s	   Party	   into	   a	  series	  of	  “provincial	  Party	  principalities.”287	  The	  purges	  affected	  the	  entire	  republic,	  yet	  they	  disproportionately	  focused	  on	  western	  Georgia	  (Mingrelia,	  Guria,	  Svanet’i,	  and	   Imeret’i)	   and	   Tbilisi	   and,	   later	   on,	   Kaxet’i	   and	   Ajaria.	   Mountainous	   areas	   of	  northeastern	  Georgia,	  Mesxet’i,	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia	  ASSRs	  saw	   less	  of	  an	   impact.288	  The	   geographic	   distribution	   of	   the	   purges	   makes	   sense	   for	   several	  reasons.	   First,	   the	   northeastern	   mountainous	   areas	   were	   also	   less	   populous	   and	  more	   remote	   than	   more	   urban	   areas	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   republic.	   Second,	   the	  perceived	  threat	  to	  the	  Mesxet’i	  region	  had	  already	  been	  addressed	  in	  1944	  with	  the	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  “Postanovlenie	  Politbiuro	  o	  polozhenii	  del	  v	  kompartii	  Gruzii,”	  27	  March	  1952,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  1093,	  ll.	  36-­‐39,	  reprinted	  in	  Khlevniuk,	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  VKP(b),	  352-­‐354.	  Mgelaże	  was	  born	  in	  1910	  in	  Ozurget’i	  district	  and	  spent	  his	  childhood	  in	  Gudauta,	  Abkhazia.	  As	  a	  Georgian	  in	  Soviet	  Abkhazia,	  Mgelaże	   became	   the	   head	   of	   the	   autonomous	   republic’s	   and	   Georgia’s	   Komsomol,	   served	   on	   the	  Caucasus	  front	  during	  World	  War	  Two,	  and	  served	  as	  the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  and	  Sukhumi	  Gorkom	  first	  secretary	  from	  1943	  to	  1951.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  greater	  oversight	  in	  Georgia,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  “Mingrelian	  Affair,”	  central	  authorities	  divided	  Georgia	  into	  two	  new	  oblasti	  (east	  and	  west)	  –	  Tbilisi	  and	  Kutaisi.	  They	  were	  abolished	  in	  April	  1953,	  when	  Beria	  began	  to	  restore	  his	  network	  in	  Georgia.	  286	  Conquest	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Georgian	   purges	   in	   this	   period	  were	   comparable	   (“in	  dismissals	   rather	   than	   deaths”)	   to	   those	   during	   the	   Yezhovshchina,	   Robert	   Conquest,	   Power	   and	  
Policy	  in	  the	  USSR:	  The	  Study	  of	  Soviet	  Dynastics	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1961),	  144.	  287	  “Postanovlenie	  Politbiuro	  o	  vziatochnichestve	  v	  Gruzii	   i	  ob	   ‘antipartiinoi	  gruppe	   t.	  Baramiia’,”	  9	  November	  1951,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  3,	  d.	  1091,	  ll.	  72-­‐75,	  reprinted	  in	  Khlevniuk,	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  VKP(b),	  349-­‐351.	  288	  Fairbanks,	  “Clientelism	  and	  Higher	  Politics	  in	  Georgia,”	  354-­‐355.	  
	   128	  Meskhetian	   deportations	   and	   Georgian	   resettlements.	   Finally,	   in	   Abkhazia	  especially,	   Mgelaże	   maintained	   his	   own	   patronage	   network	   and	   had	   already	  cleansed	   the	   republic	   of	   potentially	   suspect	   populations	   in	   operations	   such	   as	  “Volna”	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair.	  	  Charles	   Fairbanks	   suggests	   that	   the	   attacks	   waged	   against	   Beria’s	   clients	  indicate	  that	  clienteles	  in	  Georgia	  “may	  have	  had	  an	  ethnic	  basis,”	  demonstrating	  a	  “surprising	   exception	   to	   the	   atomization	   practiced	   by	   the	   Stalin	   regime.” 289	  Expanding	   on	   Fairbanks’	   point,	   we	   may	   even	   consider	   the	   Mingrelian	   affair	  alongside	  other	  deportation	  waves	  in	  the	  republic	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   high	   political	   purges,	   over	   11,200	   Georgians	   were	   deported	   to	  Central	   Asia	   on	   26	   December	   1951	   according	   to	   the	   19	   November	   Politburo	  resolution	  “On	  the	  deportation	  of	  enemy	  elements	  from	  the	  Georgian	  SSR.”290	  While	  the	   Mingrelian	   affair	   and	   ties	   to	   Baramia’s	   alleged	   nationalist	   ring	   provided	   the	  grounds	  for	  expelling	  “enemy	  elements,”	  this	  umbrella	  term	  concealed	  several	  more	  specific	  categories	  for	  the	  accused	  and	  their	  families,	  who	  were	  also	  deported	  to	  the	  Kazakh	   SSR	   at	   this	   time:	   ties	   to	   émigré	   Georgians;	   ties	   to	   Ajarian	   or	   Azerbaijani	  émigrés;	  suspected	  smugglers,	  border	  crossers,	  and	  accomplices	  with	  ties	  to	  Turkish	  intelligence	  services;	  recent	  “reemigrants”	  to	  Georgia	  from	  France,	  Iran,	  and	  China;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  289	  Fairbanks,	  “Clientelism	  and	  Higher	  Politics	  in	  Georgia,”	  353.	  290	  The	   9	   November	   1951	   resolution	   ordered	   only	   to	   prosecute	   the	   anti-­‐Party	   and	   anti-­‐state	  activities	  of	  Baramia	  and	  his	  “nationalistic	  group,”	  though	  this	  rather	  vague	  charge	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  16	   November	   (29	   November	   in	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers)	   order	   that	   arrested	   and	   deported	   to	  Kazakhstan	  37	  purported	  leaders	  and	  more	  than	  11,200	  others,	  “Zapiska	  L.P.	  Berii	  v	  prezidium	  TsK	  KPSS	  o	  nepravil’nom	  vedenii	  dela	  o	  tak	  nazyvaemoi	  mingrel’skoi	  natsionalisticheskoi	  gruppe,”	  8	  April	  1953,	  Arkhiv	  Prezidenta	  Rossisskoi	  Federatsii	  (AP	  RF),	  f.	  3,	  op.	  61,	  d.	  83,	  ll.	  144-­‐157,	  reprinted	  in	  V.	  Naumov	   and	   Iu.	   Sigachev,	   eds.,	   Lavrentii	   Beriia	   1953:	   Stenogramma	   iul’skogo	   plenuma	   TsK	   KPSS	   i	  
drugie	  dokumenty	  (Moscow:	  Demokratiia,	  1999).	  
	   129	  and	  prisoners-­‐of-­‐war	  who	  allegedly	  collaborated	  with	  German	  forces	  by	  serving	  in	  the	   Georgian	   National	   Legion.291 	  In	   his	   condemnation	   of	   the	   operation,	   Beria	  emphasized	   the	   innocence	   of	   those	   citizens	   expelled	   in	   1951,	   noting	   the	   lack	   of	  evidence	   for	   their	   alleged	   enemy	   activities	   and	   citing	   the	   noble	   participation	   of	  many	  deportees	  in	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	  and	  the	  process	  of	  socialist	  construction.	  He	  remarked	  further	  that	  Georgia’s	  workers	  and	  intelligentsia	  failed	  to	  comprehend	  the	   meaning	   and	   purpose	   of	   this	   “revelry,	   comparing	   it	   with	   the	   invasion	   of	  Tamerlane	  or	  Shah	  Abbas.”292	  Though	  billed	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  “enemy	  elements”	  not	  unlike	  the	  “Volna”	  operation,	  the	  deportations	  associated	  with	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair	  were	   viewed	   not	   as	   an	   assault	   against	   Mingrelian	   nationalists,	   but	   rather	   as	   a	  campaign	  against	  Georgians	  more	  broadly	  –	  a	  sentiment	  Beria	  marshaled	  in	  1953.	  	  During	   his	   tenure	   managing	   Abkhazia,	   Mgelaże	   maintained	   a	   direct	  relationship	  with	  Stalin,	   thereby	   leaving	  him	  outside	  Beria’s	  patronage	  system	  –	  a	  tactic	  Beria	  himself	  had	  successfully	  employed	  earlier	  in	  his	  career	  against	  Abkhaz	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  291	  No	  title,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  13,	  sp.	  27,	  l.	  225,	  and	  “Spravka	  po	  postanovleniiu	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Soiuza	  SSR	  No.	   4893-­‐2113ss	   ot	   29	   noiabria	   1951	   goda	   ‘o	   vyselenii	   s	   territorii	   Gruzinskoi	   SSR	   vrazhdebnykh	  elementov,”	  GARF	  R.	  9479,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  607,	  l.	  48,	  accessed	  via	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  reel	  3.5961.	  On	   the	   Georgian	   national	   legion,	   see	   Giorgi	   Mamulia,	   Gruzinskii	   Legion	   v	   bor’be	   za	   svobodu	   i	  
nezavisimost’	   Gruzii	   v	   gody	   Vtoroi	  mirovoi	   voiny	   (Tbilisi:	   C’odna,	   2003).	   On	   the	   trials	   of	   suspected	  collaborators	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   Union,	   see	   Tanja	   Penter,	   “Local	   Collaborators	   on	   Trial:	   Soviet	  War	  Crimes	   Trials	   under	   Stalin	   (1943–1953),”	   Cahiers	   du	  Monde	  Russe	  49:2–3	   (Apr.–Sept.	   2008):	   341-­‐364;	  Martin	  Dean,	  “Where	  Did	  All	  the	  Collaborators	  Go?”	  Slavic	  Review	  64:4	  (Winter	  2005):	  791–798;	  and	   Claire	   P.	   Kaiser,	   “Betraying	   their	  Motherland:	   Soviet	  Military	   Tribunals	   of	   Izmenniki	  Rodiny	   in	  Kazakhstan	  and	  Uzbekistan,	  1941-­‐1953,”	  The	  Soviet	  and	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Review	  41	  (2014):	  57-­‐83.	  292 	  “Zapiska	   L.P.	   Berii	   v	   prezidium	   TsK	   KPSS	   o	   nepravil’nom	   vedenii	   dela	   o	   tak	   nazyvaemoi	  mingrel’skoi	   natsionalisticheskoi	   gruppe,”	   8	   April	   1953,	   AP	   RF,	   f.	   3,	   op.	   61,	   d.	   83,	   ll.	   144-­‐157,	  reprinted	  in	  Naumov	  and	  Sigachev,	  Lavrentii	  Beriia	  1953,	  35.	  Tamerlane	  and	  the	  Mongols	  conquered	  the	  Georgian	  territories	  in	  the	  thirteenth	  century	  and	  Shah	  Abbas	  of	  the	  Safavid	  Empire	  fought	  many	  wars	   across	   the	   Caucasus	   in	   the	   early	   seventeenth	   century.	   Both	   figures	   are	   regularly	   invoked	   as	  enemies	  in	  Georgian	  national	  narratives.	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  leader	  Nestor	  Lakoba.293	  In	  his	  memoir,	  Mgelaże	  recalled	  in	  detail	  the	  conversation	  in	   which	   Stalin	   asked	   him	   to	   replace	   Č’arkviani	   as	   first	   secretary.	   In	   Mgelaże’s	  account,	  Stalin	  said	  to	  him:	  We	   chatted	   with	   you	   on	   the	   Black	   Sea	   coast	   about	   the	   challenges	  facing	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Georgia.	   We	   must	   end	   bribery,	  embezzlement,	  and	  other	  disgraces.	  We	  must	  end	  provincial	  “leaders.”	  After	  all,	  a	  feud	  between	  Georgian	  provinces	  has	  always	  been	  a	  great	  disaster	   for	   the	   country.	   The	   Iranian	   shah	   and	   Turkish	   sultan	   took	  advantage	  of	  this	  in	  their	  time.	  If	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  tragedy	  of	  Georgia,	  then	   one	  may	   claim	  without	   question	   that	   neither	   shah,	   nor	   sultan,	  nor	  Tamerlane	  caused	  her	  as	  much	  harm	  as	  did	  internecine	  struggle.	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  not	  this	  danger	  now,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  different	  danger	  –	  provincial	  “vozhdizm”	  engenders	  squabbles	  and	  intrigues.	  Each	  pulls	  to	  his	  own	  side,	  seems	  to	  nominate	  cadres	  from	  “his	  province,”	  create	  better	   conditions	   for	   “his	   countrymen	   (svoim	   zemliakam).”	   These	  trends	  are	  especially	  apparent	  in	  Ajaria	  and	  Mingrelia.	  If	  tendencies	  of	  patronage	   (shefstvo)	   are	   not	   prevented,	   then	   it	   will	   lead	   to	   the	   fact	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  and	  government	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	   republic	  will	  be	   reduced	   to	  zero.	  Without	   regard	   for	  anything	  or	  anyone!294	  	  Stalin	  elucidated	  his	  preoccupation	  with	  longue	  durée	  Georgian	  history	  and	  Turkish	  and	   Iranian	   enemies	   in	   his	   charge	   to	   Mgelaże.	   He	   likewise	   sought	   to	   motivate	  Mgelaże’s	  sense	  of	  Georgian	  patriotism	  in	  waging	  his	  campaign	  against	   the	  alleged	  Mingrelian	  conspirators.	  Robert	  Conquest	  postulated	  that	  Mgelaże’s	  appointment	  as	  first	   secretary	  of	  Georgia	   reflected	   an	   “almost	   completed	  pilot	   project	   for	   a	   larger	  central	   scheme”	   of	   appointments	   at	   the	   center	   in	   Moscow.295 	  If	   so,	   Mgelaże’s	  promotion	  signaled	  a	  significance	  far	  beyond	  Georgia’s	  borders:	  not	  only	  was	  he	  to	  be	   the	   face	  of	   a	  new	  generation	  of	   cadre	   loyal	   to	  Stalin,	  but	  he	  also	   represented	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  293	  Timothy	  K.	  Blauvelt,	  “Abkhazia:	  Patronage	  and	  Power	  in	  the	  Stalin	  Era,”	  Nationalities	  Papers	  35,	  no.	  2	  (May	  2007):	  203–32,	  205.	  294	  Mgeladze,	  197.	  	  	  295	  Conquest,	  Power	  and	  Policy	  in	  the	  USSR,	  130.	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  desire	  to	  break	  the	  power	  of	  local	  patron-­‐client	  networks	  that	  provided	  autonomous	  sources	   of	   power,	   whether	   Zhdanov’s	   Leningrad,	   Beria’s	   Caucasus,	   or	   even	  Khrushchev’s	  Ukraine.296	  Mgelaże	  likewise	  served	  as	  the	  new	  face	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Mingrelian	  campaign	  as	  his	   appointment	   propelled	   him	   to	   republic-­‐level	   prominence. 297 	  In	   his	  pronouncements	   on	   the	  matter,	   he	   noted	   especially	   the	   danger	   posed	   by	   “localist	  tendencies,”	  that	   is,	  sub-­‐nationality	  nationalism,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  Mingrelians.	  Mgelaże	   likewise	   related	   the	   threat	   of	   Mingrelian	   localism	   to	   potential	  vulnerabilities	  along	  the	  Georgian-­‐Turkish	  border,	  which	  by	  1952	  had	  also	  become	  a	   Soviet-­‐NATO	   border.	   Mingrelia’s	   lack	   of	   a	   shared	   border	   with	   Turkey	  notwithstanding,	   Stalin	   seemed	   to	   have	   connected	   Mingrelians	   (and	   Mingrelian	  national	  sentiments)	  with	  links	  to	  and	  support	  for	  Turkish	  interests.298	  Mgelaże’s	   experiences	   identifying	   and	   deporting	   Abkhazian	   residents	   with	  suspected	   ties	   to	  Turkey	   in	  1949	   thus	   served	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   the	   republic-­‐wide	  campaign	  waged	  against	  the	  Mingrelians.	  In	  an	  interrogation	  in	  Moscow	  by	  Beria	  in	  April	  1953,	  which	  Mgelaże	  included	  in	  his	  memoir,	  Beria	  explicitly	  asked	  about	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  296	  Fairbanks,	  “National	  Cadres,”	  177.	  297	  This	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  claimed	  he	  was	  not	  the	  source	  who	  “uncovered”	  the	  alleged	  Mingrelian	  circle,	  Mgeladze,	  251.	  298	  	  Amy	  Knight,	  Beria:	  Stalin’s	  First	  Lieutenant	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	   1993),	   164.	  Mingrelia	  borders	  Abkhazia,	   in	  northwest	  Georgia,	  whereas	  Ajaria	  and	  Mesxet’i	  border	  Turkey.	  The	  Mingrelia-­‐Turkey	   connection	   could	   perhaps	   be	   due	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   Laz	   minority	   in	  northeastern	   Turkey,	   whose	   language	   among	   Kartvelian	   languages	   is	   most	   closely	   related	   to	  Mingrelian.	  In	  his	  memoir,	  Sergo	  Beria	  notes	  that	  his	  father	  cultivated	  and	  maintained	  spy	  networks	  among	  the	  Laz	  in	  Turkey	  early	  in	  his	  career	  in	  the	  Georgian	  state	  security	  services,	  Sergo	  Beria,	  Beria,	  
My	  Father:	  Inside	  Stalin’s	  Kremlin	  (London:	  Duckworth,	  2001),	  30-­‐31.	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  deportation	   of	   approximately	   13,000	   people	   from	   Georgia.299	  Mgelaże	   distanced	  himself	   from	   this	   action	   and	   attributed	   it	   instead	   to	   Č’arkviani	   and	   the	   Georgian	  MGB.300	  However,	   archival	   material	   regarding	   operation	   “Volna”	   shows	   not	   only	  Mgelaże’s	  active	  involvement	  in	  planning	  the	  operation,	  but	  also	  his	  proactive	  effort	  to	   expand	   the	   parameters	   of	   operation	   to	   include	   persons	   subject	   to	   deportation	  beyond	  the	  Moscow-­‐sanctioned	  orders.	  By	  June	  1952,	  Georgian	  Minister	  of	  State	  Security	  Nikolai	  Ruxaże,	  a	  formerly	  close	   ally	   of	   Beria	   who	   had	   been	   integral	   in	   carrying	   out	   operation	   “Volna”	   and	  leading	   the	   attack	   against	   the	   “Mingrelian”	   circle,	   was	   also	   dismissed.301	  Ruxaże	  purportedly	   misread	   signals	   from	   Stalin	   at	   a	   meeting	   in	   Cqaltubo	   (a	   spa	   town	  frequented	  by	  Stalin)	  that	  the	  efforts	  to	  curb	  “corruption”	  among	  Mingrelian	  circles	  were	  actually	  an	  effort	  to	  rein	  in	  Beria’s	  patronage	  network	  and	  not	  a	  call	  to	  probe	  corruption	  allegations	  more	  broadly	   in	   the	  republic	  –	  a	  campaign	  that	  would	  have	  certainly	   implicated	   Stalin-­‐protégé	   Mgelaże	   and	   his	   network. 302 	  Ruxaże	   also	  revealed	   to	   the	   USSR	   CC	   Mgelaże’s	   responsibility	   for	   the	   expanded	   Greek	  deportations	   from	  Abkhazia	   in	  an	  effort	   to	   implicate	   the	  new	   first	   secretary	   in	  his	  anti-­‐Baramia	  investigation	  –	  a	  move	  that	  the	  CC	  quickly	  deemed	  inappropriate	  and	  that	  led	  to	  his	  downfall.303	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	  Though	   it	   is	  not	  stated	  directly,	   this	  number	  most	   likely	  refers	   to	   those	  deported	  as	  part	  of	   the	  Mingrelian	  affair	  in	  December	  1951.	  	  300	  Mgeladze,	  260-­‐261.	  301	  Knight,	  Beria,	  163.	  302	  Blauvelt,	  “March	  of	  the	  Chekists,”	  85.	  303	  “Telegramma	   TsK	   VKP(b)	   A.I.	   Mgeladze	   i	   chlenam	   Biuro	   TsK	   kompartii	   Gruzii	   o	   spravke	   N.M.	  Rukhadze,”	  4	   June	  1952,	  RGASPI	   f.	   558,	  op.	  11,	  d.	  135,	   l.	   89,	   reprinted	   in	  Khlevniuk,	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  
VKP(b),	  356.	  
	   133	  Mgelaże’s	   tenure	   as	   first	   secretary	   ended	   with	   Stalin’s	   death	   on	   5	   March	  1953,	  when	  Beria	  immediately	  maneuvered	  to	  establish	  his	  authority	  in	  Moscow.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   he	   endeavored	   to	   restore	   his	   network	   in	   Georgia	   and	   undo	   the	  damage	   caused	   by	   the	   Mingrelian	   affair.	   As	   part	   of	   that	   process,	   Alek’sandre	  Iordanes	   że	   Mirc’xulava	   replaced	   Mgelaże	   as	   first	   secretary	   in	   April	   1953.	   A	  Mingrelia	  native	  and	  long-­‐time	  Beria	  client,	  Mirc’xulava	  only	  served	  in	  this	  position	  until	   September	   1953.	   Beria’s	   fall	   from	   power	   from	   June	   1953	   ensured	   a	   brief	  tenure	  for	  Mirc’xulava,	  though	  in	  that	  period	  the	  fabrication	  of	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair	  was	  exposed	  and	  those	  persons	  arrested	  or	  deported	  under	  its	  auspices	  were	  freed.	  This	  included	  not	  only	  high-­‐level	  officials,	  but	  also	  11,671	  special	  settlers	  deported	  in	  December	  1951	   to	  Kazakhstan	  under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	  Mingrelian	   affair.	   The	  deportees	   returned	   to	   their	   former	  places	   of	   residence	   on	   re-­‐installed	  Minister	   of	  Internal	  Affairs	  Beria’s	  order	  in	  late	  May	  and	  early	  June	  1953.304	  Vasil	  Pavles	  że	  Mžavanaże,	  a	  K’ut’aisi	  native	  but	  Georgian	  political	  outsider,	  replaced	   Mirc’xulava	   as	   first	   secretary.	   The	   republic	   Mžavanaże	   inherited	   in	   late	  1953	  seemed	  ripe	  for	  tensions	  on	  several	  fronts	  due	  to	  the	  tumults	  of	  late	  Stalinism	  and	   the	   subsequent	   loss	   of	   prominent	   Georgian	   “advocates”	   in	   Moscow	   after	  1953.305	  Mžavanaże	   would	   spend	   much	   of	   his	   nineteen-­‐year	   tenure	   as	   Georgia’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  304	  “Spravka:	   Vo	   ispolnenie	   prikaza	   Ministra	   Vnutrennikh	   del	   Soiuza	   SSR	   tov.	   L.P.	   BERIA	   #00112	  1953	  goda,”	   sšssa	   (I),	   f.	  13,	   sp.	  27,	   ll.	  226-­‐228.	  See	  also	   “Zapiska	  L.P.	  Berii	  v	  prezidium	  TsK	  KPSS	  o	  nepravil’nom	  vedenii	  dela	  o	  tak	  nazyvaemoi	  mingrel’skoi	  natsionalisticheskoi	  gruppe,”	  8	  April	  1953,	  AP	  RF,	  f.	  3,	  op.	  61,	  d.	  83,	  ll.	  144-­‐157,	  reprinted	  in	  Naumov	  and	  Sigachev,	  Lavrentii	  Beriia	  1953,	  36-­‐37.	  305	  By	  1956,	  for	  instance,	  the	  CC	  had	  been	  completely	  rid	  of	  Georgian	  representatives	  after	  an	  era	  of	  prominent	  representation	  in	  the	  Stalin	  period.	  	  
	   134	  leader	   attempting	   to	   move	   beyond	   these	   legacies	   and	   negotiate	   more	   effectively	  between	  Moscow’s	  imperatives	  and	  local	  needs	  and	  practices.	  *	   *	   *	  Between	  1949	  and	  1951,	  at	  least	  54,544	  people	  were	  expelled	  from	  Georgia	  to	  Central	  Asia.	  This	  number	  comprises	  approximately	  14	  percent	  of	  Polian’s	   total	  estimated	  380,000-­‐400,000	  postwar	  deportations.306	  	  Considering	  that	   in	  the	  1939	  and	   1959	   all-­‐Union	   censuses	   the	   population	   of	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   comprised	  approximately	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  USSR’s	  total	  population,	  a	  14	  percent	  share	  of	  the	  postwar	   deportation	   total	   is	   quite	   disproportionate.307	  The	   expulsion	   of	   at	   least	  80,000	   residents	   from	   the	   Armenian	   SSR	   in	   the	   same	   period	   presents	   a	   related	  picture.308	  	  Why	   are	   postwar	   deportations	   and	   cadre	   struggles	   in	   Georgia	   part	   of	   the	  same	  story?	  The	  “fiefdom”	  model	  and	   the	   ideology	  of	   “Soviet	  xenophobia”	  provide	  background	  explanations	  for	  why	  and	  how	  postwar	  population	  politics	  coalesced	  in	  this	   particular	   fashion.	   As	   early	   as	   1961,	   Conquest	   identified	   three	   competing	  patron-­‐client	   networks	   in	   Georgia	   in	   the	   postwar	   period:	   Beria’s	   allies,	   clients	  directly	   linked	   to	   Stalin	   (the	   “new	  men	  of	   1951”),	   and	   a	   third	   group	  of	   Č’arkviani	  clients	   cultivated	  –	   likely	  with	   Stalin’s	   consent	   –	   since	  Beria’s	  move	   to	  Moscow	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  306	  Polian,	  Against	  Their	  Will,	  171.	  307	  Compiled	   from	   Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1939	   goda,	   20-­‐21;	   Tsentral’noe	   Statisticheskoe	  Upravlenie	   pri	   Sovete	   Ministrov	   SSSR,	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	   1959	   goda:	   Gruzinskaia	  
SSR	  (Moscow:	  Gosstatizdat,	  1963);	  and	  Tsentral’noe	  Statisticheskoe	  Upravlenie	  pri	  Sovete	  Ministrov	  SSSR,	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	   1970	   goda,	   vol.	   4:	   Natsional'nyi	   sostav	   naseleniia	   SSSR	  (Moscow:	  Statistika,	  1973),	  9-­‐13.	  The	  total	  population	  of	  Georgia	  in	  1939	  was	  3,540,023	  and,	  in	  1959,	  4,044,045.	  308	  Lehmann,	  Eine	  sowjetische	  Nation,	  110.	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  1938.309	  In	   this	   scheme,	   Beria	   regarded	   the	   Č’arkviani	   group	   as	   an	   enemy	   by	   the	  1950s,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  his	  rehabilitation	  of	  Mingrelian	  affair	  victims	  (1951)	  but	  not	  Č’arkviani	  and	  his	  associates,	   including	  Ruxaże	   (spring	  1952).	  Furthermore,	  as	  his	  replacement,	   Mgelaże	   and	   Č’arkviani	   vied	   directly	   for	   Stalin’s	   influence,	   both	  working	  against	  Beria’s	  group	  in	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  a	  complicated	  picture,	  indeed,	  and	  its	  implications	  reached	  beyond	  the	  annals	  of	  Party	  and	  state	  power.	  	  As	   a	   result	   of	   competing	   Georgian	   “fiefdoms,”	   it	   remains	   difficult	   to	  distinguish	   between	   center	   and	   periphery	   in	   Georgia	   under	   Stalinism.	   The	  multifaceted	   roles	   played	   by	   Beria,	   Stalin,	   and	   their	   clients	   in	   Georgia	   show	   how	  postwar	   deportation	   campaigns	   reflected	   central	   power	   struggles	   and	   evolving	  security	  concerns	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  local	  actors	  to	  refine	   the	  contours	  of	  membership	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Georgian	  collective.	  Beria’s	  heavy	  involvement	  in	  the	  Meskhetian	  operation	  in	  1944	  (as	  head	  of	  the	  NKVD)	  contrasts	  with	  the	  1949	  operations,	  in	  which	  Č’arkviani,	  Ruxaże,	  and	  Mgelaże	  played	  key	  roles	  and	   took	   orders	   directly	   from	   Stalin.310	  Ruxaże	   (initially)	   and	  Mgelaże	   acted	   upon	  similar	   direction	   from	   Stalin	   and	   Ignat’ev	   during	   the	   Mingrelian	   affair.	   These	  differences	  reflect	  Beria’s	  shifting	  standing	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Stalin	  as	  well	  as	  an	   increasing	  reliance	  on	  local	  Georgian	  agents	  to	  conceive	  and	  implement	  deportation	  policies.	  In	  some	  ways,	   the	  autonomy	  created	  by	  the	  Beria	  “fiefdom”	  permitted	  this	   trajectory	  yet	   was	   also	   limited	   by	   it,	   such	   that	   restoring	   the	   balance	   between	   competing	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  Conquest,	  Power	  and	  Policy	  in	  the	  USSR,	  150-­‐152.	  	  310	  In	  1946,	  Beria	  left	  the	  NKVD	  to	  manage	  the	  USSR’s	  atomic	  weapons	  program.	  He	  did	  not	  return	  until	  immediately	  after	  Stalin’s	  death,	  when	  he	  briefly	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  re-­‐named	  MVD.	  
	   136	  patron-­‐client	  networks	   in	  Georgia	   (Beria,	  Č’arkviani,	   and	  Mgelaże)	   required	  direct	  intervention	  from	  Stalin.	  The	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  this	  process	  between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	   and	   Khrushchev’s	   rise	   to	   power	   preserved	   Stalin’s	   cult	   while	   implicating	  Georgian	  networks	  with	  alleged	  crimes	  committed	  prior	  to	  1953,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  deportations.	  	  	   The	   tension	  that	  developed	  between	  center	  and	  periphery	  via	  patron-­‐client	  networks	   reveals	   itself	   in	   the	   resulting	   discourse	   on	   assigning	   blame.	  Waging	   the	  campaign	   against	   the	   alleged	   “Mingrelian	   nationalist	   group”	   entailed	   assigning	  blame	  to	  Beria	  by	  association	  if	  not	  in	  name.	  When	  the	  fabrication	  of	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair	   came	   to	   light,	   most	   of	   the	   official	   blame	   targeted	   Ruxaże.311	  During	   the	   CC	  plenum	  discussing	  Beria’s	   arrest	   in	   July	  1953,	  Bak’raże	  and	  others	  questioned	   the	  sincerity	   of	   Beria’s	   revelations	   regarding	   the	  Mingrelian	   affair,	   suspecting	   instead	  that	  he	  had	  knowledge	  of	   the	   falsification	  all	   along.312	  Mgelaże,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  somewhat	  evaded	   responsibility	   for	   the	  Mingrelian	  affair	   (because	  he	  was	  not	  yet	  first	  secretary)	  yet	  assumed	  much	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  violations	  of	  nationality	  policy	  in	  Abkhazia	   since	   1943.	   For	   example,	   the	   1955	   Georgian	   CC	   protocol	   that	   revoked	  Mgelaże’s	   CPSU	   membership	   reveals	   the	   significance	   of	   his	   breach	   and	  responsibility	   for	   deporting	   the	   Greek	   “dobrovol’tsy,”	   as	   this	   is	   the	   first	   evidence	  offered	  to	  demonstrate	  his	  violation	  of	  Lenin-­‐Stalin	  nationality	  policy.313	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  “Postanovlenie	   Prezidiuma	   TsK	   KPSS	   o	   fal’sifikatsii	   dela	   o	   tak	   nazyvaemoi	   mingrel’skoi	  natsionalisticheskoi	  gruppe,”	  10	  April	  1953,	  AP	  RF	  f.	  3,	  op.	  61,	  d.	  83,	  ll.	  140-­‐143,	  reprinted	  in	  Naumov	  and	  Sigachev,	  Lavrentii	  Beriia	  1953,	  37-­‐40.	  312	  “Zasedanie	  vtoroe	  (utrennee,	  3	  iulia),”	  Ibid.,	  256-­‐257.	  313	  “Protokol	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  #75	  ot	  10	  maia	  1955	  g.	  ‘O	  t.	  Mgeladze	  A.I.,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  66,	  ll.	  12-­‐15.	  
	   137	  As	  the	  hearings	  and	  trials	  surrounding	  Stalin’s	  death	  and	  Beria’s	  power	  grab	  reveal,	   the	   deportations	   of	   both	   1949	   and	   1951	   provided	   important	   examples	   of	  abuse	   of	   power	   that	   protagonists	   were	   keen	   to	   employ	   in	   their	   attacks	   against	  Ruxaże,	   Mgelaże,	   and	   Beria.	   Beria’s	   fall	   and	   Mgelaże’s	   loss	   of	   his	   patron	   (Stalin)	  meant	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  actively	  worked	  against	  one	  another	  in	  the	  late	  Stalin-­‐era,	  they	  assumed	  most	  of	  the	  blame	  as	  co-­‐conspirators	  for	  carrying	  out	  deportations	  and	  resettlements	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  and	  a	  longer-­‐term	  charge	  of	   “Georgification”	   of	   Abkhazia	   attributed	   to	   both	   Beria	   and	   Mgelaże.	   This	  association	  continued	  into	  the	  Khrushchev-­‐Mžavanaże	  era	  as	  deportees	  appealed	  to	  new	   leaders	   for	   return,	   rehabilitation,	   and	  property	   compensation	  as	  well	   as	  non-­‐entitled	  nationality	  rights.	  Tellingly,	  the	  discourse	  on	  blame	  was	  not	  about	  familiar	  Soviet	   foes	   such	   as	   class	   enemies,	   enemies	   of	   the	   people,	   leftovers	   of	   the	   past,	   or	  representatives	   of	   the	   bourgeoisie,	   as	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   the	   prewar	   era.	   The	  language	  of	  class	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  entirely	  displaced	  by	  the	  language	  of	  nation	  by	  the	  late	  Stalin	  era	  –	  and	  this	  in	  an	  ethnically	  diverse	  borderland	  where	  nations	  still	  competed	  with	  local	  and	  kin	  networks	  for	  preeminence.	  	  	  Second,	   the	   idea	   of	   “Soviet	   xenophobia”	   provided	   support	   not	   only	   to	  postwar	   deportations,	   but	   also	   the	   campaign	   against	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Mingrelian	  nationalist	   group”	   in	  Georgia.	  Martin	  uses	   this	   term	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  absolutizing	  of	  cross-­‐border	  ethnic	   ties	  among	  “nationalities	  of	   foreign	  governments,”	  or	  diaspora	  nationalities,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   1938	   national	   operations.	   Members	   of	   such	  diaspora	   nationalities	   were	   in	   most	   cases	   Soviet	   citizens	   whose	   relatives	   had	  
	   138	  resided	   in	   Russia	   or	   the	   USSR	   for	   multiple	   generations.314	  With	   purported	   cross-­‐border	   ties	   as	   the	   “only	   salient	   aspect	   of	   their	   identity,”	   diaspora	   nationalities	  provided	   “sufficient	   proof	   of	   their	   disloyalty	   and	   sufficient	   justification	   for	   their	  arrest	  and	  execution.”315	  Though	  Martin	  restricts	  this	  concept	  to	  the	  late	  1930s,	   its	  explanatory	   power	   for	   the	   postwar	   period	   shows	   a	   reinvigorated	   “Soviet	  xenophobia”	  during	  the	  late	  Stalin	  era,	  as	  the	  Union	  struggled	  to	  incorporate	  newly-­‐acquired	   territories	   in	   Europe,	   enact	   retribution	   for	   wartime	   crimes,	   and	   ensure	  control	  and	  security	  in	  border	  regions.	  The	  unfolding	  Cold	  War	  created	  new	  arenas	  for	  contestation	  and,	   likewise,	  a	  revised	  application	  of	  “Soviet	  xenophobia”	  toward	  “new”	   enemies.	   In	   Georgia,	   purported	   ties	   with	   (geopolitically)	   Western-­‐leaning	  Turkey,	   Greece,	   and	   Iran	   or	   the	   Armenian	   nationalist	   diaspora	   overrode	   Soviet	  citizenship,	   service	   in	   the	   Red	   Army,	   Party	  membership,	   or	   other	   key	  markers	   of	  participation	   in	   the	   Soviet	   collective.316	  This	  was	   true	   in	   both	   the	   1949	   and	   1951	  deportations.	  An	   ideology	   of	   “Soviet	   xenophobia”	   continued	   through	   the	   immediate	  postwar	   period,	   yet	   it	   does	   not	   sufficiently	   explain	  why	   expulsions	   in	   this	   period	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  both	  the	  European	  borderlands	  and	  in	  the	  Caucasus.	  Unlike	  the	  European	   borderlands,	   Georgia	   did	   not	   experience	   German	   or	   Romanian	  occupation,	  and	  deportees	  were	  expelled	  from	  Georgia	  less	  for	  wartime	  deeds	  than	  prewar	  citizenship	  status	  or	  absolutized	  ethnic	  ties	  to	  nearby	  states	  such	  as	  Turkey,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  314	  Martin,	  “The	  Origins	  of	  Soviet	  Ethnic	  Cleansing,”	  855.	  315	  Ibid.	  316	  These	   sources	  of	   legitimacy	   likewise	  provided	  persuasive	   evidence	   in	   appeals	   for	   amnesty	   and	  rehabilitation.	  
	   139	  Greece,	   and	   Iran.	   Furthermore,	   expellees	   from	  Georgia	  were	   typically	   from	   ethnic	  minority	  populations,	  whereas	  European	  borderland	  expulsions	  targeted	  suspected	  collaborators,	   class	   enemies,	   and	   bourgeois	   nationalists	   from	   among	   the	   to-­‐be-­‐entitled	   nationalities	   of	   the	   Baltics,	   Ukraine,	   Moldova,	   and	   Belarus.	   Processes	   of	  ethnic	   consolidation	   occurred	   in	   both	   locales,	   yet	   the	   ideological	   mechanisms	   of	  “excision”	  differed	  in	  subtle,	  yet	  important	  ways.317	  Even	  if	  postwar	  operations	  had	  ideological	  rather	  than	  ethnonational	  intent,	  the	   experience	   of	   deportation	   caused	   those	   affected	   to	   comprehend	   and	   explain	  these	   processes	   through	   ethnic	   lenses.	   Expulsion	   from	   Tbilisi	   as	   a	   suspected	  Dashnak	   or	   former	   Turkish	   subject	   meant	   expulsion	   as	   an	   Armenian	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   both	   the	   deportees	   and	   local	   residents.	   Though	   wholly	   fabricated,	  revelations	  of	  a	  Mingrelian	  nationalist	  group	  had	  some	  basis	   in	  recent	  history	  and	  could	   likewise	   appear	   at	   least	   plausible	   to	   a	   homogenizing	   Georgian	   populace	   for	  whom	   sub-­‐national	   identities	   remained	   palpable.	   This	   larger	   ethnic	   consolidation	  effort	  entailed	  expelling	  Muslim	  Meskhetians	  due	  to	  purported	  diaspora	  nationality	  ties	  to	  Turkey;	  Greeks,	  Turks,	  and	  Iranians	  not	  only	  for	  diaspora	  nationality	  status,	  but	  also	  for	  experiences	  living	  outside	  Russian	  or	  Soviet	  control,	  signaled	  by	  recent	  repatriation	   or	   former	   citizenship	   status;	   and	  Armenian	   “Dashnaks”	   and	  Georgian	  “enemy	  elements”	  whose	  alleged	  political	  deeds	  and	  affiliations	  made	  the	  expelled	  incompatible	   with	  membership	   in	   the	   increasingly	   homogenizing	   yet	   still	   diverse	  Soviet	  collective	  in	  Georgia.	  While	  these	  reasons	  remain	  tied	  to	  fluctuating	  security	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  317	  I	  borrow	  the	  “excision”	  terminology	  from	  Weiner,	  Making	  Sense	  of	  War,	  Chapter	  3.	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  concerns,	  the	  postwar	  Georgian	  expulsions	  likewise	  show	  how	  “nationalities…were	  stigmatized	   as	   potential	   traitors	   to	   Soviet	   power	   because	   of	   their	   supposed	  allegiance	   to	   a	   pre-­‐Soviet	   or	   non-­‐Soviet	   national	   past.” 318 	  The	   deliberate	  consolidation	   of	   alleged	   enemy	   nationalities	   in	   exile	   (e.g.	   Turks	   to	   Tomsk	   oblast’,	  Greeks	   to	   Iuzhno-­‐Kazakhstan	   and	   Dzhambul	   oblasts,	   Armenian	   Dashnaks	   to	   Altai	  krai)	   further	   suggests	   that	   the	   expulsions	   were	   not	   about	   simply	   eliminating	   a	  security	   threat	   but	   about	   forging	   new	   Soviet	   nationalities	   (even	   if	   in	   special	  settlement	  regimes).	  	  	   Whereas	  comparable	  deportations	  elsewhere	  acquired	  a	  Russian	  versus	  non-­‐Russian	   tinge,	   in	   Georgia	   the	   division	   fell	   broadly	   between	   Georgians	   and	   non-­‐Georgians,	  with	   little	   to	  no	  reference	   to	   “Russian”	   interference	  or	  machinations.319	  Indeed,	   as	   explained	   above,	   with	   a	   muddled	   distinction	   between	   center	   and	  periphery	  in	  Stalin-­‐era	  Georgia,	  the	  same	  person	  could	  embody	  the	  colonial	  official	  and	  the	  nation-­‐builder	  due	  to	  the	  deep	  permeation	  of	  the	  patron-­‐client	  networks	  of	  Stalin,	   Beria,	   and	   Č’arkviani.	   Such	   patron	   and	   client	   nation-­‐builders	   did	   not	  necessarily	  enact	  deportation	  policies	  solely	  out	  of	  opportunism.	  When	  considered	  alongside	   concurrent	   Georgian	   official	   and	   popular	   campaigns	   to	   reach	   out	   to	  diaspora	   communities	   in	   Iran	   and	   Azerbaijan	   (discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5),	   and	  territorial	  irredentism	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  deportations	  look	  less	  like	  a	  Moscow-­‐driven,	   opportunistic	   Cold	  War	   power	   play	   than	   a	  more	   local	   effort	   to	   define	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  Hirsch,	  “Race	  without	  the	  Practice	  of	  Racial	  Politics,”	  38.	  319	  Much	   of	   the	   “punished	   peoples”	   literature	   adopts	   this	   point	   of	   view,	   such	   as	   Nekrich,	   The	  
Punished	  Peoples;	  Conquest,	  The	  Nation	  Killers.	  
	   141	  refine	   the	   constitution	   of	   Soviet	   Georgia’s	   citizenry.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   tools	  embraced	   by	   Georgian	   nation-­‐builders	   in	   the	   Stalin	   era	   show	   the	   spectrum	   of	  practices	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  a	  “nationalizing	  republic”	  to	  define,	  categorize,	  and	  refine	  the	  republic’s	  populace	  through	  Soviet	  institutions.320	  Deportations	  were	  the	  darker	  mechanisms	   in	   a	   wider	   process	   in	   late	   Stalin-­‐era	   Georgia	   motivated	   by	   genuine	  belief	  in	  a	  Soviet	  Georgian	  nation-­‐building	  ideology	  among	  key	  local	  actors	  such	  as	  Č’arkviani,	  Ruxaże,	  or	  Mgelaże;	  and	  Janašia,	  Berżenišvili,	  and	  Kiknaże,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	   1.	   The	   concurrent	   pursuit	   of	   territorial	   irredentism	   and	   national	  deportations	  in	  late	  Stalin-­‐era	  Georgia	  affirms	  rather	  than	  retreats	  from	  Soviet	  long-­‐term	  goals,	  whereby	  smaller	  ethnic	  groups	  were	  to	  be	  amalgamated	  into	  a	  smaller	  number	   of	   developed	   Soviet	   nationalities	   over	   time.321	  In	   this	   way,	   even	   such	  geopolitical	  maneuvers	  as	   those	   in	   the	  greater	  Caucasus	  region	  at	   the	  dawn	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	   could	   involve	   the	   active	   participation	   of	   governmental	   actors	   and	   other	  nation-­‐builders	  in	  the	  Caucasus.322	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 On	  “nationalizing	  states,”	  see	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  Chapter	  4. 321	  The	   concurrent	   pursuit	   of	   these	   aims	   goes	   against	   the	   trajectory	   Martin	   provides,	   which	   sees	  Soviet	   xenophobia	   as	   replacing	   the	   Piedmont	   Principle.	   See	   Martin,	   “The	   Origins	   of	   Soviet	   Ethnic	  Cleansing.”	  My	   line	  of	   thinking	  expands	  Hirsch's	   critique	  of	  Martin	  as	  detailed	   in	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  
Nations,	  8-­‐9.	  Hirsch	  directly	  refutes	  Martin’s	  portrayal	  of	  this	  process	  as	  a	  “retreat”	  from	  affirmative	  action	  and	  nation-­‐building	  policies	  pursued	  in	  the	  1920s.	  322	  This	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Suri’s	   argument	   for	   détente	   as	   a	   process	   driven	   from	  below	   rather	   than	  from	   above,	   Jeremi	   Suri,	  Power	  and	  Protest:	   Global	  Revolution	  and	   the	  Rise	   of	  Detente	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2005).	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Part	  II:	  Popularizing	  the	  Nation:	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Chapter	  3:	  De-­‐Stalinization,	  k’art’ulad:	  	  
Deciphering	  Georgia’s	  1956	  	  	   Stalin’s	  death	  on	  5	  March	  1953	  shocked	  the	  entire	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  no	  less	  so	  Georgia,	  his	  birthplace.	  The	  vozhd’	  had	  not	  visited	  Tbilisi	  for	  several	  years,	  yet	  the	  cults	   of	   Stalin	   and	   his	   long-­‐time	   emissary	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR,	   Lavrenti	   Beria,	  dominated	   public	   life	   in	   the	   republic	   through	   the	   late	   Stalin	   era.	   Beria’s	   fall	   from	  power	   and	   execution	   in	   1953	   required	   expunging	   his	   cult	   from	   Georgia.	   Stalin,	  however,	   retained	   his	   revered	   status	   in	   Georgia	   in	   his	   afterlife.	   On	   the	   first	  anniversary	  of	  Stalin’s	  death,	  Georgian	  writer	  and	  critic	  Geronti	  K’ik’oże	  recalled	  the	  following	  scene:	  On	   5	  March	   1954,	   the	   first	   anniversary	   of	   Stalin’s	   death,	   a	   Georgian	  girl	  brought	  a	  bouquet	  of	  violets	  to	  the	  Stalin	  monument	  and	  laid	  it	  on	  the	   pedestal...Baskets	   of	   little	   bouquets	   and	   wreaths	   followed	   and	  finally	   the	   entire	   huge	   bronze	  monument’s	   pedestal	   and	   steps	  were	  filled	  with	  flowers.	  This	  mourning	  continued	  for	  ten	  days.	  Almost	  all	  the	  residents	  of	  Tbilisi	  passed	  in	  front	  of	  the	  leader	  (beladi)’s	  statue	  with	  feelings	  of	  goodwill.	  Some	  came	  there	  with	  wine	  to	  drink	  toasts	   in	  honor	  of	   the	  deceased.	   Honor	   guards	   stood	   on	   the	   pedestal	   steps	   from	   morning	  until	  midnight.	   They	   consisted	  mainly	   of	   students	   and	   teachers.	   Not	  once	  was	  decency	  undone,	   participants	   kept	   themselves	   in	   order	   by	  duty.	  Speeches	  changed	  into	  verses,	  verses	  –	  into	  chanted	  hymns.	  The	  people	  often	  bowed	  on	   their	   knees	  upon	  hearing	   “Nana”	   and	   “Jump,	  Black	   Swallow”.323	  Very	   often	   the	  word	   immortality	  was	  mentioned.	  Vaxtang	   Gorgasali,	   Davit’	   Aġmašenebeli,	   T’amar-­‐Mep’e,	   and	   Little	  Kaxa’s	   names	   were	   also	   often	   heard.324	  It	   was	   clearly	   seen	   that	   the	  long-­‐suppressed	  patriotic	   feeling	   found	   an	   outlet	   and	   spontaneously	  gushed	   forth	   with	   great	   strength.	   It	   was	   as	   though	   Georgian	   young	  people	  had	  forgotten	  the	  harm	  that	  Stalin’s	  dictatorship	  had	  inflicted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  323	  These	  were	  reportedly	  two	  of	  Stalin’s	  favorite	  Georgian	  songs.	  	  324	  These	   are	   all	   major	   figures	   in	   Georgian	   history:	   Vaxtang	   Gorgasali	   founded	   Tbilisi	   (558	   AD),	  Davit’	   Aġmašenebeli	   (“the	   builder”)	   and	   Tamar-­‐Mep’e	   ruled	   during	   Georgia’s	   “golden	   age”	   in	   the	  eleventh	   and	   twelfth	   centuries,	   and	   Little	   Kaxa	   is	   Erekle	   II’s	   nickname,	   who	   was	   king	   of	   K’art’li-­‐Kaxet’i	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Georgievsk	  (with	  Russia)	  in	  1783.	  
	   144	  on	  Georgia	  for	  thirty	  years,	  had	  forgiven	  his	  severity	  and	  Satanic	  pride	  and	  were	  trying	  to	  move	  the	  halo-­‐clad	  leader	  into	  myth.325	  	  	  Similar	   commemorations	   of	   Stalin’s	   death	   the	   following	   year	   secured	   his	   mythic	  status,	   yet	   in	   Georgia,	   such	   veneration	   acquired	   a	   distinctly	   national	   tinge	  unparalleled	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Union.	   K’ik’odze	   keenly	   observed	   the	   “patriotic	  feeling”	   already	   evident	   in	   1954.	   “The	   protest	   of	   Tbilisi’s	   youth,”	   he	   wrote,	   “was	  especially	   strong.	   This	   protest	   took	   on	   a	   character	   similar	   to	   a	   national	  demonstration.”326	  	  These	  national,	  Stalin-­‐centric	  trends	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  most	  overtly	  in	  1956	  in	  the	   aftermath	   of	  Khrushchev’s	   revelations	   on	   25	   February	   at	   the	  Twentieth	   Party	  Congress	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   (CPSU),	   during	   which	   he	  denounced	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   “secret	   speech”	   the	   alleged	   cult	   of	   personality	   created	  around	   Stalin	   and	   revealed	   a	   plethora	   of	   crimes	   committed	   by	   Stalin	   himself	   to	  sustain	   his	   cult.	   In	   spite	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   prohibition	   of	   commemorations	   for	   the	  third	   anniversary	   of	   Stalin’s	   death,	  memorial	   events	   evolved	   into	   demonstrations	  across	   Georgia	   in	  March	   1956	   that	   produced	   a	   range	   of	   demands	  with	   regard	   to	  Stalin’s	  commemoration,	  Georgians’	  status	  in	  the	  Union	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  nationalities,	  and	  relations	  between	  Tbilisi	  and	  Moscow.	  327	  The	  result	  was	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  response	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  325	  Geronti	  K’ik’oże,	  t’anamedrovis	  č’anacerebi	  (Tbilisi:	  Arete,	  2003),	  143-­‐144.	  326	  K’ik’oże,	  143.	  K’ik’oże’s	  observations	  reveal	  that	  such	  sentiments	  did	  not	  appear	  spontaneously	  in	  1956	  but,	  rather,	  are	  more	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Stalin’s	  death	  had	  been	  commemorated	  in	  Georgia	   in	   previous	   years.	   For	   an	   example	   of	   official	   commemoration	   preparations	   for	   1954,	   see	  “Protokol	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  141	  ‘o	  provedenii	  pervoi	  godovshchiny	  so	  dnia	  smerti	  I.V.	  Stalina,”	  13	  February	  1954,	  sšssa	  (I)	  f.	  14,	  op.	  28,	  d.	  83,	  ll.	  1-­‐2.	  	  327	  For	   other	   treatments	   of	   the	  March	   events,	   see	   Vladimir	   A.	   Kozlov,	  Mass	  Uprisings	   in	   the	  USSR:	  
Protest	   and	   Rebellion	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Stalin	   Years	   (Armonk:	   M.E.	   Sharpe,	   2002).,	  Chapter	   7;	   Suny,	   The	  
Making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation,	   Chapter	   13;	   Jürgen	   Gerber,	   Georgien:	   Nationale	   Opposition	   und	  
	   145	  to	   Khrushchev’s	   revelations	   at	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress:	   the	   demonstration	  targeted	   current	   government	   leaders	   (in	   particular	   Khrushchev,	   Bulganin,	   and	  Mikoyan)	  rather	  than	  the	  Soviet	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  national	  dishonor	  and	  offense	  visited	  upon	  Stalin	  by	  his	  successor	  brought	  many	  Georgians	  across	  the	  republic	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  his	  defense.	  	  	  	  The	   conflict	   did	   not	   end	   with	   the	   violent	   suppression	   of	   Tbilisi	  demonstrations	  by	  the	  Red	  Army	  on	  9	  March,	  which	  resulted	  in	  dozens	  of	  casualties.	  Rather,	  the	  demonstrations,	  suppression,	  and	  subsequent	  public	  relations	  campaign	  ultimately	   altered	   the	   relationship	   between	   Tbilisi	   and	  Moscow	   and	  widened	   the	  cultural-­‐political	  space	  for	  Georgia’s	  entitled	  nationality	  to	  pursue	  its	  own	  variants	  of	   Sovietness	   in	   the	   post-­‐Stalin	   era.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Abkhaz	   intellectuals	   and	  leaders	   took	   this	   opportunity	   to	   connect	   pre-­‐existing	   grievances	   about	   Beria’s	  policies	  in	  Abkhazia	  with	  an	  academic	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  Abkhazia	  in	  Georgian	  history.	   In	   the	   longer	   term,	   the	  March	   events	   outlined	   the	   triangular	   relationship	  between	  Moscow,	  Tbilisi,	  and	  Sukhumi	  that	  would	  reorient	  centers	  and	  peripheries	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come,	  as	  the	  entitled	  Georgian	  nationality	  increasingly	  held	  decisive	  power	  over	  affairs	  on	  the	  republic’s	  territory.	  In	   this	  chapter,	   I	   reconsider	   the	  events	  of	  1956	   in	  Georgia	  apart	   from	  their	  subsequent	  mobilization	  in	  nationalist	  narratives	  and	  historiographies.	  Rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
kommunistische	   Herrschaft	   seit	   1956	   (Baden-­‐Baden:	   Nomos	   Verlagsgesellschaft,	   1997);	   Makvala	  Natmeladze	   and	  Aleksandr	  Daushvili,	  Noveishaia	   istoriia	  Gruzii	   (Tbilisi:	  Universal,	   2010);	   and	  Šot'a	  Nozaże,	  tragik’uli	  9	  marti.	  (Tbilisi:	  Merani,	  1992).	  For	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  across	   the	  south	  Caucasian	  republics,	   see	   Jamil	  Hasanli,	  Khrushchevskaia	  “ottepel’”	  i	  
natsional’nyi	   vopros	   v	   Azerbaidzhane	   (1954-­‐1959),	   (Moscow:	   Flinta,	   2009).	   	   For	   a	   persuasive	  explanation	   that	   the	   March	   demonstrations	   resulted	   from	   perceived	   loss	   of	   status	   (as	   ethnic	  Georgians)	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  USSR,	  see	  Timothy	  Blauvelt,	  “Status	  Shift	  and	  Ethnic	  Mobilisation	  in	  the	  March	  1956	  Events	  in	  Georgia,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  61,	  no.	  4	  (June	  2009):	  651-­‐668.	  	  	  
	   146	  serving	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   Georgian	   national	   dissidents,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   March	  1956	   events	   marked	   a	   foundation	   for	   experiencing	   Georgian	   Sovietness	   in	   the	  postwar	   era.	   Following	   Shahid	   Amin’s	   event-­‐metaphor-­‐memory	   “historical	  fieldwork”	   approach	   toward	   an	   allegedly	   foundational	   event	   in	   Indian	   nationalist	  historiography,	   the	   “peasant	   riots”	   at	   Chauri	   Chaura	   in	   1922,	   I	   return	   to	  reconstructing	   the	   event	   itself;	   interrogating	   the	   metaphors	   derived	   from	   and	  constructed	   around	   the	   event	   in	   its	   immediate	   aftermath	   by	   republic	   leaders,	  Georgians,	  and	  non-­‐Georgian	  citizens	  across	  the	  republic;	  and	  situating	  the	  event	  in	  memory	   among	   subsequent	   generations.328	  More	   than	   the	   caesura	   of	   the	   Great	  Patriotic	  War,	  the	  changes	  wrought	  in	  1956	  in	  Georgia	  marked	  a	  profound	  turning	  point	   through	  which	  nationality	   transformed	   from	  an	   ascribed,	   elite	   category	   to	   a	  lived	   category	   among	   much	   of	   the	   republic’s	   citizenry.	   As	   Rogers	   Brubaker	   and	  Frederick	   Cooper	   have	   suggested,	   viewing	   the	   nation	   as	   a	   practical	   category	   and	  contingent	   event	   permits	   us	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   nation	   “can	  crystallize,	   at	   certain	  moments,	   as	   a	   powerful,	   compelling	   reality”329	  and	   “come	   to	  structure	  perception,	   to	   inform	  thought	  and	  experience,	   to	  organize	  discourse	  and	  political	   action.”330	  	   The	   initiation	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Stalin	   campaign	   and	   March	   events	  provided	  such	  a	  moment	  of	  crystallization	  for	  many	  Georgians,	  for	  an	  early	  wave	  of	  Abkhaz	  activists,	  and	  for	  other	  minorities	  in	  the	  republic.331	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  328	  Shahid	  Amin,	  Event,	  Metaphor,	  Memory:	  Chauri	  Chaura,	  1922-­‐1992	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1995).	  329	  Brubaker	  and	  Cooper,	  “Beyond	  ‘Identity’”,	  5.	  330	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  7.	  331	  Though	  early	  from	  a	  current	  perspective,	  the	  postwar	  cadre	  of	  Abkhaz	  activists	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	   challenge	   the	   status	   quo.	   For	   an	   earlier	   example,	   see	   Timothy	   K.	   Blauvelt,	   “Resistance	   and	  
	   147	  In	   a	   year	   otherwise	   known	   for	   such	   disparate	  milestones	   as	   Khrushchev’s	  speech	  to	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  (25	  February)	  and	  the	  Soviet	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	   uprising	   (4	  November),	   knowledge	   of	   the	  March	   events	   in	   Georgia	  remained	  largely	  limited	  to	  the	  republic	  itself	  and	  policymakers	  in	  Moscow.	  	  Yet,	  in	  many	   ways	   the	   situation	   in	   Georgia	   encapsulated	   the	   political	   highs	   and	   lows	   of	  Khrushchev’s	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign:	  the	  attempt	  to	  distance	  the	  Soviet	  present	  from	  its	   Stalinist	   past	   and	   the	   willingness	   of	   the	   (allegedly)	   post-­‐Stalinist	   state	   to	   use	  force	  to	  quell	  dissent,	  whether	  in	  the	  Soviet	  periphery	  or	  in	  a	  Warsaw	  Pact	  state.332	  Further,	   the	   March	   1956	   events	   and	   their	   immediate	   interpretations	   in	   Georgia	  illustrate	   one	   variation	   of	   the	   disorder	   and	   confusion	   surrounding	   Khrushchev’s	  revelations	  or,	  in	  Alexei	  Yurchak’s	  formulation,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Stalin	  “master”	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  “authoritarian	  discourse”	  which	  governed	  Soviet	  life	  to	  that	  point.333	  The	  rupture	  initiated	  by	  Khrushchev’s	  revelations	  in	  1956	  reverberated	  throughout	  the	   Soviet	   Union,	   causing	  many	   citizens	   to	   reevaluate	   their	   life	   stories	   and	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Accommodation	  in	  the	  Stalinist	  Periphery:	  A	  Peasant	  Uprising	  in	  Abkhazia,”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2012,	  no.	  3:	  78–108.	  332	  Officially	  an	  attempt	  at	  “overcoming”	  or	  “exposing”	  Stalin’s	  cult	  of	  personality,	  outside	  observers	  and,	  subsequently,	  scholars,	  have	  cast	  this	  effort	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  process	  of	  de-­‐Stalinization.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  anachronistic	  destalinizatsiia	   and	   the	  more	  apt	  preodolenie/razoblachenie	  kul’ta	  
lichnosti	   (overcoming/exposure	   of	   the	   cult	   of	   personality),	   see	   Polly	   Jones,	   “Introduction”	   in	   The	  
Dilemmas	   of	   De-­‐Stalinization:	   Negotiation	   cultural	   and	   social	   change	   in	   the	   Khrushchev	   era,	   Polly	  Jones,	  ed.	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2006),	  1-­‐18.	  On	  the	  role	  of	  purported	  “nationalists”	  in	  Soviet	  policies	  toward	   the	   western	   borderlands	   in	   1956,	   see	   Amir	   Weiner,	   “The	   Empires	   Pay	   a	   Visit:	   Gulag	  Returnees,	  East	  European	  Rebellions	  and	  Soviet	  Frontier	  Politics,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History	  78	  (June	  2006):	  333-­‐376,	  and	  Dobson,	  Khrushchev's	  Cold	  Summer.	  	  For	  perspectives	  on	  the	  secret	  speech	  and	  responses	  in	  eastern	  Europe	  from	  the	  Ukrainian	  borderlands	  and	  Albania,	  see	  Wojnowski,	  “De-­‐Stalinization	   and	   Soviet	   Patriotism”	   and	   Elidor	   Mëhilli,	   “Defying	   De-­‐Stalinization:	   Albania’s	   1956,”	  
Journal	  of	  Cold	  War	  Studies	  13,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2011):	  4-­‐56.	  333	  Yurchak,	  Everything	  Was	  Forever.	  Yurchak	  argues,	  drawing	  extensively	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Mikhail	  Bakhtin,	  that,	  beginning	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  Stalin	  instigated	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  field	  of	  linguistics	  (inspired	   by	   the	   work	   of	   Georgian	   linguist	   Arnold	   Čik’obava),	   in	   which	   he	   positioned	   himself	   as	  “master”	  external	  to	  the	  authoritative	  discourse	  framing	  Soviet	  society.	  
	   148	  roles.	  However,	  the	  post-­‐1956	  transformation	  described	  by	  Yurchak	  did	  not	  proceed	  unidirectionally:	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Georgia,	   the	   mixed	   reaction	   among	   the	   republic’s	  citizenry	   reveals	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  many	   citizens	   understood	  membership	   in	   a	  Soviet	   collective,	   a	   specifically	  Georgian	  national	   identity,	   and	   loyalty	   to	   Stalin	   (as	  Soviet	  and/or	  Georgian)	  as	  intertwined.	  	  Finally,	  the	  events	  of	  1956	  in	  Georgia	  capture	  the	  utility	  and	  resonance	  of	  a	  form	   of	   dead-­‐body	   politics	   for	   nation-­‐building	   efforts.	   As	   Katherine	   Verdery	   has	  argued	  with	  regard	  to	  postsocialist	  states	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  “dead	  bodies	  have	  an	  additional	  advantage	  as	  symbols”	  in	  that	  they	  “lend	  themselves	  particularly	  well	  to	  politics	   in	   times	   of	   major	   upheaval.”334 	  	   Furthermore,	   for	   Verdery,	   dead-­‐body	  politics	   bear	   a	   close	   connection	   not	   only	   with	   national	   identities,	   but	   also	   with	  related	  notions	  of	  kinship:	  “The	  identities	  produced	  in	  nation-­‐building	  processes	  do	  not	  displace	  those	  based	  in	  kinship	  but	  –	  as	  any	  inspection	  of	  national	  rhetorics	  will	  confirm	   –	   reinforce	   and	   are	   parasitic	   upon	   them.”335	  	   Verdery	   argues	   that	   the	  postsocialist	   space	   has	   proven	   particularly	   ripe	   for	   the	   “political	   lives	   of	   dead	  bodies.”	  	  	  Yet	  the	  changes	  wrought	  in	  1956	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  major	  upheaval	  as	  well,	  in	  which	  Stalin’s	  bodies	  –	  whether	  in	  statue	  form	  in	  Tbilisi	  or	   Gori	   or	   in	   a	   Red	   Square	   mausoleum	   –	   saw	   a	   disavowal	   from	   without	   and	   re-­‐appropriation	  from	  within,	  as	  a	  specifically	  Georgian	  symbol	  rather	  than	  the	  Soviet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  Katherine	   Verdery,	   The	   Political	   Lives	   of	   Dead	   Bodies:	   Reburial	   and	   Postsocialist	   Change	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  31-­‐2.	  335	  Verdery,	  The	  Political	  Lives	  of	  Dead	  Bodies,	  41.	  
	   149	  cult	   of	   Stalin	   propagated	   since	   1929.	  336	  	   The	   symbolic	   value	   of	   dead	   bodies	   also	  extended	   beyond	   Stalin,	   as	   Beria’s	   body	   provided	   a	   powerful	   scapegoat	   that	  permitted	   the	   further	  preservation	  of	  Stalin’s	   form	  and	  meaning	  among	  Georgians	  and	  source	  of	  blame	  among	  Abkhaz.	  	  The	  March	  demonstrations	  and	  their	  aftermath	  in	  Georgia	  revealed	  a	  rupture	  in	  what	   had	   previously	   been	   an	   uncomplicated	   coexistence	   of	   a	   popular,	   national	  veneration	  of	  Stalin	  as	  a	  Georgian	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  Stalin	  cult	  throughout	  the	   USSR.	   During	   his	   lifetime,	   the	   “Stalin	   cult”	   emphasized	   the	   leader’s	   Soviet	  identity	  (albeit	  in	  a	  subtly	  Russian	  cast),	  deliberately	  eschewing	  or	  avoiding	  Stalin’s	  Georgianness	  in	  the	  production	  of	  portraits,	  poetry,	  journalism,	  and	  other	  media,	  as	  Jan	  Plamper	  has	  shown.337	  Stalin	  himself	  went	  through	  numerous	  identity	  iterations	  presented	   publicly	   –	   from	   Georgian	   to	   Marxist	   to	   revolutionary	   to	   Soviet	  internationalist	  –	  as	  he	  rose	  to	  prominence	  on	  a	  national	  and	  international	  stage.338	  Yet	   the	   top-­‐down	  construction	  of	   the	  Stalin	   cult	   as	   explicitly	  non-­‐national	   still	   left	  room	  for	  popular	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Stalin	  cult	  in	  a	  national	  idiom	  in	  Georgia.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Stalin’s	  (and	  Beria’s)	  name	  dominated	  the	  territorial	   landscape,	   from	   the	   republic’s	   oldest	  university	   to	  district,	  kolkhoz,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  336	  On	  the	  “cult	  of	  the	  personality”	   in	  Russian	  cultural	  history,	  see	  Oleg	  Kharkhordin,	  The	  Collective	  
and	  the	  Individual	  in	  Russia:	  A	  Study	  of	  Practices	   (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999).	  On	  the	  Lenin	  cult,	  see	  Nina	  Tumarkin,	  Lenin	  Lives!:	  The	  Lenin	  Cult	  in	  Soviet	  Russia	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1983).	  	  On	  the	  making	  of	  the	  Stalin	  cult,	  see	  Jan	  Plamper,	  The	  Stalin	  Cult:	  A	  Study	  in	  
the	  Alchemy	  of	  Power	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  337	  Plamper,	   The	   Stalin	   Cult,	   46-­‐47.	   See	   also	   Jan	   Plamper,	   “Georgian	   Koba	   or	   Soviet	   ‘Father	   of	  Peoples’?	   The	   Stalin	   Cult	   and	   Ethnicity,”	   Balazs	   Apor,	   et	   al,	   eds.,	   The	   Leader	   Cult	   in	   Communist	  
Dictatorships:	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  (Baskingstoke:	  Palgrave,	  2004):	  123-­‐140.	  338	  See	  especially	  Alfred	   J.	  Rieber,	   “Stalin,	  Man	  of	   the	  Borderlands,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  106,	  no.	  5	  (December	  2001):	  1651–91.	  	  
	   150	  factory	  names.	  Stalin	  also	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Georgian	  national	  canon,	   from	   the	   propagation	   of	   twelfth-­‐century	   poet	   Šota	   Rust’aveli	   to	   close	  involvement	  in	  writing	  Georgian	  national	  histories,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Stalin	  could	  distance	  his	  public	  image	  from	  a	  Georgian	  identity	  while	  continuing	  to	  serve	  as	   editor-­‐in-­‐chief	   of	   Georgian	   cultural	   production,	   popularized	   through	   the	  
korenizatsiia	  dictum	  that	  culture	  must	  be	  “national	  in	  form,	  socialist	  in	  content.”	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   cults	  of	   Stalin	  and	   the	  nation	   in	  Georgia	   intertwined	   in	  ways	   that	  were	  revealed	  only	  after	  his	  death.	  As	   long	  as	  Stalin’s	  cult	  survived,	  even	  posthumously,	  so	  too	  could	  a	  coterminous	  Georgian	  national	  cult.	  Khrushchev’s	  secret	  speech	  and	  subsequent	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign	  exposed	  the	  limits	  and	  contradictions	  of	  this	  dual	  cult	  among	  Georgians.	  	  
	  
The	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  and	  Georgia	  In	   a	   closed	   session	   of	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   on	   25	   February	   1956,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  delivered	  the	  address	  that	  ushered	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  away	  from	  his	  predecessor.	   	  In	  “On	  the	  Cult	  of	  Personality	  and	  its	  Consequences,”	  Khrushchev	  detailed	   specific	   crimes	   attributed	   to	   Stalin	   over	   the	   course	   of	   his	   tenure,	   from	  repression	   and	   purges	   during	   the	  Great	   Terror	   to	   deportations	   of	   alleged	   “enemy	  nationalities”	   to	   the	  so-­‐called	  “Doctors’	  Plot”	  and	  Mingrelian	  Affair.339	  	  Khrushchev	  further	  described	  how,	  through	  the	  extensive	  repression	  of	  “enemies	  of	  the	  people,”	  a	  “cult	  of	  personality”	  (kul’t	  lichnosti	  in	  Russian	  and	  pirovnebis	  kulti	  in	  Georgian)	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  The	  entire	  text	  of	  the	  speech	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Doklad	  N.S.	  Khrushcheva	  o	  kul’te	  lichnosti	  Stalina	  na	  
XX	  s”ezde	  KPSS	  dokumenti,	  K.	  Aimermakher,	  V.	  Afiani,	  et	  al.	  (eds),	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2002),	  pp.	  51-­‐119.	  
	   151	  created	  around	  Stalin	  –	  a	  notion	  explicitly	  criticized	  by	  Karl	  Marx	  in	  his	  writings.340	  	  	  In	   denouncing	   Stalin	   through	   a	   specifically	   Marxist	   vehicle,	   Khrushchev	   cast	   the	  Stalin	   era	   as	   a	   deviation	   from	   the	   proper	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   trajectory,	   which	   he	  aimed	   to	   correct	   through	   a	   campaign	   to	   expose	   and	   overcome	   Stalin’s	   cult	   of	  personality.	  	  The	   deep	   permeation	   of	   the	   personality	   cult	   in	   Soviet	   society	   and	   culture,	  however,	  unsurprisingly	   led	   to	  confusion	  over	  how	  to	  actually	  expunge	   the	  cult	   in	  practice.	   	   The	   ensuing	   challenge	   to	   public	   opinion	   proved	   even	   more	   difficult	  because,	  as	  Polly	  Jones	  has	  shown,	  Khrushchev’s	  pronouncement	  in	  the	  short	  term	  blurred	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   permitted	   with	   regard	   to	   public	   discourse	   and	  expression. 341 	  The	   resulting	   confusion	   regarding	   how	   to	   react	   toward	   the	  pronouncement	   led,	   throughout	   the	   country,	   to	   “iconoclastic”	   responses	   which	  were,	   “at	   least	   initially,	   seen	   as	   excusable	   excesses	   of	   emotion,”	   whether	   through	  emphasizing	  or	  even	  exaggerating	  Stalin’s	  crimes,	  excessive	  personal	   reflection	  on	  the	   Terror,	   or	   comparisons	  with	   Tsarist	   oppression.	  342	  	  More	   than	   any	   other,	   the	  Georgian	   variant	   of	   response	   tested	   the	   limits	   of	   “emotional	   excess”	   (through	   five	  days	   of	   speeches,	   poetry	   readings,	   and	   songs	   at	   Stalin	   monuments	   across	   the	  republic),	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  forcible	  suppression	  of	  the	  Georgian	  demonstrators.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	  The	   term	   coined	   by	  Marx	   in	   an	   1877	   letter	   to	  Wilhelm	  Blos	  was	   “der	   Personenkult.”	   Both	   the	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  variants	  translate	  literally	  as	  “cult	  of	  the	  individual,”	  though	  this	  term	  is	  more	  frequently	  translated	  as	  “cult	  of	  personality.”	  341	  Jones,	  Myth,	  Memory,	  Trauma,	  Chapter	  1.	  On	  the	  Secret	  Speech	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  Soviet	  public	  opinion,	  see	  Karl	  E.	  Loewenstein,	  “Re-­‐Emergence	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  Khrushchev	  and	  Responses	  to	  the	  Secret	  Speech,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  58,	  no.	  8	  (Dec.	  2006):	  1329-­‐1345.	  342	  Polly	   Jones,	   “From	   the	   Secret	   Speech	   to	   the	   Burial	   of	   Stalin:	   Real	   and	   Ideal	   Reponses	   to	   De-­‐Stalinization,”	   in	   Polly	   Jones,	   ed.,	  The	  Dilemmas	   of	  De-­‐Stalinization:	  Negotiating	  Cultural	   and	   Social	  
Change	  in	  the	  Khrushchev	  Era,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2006).43-­‐4.	  
	   152	  	   Reactions	   in	   Georgia	   to	   Khrushchev’s	   revelations	   at	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	  Congress	   reflected	   the	   resistance	   and	   confusion	   seen	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   Union.	  	  However,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   not	   surprising	   that	   some	   Georgians	   saw	   as	   particularly	  offensive	  Khrushchev’s	  specific	  points	  about	  Georgia	  and	  Georgians	  in	  the	  speech	  –	  points	   which	   went	   beyond	   the	   Stalin-­‐Georgia	   link.	   	   For	   example,	   Khrushchev	  explained,	  We	  know	  that	  in	  Georgia,	  as	  in	  some	  other	  republics,	  there	  were	  once	  manifestations	  of	  local,	  bourgeois	  nationalism.	  	  The	  question	  arises	  as	  to	   whether,	   in	   the	   period	   when	   the	   above	   decision	   was	   taken,	   the	  nationalistic	  tendencies	  grew	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  there	  was	  a	  threat	  of	  Georgia	  leaving	  the	  Soviet	  Union…This,	  of	  course,	  is	  nonsense.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  even	  imagine	  who	  could	  have	  come	  up	  with	  such	  notions.343	  	  Furthermore,	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   in	   Georgia,	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   economic	   and	   cultural	  development	   and	   the	   growth	   of	   socialist	   consciousness	   of	   the	  workers,	   the	   soil	   on	   which	   bourgeois	   nationalism	   feeds	   is	  disappearing.	   	   And	   as	   it	   turned	   out,	   there	   were	   no	   nationalistic	  organizations	   in	   Georgia.	   	   Thousands	   of	   innocent	   Soviet	   people	  became	   victims	   of	   tyranny	   and	   lawlessness.	   	   And	   this	   was	   all	   done	  under	   the	   “genius”	   leadership	   of	   Stalin	   –	   “great	   son	   of	   the	   Georgian	  people,”	  as	  Georgians	  love	  to	  call	  their	  countryman.344	  	  In	  these	  excerpts,	  Khrushchev’s	  antipathy	  toward	  Georgia	  and	  Georgians	  is	  thinly,	  if	  at	   all,	   veiled.	   	   Whether	   his	   jocular	   and	   dismissive	   attitude	   toward	   Georgian	  nationalism	  reflected	  real	  concerns	  or	  merely	  supported	  his	  derision	  of	  Stalin	  as	  a	  Georgian	  figure,	  Khrushchev	  nevertheless	  provided	  ample	  fodder	  in	  this	  speech	  for	  critics	  in	  Georgia.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343	  Doklad	  N.S.	  Khrushcheva…,	  96.	  344	  Ibid.,	  97.	  
	   153	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Khrushchev	   denied	   the	   existence	   of	   local	   “bourgeois”	  nationalism	   in	  Georgia	   –	   a	   purported	   success	   of	   the	   Stalin-­‐era	   purges	   and	  Terror.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Khrushchev	  mocked	  Georgians’	  attitude	  toward	  Stalin	  as	  one	  of	  their	   own,	   as	   an	   explicitly	   national	   figure.	   	   The	   resulting	   protests	   in	   Tbilisi	   and	  elsewhere	  in	  Georgia	  arose	  once	  word	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  ban	  on	  commemorations	  on	  the	   third	   anniversary	  of	   Stalin’s	   death	   spread	   informally	   in	   the	  week	  prior	   to	   this	  date.	   	  The	   timing	  of	   the	  announcement	  colored	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  anti-­‐Stalinist	  campaign	  was	  received	   in	  Georgia.	  The	  nearly	  concurrent	   timing	  demonstrated,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Elena	  Zubkova,	  an	   “utter	  neglect	  of	   social	  psychology”	  on	   the	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  government.345	  	  However,	  while	   the	  content	  and	  timing	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  proclamation	  may	  explain	  why	  Georgians	  demonstrated	  en	  masse	  to	  commemorate	  Stalin’s	   death	   despite	   the	   new,	   anti-­‐Stalinist	   campaign,	   they	   explain	   neither	   the	  violent	  crackdown	  in	  Tbilisi	  on	  9	  March	  nor	  how	  Georgians	  viewed	  these	  events	  as	  linked	  in	  their	  immediate	  aftermath.	  	  
Event:	  5-­‐9	  March	  1956	  	  Shortly	  after	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress,	  rumors	  allegedly	  began	  to	  spread	  in	  Georgia	  among	  those	  congress	  delegates	  who	  returned	  to	  Tbilisi	  earlier	  than	  the	  republic’s	   Party	   leadership.	   However,	   according	   to	   KGB	   representative	   and	   Army	  General	   I.	   Serov,	   as	   reported	   on	   22	  March	   in	   a	   top	   secret	   report	   to	   the	   CPSU	   CC,	  “among	   the	   population	   they	   began	   to	   exaggerate	   rumors	   about	   the	   cult	   of	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  Elena	  Zubkova,	  Russia	  after	  the	  War:	  Hopes,	  Illusions,	  and	  Disappointments,	  1945	  –1957	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  1998),	  185-­‐6.	  
	   154	  personality	   in	   an	   arbitrary	   manner,”	   and	   Party	   activists	   could	   not	   effectively	  respond	  to	  said	  rumors	  because	  the	  report	  was	  not	  yet	  public	  knowledge.346	  	  On	   the	   evening	   of	   4	   March	   1956,	   crowds	   began	   to	   gather	   at	   the	   Stalin	  monument	  in	  Tbilisi,	  which	  was	  located	  along	  the	  bank	  of	  the	  Mtkvari	  River,	  down	  the	  hill	   from	   the	  city’s	  main	   thoroughfare,	  Rust’aveli	  Avenue.	   In	  addition	   to	   laying	  wreaths	   at	   the	   base	   of	   the	   monument,	   as	   had	   been	   the	   tradition	   since	   1953,	   in	  accordance	   with	   Georgian	   commemoration	   of	   the	   deceased,	   attendees	   recited	  poems,	   delivered	   speeches,	   and	   sang	   songs	   dedicated	   to	   Stalin.347	  While	   some	  reports	   emphasized	   that	   this	   act	   was	   entirely	   peaceful,	   others	   noted	   that	   some	  visitors	  were	   drunk	   and	   disorderly.348	  The	   next	   day,	   this	   smaller	   commemoration	  expanded	   into	   several	   funeral-­‐like	   processions,	   bearing	   portraits	   of	   Stalin,	   by	   car	  and	  by	   foot	   from	  all	   over	   the	   city	   to	   the	  Stalin	  monument	   to	   lay	  wreaths	   and	  pay	  homage	  to	  the	  departed	  beladi.349	  Though	  the	  processions	  bore	  the	  trappings	  of	  an	  official	   function	   –	   rife	   with	   Soviet	   ritual	   and	   symbols	   –	   the	   participants	   in	   these	  “improvised”	   demonstrations	   were	   “usually	   high	   school	   and	   university	   students,	  and	   the	   urban	   intelligentsia.”350	  At	   the	   demonstrations	   in	   Tbilisi,	   attendees	   read	  poems	  by	  Georgian	  poets	  and	  sang	  Georgian	  songs	  in	  honor	  of	  Stalin.	  Meanwhile,	  in	  Gori,	   mourners	   gathered	   outside	   Stalin’s	   birthplace	   in	   the	   center	   of	   the	   town.	   In	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  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  29.	  347	  Nozaże,	  1956	  tragikuli	  9	  marti,	  6.	  348	  Ibid.	  and	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  30.	  349	  “Zakrytoe	   pis’mo,”	   Trud	   Georgian	   SSR	   correspondent	   S.	   Statnikov	   to	   Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	  54.	  350	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  28.	  	  
	   155	  Sukhumi,	  Georgian	  schoolchildren	  brought	  wreaths	   to	   the	  Stalin	  monument	   in	   the	  center	  of	  town,	  and	  similar	  commemorations	  occurred	  in	  Batumi	  and	  Kutaisi.	  	  On	  6	  and	  7	  March,	  commemorations	  continued	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  cities,	  albeit	  in	  a	  more	  “organized”	  manner.351	  In	  Tbilisi,	  mourners	  began	  to	  carry	  portraits	  of	  Lenin,	  with	  red	  flags	  and	  funeral	  ribbons,	  alongside	  portraits	  of	  Stalin.352	  On	  the	  afternoon	  of	  6	  March,	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  convened	  a	  public	  forum	  to	  read	  “On	  the	  Cult	  of	   Personality	   and	   its	   Consequences.”	   The	   CC	   proposed	   to	   acquaint	   all	   republican	  Party	  and	  Komsomol	  members	  with	  its	  contents	   in	  the	  coming	  days,	  though	  at	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  document	  itself	  leaders	  did	  not	  address	  questions	  from	  attendees.353	  	  On	   the	   morning	   of	   7	   March,	   students	   at	   Stalin	   State	   University,	   the	   main	  university	  in	  the	  republic,	  boycotted	  classes	  and	  went	  to	  the	  streets,	  where	  students	  from	   other	   universities	   and	   high	   schools	   joined	   them.	   They	   proceeded	   from	   their	  campus	  in	  the	  Vake	  district	  down	  Rust’aveli	  Prospect	  to	  Lenin	  Square	  while	  singing	  and	   reciting	   verses	   about	   Stalin,	   such	   as	   “Glory	   to	   the	   great	   Stalin”	   (dideba	   did	  
stalins)	  and	  “Glory	  to	  the	  leader	  Stalin”	  (dideba	  belade	  stalins).354	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  new	  demonstration	  began	  at	  the	  Stalin	  monument,	  where	  attendees	  gave	  speeches	  about	  attempts	  to	  blacken	  Stalin’s	  name.	  In	  Gori,	  an	  additional	  5,000	  to	  6,000	  people	  visited	   Stalin’s	   house	   daily,	   and	   participants	   organized	   an	   honor	   guard	   in	   that	  location.	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  “Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956.	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	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   156	  By	  8	  March,	  Tbilisi	  ceased	  to	  function	  as	  a	  city	  as	  the	  demonstrations	  grew.	  Many	   people	   stayed	   home	   from	   work,	   transport	   remained	   difficult,	   and	  demonstrators	  occasionally	   clashed	  with	  policemen.	  Two	  centers	  emerged	  around	  the	  Stalin	  monument	  and	  on	  Lenin	  Square,	  across	  from	  the	  CC	  headquarters	  and	  the	  House	   of	   Government.	   Per	   the	   demonstrators’	   request,	   First	   Secretary	  Mžavanaże	  delivered	   a	   brief	   speech	   to	   the	   Lenin	   Square	   crowd,	   promising	   to	   defend	   Stalin.	  Following	  his	  speech,	  a	  group	  of	  demonstrators	  presented	  the	  following	  demands:	  1. Declare	  9	  March	  a	  day	  of	  mourning	  with	  all	  work	  cancelled	  2. Publish	  articles	  dedicated	  to	  Stalin’s	  life	  and	  work	  in	  all	  local	  papers	  3. Screen	  “The	  Fall	  of	  Berlin”	  and	  “Unforgettable	  1919”	  in	  movie	  theatres355	  4. Invite	   Marshal	   Zhu	   De,	   of	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China,	   to	   the	  demonstration356	  5. Perform	  the	  GSSR	  hymn	  in	  full	  text	  (without	  excluding	  Stalin’s	  name)357	  6. Install	  a	  microphone	  at	  the	  Lenin	  Square	  demonstration	  7. Invite	  poets	  and	  writers	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  Georgian	  people358	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  escalations	  of	  violence	  and	  increasing	  demands	  from	  demonstrators,	  the	  Trud	  Tbilisi	  correspondent	  Statnikov	  observed	  that	  the	  militia	  did	  not	  intervene	  to	  quell	  the	  situation	  because,	  “All	  that	  was	  done	  in	  those	  days	  was	  connected	  with	  the	  name	  of	  the	  son	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people	  –	  Stalin-­‐Juġašvili	  –	  this	  name	  was	  often	  mentioned	   in	   order	   to	   emphasize	   their	   feelings.” 359 	  Soon	   thereafter,	   on	   the	  afternoon	  of	  8	  March,	  a	  crowd	  of	  500-­‐600	  traveled	  to	  Krcanisi,	  the	  elite	  dacha	  where	  Chinese	   delegate	   to	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   Zhu	   De	   was	   staying,	   to	   try	   to	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   movies	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   Stalin’s	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   victory	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   World	   War	   Two	   and	   Russian	   Civil	   War,	  respectively.	  356	  Zhu	  De	  visited	  Tbilisi	  and	  other	  cities	  in	  the	  USSR	  following	  his	  participation	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  at	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress.	  	  357	  Kozlov,	  117.	  358	  “Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	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  op.	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  d.	  140,	  l.	  56.	  359	  Ibid.	  
	   157	  convince	   him	   to	   visit	   the	   Stalin	   monument.360	  Though	   he	   greeted	   the	   group,	   he	  declined	  their	  offer.	  Demonstrators	  attempted	  to	  appeal	  to	  Zhu	  De	  by	  reciting	  “Long	  live	  Mao	  Zedong”	  in	  addition	  to	  “Long	  live	  the	  USSR,”	  “Long	  live	  the	  party	  of	  Lenin-­‐Stalin,”	  “Glory	  to	  Lenin,”	  and	  “Glory	  to	  Stalin.”361	  Per	   the	  demonstrators’	   request,	  a	  microphone	  was	   installed	  on	   the	  evening	  of	   8	   March	   at	   Lenin	   Square.	   Speeches	   in	   Lenin	   Square	   garnered	   even	   more	  attendees,	   as	   speakers	   could	   now	   be	   heard	   clearly,	   and	   the	   range	   of	   issues	   and	  imperatives	   elicited	   by	   speakers	   conveyed	   both	   the	   gravity	   and	   confusion	   of	   the	  situation	   at	   hand.	   For	   example,	   one	   speaker	   proclaimed	   that,	   “With	   the	   death	   of	  Stalin,	  everything	  that	  had	  been	  achieved	  perishes	  already,	  the	  country,	  and	  above	  all,	  Georgia,	  will	  die.”	  Holding	  up	  his	  Party	  card,	  he	  called	  on	  attendees	  to	  fight	   for	  the	   cause	  of	   Stalin	   and,	   if	   necessary,	   give	   their	   lives.362	  A	   student	   speaker	  derided	  the	  Party	  leadership	  and	  recalled	  the	  history	  of	  Georgians’	  struggle	  against	  foreign	  enemies,	  concluding	  that	  “The	  Georgian	  people	  will	  not	  forgive	  whoever	  decided	  to	  tarnish	   the	   bright	   memory	   of	   Stalin.	   Do	   not	   succumb	   to	   criticism	   of	   Stalin,	   our	  leader.	  The	  revision	  of	  Stalin	  is	  a	  revision	  of	  Marxism.	  They	  will	  pay	  for	  Stalin	  with	  blood.”363	  Meanwhile,	   a	   woman	   asserted,	   “Listen,	   Georgians!	   They	   support	   us	   in	  Moscow.	   Demonstrations	   are	   happening	   now	   not	   only	   in	   Georgia,	   but	   also	   in	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  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  30;	  Nozaże,	  13-­‐15.	  361	  Nozaże,	  1956	  tragikuli	  9	  marti,	  15.	  362	  “Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	  57.	  	  363	  Ibid.	  
	   158	  Stalingrad,	   Leningrad,	   and	  other	   cities.”364	  In	   addition	   to	   speeches,	  Georgian	  poets	  and	  writers	  read	  poems	  dedicated	  to	  Stalin,	  and	  according	  to	  Statnikov,	  “they	  even	  found	   a	   priest,	  who	   blessed	   the	  Georgians	   for	   their	   sacred	   cause	   –	   the	   defense	   of	  Stalin’s	   name.”365	  While	   initial	   crowds	   on	   5	  March	   numbered	   around	   2,000-­‐3,000	  between	   the	   Stalin	   Monument	   and	   Lenin	   Square,	   in	   the	   following	   days	   crowds	  swelled	   to	   as	  many	   as	   15,000-­‐20,000	   people,	   in	   Serov’s	   estimate.366	  The	   historian	  Vladimir	  Kozlov	  describes	  crowds	  as	  large	  as	  70,000	  in	  Tbilisi.367	  	   On	  9	  March,	  conceding	  to	  some	  of	   the	  demonstrators	  requests,	  newspapers	  published	  memorial	  articles	  about	  Stalin,	  alongside	  a	  photo	  of	  Stalin	  and	  Lenin	  from	  1922.368	  Officially	   sanctioned	   memorial	   meetings	   throughout	   the	   republic	   were	  scheduled	   for	   1:00	   p.m.	   in	   all	   enterprises,	   institutes,	   and	   higher	   educational	  institutions.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  local	  party	  authorities	  read	  the	  report	  from	  the	  CPSU	  “On	   the	   Cult	   of	   Personality	   and	   its	   Consequences”	   to	   Party	   audiences.	   Statnikov	  understood	  these	  measures	  as	  an	  effort	  (albeit	  a	  belated	  one)	  by	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  to	  attempt	   to	   restore	   order	   in	   Tbilisi. 369 	  	   Yet	   in	   Tbilisi,	   Gori,	   and	   Sukhumi,	  demonstrators	   overtook	   the	   official	   meetings:	   in	   Gori,	   by	   that	   time,	   as	   many	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  364	  Ibid.,	   l.	   58.	   This	   comment	   proved	   to	   be	   an	   exaggeration:	   while	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   other	   locales	  questioned	  or	  challenged	  dethroning	  the	  vozhd’,	  demonstrations	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  those	  in	  Tbilisi	  were	  unmatched	  elsewhere.	  365	  Ibid.,	  l.	  59.	  366	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  30.	  
367 Kozlov,	  114-­‐116. 368	  See,	  for	  example,	  “Tret’e	  godovshchina	  so	  dnia	  smerti	  I.V.	  Stalina,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka,	  9	  March	  1956,	  p.	  1.	  The	  front	  page	  also	  announced	  that	  official	  commemorations	  would	  be	  held	  at	  1:00	  that	  day.	  369	  “Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  ll.	  59-­‐60.	  
	   159	  70,000	  people	  had	  gathered,	  and	  some	  attempted	  to	  drive	  to	  Tbilisi.370	  Mžavanaże,	  meanwhile,	   attended	   the	   demonstration	   in	   Lenin	   Square	   and	   told	   the	   crowd	   he	  would	  review	  some	  of	  their	  additional	  requests	  and	  return	  with	  an	  answer.371	  	  	  	   That	   evening,	   demonstrators	   presented	   a	   series	   of	   demands,	   or,	   in	   Serov’s	  telling,	  “ultimatums”	  to	  the	  Georgian	  CC.	  These	  included	  establishing	  an	  honor	  guard	  of	  military	  officers	  at	  the	  Stalin	  monument	  that	  day;	  organizing	  a	  military	  flyover	  for	  Tbilisi	   and	   Gori	   depicting	   the	   words	   “Glory	   to	   Stalin”;	   sounding	   the	   horns	   in	  factories	  to	  mark	  Stalin’s	  funeral;	  lifting	  a	  balloon	  over	  Tbilisi	  with	  portraits	  of	  Lenin	  and	  Stalin;	  delivering	  radio	  addresses	  by	  demonstrators;	  restoring	   the	  Stalin	  prize	  and	   the	   name	   of	   the	   “Stalin	   Constitution”;	   completely	   describing	   Stalin’s	   life	   and	  activities	   in	   the	  Great	  Soviet	  Encyclopedia;	  designating	  9	  May	  as	   the	  Day	  of	  Stalin’s	  Victory;	   determining	   the	   whereabouts	   of	   Vasili	   Stalin	   (Stalin’s	   son);	   resuming	  production	  of	  Stalin’s	  works;	  and	  naming	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Railway	  after	  Stalin.372	  A	  list	  of	  demands	  allegedly	  read	  by	  Ruben	  Qip’iani	  near	  the	  Stalin	  monument	  further	  escalated	  the	  stakes:	  	  1. Return	  the	  closed	  letter	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC373	  2. Remove	  Mikoyan,	  Bulganin,	  and	  Khrushchev	  from	  their	  posts	  3. Create	  a	  new	  government	  	  4. Free	  Bagirov	  from	  prison374	  5. Promote	  Mgelaże	  and	  Mžavanaże	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  presidium	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  370	  Kozlov,	  130.	  371	  “Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	  61.	  372	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	   f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	   ll.	  31-­‐32	  and	  “Vyskazyvaniia	  otdel’nykh	  lits,	  vystupavshikh	  u	  pamiatnika	  tov.	  Stalina	  I.V.,”	  8	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  1,	  d.	  13,	  ll.	  9-­‐10,	  19-­‐25.	  373	  Demonstrators	  referred	  to	  the	  text	  read	  at	  local	  party	  meetings	  about	  the	  “on	  the	  cult”	  speech	  as	  a	  secret	  letter	  from	  Moscow.	  374	  Mir	  Jafar	  Bagirov	  served	  as	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Azerbaijan	  CP	  from	  1933	  to	  1953.	  A	  close	  ally	  of	  Beria,	  Bagirov	  was	  arrested	  in	  1954.	  
	   160	  6. Appoint	  Vasili	  Stalin	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  7. Institute	  an	  amnesty375	  Speeches	  continued	  in	  both	  locales	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  9	  March	  and	  took	  on	  a	  more	  fateful	  tone.	  A	  speech	  from	  around	  10:30	  that	  night	  by	  poet	  Jansul	  Č’arkviani,	  a	  recent	  graduate	  of	  Stalin	  State	  University,	  reflected	  the	  passion	  and	  intensity	  of	  the	  moment:	  Comrades,	  Georgians,	  please	   listen	  to	  me.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  here	  are	  martyrs,	  I’ve	  been	  together	  with	  you	  for	  these	  five	  days	  and	  felt	  these	  difficult	  days.	  Comrades,	  I	  am	  a	  Georgian	  as	  you	  all	  are.	  I	  also	  love	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  great	  Communist	  Party,	  as	  you	  all	   love	  them.	  As	  the	  Communist	  Party	  loves	  you.	  (Crowd:	  We	  love	  it,	  we	  love	  it.)…Long	  live	  free	  Georgia	  (crowd:	  hooray!)!	  Long	  live	  Soviet	  Georgia	  (crowd:	  hooray!)!	  Comrades!	  No	  one	  may	  defile	  the	  name	  of	  the	  great	  Stalin	  if	  we	  will	  be	  together	  and,	  in	  this	  remarkable	  initiative,	  defend	  great	   Stalin’s	   name	   to	   the	   end,	   without	   fail,	   consciously	   and	  honestly…Comrades,	  we	  must	  be	  awake,	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  next	  to	   us	   are	   our	   repulsive	   enemies,	   who	   also	   remember	   our	   Georgian	  courage	  that	  repelled	  Turkey	  and	  Persia.	  Comrades,	  we	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  say	  we	  do	  not	  love	  great	  Russia,	  this	  is	  a	  lie.	  We	  love	  the	  great	  Russian	  people,	  we	  only	  must	  walk	  with	  them	  side	  by	  side	  in	  an	   honest	   way,	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   Georgia	   was	   from	   the	   beginning.	  Comrades,	  we	  are	  Christians,	  we	  are	  courageous	  men	  (važkac’ebi),	  we	  learned	   from	   our	   ancestors	   that	   we	   are	   free	   and	   will	   be	   eternally.	  Comrades,	  long	  live	  great	  Stalin,	  we	  are	  together	  with	  Stalin’s	  glory.376	  	  Č’arkviani	  appealed	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  historical	  and	  identity	  markers	  in	  this	  speech,	  demonstrating	   the	   intricacy	  of	  Soviet	  Georgian	  views	  of	  Stalin.	  Concurrent	  odes	   to	  communism,	   freedom,	   historical	   enemies,	   Christianity,	   and	   Georgian	   values	   –	   as	  contradictory	   as	   they	   may	   seem	   –	   were	   mobilized	   to	   bring	   Georgians	   to	   Stalin’s	  defense.	  And	  this	  blend	  of	  appeals	  and	  interpretations,	  emphasizing	  Sovietness	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  375	  Kozlov,	  121.	  	  	  376	  As	  reported	  in	  Nozaże,	  1956	  tragikuli	  9	  marti,	  26-­‐27.	  The	  transcript	  of	  speeches	  he	  provides	  in	  his	  book	  reportedly	  comes	  from	  a	  recording	  made	  during	  the	  demonstrations	  for	  the	  KGB.	  
	   161	  Georgianness,	   was	   likewise	   evident	   in	   statements	   collected	   via	   KGB	   eyewitness	  reporting	  and	  svodki	  from	  8-­‐9	  March.377	  After	   receiving	   reports	   on	   the	   situation	   in	   Tbilisi,	   the	   Red	   Army,	   via	   the	  Transcaucasus	   Military	   District,	   intervened	   to	   re-­‐establish	   order.378	  Meanwhile,	   a	  group	  of	  demonstrators	  from	  the	  Stalin	  monument	  processed	  toward	  the	  House	  of	  Communications	   at	   11:45.	   As	   the	   crowd	   forced	   its	   way	   into	   the	   House	   of	  Communications	  (on	  Rust'aveli	  Avenue)	  to	  attempt	  to	  radio	  and	  telegram	  Moscow,	  troops	   fired	   into	   the	   crowd.	   Tanks	   subsequently	   moved	   to	   disperse	   the	  demonstrations	  at	   the	  Stalin	  monument,	   just	  down	   the	  street.	  Whether	   the	   troops	  fired	   the	   first	   shots	   or	   were	   acting	   in	   self-­‐defense	   from	   attacking	   demonstrators,	  there	  were	   casualties	   in	   the	   chaos:	   according	   to	   the	  Georgian	  Ministry	   of	   Internal	  Affairs,	   the	   crackdown	   resulted	   in	   twenty-­‐one	   demonstrators	   killed	   and	   fifty-­‐four	  wounded.	  Of	  the	  twenty-­‐one	  killed,	  eleven	  were	  Komsomol	  members,	  and	  ten	  were	  students.	  Four	  were	  unemployed,	  and	  three	  were	  under	  the	  age	  of	  sixteen.	  Among	  the	   injured	  were	   twenty-­‐three	  Komsomol	  members	  and	   four	   teenagers.379	  Though	  similar	   demonstrations	   occurred	   in	   at	   least	   Gori,	   Sukhumi,	   K’ut’aisi,	   and	   Batumi,	  they	  were	   “without	   serious	   excesses”	   and	   therefore	   no	  military	   intervention	   took	  place.380	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	  “Vyskazyvaniia	  otdel’nykh	  lits,	  vystupavshikh	  u	  pamiatnika	  tov.	  Stalina	  I.V.,”	  8	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  1,	  d.	  13.	  378	  “Prikaz	  14,	  g.	  Tbilisi,	  Nachal’nika	  Tbilisskogo	  Garnizona,”	  9	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	  68.	  379	  “SPISOK	  ubitykh	  grazhdan	  9	  marta	  1956	  goda	  (sov.	  sekretno)”	  and	  “SPISOK	  lits,	  postradavshikh	  9	  marta	  1956	  goda,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  1,	  d.	  14,	  ll.	  1-­‐22.	  380	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  33.	  
	   162	  In	   response	   to	   the	   disorder,	   security	   organizations	   identified	   and	   arrested	  the	   alleged	   “organizers	   and	   active	   participants	   in	   anti-­‐Soviet,	   nationalistic	  declarations.”	  While	  establishing	  order	  in	  Tbilisi,	   the	  Red	  Army	  arrested	  up	  to	  300	  people	  on	  9-­‐10	  March.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  twelve	  days,	  state	  security	  organs	  conducted	   investigations	   and	   found	   39	   individuals	   responsible	   for	   the	  disturbances.381	  By	  12	  March,	  order	  had	  been	  restored	  in	  Tbilisi.382	  	  	  
Metaphor:	  Aftermath	  and	  Explanation	  	  	   What	   went	   wrong?	   Citizens	   throughout	   Georgia	   struggled	   to	   interpret	   the	  meaning	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “March	  events,”	  from	  victims	  to	  demonstration	  participants	  to	   witnesses	   to	   Party	   leadership.	   Serov	   and	   Statnikov,	   for	   instance,	   in	   their	  immediate	  reports	  to	  Moscow,	  emphasized	  the	  influence	  of	  hooliganism,	  idlers,	  and	  manipulation	  of	  national	  feeling	  among	  students	  and	  the	  urban	  intelligentsia	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  March	  events.383	  	  Writer	  Ak’ak’i	  Ceret’eli,	  meanwhile,	  sensed	  already	   that	   these	   “bloody	  days”	  would	  have	  echoes	   in	   the	   future	  as	   the	  Georgian	  people	   continued	   its	   “struggle”	   for	   “freedom.” 384 	  Still	   others	   expressed	   more	  muddled	   and	   convoluted	   explanations	   for	   what	   had	   transpired	   in	   the	   republic	   in	  March,	  as	  will	  be	  examined	  below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  381	  Ibid.	  382	  Zakrytoe	  pis’mo,”	  Trud	  Georgian	  SSR	  correspondent	  S.	  Statnikov	  to	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  Trud	  Burkov,	  12	  March	  1956,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  140,	  l.	  64.	  383	  Ibid.;	  Serov	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  22	  March	  1956,	  	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  ll.	  28-­‐34.	  384	  Ak'ak'i	  Ceret’eli,	  9	  martis	  monacilis	  dġiurebidan	  (Tbilisi:	  C’odna,	  1994),	  45-­‐46.	  
	   163	  To	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  initial	  fallout	  of	  the	  campaign	  against	  Stalin’s	  cult	  of	  personality	   in	  Georgia,	  we	  must	   first	   consider	   the	  explanations	  offered	  by	  First	  Secretary	   Mžavanaże	   to	   account	   for	   the	   events.	   Mžavanaże,	   who	   had	   been	   First	  Secretary	  only	  since	  September	  1953,	  was	  an	  outsider	   to	  Georgian	  politics,	  having	  honed	   his	   credibility	   and	   networks	   as	   a	   political	   commissar	   during	   the	   war	   in	  Ukraine	  and	  deputy	  to	  Khrushchev	  in	  Kiev.	  	  The	  republic	  Mžavanaże	  inherited	  was	  “extremely	  tense”	  by	  1956,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  purges,	  deportations,	  poor	  economic	  performance,	   and	   increasing	   dissatisfaction	   among	   non-­‐entitled	   nationalities.385	  Even	   if	   his	   job	   security	   improved	   with	   Khrushchev’s	   solidification	   of	   power	   in	  Moscow,	   Mžavanaże	   still	   had	   to	   gain	   legitimacy	   in	   Georgia	   among	   his	   new	  constituents.	   It	   is	   this	  peculiar	  situation	   that	   likely	   influenced	  Mžavanaże’s	  actions	  surrounding	  the	  March	  events.	  Moreover,	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  failure	  to	  effectively	  manage	  the	  March	  1956	  crisis	  as	   it	  unfolded	  (a	  fault	   for	  which	  he	  was	  certainly	  blamed	  by	  Moscow),	  Mžavanaże	  himself	  suffered	  little	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  actions	  as	  the	  republic’s	  leader;	  in	  fact,	  he	  was	  shortly	  thereafter	  promoted	  to	  Presidium	  status	  in	  perhaps	  a	  delayed	   response	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   some	   Georgians	   to	   retain	   a	   Georgian	  representative	  in	  Moscow.	  	  	  In	   reports	   to	   the	   CPSU	   CC	   shortly	   following	   the	   March	   events,	   Mžavanaże	  emphasized	   in	   particular	   how	   “Stalin’s	   cult	   of	   personality	   was	   combined	   with	  national	   feelings	   in	   Georgia.”386 	  	   While	   “these	   feelings	   are	   especially	   strongly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  385	  Khlevniuk,	  “Kreml’	  –	  Tbilisi.”	  386	  “Dokladnaia	   zapiska	   Biuro	   TsK	   KP	   Gruzii	   o	  massovykh	   volneniiakh	   naseleniia	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   Tbilisi,	   Gori,	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  osuzhdeniem	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   164	  expressed,	   primarily,	   by	   university	   and	   high-­‐school	   students	   and	   by	   a	   part	   of	   the	  intelligentsia,”	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  “a	  large	  portion	  of	  Communists	  and	  Komsomol	  members	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  young	  peoples’	  statements,	  and	  some	  Communists	  and	   large	   number	   of	   Komsomol	   members	   actively	   participated	   in	   [the	   March	  demonstrations]	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  clearly	  result	  in	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  provocation.”387	  	  Furthermore,	   “many	   Communists,	   Komsomol	   members,	   and	   Party	   and	   Soviet	  workers	  expressed	  confusion	  and	  took	  a	  passive	  stance.”388	  In	   an	   April	   report	  Mžavanaże	   also	   noted	   the	   “complication	   of	   the	   national	  question”	   in	   Georgia:	   “Among	   many	   Communists	   and	   a	   part	   of	   the	   population	  unhealthy	  discussions	  of	  a	  nationalistic	  character	  have	  taken	  place,	  and	  fear,	  stress	  and	  aggravation	  of	  relations	  between	  different	  nationalities	  can	  be	  noticed,	  and	  also	  elements	   of	   mistrust	   between	   them.”389	  	   Later,	   in	   his	   May	   reports,	   Mžavanaże	  seemed	  to	  switch	  course	  on	  this	  issue,	  insisting	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  conclude	  that	   in	  Georgia	  there	  exists	  an	  anti-­‐Russian	  or	  anti-­‐Georgian	  sentiment”	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  5-­‐9	  March	  events	  showed	  that	  “in	  the	  republic	  there	  are	  individual	  manifestations	   of	   abnormal,	   unfriendly	   relations	   between	   persons	   of	   different	  nationalities.”390	  	  Yet	  Mžavanaże	  devoted	  an	  entire	  subsequent	  report	  to	  supporting	  the	   claim	   that	   animosity	   between	  Russians	   and	   Georgians	  was	  widespread	   in	   the	  republic,	   maintaining	   that	   while	   “unfriendly	   relations”	   existed	   between	   Russians	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   d.	   47,	   ll.	   9-­‐28.	   	   In	   Fursenko,	   A.A.	   (ed.)	   Prezidium	  TsK	   KPSS	   1954-­‐1964,	   tom	   2	   (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2006),	  289.	  387	  Ibid.,	  290-­‐291.	  388	  Ibid.,	  292.	  389	  Mžavanaże	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  “Informatsiia	  ob	  oznakomlenii	  kommunistov	  s	  dokladom	  t.	  Khrushcheva	  N.S.	  ‘o	  kul’te	  lichnosti	  i	  ego	  posledstviiakh,”	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  201,	  l.	  35-­‐36.	  390	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  Biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  o	  massovykh	  volneniiakh	  naseleniia…”,	  295.	  
	   165	  and	  Georgians,	   “even	   in	   the	  days	  of	  disorder	  of	  5-­‐9	  March	   there	  were	  no	  excesses	  between	   Russians	   and	   Georgians,	   between	   representatives	   of	   different	  nationalities.”391	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  noted,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	   individuals	  of	  Georgian	   nationality	   (above	   all	   students	   and	   the	   intelligentsia),	   it	   seemed	   that	  “Russians	  do	  not	  want	  Stalin	  because	  he	  was	  a	  Georgian:	  Russians	  want	  to	  destroy	  Georgians,	  eventually	  all	  Georgians	  will	  be	  expelled.”	  	  From	  the	  Russian	  perspective,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   Mžavanaże	   saw	   it,	   “Stalin	   was	   a	   traitor;	   they	   shot	   at	   the	  Georgian	  people	  a	  little	  on	  9	  March;	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  destroy	  them	  more	  fully;	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  expel	  half	  of	  the	  Georgians	  and	  settle	  fresh	  people	  here.”392	  	  Even	  if	  these	   were	   the	   opinions	   of	   some	   individuals,	   Mžavanaże	   also	   mentioned	   that	  “enemy	  elements,	  provocateurs”	  emphasized	  the	  use	  of	  force	  on	  9	  March	  in	  a	  series	  of	   anonymous	   letters	   addressed	   to	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   and	   other	   republic	   organs.	  	  These	   letters	   were	   of	   a	   “threatening,	   terroristic	   character”	   and	   conveyed	   “insults	  toward	   the	   Russian	   nation,	   individual	   leaders	   of	   the	   party	   and	   government,	   and	  raised	   the	   question	   of	   secession	   of	   Georgia	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union.”	   	   Additionally,	  “there	   is	   talk	   that	  on	  9	  March	   the	   friendship	  of	   the	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  peoples	  was	   annihilated.” 393 	  	   As	   these	   contradictory	   and	   convoluted	   reports	   imply,	  Mžavanaże	   struggled	   initially	  with	  how	   to	   relate	   the	  March	  events	   to	   the	  national	  situation	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   While	   clearly	   attributing	   the	   March	   demonstrations	   to	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  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  Biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  N.S.	  Khrushchevu	  o	  proiavleniiakh	  natsionalisticheskikh	  nastroenii	  gruzinskogo	  naseleniia	  	  v	  sviazi	  s	  osuzhdeniem	  kul’ta	  lichnosti	  Stalina	  na	  XX	  s”ezde	  KPSS.”	  RGANI	   f.	   3,	   op.	   12,	   d.	   47,	   ll.	   29-­‐39.	   	   In	   Fursenko,	   A.A.	   (ed.)	   Prezidium	  TsK	  KPSS	   1954-­‐1964,	   tom	   2	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2006),	  297.	  392	  Ibid.,	  298.	  393	  Ibid.	  
	   166	  national	  feelings	  among	  Georgian	  students	  and	  the	  intelligentsia	  –	  with	  the	  tacit	  or	  overt	  support	  of	  many	  Party	  and	  Komsomol	  members	  –	  Mžavanaże	  also	  attempted	  to	   downplay	   charges	   of	   widespread	   animosity	   between	   nationalities	   in	   Georgia,	  likely	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  his	  own	  reputation	  as	  republican	  manager.	  	  In	  the	  early	  aftermath	  of	  the	  March	  events,	  then,	  Mžavanaże	  blamed	  individual	  manifestations	  of	  national	  animosity	  rather	  than	  widespread	  anti-­‐Russian	  or	  anti-­‐Georgian	  sentiment	  in	  the	  republic.	  	   Mžavanaże’s	   explanation	   in	   August	   to	   his	   Party	   subordinates	   in	   Georgia	  differed	  in	  significant	  ways	  from	  the	  reports	  he	  filed	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee	  and	  Khrushchev	  in	  Moscow	  from	  April	  and	  May.	  	  As	  Mžavanaże	  noted	  in	  a	  speech	  at	  the	  August	   Party	  plenum	   in	  Tbilisi,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  Georgia	   had	  over	  180,000	  Party	   and	   350,000	   Komsomol	   members,	   between	   5-­‐9	   March,	   “large	   crowds,	  provoked	   by	   enemy	   nationalistic	   elements,	   committed	   excesses,	   violated	   public	  order,	   and	   permitted	   anti-­‐Soviet	   attacks.” 394 	  	   Mžavanaże	   attributed	   this	  development	  to	  two	  causes:	  the	  legacy	  of	  Beria’s	  hold	  on	  the	  republic	  and	  the	  failure	  of	   the	  republic’s	  Party	  organs	   to	  effectively	  educate	   the	  populace	  about	   the	  cult	  of	  personality.395	  Beria,	   as	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Georgian	  Communist	   Party	  between	  1931	  and	  1938,	  presided	  over	  the	  Terror	  and	  purges	  in	  the	  republic	  and	  from	  there	  led	  the	  Union-­‐wide	  secret	  police	  until	  Stalin’s	  death.	   	  Mžavanaże	  rooted	  the	  recent	  expressions	   of	   Georgian	   nationalism	   in	   Beria-­‐cultivated	   “feelings	   of	   national	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  394	  “Stenogramma	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  ot	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  avgusta	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  g.,”	  sšssa	  (II),	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  6-­‐7.	  395	  These	  were	   both	   safe,	   “Orthodox”	   explanations,	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  meaning	   of	  Soviet	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   167	  exceptionalism	   among	   the	   Georgian	   population.”	   These	   feelings	   allegedly	   led	   in	  Abkhazia	   and	   South	   Ossetia	   to	   manufactured	   “discord	   among	   Georgians,	   Abkhaz,	  Armenians,	   and	   Ossetians”	   and	   Georgians	   “intentionally	   held	   the	   line	   [of	   Beria’s	  policies	   in	   Abkhazia,	   CK]	   on	   the	   liquidation	   [of	   the]	   national	   culture	   of	   the	   local	  Abkhaz,	   Armenian,	   and	   Ossetian	   populations.”396	  	   In	   this	   sense,	  Mžavanaże	   linked	  the	   negative	   ramifications	   of	   alleged	   Beria-­‐esque	   Georgian	   nationalism	   to	   current	  Georgian	  national	  expression:	  as	  a	  survival	  of	   the	  era	  of	  high	  Stalinism	   in	  Georgia,	  Georgian	   nationalism	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Stalinist	   campaign	   threatened	   other	  local	   nationalities	   in	   the	   republic	   and	   “criminally	   violated	   Leninist	   principles	   of	  nationality	   policy.”397	  	   Mžavanaże	   further	   acknowledged	   that	   Party	   organs	   in	   the	  republic	  had	  not	   “used	  all	  methods	  of	  oral	  and	  printed	  propaganda	   to	  expose	  and	  discredit	   Beria	   and	   his	   cult	   of	   personality.”398	  	   Thus,	   Mžavanaże	   attacked	   Beria’s	  allegedly	   “nationalistic”	   excesses	   through	   the	   resurrected	   mechanism	   of	   the	  personality	  cult.	  	  	  	   Second,	   Mžavanaże	   placed	   blame	   squarely	   with	   his	   own	   Communist	  establishment	   in	   Georgia	   for	   lacking	   the	   “courage	   and	   political	   maturity…to	   deal	  with	  those	  nationalists	  and	  provocateurs	  among	  them,	  who	  praised	  and	  demanded	  the	   absolution	   of	   this	   despicable	   enemy	   of	   our	   people	   [referring	   to	   Beria	  CK].”399	  	  This	   was	   because	   the	   “Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Communist	   Party	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  “Stenogramma	  zasedanii	  II-­‐go	  Plenuma	  TsK	  KP	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  Ibid.,	  l.	  9.	  398	  Ibid.,	  l.	  11.	  399	  Ibid.,	  l.	  10.	  
	   168	  underestimated	   the	   fact	   that	   Stalin’s	   personality	   cult	  was	   deeply	   ingrained	   in	   the	  minds	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Georgia	  and	  assumed	  especially	  exaggerated	  dimensions	  and	   a	   nationalistic	   color.”400	  	   The	   conflict	   that	   arose	   between	   5-­‐9	   March	   was	   no	  accident:	   rather,	   the	   events	   were	   caused	   by	   “gross	   distortions	   in	   the	   past	   of	   the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  ideological	  party	  line,	  by	  neglect	  of	  the	  ideological-­‐political	  education	   of	   the	   population,	   and	   by	   the	   low	   level	   of	   Georgian	   Communist	   Party	  leadership	   in	   the	   economic	   and	   political	   life	   of	   the	   republic.”401 	  	   As	   a	   result,	  “nationalistic,	   enemy	   elements”	   were	   able	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   “carelessness	  and	   complacency	  of	   the	   leadership	  of	  Party,	  Komsomol,	   and	  Soviet	  organs”	   to	  use	  the	  third	  anniversary	  of	  Stalin’s	  death	  to	  protest	  the	  campaign	  against	  Stalin’s	  cult	  of	  personality	   initiated	   by	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress.402 	  Not	   only	   did	   “many	  Communists	   take	  a	  position	  as	  passive	  observers,”	   several	  Communists	  were	  even	  “themselves	   complicit	   in	   the	   disturbances	   and	   appeared	  with	   anti-­‐Party	   speeches	  and	  appeals.”403	  	  For	   these	  reasons,	  according	  to	  Mžavanaże,	   the	  “Presidium	  of	   the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  quite	  correctly	  criticizes	  us,	  that	  we	  did	  not	  conduct	  a	  determined	  struggle	  with	  certain	  manifestations	  of	  bourgeois	  nationalistic	  ideology.”	  In	  reporting	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  ideological	  work	  among	  Party	  members	  in	  Georgia,	  Mžavanaże	  noted	  at	  first	  that:	  “In	  the	  majority	  of	  district	  party	  organizations	   attention	   was	   not	   drawn	   to	   the	   events	   which	   took	   place	   from	   5-­‐9	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  Ibid.,	  l.	  12.	  401	  Ibid.,	  	  l.	  17.	  402	  Ibid.,	  	  l.	  17.	  	  403	  Ibid.,	  	  l.	  18.	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  March…a	  proper	  political	  assessment	  of	   these	  events	  was	  not	  given.”404	  	  However,	  he	  also	  suggested,	  “A	  number	  of	  Communists	  and	  Komsomol	  members	  are	  dismayed	  and	  confused.	   	  One	  observes	  [in	  questions	  posed	  about	  the	  events	   in	  5-­‐9	  March]	  a	  manifestation	   of	   dissent,	   discontent,	   or	   even	   a	   kind	   of	   silent	   protest.”405	  Even	   if	  questions	   about	   the	   5-­‐9	   March	   events	   were,	   indeed,	   exceptional,	   as	   Mžavanaże	  reported,	   that	   does	   not	  make	   the	   claims	   less	   significant.	   	   Rather,	   it	   points	   to	   the	  uncertainty	   surrounding	   these	   events	   and	   how	   they	  were	   understood	   by	   at	   least	  some	   of	   the	   republic’s	   residents	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   year.	   	   Furthermore,	   if	   the	  “confusion	   and	   dismay”	   exhibited	   by	   many	   Party	   and	   Komsomol	   members	   were	  indicative	  of	  “a	  kind	  of	  silent	  protest,”	  toward	  what	  was	  this	  silent	  protest	  aimed?	  	  	  	  
	  Metaphor:	  Views	  from	  Georgians	  and	  Non-­‐Georgians	  The	  peculiar	  environment	  engendered	  by	  the	  March	  events	  in	  Georgia	  led	  the	  republic’s	  citizens	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  state	  of	  nationality	  and	  national	  relations	  within	  Georgia	   in	  addition	   to	  questioning	   the	  bounds	  of	   the	  anti-­‐Stalin	   line	  and	   the	   truth	  about	   the	   Stalin	   era.	   Active	   participation	   in	   demonstrations	   across	   the	   republic	  between	   5-­‐9	   March	   constituted	   the	   most	   visible	   conflict	   between	   the	   planned	  Moscow-­‐led	   anti-­‐Stalin	   campaign	   and	   conditions	   in	   Georgia,	   yet	   Party	   members	  across	  Georgia	  exhibited	  their	  own	  reservations	  regarding	  Stalin’s	  association	  with	  a	   cult	   of	   personality.	   	   These	   were	   expressed	   during	   special	   meetings	   devoted	   to	  discussion	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   secret	   speech,	   which	   took	   place	   across	   the	   Soviet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  Biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  o	  massovykh	  volneniiakh	  naseleniia…”,	  294.	  405	  Ibid.	  
	   170	  Union.406	  	  Meetings	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Union	  (including	  the	  RSFSR,	  Ukraine,	  Armenia,	  Estonia,	  Kazakhstan,	  Uzbekistan,	  and	  Belarus)	  occurred	  prior	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  meetings	   in	   Georgia,	   in	   early	   to	   mid-­‐March,	   and	   throughout	   the	   Union,	   these	  sessions	  continued	  until	  December	  1956.407	  	  	  	   While	   organized	   discussions	   about	   Khrushchev’s	   speech	   took	   place	  throughout	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   1956,	   in	   Georgia,	   these	   formal	   discussions	   first	  occurred	   in	   late	   March	   and	   early	   April	   more	   explicitly	   as	   a	   retroactive	   effort	   to	  manage	   public	   opinion	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   demonstration	   and	   violent	  crackdown	  on	  9	  March.	  	  The	  meetings	  were	  held	  for	  two	  purposes:	  first,	  to	  formally	  read	   and	   discuss	   Khrushchev’s	   report	   “On	   the	   Cult	   of	   Personality	   and	   its	  Consequences”;	  and	  second,	  to	  discuss	  a	  28	  March	  article	  which	  appeared	  in	  Pravda	  (Russian)	  and	  in	  komunisti	  (Georgian)	  titled	  “Why	  the	  cult	  of	  personality	  is	  alien	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism.”408	  	  These	  discussions	  occurred	  in	  Party	  district	  and	  city	   committees	   across	   the	   republic,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   factory	   and	   professional	   party	  committees.	   	  Subsequent	  waves	  of	  meetings	  occurred	  that	  summer	  and	  autumn	  to	  discuss	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  resolution	  “On	  the	  Mistakes	  and	  Shortcomings	  in	   the	  Work	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Communist	   Party”	   and	   to	  continue	  to	  monitor	  reception	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress’s	  proclamations.	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  Jones,	   ed.	   The	   Dilemmas	   of	   De-­‐Stalinization;	   Zubkova,	   Russia	   after	   the	   War;	   and	   Dobson,	  
Khrushchev’s	  Cold	  Summer	  in	  particular.	  407	  For	  a	  collection	  of	  these	  reports	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Union,	  see	  Doklad	  N.S.	  Khrushcheva	  o	  kul’te	  
lichnosti	  Stalina	  na	  XX	  s”ezde	  KPSS:	  Dokumenty	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2002).	  408	  “ratom	  aris	  uc’xo	  marksizm-­‐leninizmisat’vis	  pirovnebis	  kulti?”	  komunisti	   (28	  March	  1956),	  p.	   2	  and	  “Pochemu	  kul’t	  lichnosti	  chuzhd	  dukhu	  Marksizma-­‐Leninizma?”	  Pravda	  (28	  March	  1956),	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  	  
	   171	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  draw	  from	  questions	  and	  speeches	  posed	  in	  districts	  across	  the	   Georgian	   SSR	   (including	   from	   the	   three	   autonomous	   regions)	   and	   from	   the	  comments	  of	  officers	  of	  the	  74th	  Georgian	  Rifle	  Division,	  stationed	  in	  K’ut’aisi.409	  By	  examining	   questions	   posed	   by	   meeting	   attendees,	   we	   may	   see	   not	   only	   how	  Khrushchev’s	   revelations	   were	   first	   received	   among	   Georgians,	   but	   also	   how	  Georgians	  and	  non-­‐Georgians	  alike	  understood	  this	  shift	  in	  discourse	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	   unfolding	   events	   between	   5-­‐9	   March	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   Including	   locations	  across	   the	   republic	   reveals	   those	   issues	   that	   are	   raised	   regardless	   of	   locale,	   and	  those	  which	  express	  local	  concerns,	  particularly	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  	  	  	   Across	  the	  republic,	  meeting	  attendees	  sought	  a	  definition	  of	  what,	  precisely,	  constituted	  a	  “kul’t	  lichnosti”	  or	  “pirovnebis	  kulti”	  (literally	  “cult	  of	  the	  individual”	  in	  both	  Russian	   and	  Georgian,	   yet	  more	   commonly	   rendered	   into	   English	   as	   “cult	   of	  personality”).	   	   Initially	  such	  questions	  explicitly	  asked	   for	  a	  definition	  of	   the	   term,	  and	   probed	   the	   definition’s	   limits	   and	   further	   applications.	   	   This	   suggested	   that,	  despite	   its	  Marxist	   pedigree,	   the	   “cult	   of	   personality”	   terminology	  was	   essentially	  alien	  to	  the	  Soviet	  lexicon.	  	  In	  Siġnaġi,	  an	  attendee	  asked,	  “Where	  did	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  cult	  of	  personality	  come	  from?	  Did	  the	  masses	  create	  the	  cult	  of	  personality,	  or	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  The	   district	   committees	   included:	   Orjonikiże	   (Tbilisi),	   Kalinin	   (Tbilisi),	   Kirov	   (Tbilisi),	   Lenin	  (Tbilisi),	   Stalin	   (Tbilisi),	   Gareubani	   (Tbilisi),	   Orjonikiże	   (Imeret’i),	   Gudaut’a,	   Bogdanov,	   Poti,	   K’edi,	  Cali,	   Siġnaġi,	   Gurjaani,	   K’achreti,	   K’areli,	   Kaspi,	   T’ianet’i,	   Kutaisi,	   Cit’elcqaro,	   Axmeta,	   Lagodexi,	  Bolnisi,	   Ambrolauri,	   Qvareli,	   Xobi,	   Xašuri,	   Zestap’oni,	   Culukiże,	   Gali,	   Čoxatauri,	   and	   Samtredi.	   	   City	  committees	  included	  Batumi,	  Gori,	  K’ut’aisi,	  Poti,	  and	  Čiat’ura.	  
	   172	  did	  it	  come	  from	  above,	  from	  the	  leadership?”410	  	  While	  this	  questioner	  attempts	  to	  locate	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   problem	   denounced	   by	   Party	   leadership,	   an	   attendee	   in	  Kač'ret’i	   District	   asked,	   “Please	   explain	   how	   to	   understand	   the	   cult	   of	   personality	  and	  who	  is	  meant	  by	  cult	  of	  personality.	  	  The	  people	  are	  the	  creators	  of	  history,	  and	  if	   the	   people	   rightly	   exalted	   the	   personality,	   then	   is	   it	   a	   cult	   of	   personality.”411	  Furthermore,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  Soviet	  triumph	  in	  World	  War	  Two	  and	  a	  cult	  of	  personality	  around	  Stalin	  appeared	  problematic	   for	  one	  attendee,	  who	  said	  “As	  we	   all	   know,	  when	   the	  Great	   Patriotic	  War	   ended,	   Stalin	   said	   that	   he	  had	  not	  won	   the	   war	   personally,	   but	   that	   [it	   was	   won	   by]	   our	   heroic	   Soviet	   people	   and,	  above	  all,	  the	  great	  Russian	  people.	  	  Is	  this	  a	  cult	  of	  personality?”412	  In	  many	  locales,	  questioners	  asked	  whether	  cults	  of	  personality	  existed,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   for	  Marx,	  Engels,	   and	   Lenin	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   whether	   currently	   such	   a	   cult	   existed	  around	   Khrushchev,	   Anastas	   Mikoyan,	   and	   Nikolai	   Bulganin,	   two	   other	   CPSU	   CC	  members.	   Though	   the	   temporal	   parameters	   of	   Stalin’s	   personality	   cult	   seemed	  clearly	   demarcated,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   cult	   paradigm	   could	   be	   retroactively	  applied	  to	  other	  individuals	  (or,	  in	  a	  more	  expansive	  move,	  to	  the	  Soviet	  or	  Russian	  people)	  remained,	  at	  this	  point,	  more	  open	  to	  interpretation	  among	  questioners.	  	  	   In	   spite	   of	   attempts	   to	   extend	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   cult	   of	   personality	   to	  other	   historically	   relevant	   periods	   and	   individuals,	   questions	   devoted	   more	  attention	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Stalin	  himself,	  both	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  cult	  of	  personality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  “Voprosy,	  postupivshie	  na	  sobraniiakh	  partaktiva	  raionnykh	  partiinykh	  organizatsii	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  201,	  l.	  53-­‐4.	  411	  Ibid.	  412	  “Informatsiia,”	  Kalinin	  District	  Agitprop	  Chairman	  Z.	  Berišvili	  to	  N.U.	  Jaši,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  251,	  l.	  9.	  
	   173	  and	   to	   his	   relationship	   with	   Georgians.	   	   In	   particular,	   questions	   sought	   to	  understand	   the	   timing	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   announcement.	   	   In	   T’ianet’i	   District,	   an	  attendee	   asked	  why	   Stalin’s	  mistakes	   were	   “attributed	   to	   the	   cult	   of	   personality”	  only	  after	  his	  death.413	  	  In	  Kirov	  District	  (Tbilisi),	  a	  factory	  worker	  asked	  “Why	  did	  they	  not	  speak	  of	  a	  cult	  of	  personality	  and	  criticize	  while	  comrade	  Stalin	  was	  alive,	  and	  if	  they	  did,	  how	  did	  comrade	  Stalin	  react?”	  and	  “Did	  Stalin	  promote	  those	  people	  who	   praised	   him?”414	  	   Developing	   this	   inquiry	   further,	   a	   question	   from	  Gareubani	  District	  (Tbilisi)	  explained,	  “The	  goal	  of	  criticism	  is	  to	  correct	  a	  living	  person.	  	  After	  death	  [the	  goal	  of]	  criticism	  is	  not	  clear.”	  415	  This	  speaker	  thus	  casts	  the	  exposure	  of	  Stalin's	   “mistakes”	   within	   the	   Soviet	   (and	   Stalinist)	   ideal	   of	   criticism	   and	   self-­‐criticism	   (kritika	   i	   samokritika),	   in	   which	   self-­‐improvement	   through	  acknowledgement	   and	   correction	   of	   defects	  would	   create	   a	   vigilant,	   dutiful	   Soviet	  citizenry.	   	   At	   a	   later	   wave	   of	   meetings	   that	   summer,	   M.S.	   Golaże,	   a	   Tbilisi	   Party	  member	  at	  “Gruzneft,”	  agreed:	  “it	  was	  necessary	  to	  criticize	  and	  speak	  about	  Stalin’s	  mistakes	   during	   his	   lifetime	   so	   that	   he	   could	   respond	   and	   correct	   his	   mistakes.”	  	  Further,	  he	  noted	   that	   “We	  should	  criticize	   the	   living	  and	   if	  we	  do	  not	   criticize	  an	  individual,	  do	  not	  tell	  the	  truth,	  he	  may	  revive	  the	  cult	  of	  personality.	  	  For	  example:	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  “Voprosy,	  postypivshie	  na	  sobraniiakh	  partaktiva	  raionnykh	  partiinykh	  organizatsii	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  201,	  l.	  56.	  414	  Kirov	  District	  Secretary	  I.	  Tandilašvili	  to	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation	  of	  Georgian	  CC,	  3	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op	  31,	  d.	  251,	  l.	  27.	  415	  	  Head	  of	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation	  of	  Tbilisi	  City	  Committee	  M.	  Gaprindašvili	   to	  N.U.	  Jaši,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  251,	  l.	  7.	  
	   174	  today	   Comrade	   Tito	   leads	   Yugoslavia,	   he	   can	   also	   make	   mistakes,	   and	   so	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  warn	  him	  promptly	  of	  criticism.”416	  	  	  K’ut’aisi	  Party	  member	  Xurc’iże	  similarly	  questioned	  the	  purpose	  behind	  the	  timing	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  announcement:	  “If	  during	  Stalin’s	  life	  no	  one	  spoke	  about	  his	  mistakes,	  what	  benefit	  will	  criticism	  of	  the	  deceased	  bring	  the	  party	  now?	  Or,	  why	  speak	  with	  derision	  about	  the	  Georgian	  people,	   to	  what	  end	   is	  a	  statesman	  judged	  based	   on	   nationality?”417	  	   As	   he	  makes	   clear	   in	   this	   question,	   Xurc’iże	   interpreted	  the	  attacks	  as	  criticizing	  Stalin	  explicitly	  as	  a	  Georgian	  (rather	  than	  Soviet)	  figure.	  	  In	  a	  meeting	  to	  discuss	  Khrushchev’s	  report	  in	  Orjonikiże	  District	  (Imeret’i),	  among	  the	  two	  hundred	  questions	  asked,	  M.	  Megrelišvili	  reported	  that:	  	  A	  number	  of	  organizations	  are	  sensitive	   to	  and	  consider	  offensive	  to	  the	   Georgian	   people	   that	   in	   [Khrushchev’s]	   report	   it	   says	   that	   “in	  Georgia,”	  thousands	  of	  innocent	  Soviet	  people	  were	  victims	  of	  tyranny	  and	  lawlessness,	  and	  it	  was	  all	  done	  under	  the	  “genius”	  leadership	  of	  Stalin,	  the	  “great	  son	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people,”	  as	  Georgians	  love	  to	  call	  their	  countryman.418	  	  	  	  In	   this	   instance,	   at	   least,	   the	   report	   author	   acknowledged	   the	   direct	   link	   between	  this	   particular	   excerpt	   from	   Khrushchev’s	   pronouncement	   and	   the	   “national	  offense”	  in	  which	  it	  was	  interpreted	  among	  Georgians.	  	  	  The	  explicit	   issue	  of	   the	  5-­‐9	  March	  events	  was	   likewise	   raised	  at	  meetings.	  	  For	   example,	   in	   Stalin	  District	   (Tbilisi),	   an	   attendee	   asked,	   “How	   correct	   is	   it	   that	  they	  are	  working	  over	  a	  dead	  man?	  In	  the	  letter	  [from	  Khrushchev]	  it	  is	  written	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  416	  "Informatsiia	  o	  khode	  obsuzhdeniia	  postanovleniia	  TsK	  KPSS	  'o	  preodolenii	  kul'ta	  lichnosti	  i	  ego	  posledstvii'	  v	  partiinykh	  organizatsiiakh	  Gruzii,"	  sšssa	  (II).	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31	  d.	  201,	  l.	  108.	  417	  “Informatsiia	  ob	  oznakomlenii	  kommunistov	  s	  dokladom	  t.	  Khrushcheva	  N.S.	   ‘o	  kul’te	   lichnosti	   i	  ego	  posledstviiakh,”	  V.	  Mžavanaże	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  201,	  l.	  31.	  418	  “Informatsiia,”	  Head	  of	  Department	  of	  Party	  Organs	  of	  Georgian	  CC	  M.	  Megrelišvili,	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  202,	  l.	  5.	  
	   175	  people	  were	  executed	  by	  Stalin’s	  order.	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  by	  whose	  order	  were	  people	  killed	  on	  9	  March?”419	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  Party-­‐member	  middle	  school	  teacher	  from	  Poti,	  S.	  T’avaże,	  explained:	  I	  do	  not	  believe	   it,	  but	  even	   if	   the	  documents	   that	  you	  read	  now	  are	  correct,	   the	  question	  remains	  whether	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   lead	  the	  state	  so	  as	  not	  to	  touch	  the	  immortal	  name	  of	  Stalin	  after	  his	  death.	   	  After	  all,	   Stalin	   died	   and	   he	   failed	   to	   prevent	   the	   recurrence	   of	   “such	  mistakes”:	  in	  Tbilisi	  on	  9	  March,	  like	  “Bloody	  Sunday,”	  they	  committed	  a	  massacre	  of	  unarmed	  people.	   	  Who	   is	   to	  blame	   for	   this?	   	  Comrade	  Stalin?!	   	   Is	   it	   justified	  when	   new	   cadres	   begin	   an	   “improvement”	   of	  their	  authority	  by	  affront,	  as	  if	  by	  criticism,	  of	  the	  old	  extraordinarily	  authoritative	   cadre?	   Are	   good	   results	   achieved	   by	   this	  method?	   No,	  no,	  and	  no…420	  	  These	   questions	   convey	   two	   central	   understandings	   of	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	  center’s	   exposure	   of	   Stalin’s	   crimes	   and	   how	   this	   effort	  was	   received	   in	   by	   Party	  members	  Georgia:	   first,	   a	   discomfort	   and	   confusion	   regarding	   the	  denunciation	  of	  Stalin’s	  crimes	  only	  after	  his	  death;	  and	  second,	  an	  explicit	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  hypocrisy	   of	   the	   center	   which,	   while	   denouncing	   Stalin’s	   ordering	   of	   executions,	  proved	   willing	   weeks	   after	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   to	   kill	   unarmed	  demonstrators	   in	   Tbilisi.	   Furthermore,	   for	   these	   Party	   members,	   Stalin’s	  posthumous	   political	   fate	   was	   explicitly	   linked	   to	   those	   demonstrators	   killed	   in	  Tbilisi.	  	  Though	  uttered	  in	  a	   less	  formal	  forum,	  frank	  explanations	  by	  officers	  of	  the	  74th	   Georgian	   Rifle	   Division,	   stationed	   in	   Kutaisi,	   reported	   in	   a	   spravka	   clearly	  demarcate	   a	   contrast	   between	   Stalin’s	   service	   to	   the	   Soviet	   state	   and	   the	   current	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  419	  “Voprosy,	  zadannye	  pri	  provedenii	  chitki	  doklada	  t.	  Khrushchev	  N.S.	  v	  partiinykh	  organizatsiiakh	  Stalinskogo	  raiona,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  212,	  l.	  40.	  420	  “Informatsiia,”	  Head	  of	  Department	  of	  Party	  Organs	  of	  Georgian	  CC	  M.	  Megrelišvili,	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  202,	  ll.	  6-­‐7.	  
	   176	  government.421	  As	   reported	   by	   an	   Agent	   Abrosimovy	   on	   18	  March,	   regarding	   the	  demonstrations	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Batumi,	  Captain	  Čankuliże	  explained	  that,	  The	  demonstrations	  and	  meetings	  that	  occurred	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Batumi	  were	   organized	   by	   the	   local	   populations	   as	   a	   protest	   against	   the	  government,	   which	   had	   forgotten	   the	   service	   of	   Stalin	   to	   the	   state.	  	  The	   government	   became	   accustomed	   to	   the	   people	   applauding	   its	  decisions,	   and	   bowing	   their	   heads	   before	   it.	   	   So	   it	   was	   during	   the	  arrest	  of	  Beria,	  who	  was	  indeed	  the	  enemy.	  	  Therefore	  the	  arrest	  was	  endorsed	  by	  the	  people.	   	  But	  when	  they	  began	  to	  criticize	  Stalin,	   the	  people	  did	  not	  approve	   this	  action	  of	   the	  government,	  and	   therefore	  [the	  people]	  protests	  now.422	  	  As	  this	  excerpt	  demonstrates,	  “the	  people”	  and	  Stalin	  were	  aligned	  in	  support	  of	  and	  service	   to	   the	   state,	   whereas	   their	   protests	   were	   directed	   toward	   the	   current	  government.	   	  Medical	  Service	  Captain	  C’xomeliże	  made	  a	   similar	  connection	  when	  he	  claimed,	  “How	  our	  youth	  is	  growing,	  because	  even	  they	  do	  not	  fear	  to	  go	  against	  the	  government.	  	  This	  is	  a	  true	  political	  demonstration	  about	  which	  has	  never	  been	  heard	  or	  written	  in	  history.	  	  It	  is	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  dirty	  Stalin’s	  name.”423	  A	  Lieutenant	  Orażeliże	   also	  distinguished	  between,	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  will	   of	   the	  people	   and	  Stalin,	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   the	   party:	   “You	   speak	   about	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   people.	  	  Typically	   it	   can	   be	   verified	   by	   the	   responses	   of	   the	   people.	   	   But	   the	   recent	   event	  suggests	  otherwise.	  	  The	  party	  wants	  to	  impose	  its	  will	  on	  the	  people	  –	  to	  make	  the	  people	   forget	   Stalin.”424	  	   Finally,	   in	   a	   discussion	   on	   14	   March	   between	   several	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  Serov	  singled	  this	  division	  out	   in	  his	  report	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC,	  citing	  their	  “unhealthy	  feelings	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet	  utterances.”	  sšssa	  (I),	  f.	  6,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  34.	  422	  “Spravka	  po	  reagirovaniiu	  lichnogo	  sostava	  chastei	  Zakavkazskogo	  Voennogo	  Okruga	  na	  sobytiia	  v	   sviazi	   s	   godovshchinoi	   smerti	   tovarishcha	   STALINA,”	   Head	   of	   the	   2nd	   Sector	   of	   the	   Special	  Department	  of	  the	  KGB/ZakVO	  Lieutenant	  Dunaev,	  20	  March	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  297,	  ll.	  36-­‐7.	  423	  Ibid.,	  l.	  6.	  424	  Ibid.,	  l.	  18.	  
	   177	  majors,	  Major	  Kuxaleišvili	  explained,	  “the	  crowd	  was	  against	  comrades	  Khrushchev	  and	  Bulganin	  because	  in	  a	  secret	  letter	  about	  Stalin	  they	  allegedly	  called	  him	  a	  crook	  and	   other	   bad	   words.”	   	   After	   hearing	   this,	   Major	   Gogoliuk	   (likely	   a	   Ukrainian	   by	  nationality,	   based	   on	  his	   surname)	   suggested	   instead	   that	   it	  was	   a	   demonstration	  “against	  the	  Soviet	  government	  and	  Soviet	  power.”	  Kuxaleišvili	  retorted,	  “It	  was	  only	  against	  the	  two	  aforementioned	  comrades.”425	  While	   the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  pronouncements	  were	  associated	  with	  Khrushchev	   in	   particular,	   some	   Party	   member	   servicemen	   interpreted	   the	  demonstrations	   as	   against	  Mikoyan	   rather	   than	   Khrushchev.	   	   Captain	   K’itošvili,	   a	  company	  commander,	   singled	  out	  Mikoyan	  as	   the	  embodiment	  of	   the	  government	  and,	  as	  such,	   the	   target	  of	   the	  5-­‐9	  March	  demonstrations.	   	  After	  discussions	  about	  the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   among	   a	   group	   of	   officers	   on	   13	   March,	   K’itošvili	  exclaimed,	  “How	  can	  this	  miserable	  Armenian	  speak	  out	  against	  Stalin	  and	  spoil	  his	  name?	  	  Not	  for	  nothing	  were	  these	  demonstrations	  held	  against	  him,	  which	  brought	  about	  victims.	  	  This	  will	  not	  happen	  for	  nothing.”426	  	  Senior	  Lieutenant	  C’omolašvili	  expanded	   on	   this	   point	   by	   recounting	   how	  Mikoyan’s	   portrait	   had	   been	   allegedly	  hung	  upside	  down	  on	  a	  train	  and	  that	  this	  was	  done	  correctly	  because	  he	  had	  soiled	  Stalin’s	   name.427 	  	   Whether	   interpreted	   as	   demonstrations	   against	   Khrushchev,	  Bulganin,	   or	  Mikoyan,	   the	   sentiment	   remained,	   as	   noted	   by	   I.M.	   Berikac’išvili	   that	  “At	   the	   current	   time,	   of	   course,	   it	   is	   not	   right	   that	   in	   the	   government	   in	  Moscow	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   178	  there	   is	   not	   a	   single	   Georgian.	   	   The	   government	   is	   a	   great	   power	   and	   it	   is	   not	   a	  coincidence	   that	   recently	   for	  us	   in	  Georgia	   there	  were	  killings	  and	   injuries.”428	  	  As	  these	  comments	  demonstrate,	  attacks	  levied	  against	  Mikoyan	  in	  particular	  acquired	  a	   national	   (and	   at	   times	   xenophobic)	   tinge,	   both	   for	   his	   position	   as	   a	   prominent	  Armenian	   –	   a	   nationality	   with	   a	   tangible	   presence	   in	   Georgia	   and	   against	   whom	  Georgians	  historically	  have	  identified	  –	  and	  for	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  a	  comparable	  Georgian	   spokesman	   at	   the	   all-­‐Union,	   Presidium	   level	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   Stalin’s	  death	  and	  Beria’s	  execution.429	  The	  questions	  and	  explanations	  posed	  above	  reveal	  an	  underlying	  confusion	  and	   concern	  with	   the	   timing	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   denunciations,	  which	   point	   in	   some	  cases	  to	  a	  distinctively	  “national”	  interpretation	  of	  the	  situation,	  and	  in	  others,	  one	  which	   is	  more	   concerned	  with	   the	   historical	   context	   of	   de-­‐Stalinization	   and	   the	   9	  March	   Tbilisi	   crackdown.	   	   Non-­‐Georgians	   outside	   of	   the	   autonomous	   regions	  likewise	  used	  the	  opportunity	  afforded	  by	  these	  discussions	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  national	   priorities	   in	   an	   official	   setting.	   	   For	   example,	   at	   Party	   meetings	   in	  Axalk’alak’i,	  Bolnisi,	  Dmanisi,	  and	  Marneuli	  districts,	  which	  had	  large	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	   populations,	   Party	  members	   “spoke	   about	   the	   necessity	   of	   organizing	  radio	   programs	   in	   Armenian	   and	   Azerbaijani	   languages,	   about	   the	   creation	   of	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  A	  particularly	  glaring	  example	  of	  this	  link	  was	  reported	  on	  13	  March	  in	  Axalk’alak’i,	  a	  city	  with	  a	  large	  Armenian	  population.	   	  A	  make-­‐shift	   announcement	  was	  posted	   in	  Armenian	   that	   read:	   “Dear	  Georgians,	  do	  not	  be	  afraid	  of	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  Armenians	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  a	  Georgian…”	  Ibid.	  
	   179	  republican	   newspapers	   in	   the	   Azerbaijani	   language	   and	   Azerbaijani	   theatre.”430	  Rather	   than	   speaking	   directly	   about	   the	   cult	   of	   personality	   or	   the	   March	   1956	  events,	   in	   these	   locales	   meeting	   attendees	   raised	   their	   own	   long-­‐standing	  grievances.	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  March	  event,	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  received	  a	  number	   of	   letters	   and	   petitions	   from	   Russian	   residents	   of	   Georgia	   (in	   Rustavi,	  Tbilisi,	   and	  Cxaltubo),	   citing	  discrimination	  against	  non-­‐Georgians	   for	  professional	  assignments,	  Party	  membership,	  and	  in	  daily	  interactions	  in	  a	  developing	  “Georgia	  –	  for	  Georgians.”431	  	  Just	  as	  a	  Georgian	  national	  discourse	  coalesced	  around	  the	  March	  1956	  events,	   the	  opening	  provided	  by	   the	  cult	  of	  personality	  discussions	  similarly	  inspired	  non-­‐Georgians	  to	  voice	  more	  vociferously	  their	  own	  opinions	  on	  issues	  of	  nationality	  in	  the	  republic.	  	  	  
Metaphor:	  Views	  from	  the	  Autonomous	  Regions	  	   Discussions	   in	   the	   autonomous	   regions	   demonstrate	   that,	   while	   the	  March	  events	   were	   first	   and	   foremost	   a	   Georgian	   national	   affair,	   the	   fallout	   of	   the	  demonstrations	  and	  opening	  offered	  by	  Khrushchev’s	  discourse	  shift	  caused	  citizens	  in	  Abkhazia,	  Ajaria,	   and	   South	  Ossetia	   to	   express	   their	   own	   spectrum	  of	   concerns	  regarding	   their	   status	   within	   the	   republic.	   Though	   Abkhaz	   representatives	   in	  particular	   voiced	   certain	   grievances	   against	   the	   Tbilisi	   center	   prior	   to	   1956,	   the	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  rabote	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii’	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  Second	  Secretary	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  Georgian	  CC	  P.B.	  Kovanov,	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  RGANI,	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  tenor,	  breadth,	  and	  quantity	  of	  their	  concerns	  increased	  markedly	  from	  this	  point	  –	  a	  trend	  that	  would	  continue,	  haltingly,	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Soviet	  period.	  	  In	  all	  three	  regions,	  the	  specter	  of	  1937-­‐1938	  dominated	  discussions	  among	  Party	  members.	  Even	   in	  the	   largely	  ethnically	  Georgian,	  historically	  Muslim	  Ajaria,	  for	   instance,	   T.	   Čik’ovani,	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   Ajaria	   KGB,	   noted	   that	   over	   the	  course	   of	   1937-­‐1938,	   Beria	   and	   his	   “henchmen”	   (prispeshniki)	   arrested	   11,000	  innocent	  people,	  of	  whom	  4,000	  were	  executed,	  in	  the	  “small	  autonomous	  republic	  of	  Ajaria”	   for	  having	  “family	  ties	   in	  Turkey”	  and	  “smuggling	  honest	  workers	  to	  the	  Turkish	   border	   region”	   in	   addition	   to	   purported	   spy	   and	   terrorist	   activities.432	  In	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia,	  charges	  regarding	  the	  national	  dimension	  of	  the	  Terror	  were	   even	   more	   glaring.	   In	   a	   6	   September	   Party	   meeting	   of	   the	   Staliniri	   (South	  Ossetia)	  State	  Pedagogical	  Institute,	  F.Z.	  Chuchiev	  claimed,	  	  From	  Georgia	  [Beria]	  wanted	  to	  create	  a	  “great”	  Georgia	  and	  separate	  her	  from	  the	  family	  of	  socialist	  republics.	  He	  and	  his	  henchmen	  strove	  to	  foster	  national	  exceptionalism	  among	  the	  Georgian	  population	  and	  confine	  it	  in	  a	  narrow	  national	  framework,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  creating	  a	  feeling	  of	  superiority	  over	  and	  hatred	  toward	  other	  nations	  (natsiia):	  Ossetian,	  Abkhaz,	  Armenian	  and	  others	  living	  in	  Georgia;	  they	  sowed	  enmity	   between	   them.	   His	   approach	   against	   Ossetians	   and	   Abkhaz	  began	  in	  1937.	  He	  decided	  to	  assimilate	  Ossetians	  and	  Abkhaz.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  assimilation,	  he	  had	  to	  clear	  the	  path	  himself	  and	  he	  did	  so.433	  	  Similarly,	  during	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Party	  organization	  of	  the	  Mugudzirkhva	  kolkhoz,	  in	   Gudauta	   District	   (Abkhazia),	   attendees	   took	   the	   opportunity	   offered	   by	  discussions	  of	  the	  cult	  of	  personality	  to	  openly	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  “atrocities	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  432	  “O	  khode	  obsuzhdeniia	  Postanovleniia	  TsK	  KPSS	  ot	  10	  iiulia	  1956	  goda	  v	  Adzharskoi	  organizatsii	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  208,	  ll.	  291-­‐292.	  	  433 	  “Protokol	   8	   zakrytogo	   partiinogo	   sobraniia	   pervichnoi	   partorganizatsii	   Stalinirskogo	  Gospedinstituta	  ot	  6-­‐go	  sentiabria	  1956	  g.,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  210,	  ll.	  249-­‐250.	  
	   181	  lawlessness”	   in	   Abkhazia	   during	   1937,	   when	   eighty	   kolkhozniki	   from	   this	   village	  were	  “repressed,”	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  posthumously	  rehabilitated.	   	  According	  to	  the	  report	  prepared	  by	  M.	  Megrelišvili	  for	  the	  Georgian	  Central	  Committee,	  Party	  members	   Dzhikirba,	   Agrba,	   and	   Gubaz,	   who	   themselves	   were	   arrested	   in	   1937,	  asked	  “Do	  we	  need	  portraits	  and	  monuments	  to	  such	  a	  person	  who	  so	  mercilessly	  destroyed	  people?	  After	  all,	  by	  his	  actions	  he	  was,	   in	   fact,	  an	  enemy	  of	   the	  people,	  only	  this	  was	  not	  revealed	  until	  now.”434	  Based	  on	  their	  surnames,	  Dzhikirba,	  Agrba,	  and	  Gubaz	  were	   likely	  Abkhaz	   by	   nationality.	   	   Their	   strong	   anti-­‐Stalin	   sentiments	  (rather	  than	  simply	  anti-­‐Beria),	  as	  expressed	  in	  this	  statement,	  depart	  significantly	  from	   the	   concerns	   expressed	   by	   Georgian	   Party	  members	   described	   above.	   	  M.M.	  Shamba,	   procurator	  of	   the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR,	   conveyed	  a	   similar	  point	  when	  he	  noted	  that	   the	   crimes	   of	   the	   Terror	  were	   the	   “result	   of	   the	  well-­‐being	   of	   Stalin’s	   cult	   of	  personality,	   giving	   the	   possibility	   to	   Beria’s	   band	   to	   do	   its	   dirty	   work	   and	  treacherously	  destroy	  the	  best	  cadres	  of	  our	  party	  and	  country,	  and	  the	  limits	  were	  solicited	   by	   Beria	   and	   sanctioned	   by	   Stalin.” 435 	  While	   for	   many	   Georgians	   it	  remained	   possible	   at	   this	   point	   to	   view	   Stalin	   positively	   as	   a	   Georgian	   national	  figure,	   among	   Abkhaz	   representatives,	   understanding	   Stalin	   –	   like	   Beria	   -­‐-­‐	   as	   a	  Georgian	   only	   reinforced	   animosities	   between	   Georgians	   and	   Abkhaz	   in	   the	  republic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  434	  “Informatsiia,”	  Head	  of	  Department	  of	  Party	  Organs	  of	  Georgian	  CC	  M.	  Megrelišvili,	  April	  1956,	  sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   31,	   d.	   202,	   l.	   3.	   	   This	   comment	  was	   deemed	   important	   enough	   to	   be	   included	  explicitly	  in	  a	  report	  from	  Mžavanaże	  to	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee,	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  Biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  o	  massovykh	  volneniiakh	  naseleniia…”,	  294.	  435	  Speech	  by	  M.M.	  Shamba	  to	  oblast	  aktiv	  in	  fall	  1956,	  reprinted	  in	  Abkhazskie	  pis’ma	  (1947-­‐1989):	  
Sbornik	   dokumentov	   (Sukhum:	   El-­‐Fa,	   1994),	   119.	   Original	   in	   Partarkhiv	   Abkhazskogo	   obkoma	   KP	  Gruzii,	  f.	  1,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  36,	  ll.	  127-­‐134.	  	  
	   182	  	   As	  Chuchiev	  makes	  clear,	  exposing	  truths	  about	  the	  Terror	  remained	  closely	  linked	   with	   perceived	   threats	   to	   rights	   of	   non-­‐Georgians	   in	   South	   Ossetia	   and	  Abkhazia.	  Both	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetian	  representatives	  accused	  Beria	  and	  his	  cohort	  of	  implementing	  a	  “policy	  of	  forced	  assimilation”	  in	  their	  territories	  during	  his	  tenure	  as	   Georgian	   First	   Secretary.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Abkhazia,	   according	   to	   Abkhaz	   Obkom	  Secretary	  Tarba,	  this	  policy	  manifested	  itself	  on	  many	  fronts:	  Beria’s	  team	  allegedly	  “exterminated”	   the	   republic’s	  best	   cadres,	   exclusively	  promoted	   those	  of	  Georgian	  nationality	   to	   leadership	   posts,	   closed	   Abkhaz	   schools,	   mandated	   instruction	   of	  Abkhaz	   children	   in	   the	   Georgian	   language,	   converted	   the	   Abkhaz	   alphabet	   to	  Georgian,	   closed	   Armenian	   and	   many	   Russian	   schools,	   re-­‐named	   cities,	   streets,	  villages,	  kolkhozes,	  rivers,	  and	  railway	  stations	  in	  a	  Georgian	  fashion,	  and	  resettled	  Georgians	  from	  other	  districts	  of	  Georgia	  in	  Abkhazia.436	  Chuchiev	  complained	  of	  a	  similar	   process	   in	   South	  Ossetia,	   including	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   “best”	   cadres	   in	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  the	  entire	  intelligentsia,	  the	  “liquidation”	  of	  sources	  of	  culture,	  the	  conversion	  of	  the	  Ossetian	  alphabet	  to	  Georgian,	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  Ossetian	  and	  Russian	  schools.437	  	  	   Abkhaz	   and	   Ossetian	   representatives	   did	   not	   limit	   their	   complaints	   to	   the	  Beria	  era:	  the	  recent	  past,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  postwar	  resettlements,	  the	  March	  events,	  or	  the	   rewriting	   of	   Georgian	   history,	   all	   proved	   ripe	   sources	   of	   grievance	   as	  well.	   In	  Abkhazia,	  participants	  lamented	  the	  resettlement	  policies	  that	  changed	  many	  parts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  436	  “Informatsiia	   o	   sobraniiakh	   aktiva	   Abkhazskoi	   oblastnoi,	   raionnykh	   i	   gorodskikh	   partiinykh	  organizatsii	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  208,	  ll.	  398-­‐399.	  437 	  “Protokol	   8	   zakrytogo	   partiinogo	   sobraniia	   pervichnoi	   partorganizatsii	   Stalinirskogo	  Gospedinstituta	  ot	  6-­‐go	  sentiabria	  1956	  g.,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  210,	  ll.	  249-­‐250.	  
	   183	  of	   the	   autonomous	   republic	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   period.	   Shamba,	   for	   example,	   in	   his	  speech	   noted	   the	   “impoverished”	  Greek	   families	  with	   Soviet	   citizenship,	   including	  decorated	   Great	   Patriotic	   War	   veterans,	   who	   were	   deported	   from	   Abkhazia	   and	  expelled	   from	   their	   homes. 438 	  In	   the	   village	   of	   Amtqeli	   (Gul’ripskii	   District),	  Comrade	  Markosian,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Rust'aveli	  kolkhoz	  (and	  likely	  Armenian	  by	  nationality	  based	  on	  his	  surname),	  similarly	  pointed	  to	  the	  “illegal	  deportation	  of	  Armenians	  and	  Greeks	  in	  1949.”439	  In	  the	  same	  village,	  S.	  Zurabiani	  of	  the	  Malenkov	  
kolkhoz	  reminded	  attendees	  that,	   in	  connection	  with	  Beria’s	  cultivation	  of	  national	  enmity	   in	  Georgia,	   “We	  were	   resettled	  here	   against	  our	  will	   from	  K’vemo	  Svanet’i	  District,	   and	   the	   Greeks	   who	   were	   residing	   here	   were	   illegally	   deported	   to	  Kazakhstan	  and	  other	  districts	  of	  the	  country.”440	  Furthermore,	  A.A.	  Beslanże	  of	  the	  Mugudzirkhva	  kolkhoz	   (Gudauta	  District,	   likely	   a	   Georgian)	   complained	   about	   the	  redistribution	   of	   lands	   by	   Abkhazpereselenstroi	   to	   accommodate	   newly-­‐resettled	  
kolkhozniki	   from	   Svanet’i	   to	   villages	   such	   as	   Otkhara	   and	   Dzhirkhva.441 	  These	  speakers,	   who	   included	   Abkhaz,	   Armenian,	   and	   Svan	   representatives,	   not	   only	  linked	  their	  own	  fates	  with	  the	  policies	  of	  Beria	  and	  Stalin,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  the	  Greek	  population	   deported	   from	   Abkhazia.	   Though	   expressing	   its	   own	   grievances,	   a	  broader	  “non-­‐Georgian”	  consensus	  within	  Abkhazia	  appeared	  as	  well.	  Furthermore,	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  Speech	  by	  M.M.	  Shamba	  to	  oblast	  aktiv	  in	  fall	  1956,	  reprinted	  in	  Abkhazskie	  pis’ma	  (1947-­‐1989),	  116.	  Original	  in	  Partarkhiv	  Abkhazskogo	  obkoma	  KP	  Gruzii,	  f.	  1,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  36,	  ll.	  127-­‐134.	  	  439	  “Informatsiia	   o	   sobraniiakh	   aktiva	   Abkhazskoi	   oblastnoi,	   raionnykh	   i	   gorodskikh	   partiinykh	  organizatsii	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	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  14,	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  31,	  d.	  208,	  ll.	  419-­‐420.	  440	  “Informatsiia	  o	  khode	  zakrytykh	  partiinykh	  sobranii	  po	  obsuzhdeniiu	  postanovleniia	  Prezidiuma	  TsK	  KPSS	  ot	  10	  iiulia	  1956	  goda	  ‘ob	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  i	  nedostatkakh	  v	  rabote	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  19	  September	  1956,	  sšssa	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  f.	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  31,	  d.	  209,	  l.	  152.	  	  441	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  153-­‐154.	  
	   184	  the	   Georgian	   Beslanże	   used	   the	   opportunity	   to	   express	   his	   resentment	   about	   the	  Abkhazpereselenstroi	  project	  and	  resettled	  Svan	  populations.	  The	  Svan	  perspective	  (Zurabiani)	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   particularly	   illustrative:	   as	   a	   sub-­‐Georgian	   ethnic	  group	  (like	  Mingrelians),	  the	  Svan	  settlers	  served	  as	  both	  Georgian	  representatives	  (from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Tbilisi)	  dispatched	  in	  an	  autonomous	  region	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐Georgians	  in	  the	  local	  landscape	  of	  multiethnic	  Abkhazia.	  	  	   Not	   surprisingly,	   residents	   of	   Abkhazia	   and	   South	   Ossetia	   interpreted	   the	  March	   events	   in	   a	   different	   light	   than	   fellow	   citizens	   in	   Tbilisi	   or	   Gori.	   As	   noted	  above,	   the	  commemorations	  and	  demonstrations	   that	   took	  place	   in	  Sukhumi	  were	  largely	  the	  concern	  of	  ethnic	  Georgians,	  not	  Abkhaz	  or	  other	  non-­‐Georgian	  minority	  populations.	   In	   Abkhazia,	   a	   group	   of	   Georgians	   (Getia,	   Axalaia,	   and	   Gabasonia,	  representatives	  of	  two	  kolkhozes	  and	  one	  village)	  asked,	   in	  a	  petition,	  what	  would	  be	   done	   with	   those	   who	   gave	   the	   order	   to	   shoot	   at	   “defenseless	   children”	   on	   9	  March	   in	   Tbilisi.	   They	   also	   described	   manifestations	   of	   “Abkhaz	   bourgeois	  nationalism”	  and	  “Great	  Russian	  chauvinism”	  among	  several	  workers	  in	  the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  and	  Abkhaz	  Presidium,	  but	  noted	  that	  the	  Georgian	  Central	  Committee	  had	  not	  taken	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  counter	  it.442	  The	  perceived	  alliance	  of	  Abkhaz	  and	  Russian	  national	   agendas	   for	   this	   speaker	  points	   to	   the	  perception	   that	   the	  9	  March	  crackdown	  by	  the	  Red	  Army	  was	  a	  Russian	  action	  against	  Georgians,	  thereby	  making	  an	  Abkhaz-­‐Russian	  link	  all	  the	  more	  threatening	  (from	  their	  point	  of	  view)	  for	  Georgians	  living	  in	  Abkhazia.	  Similar	  protests	  did	  not	  occur	  in	  Staliniri,	  despite	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  “Informatsiia	   o	   sobraniiakh	   aktiva	   Abkhazskoi	   oblastnoi,	   raionnykh	   i	   gorodskikh	   partiinykh	  organizatsii	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  208,	  ll.	  424-­‐425.	  
	   185	  its	   namesake,	   but	   residents	   of	   South	   Ossetia	   still	   voiced	   opinions	   on	   the	   March	  events.	   For	   example,	   Party	   member	   V.M.	   Khetagurov	   explained	   that	   the	   Tbilisi	  events	  were	  the,	  	  most	   disgraceful	   stage	   in	   the	   party	   life	   of	   the	   Georgian	   SSR.	   At	   first	  glance	   it	   seemed	   as	   if	   nothing	   peculiar	   had	   happened.	   Workers,	  especially	  young	  students,	  honored	  the	  memory	  of	  comrade	  Stalin,	  but	  if	   one	   understands	   it	   politically,	   then	   it	   was	   a	   truly	  counterrevolutionary	   and	   I	   would	   say	   shamelessly	   nationalistic	  statement.443	  	  Whereas	   the	   Georgians	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   regarded	   the	   5-­‐9	   March	  demonstrations	  primarily	   as	   a	  national,	   cultural	   statement,	  non-­‐Georgians	   such	  as	  Khetagurov	   attributed	   a	   stronger,	   political	  motivation	   to	   the	  Georgians’	   actions.	   It	  remains	   significant	   (though	  perhaps	   not	   surprising)	   that	   on	   this	   point	  many	  non-­‐Georgian	  Party	  members	  agreed	  with	  Mžavanaże:	  that	  (in	  their	   interpretation)	  the	  overtly	   nationalistic	   aims	   of	   Georgians	   in	   the	   republic	   not	   only	   increased	   discord	  between	  Georgians	   and	   other	   nationalities,	   but	   also	  were	   detrimental	   to	  minority	  national	  rights	  within	  the	  Georgian	  SSR.	  	  	  
From	  Metaphor	  to	  Memory:	  	  
giorgi	  merč’ule	  and	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  Relations	  	  	   Discussions	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  March	  events	  confronted	  a	  more	  complex	  recent	   history	   in	   Abkhazia	   for	   reasons	   other	   than	   those	   noted	   above.	   In	   1954,	  Georgian	  literary	  historian	  Pavle	  Ingoroqva	  published	  a	  thousand-­‐page	  work,	  Giorgi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  443	  Secretary	  of	  South	  Ossetia	  obkom	  Sanakoev	  G.G.	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  28	  September	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  210,	  l.	  196.	  
	   186	  
Merč’ule:	   A	   Tenth-­‐Century	   Georgian	   Writer,	   in	   Tbilisi.444	  Though	   Ingoroqva	   had	  published	  shorter	  articles	  on	  the	  topic	  in	  the	  scholarly	  journal	  mnat’obi	   in	  1949,	  at	  that	  time,	  little	  critical	  discussion	  ensued.445	  	  The	  scope	  of	  Giorgi	  Merč’ule	  was	  considerably	  broader	   than	   the	   topics	   in	   it	  that	  generated	  the	  most	  discussion:	  ostensibly	  a	  biography	  of	  a	  man	  and	  his	  world	  drawn	  from	  ecclesiastical	  sources	  and	  linguistics,	  in	  his	  book,	  Ingoroqva	  also	  made	  more	   wide-­‐ranging	   interpretations	   of	   Georgian	   history,	   long	   after	   the	   period	   of	  Merč’ule’s	   life,	   through	   this	   narrative.	   Of	   these,	   new	   arguments	   about	   the	   genesis	  and	   migration	   history	   of	   the	   peoples	   and	   lands	   of	   Abkhazia	   proved	   the	   most	  controversial.	   In	   short,	   Ingoroqva	   claimed	   that	   Georgian	   tribes	   had	   settled	   the	  territories	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast	  since	  at	  least	  the	  eighth	  century,	  and	  that	   ethnic	   Abkhaz	   had	   only	   been	   on	   the	   territory	   since	   the	   seventeenth	   century.	  	  Many	   of	   Ingoroqva’s	   claims	  were	   based	   on	   rather	   specious	   evidence	   that	   Abkhaz	  words	   and	   place	   names	   actually	   had	   Kartvelian	   roots,	   thereby	   allegedly	   proving	  their	  Georgianness.	  	   As	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   scholars	   began	   to	   review	   the	   book	   within	   their	  institution,	  the	  first	  public	  review,	  by	  G.	  Axvlediani,	  appeared	  in	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  on	  9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  444	  Pavle	   Ingoroqva,	   giorgi	  merč’ule:	   k’art’veli	   mcerali	  meate	   saukunisa:	   narkvevi	   żveli	   sak’art’velos	  
literaturis,	   kulturis	   da	   saxelmcip’oebrivi	   c’xovrebis	   istoriidan	   (Tbilisi:	   Sabčot'a	   Mcerali,	   1954).	  Ingoroqva	   was	   a	   prominent	   literary	   historian	   and	   member	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Writers’	   Union	   and	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  445	  Pavle	   Ingoroqva,	   “giorgi	   merč’ule:	   k’art’veli	   mcerali	   meate	   saukunisa	   (1),”	  mnat’obi	   26,	   no.	   10	  (October	  1949):	  144–171	  and	  “giorgi	  merč’ule:	  k’art’veli	  mcerali	  meate	  saukunisa	  (2),”	  mnat’obi	  26,	  no.	  11	  (November	  1949):	  122–153.	  
	   187	  July	  1955.446	  This	  overwhelmingly	   laudatory	   review	  raised	   the	  profile	  of	   the	  work	  not	   only	   among	   Georgians,	   but	   also	   among	   the	   Abkhaz	   readership.	   The	   Abkhaz	  Obkom	  brought	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  Mžavanaże	  and	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  in	  a	  22	  August	   1955	   letter,	   which	   cast	   the	   work	   in	   the	   context	   of	   broader	   attempts	   to	  “destroy”	   everything	   connected	   with	   the	   name	   of	   the	   Abkhaz	   people.447	  In	   their	  telling,	   the	   1954	   publication	   of	   Giorgi	   Merč’ule	   went	   against	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  atmosphere	   of	   “necessary	   friendship”	   in	   the	   republic	   and	   failed	   to	   adhere	   to	  established	   scholarly	   standards.	   Furthermore,	   they	   criticized	   Axvlediani,	   who	  “wholly	   endorse[d]	   the	   author’s	   anti-­‐scholarly	   ‘new’	   view”	   while	   “idealizing	   the	  vicious	   book.”448	  In	   response	   to	   the	   Abkhaz	   Obkom’s	   complaint,	   the	   Georgian	   CC	  acknowledged	   that	   the	   paper	   published	   the	   review	  without	   waiting	   for	   sufficient	  evaluation	  of	  the	  facts	  from	  other	  scholars,	  especially	  regarding	  “the	  genesis	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  people,”	  and	  resolved	  to	  point	  out	  the	  mistakes	  to	  Zaria	  Vostoka’s	  editor,	  I.P.	  Cxikišvili.449	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  problem	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  resolved.	  	  However,	  Party	  meetings	  held	  in	  1956	  following	  the	  March	  events	  to	  discuss	  “the	  mistakes	  and	   shortcomings”	  of	   the	  Georgian	  CP	  provided	  a	   further	   forum	   for	  Abkhaz	   representatives	   to	   link	   debates	   about	   Georgian	   and	   Abkhaz	   history	   to	  broader	  grievances	  about	  the	  status	  of	  non-­‐Georgians	  in	  the	  republic.	  In	  a	  speech	  at	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  G.	  Akhvlediani,	  “Tsennyi	  trud	  po	  istorii	  gruzinskoi	  kul’tury,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka,	  (9	  July	  1955),	  p.	  3.	  For	  a	   concurrent	  draft	   review	  within	   the	  Academy	  of	   Sciences’	   Javaxišvili	   Institute,	   see	  Z.	  Anchabadze,	  “Voprosy	  istorii	  Abkhazii	   i	  abkhazskogo	  tsarstva’	  v	  knige	  P.	   Ingorokva	   ‘Georgii	  Merchule,	  gruzinskii	  pisatel’	  10	  veka,”	  smeaa,	  f.	  9,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  297,	  ll.	  106-­‐137.	  447“Pis’mo	  sekretaria	  Abkhazskogo	  obkoma	  i	  predsedatelia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR	  ot	  16	  avgusta	  1955	  g.,	  ”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  374,	  l.	  2.	  448	  Ibid.,	  l.	  5.	  449	  “Resheniia,	   priniatoe	   8	   sentiabria	   1955	   goda	   ‘O	   vystuplenii	   gazety	   ‘Zaria	   Vostoka’	   po	   povodu	  knigi	  P.	  Ingorokva	  ‘Georgii	  Merchule,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  30,	  d.	  118,	  l.	  1.	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  a	  district	  Party	  meeting,	  A.T.	  Otyrba,	   from	  the	  propaganda	  and	  agitation	  section	  of	  the	   Abkhaz	   Obkom,	   highlighted	   the	   failure	   of	   Party	   work	   “especially	   among	   the	  scholarly	   intelligentsia”	   as	   related	   to	   the	   March	   events.	   A	   combination	   of	  “nationalistic	   feelings”	   and	   “sycophants”	   attempted	   to	   “liquidate	   the	   face	   of	   the	  Abkhaz	   people,”	   and	   the	   “unfortunate	   book	   of	   P.	   Ingoroqva	  Georgii	  Merchule	   was	  generated	   by	   this	   policy.”	   Though	   Otyrba	   argued	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	  Abkhaz	  people	  were	  an	  autonomous	  (samostoiatel’nyi)	  people	  was	  not	  in	  dispute,	  “it	  is	  a	  different	  matter	   if	   the	  workers	  of	   the	  Georgian	  CP	  CC	  themselves	  are	  not	  sure	  and	   doubt	   this.”	   The	   “anti-­‐scholarly	   conception	   of	   the	   falsifier	   of	   history	   P.	  Ingoroqva”	  therefore	  necessitated	  a	  more	  concerted	  struggle	  with	  manifestations	  of	  “bourgeois	   nationalism”	   among	   the	   scholarly	   intelligentsia	   not	   merely	   for	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	   Abkhaz	   people,	   but	   for	   relations	   toward	   the	   Abkhaz,	   Ossetians	   and	  other	  peoples	  residing	  in	  Georgia.450	  	  	  	   Scholars	  continued	   to	  review	   Ingoroqva’s	  book,	  and	  as	  part	  of	   this	  process,	  an	   article	   by	   senior	   historian	   and	   Javaxišvili	   Institute	   head	   Nikoloz	   Berżenišvili	  appeared	   in	   the	  December	  1956	   issue	  of	  mnat’obi	   that	  commended	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  vast	  work	  but	  also	  detailed	  several	  shortcomings.451	  Most	  notably,	  Berżenišvili	  criticized	   Ingoroqva’s	   use	   of	   what	   Berżenišvili	   regarded	   as	   a	   literary	   source	   (the	  writings	   of	   the	  Tao-­‐Klarjet’ian	  monk	  Merč’ule)	   to	  make	   claims	   that	   necessitated	   a	  comparative	  historiographical,	  archaeological,	  ethnographic,	  linguistic,	  and	  folkloric	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  Speech	   by	   Otyrba	   A.T.	   to	   meeting	   of	   oblast’	   Party	   aktiv,	   late	   summer	   1956,	   reprinted	   in	  
Abkhazskie	  pis’ma	  (1947-­‐1989),	  123-­‐128.	  Original	  in	  Partarkhiv	  Abkhazskogo	  obkoma	  KP	  Gruzii,	  f.	  1,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  36,	  ll.	  127-­‐134.	  
451 Nikoloz	   Berżenišvili,	   “p.	   ingoroqvas	   cignis	   -­‐	   ‘giorgi	   merč’ules’	   gamo,”	   mnat’obi	   33,	   no.	   12	  (December	  1956):	  125–31. 
	   189	  approach.	  	  	  Berżenišvili	  found	  Ingoroqva’s	  arguments	  about	  the	  Abkhaz	  kingdoms	  to	  be	   particularly	   problematic,	   as	   the	   paucity	   of	   sources	   was	  most	   apparent	   in	   that	  section.	   This	   was,	   in	   short,	   a	   problem	   of	   method	   rather	   than	   content:	   in	  Berżenišvili‘s	   view,	   Ingoroqva	   wanted	   to	   explain	   the	   Georgian	   politics	   of	   Abkhaz	  kings	  of	  the	  eighth	  to	  tenth	  centuries	  on	  ethnic	  grounds.	  He	  argued	  that	  Ingoroqva	  was	  mistaken	   to	   think	   that	   the	  making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   polity	   could	   only	   include	  those	  peoples	  who	  were	  descendants	  of	  Kartvelian	  tribes	  (meaning	  that	  Ingoroqva	  argued	   for	   the	   Kartvelian	   roots	   of	   the	   Abkhaz).	   Yet	   while	   Berżenišvili’s	   review	  contained	  a	  number	  of	  criticisms	  of	  Ingoroqva’s	  work,	  the	  review	  soon	  became	  the	  center	   of	   controversy	   because	   it	   challenged	   the	  method	  more	   than	   the	   content	   of	  Ingoroqva’s	   actual	   claims.	   Berżenišvili	   later	   alleged	   that	   the	   journal’s	   editors	  changed	  the	  text	  of	  his	  article	  to	  promote	  a	  more	  positive	  view	  of	  the	  work	  without	  his	   consent,	   which	   he	   claimed	   in	   appeals	   to	   Mžavanaże	   and	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   in	  1957.452	  The	   solution,	   to	   compensate	   for	   publishing	   Berżenišvili’s	   article,	   was	   to	  publish	   a	   series	   of	  more	   critical	   reviews	   of	   Ingoroqva’s	   book	   in	  mnat’obi	   in	   early	  1957	  by	  Axvlediani,	  Qauxč’ašvili,	  and	  Kobiże.453	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 N.	  Berżenišvili	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  “ganc’xadeba,”	  xec,	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  d.	  1493,	  ll.	  1-­‐12;	  N.	  Berżenišvili	  to	  V.	  Mžavanaże,	  xec,	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  d.	  1494,	  ll.	  1-­‐2. 
453  G.	   Axvlediani,	   “ap’xazet’is	   istoriuli	   toponimikis	   zogiert’i	   sakitxisat’vis,”	   mnat’obi	   34,	   no.	   2	  (February	   1957):	   107–14;	   Simon	   Qauxč’ašhvili,	   “‘giorgi	   merč’ulis’	   garšemo,”	   mnat’obi	   34,	   no.	   2	  (February	   1957):	   115–25;	   D.	   Kobiże,	   “termini	   ‘abxazis’	  mnišvneloba	   sparsuli	   cqaroebis	  mixedvit’,”	  
mnat’obi	  34,	  no.	  2	  (February	  1957):	  126–28.	  Since	  the	  mnat’obi	  discussions,	  Berżenišvili	  submitted	  a	  number	   of	   letters	   in	   his	   defense	   to	   the	   editors	   of	  mnat’obi,	   axalgazrda	   komunisti,	   and	   literaturuli	  
gazeti,	   which	   were	   not	   published.	   The	   Georgian	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   also	   held	   a	   special	   session	  about	  the	  discussion	  of	  Ingoroqva’s	  book,	  during	  which	  Berżenišvili	  attempted	  to	  save	  his	  reputation.	  Even	  though	  Ingoroqva	  wrote	  the	  book	  in	  question	  and	  other	  scholars	  provided	  laudatory	  reviews,	  Berżenišvili	   received	   the	   brunt	   of	   the	   blame	   for	   this	   developing	   controversy.	   See	   “šesavali	   sitqva	  carmot’q’muli	  sak’.	  ssr	  mec’n.	  akademiis	  sazogadoebriv	  mec’nierebat’a	  ganqop’ilebis	  mier	  mocqobil	  diskusiaze	   ‘giorgi	  merč’ules’	   gamo,”	   31	  March	   1957,	   xec,	   N.	   Berżenišvili,	   d.	   1486,	   ll.	   1-­‐2;	   “sak’.	   ssr	  
	   190	  This	   only	   exacerbated	   the	   controversy	   generated	   by	   these	   discussions	   by	  attracting	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	   at	   hand	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   the	   Georgian	   CC	  became	   involved	   by	   April,	   when	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   and	   Abkhaz	   Obkom	   passed	  resolutions	   “On	   the	   erroneous	  discussion	   organized	  by	   the	   journal	  mnat’obi	   on	  P.	  Ingoroqva’s	   book	   Giorgi	   Merchule,”	   which	   targeted	   not	   Ingoroqva’s	   scholarship	  itself,	   but	   the	   discussions	   it	   generated	   among	   Georgian	   scholars	   and	   Abkhaz	  activists.	  A	  group	  of	  around	  200	  persons	  demonstrated	  outside	  the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  building	   in	   Sukhumi	   during	   these	   proceedings,	   demanding	   a	   retraction	   of	   the	  articles	   in	   question	   and	   their	   theses.454	  Abkhaz	   drama	   troupes	   likewise	   boycotted	  performances	   in	   protest	   and	   threatened	   to	   refrain	   from	   participation	   in	   an	  upcoming	   showcase	   of	   Abkhaz	   art	   in	   Tbilisi.	   Demonstrators	   also	   conveyed	   their	  demands	   via	   telegram	   to	   Moscow. 455 	  The	   size	   of	   these	   demonstrations	   was	  considerably	  smaller	   than	   those	  across	   the	  republic	  a	  year	  earlier,	   in	  March	  1956.	  Yet	   while	   most	   of	   the	   demonstrators’	   demands	   remained	   within	   the	   spheres	   of	  historiography	   and	   culture,	   the	   controversy	   created	   by	   the	   Merč’ule	   discussions	  made	  a	  space	  for	  a	  more	  serious	  proposition:	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  from	  Georgia	  to	  the	  RSFSR,	  a	  demand	  articulated	  by	  a	  group	  of	  schoolteachers	  in	  Gudauta	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   krebaze	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   mier	   carmot’q’muli	   sitqvis	   stenograma	   žurnal	  ‘mnat’obi’	   12	   gamok’veqnebul	   rec’enziast’an	   dakavširebit’,	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  March	   1957,	   xec',	   N.	   Berżenišvili,	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454 I.	   Shishkin,	   F.	   Konstantinov,	   V.	   Kirillin	   to	   CC	   CPSU,	   “Ob	   oshibochnoi	   diskusii,	   organizovannoi	  literaturno-­‐obshchestvennym	   zhurnalom	   Soiuza	   sovetskikh	   pisatelei	   Gruzii	   ‘Mnatobi’	   po	   knige	   P.	  Ingorokva	  ‘Georgii	  Merchule,’”	  20	  April	  1957,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  l.	  10. 
455 Ardzheniia	  Sh.A.,	  Khagba	  A.B.,	  et	  al.	  to	  Khrushchev,	  11	  April	  1957,	  from	  Adler,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  ll.	  3-­‐4;	  Aiba,	  Bartsits,	  et	  al.	  to	  CC	  CPSU,	  11	  April	  1957,	  from	  Gudauta,	  RGANI	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  ll.	  5-­‐6;	  Avidzba	  M.K.,	  Zukhba	  G.Sh.,	  et	  al.	  to	  Khrushchev,	  11	  April	  1957,	  from	  Sochi,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  ll.	  7-­‐8. 
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  in	  a	   telegram	  to	   the	  CC	   in	  Moscow	   in	  April	  1957.456	  In	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  March	  1956	  events,	  such	  expressions	  by	  Abkhaz	  representatives	  carried	  more	  weight	  than	  they	  had	  prior	  to	  1956,	  when	  they	  had	  levied	  similar	  complaints	  about	  Ingoroqva’s	  work	  (albeit	  without	  the	  request	  for	  territorial	  transfer)	  to	  little	  avail.	  	  From	  the	  Georgian	  Party	  perspective,	   the	  problem	   lay	  not	  with	   Ingoroqva’s	  book	   itself,	   but	   rather	   with	   the	   subsequent	   discussion	   centered	   on	   –	   but	   not	  confined	   to	   –	   the	  mnat’obi	   forum.	   Indeed,	   as	   Bruno	   Coppierters	   has	   argued,	   the	  Georgian	  Party’s	   refusal	   to	  censure	   Ingoroqva’s	  book	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  political	  act	  in	  and	  of	  itself.457	  By	  contrast,	  Abkhaz	  Party	  leaders	  and	  intellectuals	  took	  issue	  with	   the	  book’s	   content	   and	   the	  praise	   it	   received	  by	  Georgian	   reviewers.	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  Secretary	  Tarba	  and	  Abkhaz	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  Chairman	  Labakhua	  even	  claimed	   the	   book	   was	   part	   of	   a	   Beria-­‐era	   policy	   of	   assimilation	   of	   Abkhaz	   into	  Georgian	  history	   that	  had	  been	  published	   too	   late	   (that	   is,	   after	  Beria’s	  purge	  and	  death).458	  This	   divide	   demonstrates	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   secret	   speech	   and	   March	  events	   in	   1956:	   Abkhaz	   activists	   articulated	   grievances	   prior	   to	   1956,	   and	   the	  opening	   offered	   by	   the	   anti-­‐Stalin	   campaigns	   only	   furthered	   these	   preexisting	  efforts,	  resulting	  in	  a	  new	  political	  demand	  for	  secession	  that	  would	  re-­‐emerge	  each	  decade	   thereafter.	   While	   the	   public	   discord	   in	   Abkhazia	   over	   the	   Ingoroqva	  discussions	   was	   severe	   enough	   to	   warrant	   Party	   resolutions	   condemning	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Aiba,	  Bartsits,	  et	  al.	  to	  CC	  CPSU,	  11	  April	  1957,	  from	  Gudauta,	  RGANI	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  ll.	  5-­‐6. 
457 Bruno	  Coppieters,	  “In	  Defence	  of	  the	  Homeland:	  Intellectuals	  and	  the	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  Conflict,”	  in	  Bruno	  Coppieters	  and	  Michel	  Huysseune,	  eds.,	  Secession,	  History	  and	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  (Brussels:	  VUB	  Press,	  2002),	  93. 
458 Tarba	  and	  Labakhua	  to	  CC	  CPSU	  Presidium,	  19	  April	  1957,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  86,	  ll.	  18-­‐19. 
	   192	  episode	  in	  both	  Tbilisi	  and	  Sukhumi,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Victor	  Shnirelman,	  the	  “formal,	  demagogic	  reply”	  did	  little	  to	  convince	  either	  side	  of	  the	  other’s	  validity.459	  	  Even	   if	   Ingoroqva’s	   work	   itself	   became	   taboo,	   the	   ideas	   it	   contained	  continued	  to	  be	  attractive	  for	  Georgian	  scholars	  in	  subsequent	  decades.	  At	  least	  that	  was	  the	  argument	  made	  by	  Abkhaz	  activists	  a	  decade	  later,	  when	  mere	  mention	  of	  “Ingoroqva”	   had	   become	   a	   metaphor	   for	   larger	   tensions	   in	   Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  relations.	  In	  March-­‐April	  1967,	  a	  group	  of	  Abkhaz	  intellectuals,	  students,	  and	  Party	  leaders	   used	   the	   arguments	   put	   forth	   by	  Berżenišvili	   in	   a	   short	   article	   (published	  posthumously	   in	   his	   collected	   works	   –	   he	   died	   in	   1965)	   to	   justify	   mass	  demonstrations	   (which	  did	  occur)	   and	  demand	  changes	   to	   several	  place	  names	   in	  the	  autonomous	  republic	  to	  reflect	  Abkhaz	  words.	  460	  The	  Georgian	  CC’s	  discussions	  and	   resolution	   condemning	   the	   “unhealthy”	   and	   “nationalistic	   manifestations	   in	  Abkhazia”	   said	   explicitly	   that	   the	   arguments	   made	   in	   Berżenišvili’s	   article	   were	  insufficient	   to	   justify	   “spontaneous	   gatherings”	   in	   Abkhazia:	   Mžavanaże	   and	   his	  colleagues	   saw	   the	   historiographical	   issues	   as	   more	   of	   an	   excuse	   than	   legitimate	  grounds	   for	   grievance.461 	  The	   Georgian	   CC	   did,	   however,	   concede	   to	   changing	  several	  place	  names	  in	  Abkhazia	  per	  demonstrators’	  demands.462	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Shnirelman,	  The	  Value	  of	  the	  Past,	  244. 
460 Kobakhiia	  V.O.	  (Abkhaz	  Obkom),	  Shinkuba	  B.V.	  (Abkhaz	  Supreme	  Soviet),	  and	  Chikovani	  M.G.	  (Abkhaz	  Council	  of	  Ministers)	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  12	  March	  1967,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  42,	  d.	  65,	  ll.	  12-­‐16.	  The	  article	  in	  question	  was	  Nikoloz	  Berżenišvili,	  "mc'ire	  šenišna	  did	  sakit'xnis	  gamo,"	  sak’art’velos	  
istoriis	  sakit’xebi,	  cigni	  3	  (Tbilisi:	  Mec’niereba,	  1966),	  277-­‐288.	   
461 “Protokol	   30	   zasedaniia	   TsK	   KP	   Gruzii	   ot	   31	   marta	   1967	   goda	   ‘O	   faktakh	   nepravil'nogo	  reagirovaniia	  sredi	  chasti	  intelligentsia	  Abkhazii	  na	  stat’iu	  akademika	  N.A.	  Berdzenishvili,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  42,	  d.	  58,	  ll.	  2-­‐9;	  “O	  nezdorovykh	  proiavleniiakh	  v	  Abkhazii,”	  sšssa	  (II)	  f.	  14,	  op.	  42,	  d.	  65,	  ll.	  2-­‐3;	   “O	   ser’eznoi	   oploshnosti,	   dopushchennoi	   pri	   izdanii	   3	   toma	   izbrannykh	   sochinenii	   akademika	  N.A.	  Berdzenishvili,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  42,	  d.	  65,	  ll.	  3-­‐4.	   
462 “O	  pereimenovanii	  nekotorykh	  sel	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  42,	  d.	  65,	  ll.	  4-­‐11. 
	   193	  The	  way	   in	  which	   this	   longer-­‐term	   historiographical	   debate	   enveloped	   the	  March	   1956	   events	   (and	   their	   fallout)	   was	   no	   accident,	   and	   it	   proved	   to	   be	  influential	   for	  both	  Georgians	  and	  Abkhaz	   in	  subsequent	  decades.	  This	  coda	   to	   the	  March	   events	   outlined	   the	   triangular	   relationship	   between	   Moscow,	   Tbilisi,	   and	  Sukhumi	   that	  would	   reorient	   centers	  and	  peripheries	   in	   the	  years	   to	   come,	   as	   the	  entitled	   Georgian	   nationality	   increasingly	   held	   decisive	   power	   over	   affairs	   on	   the	  republic’s	  territory.	   *	   *	   *	  	  While	   after	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   Stalin’s	   body	   existed	   officially	  outside	   the	   sanctioned	   discourse	   of	   the	   government,	   some	   Georgians,	   it	   seemed,	  sought	   to	   preserve	   the	   role	   of	   his	   “political”	   body	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state.	   Even	  those	  Georgians	  who	  merely	  observed	  or	  heard	  about	  the	  unfolding	  events	  in	  March	  1956	  posited	  a	  range	  of	  interpretations	  about	  relations	  between	  citizen,	  state,	  Party,	  and	   Stalin	   himself.	   	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   were	   the	   demonstrations	   commemorating	  Stalin’s	   death	   from	   5-­‐9	   March	   understood	   as	   nationalistic	   and	   anti-­‐Soviet,	   as	  Mžavanaże	  claimed?	  	  Did	  “Soviet”	  refer	  to	  the	  government,	  the	  state,	  or	  the	  people	  (or	  some	  combination	  thereof)?	  Or	  did	  contemporaries	  perceive	  the	  demonstrations	  to	  be,	  above	  all,	  about	  defending	  Georgians’	  honor	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  insult	  against	  their	  most	  prominent	  representative?	  	  As	   evidenced	   especially	   by	   Party	  member	   questioners,	   many	   attempted	   to	  understand	   the	   shift	   introduced	   at	   the	   Twentieth	   Party	   Congress	   through	  preexisting	   Soviet	   categories,	   terminology,	   and	   Soviet	   and	   Georgian	   tradition.	   By	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  applying	  familiar	  enemy	  categories	  to	  the	  demonstrators	  –	  as	  nationalist,	  anti-­‐Soviet	  provocateurs	  –	  Mžavanaże	  likewise	  attempted	  to	  subsume	  new	  types	  of	  misconduct	  under	  old	  headings.	  Both	  Mžavanaże	  and	  local	  Party	  members	  invoked	  such	  a	  high	  Stalinist	  vernacular	  because,	  at	  that	  point,	  this	  language	  provided	  the	  only	  available	  categories	   (anti-­‐Soviet,	  bourgeois	  nationalist,	   enemy	  of	   the	  people)	   through	  which	  to	   understand	   the	   events	   unfolding	   in	   Georgia,	   even	   if	   that	   vocabulary	   proved	  inaccurate	   to	   describe	   what	   was	   actually	   taking	   place.	   	   If	   the	   anti-­‐Soviet	   charge	  referred	   to	   the	   current	   Party	   leadership,	   then	   the	   demonstrations	   in	   Georgia	   do,	  indeed,	  appear	  to	  protest	  the	  actions	  and	  policies	  of	  Khrushchev,	  Mikoyan,	  Bulganin,	  and	   other	   architects	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Stalin	   campaign.	   	   However,	   as	   the	   comments	   of	  officers	  of	  the	  74th	  Georgian	  Rifle	  Division	  clearly	  demonstrated,	   it	  was	  possible	  to	  defend	  the	  Soviet	  state	  while	  protesting	  policies	  of	  current	  officials	  in	  power	  –	  a	  new	  freedom	  made	  possible	   through	   the	  uncertainties	  ushered	   in	  by	   the	   secret	   speech	  itself.	  	   This	   tension	   points	   to	   the	   conflicting	   (and	   contradictory)	  meanings	   of	   “de-­‐Stalinization”	   in	  Georgia:	   exposing	  Stalin’s	   crimes,	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	  offending	  the	   national	   body,	   on	   the	   other.	   Shifting	   blame	   to	   Beria	   permitted	   Mžavanaże	   to	  provide	  a	  longer-­‐term	  cause	  for	  allegedly	  nationalist	  eruptions	  in	  the	  republic	  that	  pre-­‐dated	   his	   own	   tenure	   as	   republican	   leader.	   Similarly,	   for	   Party	  members	   and	  Georgians	  more	  generally,	  Beria	  proved	  a	  useful	  source	  of	  blame	  for	  Stalin’s	  crimes	  in	   the	   republic:	   as	   a	   result,	   individual	   experiences	   during	   the	   Terror	   could	   be	  attributed	   to	  Beria’s	   reign	   and	  his	   own	  personality	   cult,	   placing	   Stalin	  outside	   the	  
	   195	  field	   of	   blame	   as	   a	   national	   figure	   among	   Georgians.	   Non-­‐Georgians	   (particularly	  Abkhaz),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  linked	  the	  cults	  of	  Stalin	  and	  Beria	  more	  overtly	  in	  their	  complaints	   about	   perceived	   forced	   assimilation.	   Representatives	   expressed	   these	  grievances	  in	  national	  terms,	  yet	  they	  also	  suggested	  a	  broader,	  non-­‐Georgian	  cause	  for	   complaint,	   uniting	   the	  national	   interests	   of	  Abkhaz,	  Ossetians,	  Armenians,	   and	  Russians	   in	   the	   republic	   toward	   the	   supranational	   goal	   of	   resisting	   Georgian	  encroachments.	   Georgians	   and	   non-­‐Georgians	   evoked	   aspects	   of	  memory	   through	  discussions	   of	   the	   March	   1956	   events	   and	   de-­‐Stalinization	   campaign.	   Over	   time	  these	   memories	   –	   even	   in	   their	   conflicting	   forms	   –	   would	   continue	   to	   inspire	  national	   expression	   and	  mobilization	   in	   decades	   to	   come,	   as	   subsequent	   chapters	  will	  show.	  While	   the	   March	   1956	   demonstrations	   in	   Georgia	   were	   characterized	   as	  nationalist	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet	  by	  republic	  and	  Union	  authorities,	  these	  actions	  are	  more	  appropriately	   described	   as	   a	   defense	   of	   national	   honor	   against	   a	   specific	  government	  policy.	   	  This	  may	  seem	   like	  a	  purely	  semantic	  distinction;	  however,	   it	  reflects	   a	   decidedly	   different	   attitude	   toward	   Georgia’s	   position	  within	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	  	  Understanding	  the	  demonstrations	  as	  nationalist	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sees	  this	  as	  a	   challenge	   to	   the	   Soviet	   system	   writ	   large.	   	   However,	   in	   a	   Soviet	   state	   that	  facilitated	   national	   development	   yet	   abhorred	   nationalist	   aspirations,	   it	   was	  possible	   to	   promote	   the	   national	   through	   dialogue	   with	   the	   state	   rather	   than	  attempting	  to	  subvert	  or	  overthrow	  it.	   	  The	  “silent	  protest”	  detected	  by	  Mžavanaże	  among	  Party	  members,	   then,	  was	   a	  protest	   against	   specific	  polices	   rather	   than	  an	  
	   196	  attempt	   to	   undermine	   Soviet	   power	   –	   power	   built	   by	   Stalin,	   the	   “great	   son	   of	   the	  Georgian	  people.”	  The	  coexistence	  of	  the	  Stalin	  cult	  and	  Georgian	  cult	  of	  the	  nation,	  as	  codified	  and	   popularized	   in	   the	   Stalin	   era,	   encountered	   an	   unforeseen	   challenge	   when	  Khrushchev	  denounced	   Stalin	   –	   as	   a	  Georgian,	   no	   less	   –	   in	   the	   secret	   speech.	   The	  March	  demonstrations	  to	  defend	  Stalin’s	  national	  honor	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  process	  of	  disaggregation	   through	  which	  veneration	  of	   Stalin	   as	   a	  Georgian	   figure	  (even	   if	  he	  discouraged	  this	  association	  when	   in	  power)	  and	  adherence	  to	  current	  Soviet	   policy	   were	   no	   longer	   concurrent.	   The	   task	   remained	   for	   Georgians	   to	  cultivate	   coexisting	   national	   and	   Soviet	   identities	   and	   allegiances	   without	   the	  Stalinist	   link	   that	   had,	   to	   that	   point,	   facilitated	   a	   peculiar	   type	   of	   Georgian-­‐Soviet	  patriotism.	  The	  de-­‐Stalinizing,	  Soviet	  Georgian	  nation	  that	  came	  of	  age	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  subsequent	  chapters.	  Yet,	   the	  secret	  speech	  and	  March	  events	  in	  1956	  provided	  an	  expansion	  of	  political	  space	  that	  generated	  new	  types	  of	  national,	   political	   action	   in	  Georgia	  while	   remaining	  under	   the	   Soviet	   umbrella.463	  	  This	  demonstrates,	   in	  other	  words,	  an	   instance	  when	  nation-­‐ness	  happened	   rather	  than	   developed,	   as	   Brubaker	   has	   described.464	  	   The	  March	   events	   and	   discussions	  that	   followed	   caused	   Georgians,	   Abkhaz,	   and	   others	   not	   only	   to	   reflect	   on	   their	  statuses	  in	  the	  republic	  and	  the	  Union,	  but	  also	  to	  experience	  nationality	  as	  a	  lived	  category	  in	  new	  ways,	  beginning	  with	  participation	  in	  the	  first	  major	  demonstration	  in	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  postwar	  era.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  24.	  	  464	  Ibid.,	  18-­‐19.	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Chapter	  4:	  Inhabiting	  Nationality	  After	  Stalin:	  A	  Georgian	  Tbilisi	  	  I	  wonder	  where	  there	  is	  also	  such	  a	  sky,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Passing	  through	  the	  tree-­‐lined	  avenue	  	  bottomless	  blue,	  pure,	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  along	  the	  Mtkvari,	  just	  as	  yours	  is,	  too.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  blooming	  trees	  Scar	  of	  the	  past,	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  are	  the	  wedding	  party	  Nariqala’s	  ruin,	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	  let	  you	  know	  that	  spring	  is	  here	  has	  stayed	  gray.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  sing,	  Tbiliso	  –	  the	  side	  of	  sun	  and	  roses,	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  here	  where	  even	  asp	  trees	  sing	  without	  you	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  live,	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  the	  sky	  is	  bluer	  than	  turquoise.	  where	  else	  is	  there	  a	  new	  Varazi,	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Tbiliso	  –	  the	  side	  of	  sun	  and	  roses,	  where	  is	  there	  gray	  Mt’acminda.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  without	  you	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  live,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  where	  else	  is	  there	  a	  new	  Varazi,	  	  	  	  	  where	  is	  there	  gray	  Mt’acminda.	  
Lyrics	  to	  “Tbiliso”465	  
	  	   In	  1974,	   a	  pop	   song	  ode	   to	  Tbilisi,	   “Tbiliso,”	   swept	  across	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  quickly	  became	  a	  hit	   among	  Georgians	  and	  non-­‐Georgians	  alike.466	  The	   song’s	  original	   Georgian	   lyrics,	   composed	   by	   Petre	   Bagration-­‐Gruzinski	   for	   a	   1959	  documentary	   film,	   were	   supplemented	   with	   Russian	   versions	   of	   the	   verses	   for	  greater	   consumption	   outside	   the	   republic.	   In	   Tbilisi,	   Moscow,	   and	   in	   between,	  “Tbiliso”	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  favorite	  cover	  for	  prominent	  singers	  to	  perform	  in	  concerts	   and	   on	   television,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   standard	   in	   cafés	   and	   clubs.	   The	   song’s	  catchy	   yet	   haunting	   melody,	   composed	   by	   Revaz	   Lagiże	   and	   incorporating	   a	  traditional	  dissonance	  of	  Georgian	  music	  with	  a	  modern,	  popular	  music	   structure,	  mirrored	   the	   delicate	   balance	   between	   preserving	   tradition	   and	   building	   a	   Soviet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  465	  The	   song	   is	   written	   in	   the	   vocative	   case,	   with	   lyrics	   sung	   to	   the	   city	   of	   Tbilisi	   (hence	   the	   –o	  vocative	   marker	   to	   make	   “Tbiliso”	   rather	   than	   nominative	   “Tbilisi”).	   Nariqala	   is	   a	   mountainside	  fortress	   overlooking	   old	   Tbilisi	   that	   was	   constructed	   in	   various	   sections	   between	   the	   fourth	   and	  seventeenth	  centuries.	  Varazi	  refers	  to	  a	  ravine	  that	  separates	  the	  Vera,	  Vake,	  and	  Saburtalo	  districts	  of	  Tbilisi.	  Mt’acminda	   is	   the	  mountainside	  on	  which	   the	  nineteenth	  century	  portion	  of	   the	  city	  was	  constructed	   (parallel	   to	   Rust'aveli	   Avenue).	   Mt’acminda	   literally	   means	   “mountain	   saint.”	   The	  Mtkvari	  is	  the	  main	  river	  that	  runs	  through	  Tbilisi,	  known	  in	  Russian	  as	  the	  Kura.	  	  466	  “Tbiliso,”	  lyrics	  by	  Petre	  Bagration-­‐Gruzkinki,	  melody	  by	  Revaz	  Lagiże,	  “Melodiia,”	  1974.	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  Georgian	  modernity	   in	   the	   republic	   that	   had	   defined	   the	   postwar	   decades	   to	   that	  point.	  	  The	   song’s	   release	   also	   coincided	   (albeit	   coincidentally)	   with	   the	  achievement	   of	   a	   majority	   Georgian	   population	   of	   Tbilisi	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   its	  modern	   history.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   that	   political	   figures	   and	   residents	   celebrated	  Tbilisi’s	   antiquity,	   the	   city	   itself	   was	   undergoing	   a	   transformation	   from	   a	  cosmopolitan,	  multiethnic	  outpost	  of	  empire	   into	  a	  Soviet	  capital	  dominated	  by	  an	  entitled	   nationality.	   In	   spite	   of	   efforts	   to	   emphasize,	   and	   at	   times	   romanticize,	  Tbilisi’s	   ancient	   roots,	   the	   nationalization	   of	   the	   city	   –	   from	   population	  demographics	   to	   built	   environment	   to	   lived	   experience	   –	   was	   achieved	   through	  Soviet	  institutions,	  and	  postwar	  ones	  at	  that.	  The	   aftermath	   of	   the	   March	   1956	   demonstrations	   was	   part	   of	   a	   broader	  process	  by	  which	  Georgians	  attempted	   to	   inhabit	  nationality	   after	  Stalin.	  The	   top-­‐down,	   compensatory	   nationalism	   proffered	   by	   Moscow	   after	   1956	   provided	   an	  official	   outlet	   for	   Georgian	   national	   expression	   through	   elaborate	   celebrations	   of	  Tbilisi’s	   1,500-­‐year	   anniversary.	   The	  postwar	  development	   of	   new	  neighborhoods	  in	  Tbilisi	  demonstrates	  the	  process	  of	  urban	  nationalization	  on	  a	  larger	  and	  longer-­‐term	   scale.	   In	   particular,	   Saburtalo,	   a	   neighborhood	   that	   developed	   primarily	   via	  Khrushchev’s	   residential	  building	  boom,	   shifted	   the	   residential	   center	  of	  Tbilisi	   as	  Georgians	   from	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   republic	   migrated	   to	   the	   capital.	   I	   examine	   this	  neighborhood	   as	   a	   site	   that	  was	   central	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   Soviet,	   Georgian	  Tbilisi.	   Yet	   like	   the	   contrasts	   in	   “Tbiliso,”	   the	   Soviet	  Georgian	  modernity	   of	  Tbilisi	  
	   199	  developed	   alongside	   a	   delicate	   balance	   of	   eradicating,	   constructing,	   and	  compromising	  with	  a	  spectrum	  of	  lingering	  “traditions”	  among	  Georgia’s	  populace.	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   explore	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   the	   residential	   building	  boom	   in	  Tbilisi	   and	   the	  negotiation	  of	  practices	   that	  policy-­‐makers	  understood	  as	  “harmful,”	   “traditional,”	   and	   “modern”	   to	   illustrate	   how	   Georgians	   navigated	   the	  waters	  of	  nationality	   in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  era.	  What	  do	  popular	  experiences	  of	  Tbilisi	  residents	  tell	  us	  about	  the	   ideological	   imperative	  behind	  building	  communism	  and	  building	  a	  national	  capital?	  What	  strategies	  and	  compromises	  did	  local	  and	  republic-­‐level	   leadership	   deem	   necessary	   to	   satisfy	   an	   increasingly	   hegemonic	   entitled	  national	   citizenry?	   And,	   finally,	   how	   do	   those	   individuals	   or	   groups	   who	   never	  sought	   to	  be	  a	  part	  of	   the	  Bolshevik	   project	  –	  violent,	  worldwide	   revolution	   in	   the	  name	   of	   the	   proletariat	   -­‐-­‐	   engage	   with	   and	   become	   a	   part	   of	   the	   postwar	   Soviet	  project	   –	   active,	   participatory	   citizens	   living	   in	   developed	   socialism?	   Recent	  scholarship	   on	   mass	   housing,	   urban	   development,	   and	   lived	   experience	   in	   the	  postwar	  years	  has	  broadened	  our	  view	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  beyond	  the	  fields	  of	  struggles	   over	   high	   culture	   and	   the	   “Thaw”	   and	   begun	   to	   elaborate	   variations	   in	  local	   experiences	   and	   collectivities	   from	   the	   assumed	   (or	   projected)	   all-­‐Soviet	  norm.467	  I	  argue	   that	   the	  nationalization	  of	   the	  Georgian	  capital	  and	  negotiation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  467	  I	   refer	   especially	   to	   Stephen	   V.	   Bittner,	   The	  Many	   Lives	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   Thaw:	   Experience	   and	  
Memory	  in	  Moscow’s	  Arbat	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Steven	  E.	  Harris,	  Communism	  on	  
Tomorrow	   Street:	  Mass	   Housing	   and	   Everyday	   Life	   after	   Stalin	   (Washington,	   DC:	   Woodrow	  Wilson	  Center	   Press,	   2013);	   and	   Paul	   Stronski,	   Tashkent:	   Forging	   a	   Soviet	   City,	   1930-­‐1966,	   (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2010).	  The	  recent	  Slavic	  Review	  forum	  on	  “Redefining	  Communities	  in	  the	   Late	   Soviet	   Union”	   explores	   some	   of	   the	   other	   varieties	   of	   collectivities	   (national,	   religious,	  disability)	  and	  negotiation	  with	  “the	  Soviet”	  in	  this	  period,	  Slavic	  Review	  74,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  2015),	  1-­‐103.	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  cultural	   practices	   after	   1956	   reveal	   the	   broadened	   cultural-­‐political	   space	   made	  possible	  by	  de-­‐Stalinization.	  Yet	   the	  peculiarities	  of	  Georgians’	  experience	   in	  1956	  ushered	   in	   related	   processes	   of	   redefining	   Georgian	   culture	   and	   enlarging	   the	  mental	  space	  of	  what	   it	  meant	   to	  be	  Soviet	   in	   the	  Georgian	  SSR.	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1970s,	  Georgian	  Sovietness	  meant	  not	  only	  a	  unique	  application	  of	  local	  practices	  to	  Soviet	   templates,	  but	  also	  a	  distinct	   interpretation	  of	   the	  parameters	   for	  discourse	  and	   action	   within	   the	   legal	   and	   lived	   bounds	   of	   Sovietness.468	  I	   use	   the	   phrase	  “Georgian	   Sovietness”	   (rather	   than	   “Soviet	   Georgianness”)	   to	   emphasize	   that	   the	  processes	   examined	   in	   this	   and	   subsequent	   chapters	   illustrate	   Georgian	  perspectives	   of	   “the	   Soviet”	   rather	   than	   Soviet	   variants	   of	   a	   broader	   spectrum	   of	  Georgianness.	  These	  are	  related,	  yet	  distinct,	  ideas.	  We	  see,	   then,	   in	  the	  two	  decades	  following	  the	  March	  1956	  events	  both	  the	  nationalization	  of	  Tbilisi	  and	  Georgia	  in	  a	  modern,	  Soviet	  guise	  and	  the	  negotiation	  of	   traditions	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   republic	   leadership	   and	   the	   entitled	   national	  populace.	   The	  balance	  between	   tradition	   and	  modernity,	   unfolding	  during	   a	  more	  hands-­‐off	   relationship	  with	  Moscow,	   created	   the	  Georgian	   variant	   of	  what	   I	   call	   a	  new	  national-­‐social	   contract	   under	   developed	   socialism.	   This	   post-­‐Stalin	   national-­‐social	  contract	  created	  official	  “controlled	  spheres	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  non-­‐Russian	  national	   identities”	   yet	   at	   the	   same	   time	   cultivated	   deep,	   largely	   autonomous	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  Maike	  Lehmann	  traces	  a	  related	  development	  in	  neighboring	  Armenia,	  which	  she	  describes	  as	  a	  “local	   hybridization	   of	   official	   discourse”	   that	   had	   “developed	   into	   a	   local	   dialect	   that	   varied	   the	  official	   idiom	  as	  much	  as	   it	  affirmed	   it,”	  Maike	  Lehmann,	   “Apricot	  Socialism:	  The	  National	  Past,	   the	  Soviet	   Project,	   and	   the	   Imagining	   of	   Community	   in	   Late	   Soviet	   Armenia,”	   Slavic	   Review	   74,	   no.	   1	  (Spring	   2015):	   25.	   See	   also	   Lehmann,	   Eine	   sowjetische	   Nation;	   Maike	   Lehmann,	   “The	   Local	  Reinvention	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Project:	   Nation	   and	   Socialism	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   Armenia	   after	   1945,”	  
Jahrbücher	  für	  Geschichte	  Osteuropas,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  481–508.	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  national	  republic-­‐level	  polities.469	  As	  long	  as	  there	  was	  no	  repeat	  of	  the	  March	  1956	  demonstrations,	   republic	   leaders	   in	  Georgia	   and	   citizens	  alike	  had	  much	   room	   for	  maneuver	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  their	  own	  republic.	  The	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  Soviet	  nationality	  regime	  was	  a	  Stalin-­‐era	  creation,	  but	  the	  removal	  of	  terror	  as	  a	  tool	   of	   Soviet	   governance	   after	  1956	   inspired	  new	  arenas	   for	  discourse	   about	   the	  nation	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   Soviet	   project,	   which	   were	   as	   diverse	   as	  historiographical	  debates,	  the	  nationalization	  of	  urban	  space,	  negotiation	  of	  cultural	  practices,	   and	   demands	   for	   entitled	   language	   rights.	   As	   a	   result,	   this	   often	  overlooked	   period	   in	   the	   histories	   of	   Soviet	   nationality	   policies	   was,	   in	   fact,	  fundamental	   for	   the	   development	   of	   Soviet	   entitled	   nationalities	   into	   embryonic	  nation-­‐states.	  	  	  
Tbilisi	  at	  a	  Millennium	  and	  a	  Half	  	   In	   1957,	   a	   year	   after	   the	  March	   events	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   the	  Giorgi	  
Merč’ule	   demonstrations	   in	   Abkhazia,	   Georgian	   First	   Secretary	   Vasil	   Mžavanaże	  wrote	   to	   the	   CPSU	   CC	   regarding	   the	   approach	   of	   an	   important	   year	   in	   Georgian	  history:	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Georgian	  capital	  1,500	  years	  earlier.	  According	   to	   legend,	   in	  558	  AD,	  Vaxtang	  Gorgasali,	   a	  K’art’lian	  king	   from	  Mc’xet’a,	  came	  across	  bubbling	  hot	  springs	  near	  the	  Mtkvari	  River	  while	  hunting	  and	  decided	  to	   create	   a	   new	   settlement	   in	   the	   place	   where	   his	   falcon	   fell.	   “Tbilisi”	   was	   thus	  founded,	  named	  after	  the	  warm	  (t’bili)	  waters	  of	  its	  natural	  hot	  springs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  469	  Stephen	  E.	  Hanson,	  “The	  Brezhnev	  Era,”	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  Russia,	  ed.	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  vol.	  3,	  3	  vols.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  292–315.	  
	   202	  In	  Mžavanaże’s	  telling,	  Tbilisi	  was	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  ancient	  cities	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  in	  the	  entire	  world.”	  Borrowing	  a	  narrative	  of	  Georgian	  struggle	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  Berżenišvili	  and	  Janašia,	  The	  history	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Tbilisi	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  history	  of	  Georgia,	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  for	  all	  of	   Georgia,	   Tbilisi	   was	   an	   object	   of	   ceaseless	   incursions	   by	   foreign	  aggressors,	  Mongol,	  Iranian,	  and	  Turkish	  invaders,	  cruelly	  destroying	  and	   plundering	   the	   city,	   decimating	   its	   population.	   	   During	   these	  painful	   ordeals	   Tbilisi	   more	   than	   once	   rose	   from	   the	   ashes	   and	  courageously	  healed	  its	  wounds,	  securing	  for	  itself	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  and	  cultural	  center	  of	  Georgia.470	  	  A	  millennium	   and	   a	   half	   later,	   Mžavanaże	   explained,	   Tbilisi	   continued	   to	   flourish	  under	   Soviet	   power	   thanks	   to	   building	   socialism	   and	   the	   creativity	   of	   Leninist	  nationality	  policy.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  requested	  permission	  to	  mark	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  anniversary	  with	  appropriate	  pomp	  throughout	  1958.	  	  The	   theme	   implicitly	   outlined	   by	  Mžavanaże	   in	   his	   letter	   –	   of	   old	   and	   new	  Tbilisi	   –	   shaped	   the	   public	   discourse	   surrounding	   the	   anniversary	   the	   following	  year.	  Though	  the	  officially	  planned	  jubilee	  activities	  took	  place	  primarily	  in	  October	  and	   November	   1958,	   the	   anniversary	   theme	   appeared	   regularly	   in	   republic	  newspapers	   to	   juxtapose	  and	  celebrate	  Tbilisi’s	  past	  and	   future	  achievements.	  For	  example,	   historian	   Š.	   Mesxia	   outlined	   the	   historical	   importance	   of	   Tbilisi	   to	  
komunisti	  and	  Zaria	  Vostoka’s	  readerships	   in	   June.	  He	  claimed	  that	   the	  territory	  of	  Tbilisi	   had	   been	   populated	   by	   “Georgian	   tribes”	   since	   400	   BC	   and	   elided	   the	  distinction	   between	   Tbilisi	   the	   city,	   Georgia	   the	   political	   entity,	   and	   the	   Georgian	  people	   in	   his	   summary	   of	   Tbilisi	   history.	   	   Tbilisi’s	   rebirth	   in	   the	   aftermaths	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  470	  Mžavanaże	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  May	  1957,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  32,	  d.	  218,	  ll.	  1-­‐4.	  
	   203	  decimation	   and	   occupation	   by	   Mongols,	   Iranians,	   and	   others	   mirrored	   the	  consolidation	  and	  reconsolidation	  narrative	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people	  more	  broadly,	  as	  outlined	  by	  Georgian	  historians	  since	  the	  1940s.471	  The	   official	   planned	   activities	   to	   commemorate	   the	   anniversary	   in	   October	  and	  November	  1958	  included	  jubilee	  sessions	  of	  meetings	  of	  the	  Tbilisi	  city	  council	  and	  Party	  organizations;	  scholarly	  meetings	  of	  the	  GSSR	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  Tbilisi	  State	  University,	  the	  State	  Museum	  of	  Georgia;	  and	  the	  Georgian	  Writers’	  Union;	  and	  public	   lectures	   about	  Tbilisi	   history.	   Special	   books	  devoted	   to	  Tbilisi	   architecture,	  history,	   and	   culture	   were	   published	   for	   the	   occasion,	   and	   a	   documentary	   film	   in	  color	   about	   Tbilisi	  was	   produced.472	  The	   largest	   event	  was	   a	  mass	  meeting	   in	   the	  Dinamo	  Tbilisi	   football	  stadium,	  reportedly	  attended	  by	  as	  many	  as	  50,000	  people	  into	   the	   early	   hours	   of	   the	   morning.	   As	   first	   secretary,	   Mžavanaże	   delivered	   the	  keynote	  address	  at	  the	  meeting.	  Mžavanaże	  emphasized	  that	  the	  Tbilisi	  jubilee	  was	  not	  only	  a	  celebration	  for	  residents	  of	  Tbilisi,	  but	  for	  all	  of	  Georgia.	  While	  he	  briefly	  mentioned	   other	   “brotherly	   nationalities”	   residing	   in	   the	   city	   (who,	   at	   that	   point,	  made	   up	   over	   half	   of	   Tbilisi’s	   population),	   Tbilisi’s	   Georgianness	   remained	   the	  dominant	  theme	  of	  the	  address.	  As	  a	  city	  of	  “Georgian	  glory,”	  Mžavanaże	  lauded	  the	  “ancient	   and	   eternally	   youthful	   capital”	   and	   noted	   that	   “Tbilisi	   greets	   everyone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  471	  Sh.	  Meskhia,	  “Rol’	  Tbilisi	  v	  istorii	  gruzinskogo	  naroda,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (June	  17,	  1958).	  See	  also	  Š.	  Mesxia,	   t’bilisi	   1500	   clisaa	   (Tbilisi:	   Politikuri	   da	   mec’nieruli	   c’odnis	   gamavrc’elebeli	   sazogadoeba,	  1957);	   S.	   Žġenti,	   ed.,	   t’bilisi	   1500:	   saiubileo	   krebuli	   (Tbilisi:	   Stalinis	   saxelobis	   t’bilisis	   saxelmcip’o	  universitetis	  gamomc’emloba,	  1958).	  472	  “MEROPRIIATIIA	  provodimye	  v	  oznamenovanie	  1500-­‐letiia	  g.	  Tbilisi,”	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  32,	  d.	  218,	  ll.	  7-­‐8.	  
	   204	  worthily:	  an	  enemy	  as	  an	  enemy,	  with	  a	  raised	  sword;	  and	  a	  friend	  as	  a	  friend,	  with	  an	  open	  heart.”473	  	  Moreover,	   city	   planners	   used	   the	   events	   to	   construct	   new	   streets,	   squares,	  and	  several	  monuments	  –	  of	  Vaxtang	  Gorgasali	  (on	  Komsomol	  Alley),	  Erekle	  II	  (on	  the	  Metexi	  bridge);	   Sayat	  Nova	   (on	  Shaumian	  Street);	   and	  Nikoloz	  Barat’ašvili	   (on	  Barat’ašvili	  Bridge).474	  But	  the	  most	  prominent	  monument	  constructed	  to	  mark	  the	  city’s	   1,500th	   anniversary	  was	   the	   enormous	   k’art’lis	   deda	   (typically	   translated	   as	  Mother	  of	  Georgia,	  but	  literally	  “K’art’li’s	  mother”)	  statue,	  erected	  on	  a	  hillside	  near	  the	  Nariqala	  Fortress.475	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  473	  “Slavnyi	  iubilei	  goroda	  druzhby	  i	  bratstva,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (19	  October	  1958).	  See	  also	  “V	  iubileinom	  komitete	  po	  oznamenovanniiu	  1500-­‐letiia	  Tbilisi,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (10	  October	  1958).	  474	  “MEROPRIIATIIA	  provodimye	  v	  oznamenovanie	  1500-­‐letiia	  g.	  Tbilisi,”	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  32,	  d.	  218,	  ll.	  7-­‐8.	  Erekle	  II	  was	  the	  king	  of	  K’art’li-­‐Kaxet’i	  who	  signed	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Georgievsk	  with	  Russia	  in	   1783;	   Sayat	   Nova	   was	   an	   eighteenth-­‐century	   Armenian	   bard	   who	   was	   a	   Tbilisi	   native;	   and	  Barat’ašvili	  was	  a	  Georgian	  romantic	  poet	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.	  475	  k’art’lis	  deda	  resembles	  aesthetically	  other	  “mother”	  statues	  in	  Yerevan	  (1962),	  Kyiv	  (1981),	  and	  Volgograd	   (1967),	   yet,	   contrary	   to	   common	   assumptions,	   the	   construction	   of	   k’art’lis	   deda	   had	  nothing	   to	   do	  with	   the	  Great	   Patriotic	  War	   victory.	   The	   other	   three	  monuments	  were	   constructed	  either	   explicitly	   to	   commemorate	   the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	   (Volgograd)	  or	   to	   replace	   a	   Stalin	   statue	  associated	  with	   the	  war	   victory	   (Yerevan	   and	  Kyiv).	   The	   Tbilisi	   statue,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  was	   an	  explicitly	  national	  monument	  constructed	  after	  Stalin’s	  death	  with	  high	  Stalinist	  aesthetic	  motifs	   to	  mark	  Georgian	  Tbilisi’s	  and	  the	  Georgian	  people’s	  longevity.	  On	  the	  Stalingrad/Volgograd	  memorial,	  see	  Scott	  W.	  Palmer,	  “How	  Memory	  Was	  Made:	  The	  Construction	  of	  the	  Memorial	  to	  the	  Heroes	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Stalingrad,”	  Russian	  Review	  68,	  no.	  3	  (July	  2009):	  373–407.	  On	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  memory	  and	  commemoration	  of	  World	  War	  II	   in	  Russia,	  see	  Nina	  Tumarkin,	  The	  Living	  &	  the	  Dead:	  The	  Rise	  
and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Cult	  of	  World	  War	  II	  in	  Russia	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1994).	  





Figure	  7:	  The	  k’art’lis	  deda	  monument	  as	  viewed	  from	  the	  hillside	  overlooking	  old	  Tbilisi.	  	  
Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2011.	  
	  
k’art’lis	   deda	   (A.	   Amašukeli,	   sculptor)	   gazes	   out	   over	   the	   old	   city,	   Metexi	  Church,	  and	  the	  Mtkvari	  River,	  holding	  a	  cup	  of	  wine	  in	  her	  left	  hand	  and	  a	  sword	  in	  her	  right.	   	  The	  symbols	  were	  meant	  to	  depict	  centuries	  of	  Georgians’	  “heroic	  past,”	  greeting	   friends	  with	  hospitality	   (stumart’moqvareoba)	  and	  enemies	  with	   force,	   to	  which	  Mžavanaże	  alluded	  in	  his	  Dinamo	  stadium	  address.476	  k’art’lis	  deda	  embodied	  a	  feminized	  notion	  of	  Georgian	  nationhood,	  rooted	  in	  an	  ancient	  and	  eternal	  Tbilisi,	  Georgians’	  dedak’alak’i	  (literally	  “mother-­‐city”,	  but	  used	  to	  mean	  capital	  city).477	  	  
Soviet	  Saburtalo	  	  	   k’art’lis	  deda	  looked	  out	  over	  the	  oldest	  neighborhoods	  of	  Tbilisi,	  and	  indeed	  it	   is	   these	   districts	   –	   with	   their	   cobblestone	   streets,	   tottering	   balconies,	   ancient	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  “saiubileo	  sač’uk’ari,”	  t’bilisi	  (3	  October	  1958),	  p.	  1.	  477	  The	   feminized	   statue	   and	   city	   reflected	   a	   more	   general	   feminization	   of	   belonging	   among	   the	  trappings	  of	  Georgian	  nationhood:	  the	  Georgian	  language	  is	  known	  as	  deda-­‐ena	  (mother	  tongue),	  and	  the	  primary	   foundational	   pillar	   in	   a	   home	   is	   known	  as	   the	  deda-­‐boże	   (mother	  pillar),	   for	   instance,	  Tamara	   Dragadze,	   Rural	   Families	   in	   Soviet	   Georgia:	   A	   Case	   Study	   in	   Ratcha	   Province	   (New	   York:	  Routledge,	  1988),	  158.	  
	   206	  churches,	   tiled	   baths,	   and	   vibrant	   color	   -­‐-­‐	  which	   have	   inspired	   visitors	   to	   the	   city	  from	   Pushkin	   to	   the	   present	   day.	   Yet	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   Soviet	   century,	   the	  dynamism	   and	   modernization	   projects	   of	   building	   socialism	   occurred	   less	   in	  Tbilisi’s	   picturesque	   eighteenth-­‐	   and	   nineteenth-­‐century	   centers	   than	   in	   new,	  planned	   neighborhoods	   designed	   to	   give	   the	   republic	   capital’s	   burgeoning	  population	  appropriately	  modern	  places	  to	  live,	  work,	  and	  study.478	  	  	   With	   the	   Bolshevik	   takeover	   of	   Georgia	   in	   1921,	   Tbilisi	   already	   had	   a	  population	  of	  233,958.479	  After	  over	  a	  century	  of	  Russian	  imperial	  rule	  (and	  as	  the	  administrative	   capital	   of	   the	   entire	   Caucasus	   region),	   Tiflis	   –	   as	   Tbilisi	  was	   called	  between	  1801	  and	  1936	  –	  had	  a	  diverse	  population	  that	  reflected	  its	  importance	  as	  a	   center	   of	   imperial	   administration,	   regional	   (Russian-­‐Turkish-­‐Iranian)	   trade,	   and	  outpost	  of	  European	  culture.	  As	  the	  city	  developed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	   three	   main	   populations	   dominated	   respective	   spheres	   in	   Tbilisi	   life:	  Russians	   in	   politics	   and	   administration,	   Armenians	   in	   business	   and	   trade,	   and	  Georgians	   in	   the	   nobility	   and	   intelligentsia.480	  Other	   than	   the	   establishment	   of	  Tbilisi	  State	  University	  and	  possible	  plans	  to	  remove	  certain	  minority	  populations,	  however,	  the	  three-­‐year	  period	  of	  Georgian	  independence	  (1918-­‐1921)	  proved	  too	  brief	  for	  major	  changes	  in	  city	  development.481	  Early	  Soviet	  planners	  were	  therefore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  478	  See,	  for	  example,	  a	  newspaper	  feature	  on	  Saburtalo	  as	  indicative	  of	  Tbilisi’s	  present	  and	  future	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  1500th	  anniversary	  celebrations,	  S.	  Geftler,	  “Saburtalo	  segodnia,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka,	  (4	  October	  1958).	  	  479	  Šot’a	   Kakuria,	   k’.	   t’bilisis	   mosaxleoba	   1803-­‐1970	   cc.	   (statistikur-­‐ekonomikuri	   narkvevi)	   (Tbilisi:	  Mec’niereba,	  1979),	  69;	  Jones,	  “The	  Establishment	  of	  Soviet	  Power	  in	  Transcaucasia,"	  616–39.	  480	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation,	  139-­‐143.	  481	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  analysis	  of	  U.S.	  Vice	  Consul	  H.A.	  Doolittle	  regarding	  a	  new	  law	  on	  residence	  in	   Tiflis	   in	   1919,	   which	   he	   and	   his	   Georgian	   interlocutors	   interpreted	   as	   an	   attempt	   by	   the	   new	  
	   207	  tasked	  with	  transforming	  this	  multiethnic,	  imperial	  outpost	  into	  a	  modern	  capital	  of	  a	  socialist	  national	  republic.	  	   Architects	   Š.	   T’avaże	   and	   M.	   Sarajišvili	   cast	   the	   task	   before	   them	   and	  attendant	  challenges	  in	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  terms:	  the	  old	  city	  was	  characterized	  by	  its	  “feudal-­‐bourgeois	  essence,”	  and	  city	  planners	  needed	  to	  develop	  the	  city	  to	  change	  its	   “social	   physiognomy”	   and	   serve	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  workers	   after	   a	   century	  of	  serving	   the	   bourgeoisie.	   They	   likewise	   differentiated	   between	   their	   envisioned	  squares,	   streets,	   and	  architectural	   layout	   and	   the	  bourgeois	  market	   squares,	   dark,	  narrow	  alleys	  in	  workers’	  districts,	  and	  wide	  streets	  in	  the	  bourgeois	  center.	  Tbilisi	  had	   grown	   organically	   (through	   feudal	   and	   capitalist	   mechanisms)	   rather	   than	  rationally,	  and	  therefore	  T’avaże,	  Sarajišvili,	  and	  their	  colleagues	  sought	  to	  reorder	  and	  reconstruct	  Tbilisi	   according	   to	   socialist	   city	  principles,	   as	   they	  established	   in	  their	   twenty-­‐five	   year	   plan	   (1932-­‐1957).482	  	   The	   challenges	   and	   goals	   of	   Tbilisi’s	  first	   socialist	   urban	   plan	  were	  not	   unlike	   those	   faced	   by	   planners	   in	  Moscow	   and	  other	   large,	   medieval	   and	   organically	   developed	   cities	   such	   as	   Nizhnii	   Novgorod;	  showcase	  cities	  on	  the	  Soviet	  periphery	  such	  as	  Vladivostok	  or	  Tashkent;	  and	  even	  new	  Soviet	  industrial	  towns,	  such	  as	  Magnitogorsk	  or	  Rustavi.483	  Shared	  challenges	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Georgian	  government	  to	  lessen	  the	  number	  of	  Armenians	  residing	  in	  the	  city,	  U.S.	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration	  RG	  84:	   Records	   of	   Foreign	   Service	   Posts,	   Consular	   Posts,	   Tiflis,	   USSR:	  Volume	  014,	  number	  234.	  I	  thank	  Joshua	  Neese-­‐Todd	  for	  this	  reference.	  	  482	  Tbilisi’s	  first	  Soviet-­‐era	  urban	  plan	  seems	  to	  have	  predated	  Moscow’s,	  which	  was	  finalized	  only	  in	  1935	  (after	  deliberations	  beginning	  in	  mid-­‐1931).	  On	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Moscow	  general	  plan,	  see	   Andrew	   Elam	  Day,	   "Building	   Socialism:	   The	   Politics	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Cityscape	   in	   the	   Stalin	   Era,"	  Ph.D.	  Dissertation,	  Columbia	  University,	  1998,	  85-­‐114.	  	  
483 On	   Moscow,	   see	   Timothy	   J.	   Colton,	   Moscow:	   Governing	   the	   Socialist	   Metropolis	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  Chapters	  3-­‐4;	  Day,	  "Building	  Socialism,"	  Chapters	  2-­‐3;	  and	  Stephen	  V.	  Bittner,	   “Green	  Cities	   and	  Orderly	  Streets:	   Space	  and	  Culture	   in	  Moscow,	  1928-­‐1933,”	   Journal	  of	  
Urban	  History	  25,	  no.	  1	  (November	  1998):	  22–56.	  On	  Nizhnii	  Novgorod,	  see	  Heather	  DeHaan,	  Stalinist	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  included	  working	   toward	   the	   elimination	  of	   distinctions	  between	  urban	   and	   rural	  areas;	   and	  developing	  newer	   areas	   to	  bring	   educational	   and	   industrial	   districts	   in	  closer	  contact	  through	  planning	  rather	  than	  isolating	  these	  populations	  in	  “satellite	  cities.”484	  	  	   The	  ideological	  imperative	  behind	  “reconstructing”	  Tbilisi	  into	  a	  socialist	  city	  necessarily	  entailed	  an	  important	  ethnic	  component.485	  
Table	  2:	  Population	  by	  Major	  Nationality	  in	  Tbilisi,	  1876-­‐1930	  (%)486	  
Nationality	   1876	   1897	   1917	   1922	   1926	   1930	  Georgians	   24.2	   26.5	   25.3	   34.6	   38.2	   42.8	  Armenians	   41	   29.6	   33.7	   36.5	   34	   32.9	  Russians	   22	   28.1	   28.1	   16.5	   15.6	   14.2	  	  In	  the	  six	  decades	  shown	  here,	  the	  percentage	  of	  Armenians	  and	  Russians	  in	  Tbilisi	  fluctuated	   considerably	   across	   the	   imperial,	   independence,	   and	   Soviet	   periods,	  whereas	   the	   relative	   number	   of	   Georgian	   Tbilisians	   steadily	   increased	   across	   the	  same	  period.	  The	  proportionate	  shifts	  could	  be	  due	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  including	  war	   and	   displacement,	   revolution,	   out-­‐	   and	   in-­‐migration	   during	   the	   period	   of	  Georgian	   independence,	   and	   difference	   in	   birth	   and	   death	   rates	   between	  nationalities.	  For	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  study	  (in	  Russian)	  “Ustanovleniia	  territorii	  gor.	  Tiflisa	   i	   ego	   raionirovaniia	   srokom	   na	   25	   let	   (po	   1957	   goda),”	   however,	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
City	  Planning:	  Professionals,	  Performance,	  and	  Power	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2013);	  on	  Vladivostok,	   William	   Richardson,	   “Stalinist	   Vladivostok:	   Architecture	   and	   Urban	   Planning,	   1928-­‐1953,”	   The	   Soviet	   and	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Review	   27,	   no.	   2–3	   (2000):	   293–314;	   on	   Tashkent,	   Stronski,	  
Tashkent;	  and	  on	  Magnitogorsk,	  Kotkin,	  Magnetic	  Mountain.	  484	  “Zakliuchenie	  po	  dokladu	  ustanovleniia	  territorii	  goroda	  Tiflisa	  i	  ego	  raionirovaniia	  srokom	  na	  25	  let	  (1932-­‐1957),”	  Š.	  T’avaże	  and	  M.	  Sarajišvili,	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  4,	  d.	  4,	  ll.	  1-­‐5.	  	  
485 The	  “reconstructing”	  terminology	  used	  by	  Tbilisi	  planners	  came	  from	  Moscow	  Party	  chief	  Lazar	  Kaganovich’s	   stated	   goal	   for	   Moscow	   and	   Soviet	   city	   planning	   to	   work	   toward	   “the	   socialist	  reconstruction	  of	  life	  and	  habits,”	  quoted	  in	  Day,	  “Building	  Socialism,”	  89. 486	  “PROEKT:	   Ustanovleniia	   territorii	   gor.	   Tiflisa	   i	   ego	   raionirovaniia	   srokom	   na	   25	   let	   (po	   1957	  god),”	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  4,	  d.	  4,	  l.	  63.	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  ethnodemographic	   process	   could	   only	   have	   resulted	   from	   deliberate	   planning	  facilitated	  by	  Soviet	  nationality	  policies:	  	  Up	  to	  1917,	  Georgians	  comprised	  a	  minority	   in	  Tiflis’s	  population,	   in	  third	   place	   behind	   Armenians	   and	   Russians.	   In	   1922	   the	   Georgian	  population	  moved	   into	   second	  place,	   behind	  Armenians,	   and	  only	   in	  1926	  did	  Georgians	  move	  into	  first	  place,	  with	  Armenians	  second	  and	  Russians	   third.	   In	   this	   way,	   since	   1917	   the	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	  Georgian	  population	  over	  that	  of	  other	  nationalities	  can	  be	  observed.	  The	   “re-­‐Georgianification”	   (peregruzinovka)	   of	   the	   population	   by	  nationality	   that	   is	   taking	  place	   currently	   in	  Tiflis	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	  correct	  nationality	  policy	  of	  the	  government.487	  	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  decade	  since	  the	  Soviet	  takeover	  of	  Georgia,	  the	  more	  recent	  five-­‐year	   period	   (1926-­‐1930)	   had	   seen	   a	   markedly	   higher	   growth	   in	   the	   Georgian	  population	   of	   Tbilisi	   than	   the	   earlier	   period	   (1921-­‐1925),	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  relative	  weight	  of	  the	  Georgian	  population	  by	  69	  percent.488	  
Table	  3:	  Tbilisi	  Population	  by	  Nationality,	  1939-­‐1970489	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  487	  Ibid.,	  l.	  64.	  488	  Ibid.,	  l.	  50.	  489	  Vsesoiuznaia	  perepis’	  naseleniia	  1939	  goda,	  71-­‐72;	  Itogi	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1959	  goda,	  138-­‐139;	  Itogi	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1970	  goda,	  vol.	  4,	  258.	  
Nationality	   1939	   %	   1959	   %	   1970	   %	  Georgian	   228,394	   44	   336,254	   48.4	   511,379	   57.5	  Armenian	   137,331	   26.4	   149,258	   21.5	   150,205	   17.0	  Russian	   93,337	   18	   125,674	   18.1	   124,316	   14.0	  Jewish	   13,915	   2.7	   17,311	   2.5	   19,579	   2.2	  Ossetian	   9,328	   1.8	   15,565	   2.2	   21,797	   2.5	  Ukrainian	   7,415	   1.4	   10,927	   1.6	   10,600	   1.2	  Azerbaijani	   5,874	   1.1	   9,560	   1.4	   10,810	   1.2	  German	   5,528	   1.1	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  Kurd	   4,511	   0.9	   12,935	   1.8	   18,409	   2.1	  Greek	   N/A	   N/A	   7,054	   1	   10,696	   1.2	  Assyrian	   N/A	   N/A	   2,559	   0.4	   2,786	   0.3	  Tatar	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   1,622	   0.18	  Belorussian	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   1,402	   0.16	  Other	   13,587	   2.6	   N/A	   N.A	   5,419	   0.6	  
Total	  Tbilisi	  
Population	  
519,220	   	   694,664	   	   889,020	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  The	   nationalization	   and	   growth	   of	   Tbilisi	   in	   the	   postwar	   period	  corresponded	  to	  an	  overall	  trend	  of	  urbanization	  in	  the	  republic	  and	  the	  increasing	  hegemony	  of	  the	  entitled	  Georgian	  nationality.	  	  
Table	  4:	  Georgian	  SSR	  population	  by	  urban	  and	  rural	  residence490	  
	   1939	  (%)	   1959	  (%)	   1970	  (%)	   1979	  (%)	  
Total	  GSSR	  
population	   3,540,023	   4,044,045	   4,686,358	   5,014,771	  
Urban	   1,066,226	  (30)	   1,712,897	  (42)	   2,239,738	  (48)	   2,600,448	  (52)	  
Tbilisi	   519,220	   694,664	   889,020	   1,069,538	  
Rural	   2,473,797	   2,331,148	   2,446,620	   2,414,323	  	  In	   short,	  Tbilisi	   and	  other	  urban	   centers	   grew	  as	   a	   result	   of	   postwar	  migration	  of	  rural	  residents	  to	  cities,	  which	  proceeded	  in	  spite	  of	   the	  expansion	  of	  the	  propiska	  and	   passportization	   systems	   (which	   initially	   did	   not	   include	   collective	   farm	  workers).	   Though	   Tbilisi	   was	   added	   to	   the	   list	   of	   restricted	   cities	   in	   1956,	  demographic	  data	  indicate	  that	  rural	  residents	  flowed	  into	  urban	  areas	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  in	  spite	  of	  Tbilisi’s	  restricted	  status.491	  Because	  the	  rural	  population	  was	  predominantly	   Georgian	   by	   nationality,	   urban	   populations	   gradually	   acquired	   a	  more	   Georgian	   face	   through	   these	   processes	   of	   rural-­‐to-­‐urban	   migration.	   Tbilisi,	  which	  doubled	  in	  population	  between	  1939	  and	  1979,	  was	  emblematic	  of	  this	  trend	  yet	  not	  its	  sole	  beneficiary:	  Sukhumi,	  for	  example,	  likewise	  saw	  an	  increase	  in	  total	  and	  Georgian	  populations	  across	  a	  similar	  period.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  490	  Tsentral’noe	  statisticheskoe	  upravlenie	  SSSR,	  Chislennost’	  i	  sostav	  naseleniia	  SSSR:	  Po	  dannym	  
Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1979	  goda	  (Moscow:	  Finansy	  i	  statistika,	  1984),	  709.	  491	  Cynthia	  Buckley,	   “The	  Myth	  of	  Managed	  Migration:	  Migration	  Control	   and	  Market	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Period,”	  Slavic	  Review	   54,	   no.	   5	   (Winter	   1995):	   896–916,	   906.	  Moscow,	   Leningrad,	  Rostov-­‐on-­‐Don,	  Minsk,	   Kiev,	   Kharkov,	   and	   Vladivostok	   had	  much	   earlier	   residential	   restrictions	   (1932)	   that	   were	  arguably	   less	  about	  urban	  locale	  than	  strategic	  significance,	  Gijs	  Kessler,	   “The	  Passport	  System	  and	  State	  Control	  over	  Population	  Flows	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  1932-­‐1940,”	  Cahiers	  Du	  Monde	  Russe	  42,	  no.	  2/4	  (December	  2001):	  477–503.	  	  
	   211	  	   The	  three	  visions	  highlighted	  by	  planners	  in	  Soviet	  Georgia	  –	  of	  an	  urbanized,	  rational,	  national	  capital	   -­‐-­‐	  were	  embodied	   in	   the	  new	  district	  of	  Saburtalo	   (literal	  translation	  “ball	  field”),	  which	  linked	  the	  educational	  district	  of	  Vake	  with	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	   residential	   and	   industrial	   landscape	   of	   Saburtalo	   and	   microdistricts	  further	   afield.	   Architects	   and	   planners	   identified	   several	   new	   areas	   for	   further	  residential	   development	   in	   their	   twenty-­‐five	   year	   plan	   (from	   1932)	   that	   would	  expand	  Tbilisi’s	   residential	   capacity	   considerably	   from	   the	   districts	   of	  Nażaladevi,	  Rust’aveli,	   Didube,	   Davidov,	   and	   Vera.492	  New	   districts	   in	   Saburtalo	   and	   further	  afield	   in	  Diġomi	  and	  ĠrmeĠele	  would	  house	   the	  capital’s	  expanding	  populace	  as	   it	  built	   Georgian	   socialism.	   As	   the	   new	   district	   closest	   to	   older	   parts	   of	   the	   city,	  Saburtalo	  was	  a	   crucial	   focal	  point	   for	   the	   realization	  of	  planners’	   aspirations	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  lived	  experience	  in	  the	  Georgian	  capital	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Saburtalo’s	   postwar	   development	   took	   place	   alongside	   republic-­‐wide	  projects	   to	   build	   new,	   rational	   industrial	   centers	   and	   better	   integrate	   living	   and	  working	  quarters.	  Unique	  to	  Georgia,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  resort	  development	  and	  state	  farms	   for	   the	   production	   of	   wine,	   citrus,	   tea,	   and	   tobacco	   continued	   from	   its	  inception	  in	  the	  1930s.	  In	  spite	  of	  ambitious	  postwar	  construction	  plans	  throughout	  Georgia,	   Georgian	   architects	   lamented	   in	   1949	   that	  most	   of	   the	   time	  projects	   and	  plans	   sent	   from	   organizations	   in	   Moscow	   and	   Leningrad	   failed	   to	   meet	   local	  conditions,	   from	   weather	   and	   climate	   to	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   mountainous	  regions	   and	   their	   inhabitants	   –	   a	   disconnect	   that	   would	   continue	   into	   the	   1970s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  492	  “PROEKT:	  Ustanovleniia	  territorii	  gor.	  Tiflisa	  i	  ego	  raionirovaniia	  srokom	  na	  25	  let	  (po	  1957	  god),”	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  4,	  d.	  4,	  ll.	  102-­‐103.	  
	   212	  Moreover,	   these	   same	   architects	   noted	   challenges	   in	   design	   and	   implementation	  regarding	   local,	   Soviet,	   and	   international	   practices,	   in	   that	   “The	   issue	   of	   using	  legacies	  of	  national	  and	  world	  architecture	  has	  been	  correctly	  understood	  by	  many	  of	  our	  architects.	  But	  an	  insufficient	  understanding	  of	  modernity	  among	  some	  gives	  rise	   to	   false,	   ‘national,’	   archaic	   forms	   and	   eclecticism.” 493 	  On	   a	   seemingly	  contradictory	   note,	   the	   architects	   cited	   the	   success	   of	   certain	   low-­‐rise	   residential	  buildings	   that	   included	   in	   their	   plans	   “wide	   balconies,	   verandas,	   loggias,	   and	  terraces	   that	   are	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   living	   space”	   and	   urged	   the	   broader	  population	  to	  appreciate	  the	  “high	  level	  of	  study	  of	  ancient	  and	  folk	  architecture,	  as	  well	  as	  folk	  craftsmanship”	  on	  display	  in	  the	  republic’s	  streets.494	  Even	  with	  the	  shift	  in	   style,	   function,	   and	   pace	   of	   construction	   during	   the	   Khrushchev	   era,	   Georgian	  architects	   continued	   to	   note	   the	   tensions	   between	  Moscow	   plans	   and	   local	   needs	  and	  tastes,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	   The	   district	   of	   Saburtalo	   was	   bound	   by	   the	   Mtkvari	   River	   on	   the	   east,	  mountains	  on	  the	  west	  and	  north,	  and	  the	  Vake	  district	  to	  the	  south,	  separated	  from	  Saburtalo	   by	   the	   Varazi	   ravine.	   Given	   its	   location	   between	   the	   educational	  complexes	   of	   the	  Vake	  district	   and	   the	   industrial	  Nażaladevi	   and	  Didube	  districts,	  Saburtalo	  would	  be	  ideally	  suited	  to	  house	  workers	  and	  students	  alike,	  according	  to	  the	  plan.	  Yet	  in	  the	  1930s,	  this	  territory	  was	  largely	  rural,	  without	  a	  sewage	  system	  or	   integration	   with	   the	   city	   road	   and	   transport	   network.	   The	   only	   way	   to	   access	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  493	  “Poslevoennaia	   arkhitekturnaia	   praktika	   v	   Gruzinskoi	   SSR:	   TEZISY	   k	   doklady	   na	   tvorcheskoi	  konferentsii	  arkhitektorov	  Zakavkazskikh	  respublik	  v	  Baku,”	  (1949),	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  23,	  d.	  478,	  l.	  44,	  ll.	  37-­‐49.	  494	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  45-­‐46.	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  what	  would	  become	  Saburtalo	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Tbilisi	  was	  via	  Lenin	  Street.	  By	  1958,	  Saburtalo	  was	  to	  house	  100,000	  inhabitants	  of	  an	  expected	  total	  Tbilisi	  population	  of	   900,000.495	  Moreover,	   the	   nascent	   district	   required	   not	   just	   inhabitants,	   but	  utilities,	   a	   transport	   system,	   apartment	   buildings,	   and	   the	   services	   and	   amenities	  that	   make	   urban	   life	   possible	   and	   prosperous:	   schools,	   bazaars,	   corner	   shops,	  restaurants,	  cultural	  and	  entertainment	  centers,	  hospitals,	  and	  parks,	  among	  other	  things.	   If	   the	   Saburtalo	   project	   presented	   Tbilisi	   architects	   and	   planners	   with	   a	  relatively	  blank	  spatial	   canvas	  upon	  which	   to	  map	   their	   socialist	  urban	  ambitions,	  then	  the	  growth	  of	  this	  district	  in	  practice	  over	  the	  next	  five	  decades	  demonstrated	  the	   possibilities	   and	   limits	   of	   such	   visions	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   Saburtalo’s	  inhabitants.	  	   The	  process	  of	  dividing	  Soviet	  Tbilisi	   into	  administrative	  sub-­‐units	  began	  in	  1931,	  when	  Orjonikiże	  District	  was	  one	  of	  the	  city’s	  four	  administrative	  districts	  and	  the	   city’s	   first	   general	   plan	  was	   finalized	   in	  1934.496	  Orjonikiże	  District	   comprised	  the	   developing	   Vake	   neighborhood	   and	   the	   more	   rural	   Saburtalo	   area.	   Saburtalo	  was	   included	   in	   the	   1941	   general	   plan	   for	   Tbilisi	   as	   a	   site	   for	   residential	  development	   in	   the	   next	   twenty	   years,	   where	   squares,	   streets,	   and	   five-­‐story	  residential	  buildings	  were	  to	  be	  built	  according	  to	  a	  “unified	   idea,”	  as	  described	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  495	  “PROEKT:	  Ustanovleniia	  territorii	  gor.	  Tiflisa	  i	  ego	  raionirovaniia	  srokom	  na	  25	  let	  (po	  1957	  god),”	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  4,	  d.	  4,	  l.	  105.	  496	  Karl	  Ziegler,	  “Städtebau	  in	  Georgien	  vom	  Sozialismus	  zur	  Marktwirtschaft”	  (Ph.D.	  Dissertation,	  Raum-­‐	  und	  Umweltplanung,	  Technischen	  Universität	  Kaiserslautern,	  2005),	  99.	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  1952.497	  The	   author	   of	   “Orjonikiże	   District	   of	   the	   City	   of	   Tbilisi	   on	   the	   Path	   of	  October”	  detailed	  his	  pride	  at	  leading	  an	  assessment	  of	  local	  development	  in	  1967:	  	  I	   have	   worked	   in	   this	   area	   practically	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   its	  formation.	  The	  district	  rapidly	  grew	  and	  developed	  before	  my	  eyes.	  In	  the	   place	   of	   barren	   and	   swampy	   territories	   there	   appeared	   gardens	  and	   parks,	   the	   old	   sheds	   and	   cabins	   were	   destroyed	   and	   unique	  buildings	  and	  structures	   for	  cultural,	  everyday,	  and	  special	  purposes	  were	   erected:	   the	   sections	   of	   the	   district	   were	   transformed	   into	  “Vake”	   and	   “Saburtalo”.	   Many	   wide	   avenues	   and	   streets	   appeared,	  decorated	  with	  squares	  and	  parks.	  On	  these	  wastelands	  factories	  and	  plants	  were	  built.498	  	  	  Between	  1939	  and	  1959,	  the	  population	  of	  the	  entire	  Orjonikiże	  District	  grew	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  2.5,	  to	  172,800	  people,	  making	  up	  20.5	  percent	  of	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  Tbilisi	   by	   1959. 499 	  While	   these	   figures	   include	   both	   Vake	   and	   Saburtalo	  neighborhoods,	  much	   of	   the	   postwar	   construction	   and	   population	   influx	   occurred	  on	  the	  Saburtalo	  side	  –	  a	  trend	  that	  would	  only	  intensify	  in	  subsequent	  decades.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  497	  “POIASNITEL’NAIA	  ZAPISKA	  k	  proektu	  planirovki	  i	  zastroiki	  Saburtalinskoi	  ploshchadi	  i	  kvartala	  ogranichennogo	   ulitsami	   Voenno-­‐Gruzinskoi,	   Lisskoi	   i	   Saburtalinskoi,”	   Architects	   Kalashnikov	   and	  Andriaże,	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  4,	  d.	  205,	  ll.	  3-­‐5.	  498	  “INFORMATSIIA	  kak	  byl	   sostavlen	   statisticheskii	   spravochnik	   ‘Ordzhonikidzevskii	   raion	  goroda	  Tbilisi	  po	  puti	  Oktiabria,’”	  t’c’a,	  f.	  79,	  d.	  1385,	  l.	  71.	  	  499	  Ibid.,	  l.	  72.	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Figure	  8:	  Map	  of	  Tbilisi’s	  Neighborhoods	  
Source:	  Google	  Earth/Author	  Notations	  	  
	  
Figure	  9:	  Map	  of	  Saburtalo	  
Source:	  Google	  Earth/Author	  Notations	  
	  
	   216	  	   By	   design	   and	   in	   practice,	   Saburtalo	   was	   first	   and	   foremost	   a	   residential	  neighborhood.	  The	  pace	  of	  construction	  and	  migration	  from	  the	  1940s	  through	  the	  1970s	  –	  and	  shifts	  in	  Soviet	  design	  and	  planning	  –	  meant	  that	  Saburtalo	  contained	  in	  a	   single	   neighborhood:	   residences	   emblematic	   of	   every	   decade	   of	   Soviet	  architecture;	  a	  small	  number	  of	  pre-­‐Soviet	  single-­‐family	  homes;	  barracks	  to	  provide	  temporary	   housing	   to	   new	   residents;	   illegal,	   self-­‐constructed	   homes	   that	   went	  against	   Soviet	   bloc	   plans;	   and	   dark	   basements	   and	   hovels.	   As	   was	   the	   case	  throughout	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   Khrushchev’s	   effort	   to	   simplify,	   standardize,	   and	  expedite	   mass,	   single-­‐family	   housing	   starting	   in	   1956	   presented	   a	   bold	   set	   of	  challenges	   to	   Tbilisi	   architects	   and	   planners,	   eliciting	   uneven	   expectations	   among	  planners	  and	  local	  residents.500	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  On	   Khrushchev’s	   housing	   reforms,	   see	   Harris,	   Communism	   on	   Tomorrow	   Street;	   and	   Mark	   B.	  Smith,	   Property	   of	   Communists:	   The	   Urban	   Housing	   Program	   from	   Stalin	   to	   Khrushchev	   (DeKalb:	  Northern	   Illinois	   University	   Press,	   2010).	   On	   the	   export	   and	   comparative	   dimensions	   of	   housing	  reform	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  see	  David	  Crowley	  and	  Susan	  E.	  Reid,	  eds.,	  Socialist	  
Spaces:	  Sites	  of	  Everyday	  Life	   in	   the	  Eastern	  Bloc	   (New	  York:	  Berg,	   2002);	  David	  Crowley,	   “People’s	  Warsaw/Popular	  Warsaw,”	  Journal	  of	  Design	  History	  10,	  no.	  2	  (1997):	  203–23;	  Brigitte	  Le	  Normand,	  
Designing	   Tito’s	   Capital:	   Urban	   Planning,	   Modernism,	   and	   Socialism	   in	   Belgrade	   (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2014);	  and	  Elidor	  Mëhilli,	   “The	  Socialist	  Design:	  Urban	  Dilemmas	   in	  Postwar	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  13,	  no.	  3	  (Summer	   2012):	   635–65.	   On	   Khrushchev’s	   reforms	   within	   Russian	   history,	   see	   William	   Craft	  Brumfield	   and	   Blair	   A.	   Ruble,	   eds.,	   Russian	   Housing	   in	   the	   Modern	   Age:	   Design	   and	   Social	   History	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  Center	  Press,	  1993).	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Figures	  10	  and	  11:	  Examples	  of	  housing	  on	  Doliże	  Street,	  Saburtalo,	  in	  which	  buildings	  constructed	  
between	  the	  1930s	  and	  1970s	  are	  visible.	  
	  Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2015.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  faced	  a	  serious	  “housing	  crisis”	  in	  the	  postwar	  years,	  even	  in	   locales	   such	   as	   Georgia	   that	   saw	   neither	   wartime	   occupation	   nor	   physical	  destruction.	   Yet	   as	   soldiers	   returned	   from	   the	   front,	   (some)	   deportees	   returned	  from	   exile,	   and	   rural-­‐to-­‐urban	  migration	   began	   to	   intensify,	   the	   housing	   stock	   in	  Tbilisi	   failed	   to	   meet	   the	   technical	   and	   practical	   needs	   of	   the	   capital’s	   growing	  population.	   The	   “housing	   crisis”	   was	   particularly	   acute	   in	   the	   older	   districts	   of	  Tbilisi,	   such	   as	   Kala,	   Isani,	   and	   Avlabari,	   where	   many	   residents	   lived	   in	   dark,	  cramped	  basements,	  attics,	  and	  warehouses	  without	  proper	  utilities.501	  In	  Georgian	  CC	  Secretary	  Tadagiże’s	  estimate,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  central	  norm	  of	  9	  square	  meters	   of	   living	   space	   for	   t’biliselebi	   (residents	   of	   Tbilisi)	   within	   a	   decade,	   they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  501 	  “Pervoe	   zasedanie	   republikanskogo	   soveshchaniia	   stroitelei,	   arkhitektorov,	   rabotnikov	  promyshlennosti	   stroimaterialov,	   proektnykh	   i	   nauhno-­‐issledovatel’skikh	   organizatsii	   GSSR,”	   19	  September	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  193,	   l.	  12.	  The	  intense	  investment	  and	  focus	  on	  building	  new	  neighborhoods	  such	  as	  Saburtalo	  left	  little	  room	  for	  the	  modernization	  and	  renovation	  of	  older	  districts	   of	   Tbilisi,	   such	   that	  many	   residences	   in	   older	   neighborhoods	  were	   uninhabitable,	   Ziegler,	  “Städtebau	  in	  Georgien,”	  102.	  
	   218	  would	  need	   to	   construct	   3.4	  million	   square	  meters	   of	   housing,	   or	   each	   year	  more	  than	  double	  the	  amount	  achieved	  in	  the	  entire	  previous	  Five	  Year	  Plan.502	  	  The	   burgeoning	   neighborhood	   of	   Saburtalo	   provided	   the	   site	   of	  experimentation,	   beginning	   in	   1956,	   for	   Mingorselstroi	   to	   construct	   residential	  complexes	  with	   four-­‐	   and	   five-­‐story	   buildings	   from	  prefabricated	  materials,	   along	  the	   lines	   set	   out	   by	   Khrushchev	   in	   his	   housing	   reforms.503	  The	   new	   residential	  complexes	   were	   viewed	   as	   an	   improvement	   from	   the	   more	   recent	   practice	   of	  constructing	   individual	   buildings,	   without	   standard	   designs,	   that	   led	   to	   such	  problems	   as	   excess	   living	   space	   for	   a	   small	   number	   of	   families	   as	   well	   as	  architectural	   “excesses”	   such	   as	   complex	   cornices,	   high	   ceilings,	   and	   tower	  superstructures.	  The	  most	  grievous	  “offender”	  cited	  in	  this	  case	  was	  also	  located	  in	  Saburtalo,	   in	  the	  residence	  for	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  scholars	  at	  2-­‐3	  Pekini	  Avenue,	  where	   a	   single	   apartment	   contained	   140	   square	   meters	   of	   living	   space	   and	   an	  additional	  70	   square	  meters	  devoted	   to	   corridors,	   kitchen,	   and	  other	   rooms.	   Such	  space	   could	   house	   two	   or	   three	   families,	   yet	   was	   built	   only	   for	   one.504	  Building	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  502 	  Pervoe	   zasedanie	   republikanskogo	   soveshchaniia	   stroitelei,	   arkhitektorov,	   rabotnikov	  promyshlennosti	   stroimaterialov,	   proektnykh	   i	   nauhno-­‐issledovatel’skikh	   organizatsii	   GSSR,”	   19	  September	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  193,	  ll.	  13-­‐14.	  By	  1965,	  Georgia	  had	  managed	  to	  achieve	  only	   7.5	   square	  meters	   of	   living	   space	   per	   person	  while	   determining	   that,	   due	   to	   Georgia’s	  warm	  climate,	  the	  sanitary	  norm	  should	  actually	  be	  raised	  to	  12	  square	  meters	  per	  person,	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	   CPSU	   CC	   and	   Council	   of	  Ministers	   Committee	   of	   Party-­‐State	   Control	   I.	   Shishkin	   to	   CPSU	   CC,	   12	  November	  1965,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  351,	  ll.	  2-­‐8.	  The	  1975	  Tbilisi	  general	  plan	  expected	  to	  reach	  this	  level	  only	  in	  the	  year	  2000,	  “SPRAVKA	  osnovnye	  pokazateli	  General’nogo	  plana	  g.	  Tbilisi,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46.	  d	  474,	  ll.	  50-­‐51.	  503	  Construction	  on	  five-­‐	  and	  six-­‐story	  buildings	  in	  Saburtalo	  began	  in	  the	  1940s,	  but	  the	  1956	  shift	  introduced	   prefabricated	   materials	   and	   more	   consistent	   design	   standards	   characteristic	   of	   the	  
khrushchevka.	  504 	  Pervoe	   zasedanie	   republikanskogo	   soveshchaniia	   stroitelei,	   arkhitektorov,	   rabotnikov	  promyshlennosti	   stroimaterialov,	   proektnykh	   i	   nauhno-­‐issledovatel’skikh	   organizatsii	   GSSR,”	   19	  September	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  193,	  ll.	  31-­‐33.	  The	  standardized	  experiment	  in	  Saburtalo	  
	   219	  practices	   from	   the	   late	   Stalin	   era	   displayed	   some	   aesthetic	   and	   functional	   value,	  however:	  for	  example,	  using	  open	  stairways	  and	  carved	  balconies	  not	  only	  appealed	  to	  national	  traditions	  and	  old	  Tbilisi	  building	  motifs,	  but	  also	  helped	  keep	  buildings	  and	  their	  inhabitants	  cool	  during	  the	  hot	  summer	  months.505	  Still,	  the	  four-­‐	  and	  five-­‐story,	   single-­‐family	  apartment	   complex	  –	  known	  colloquially	   throughout	   the	  USSR	  as	   the	   khrushchevka	   -­‐-­‐	   provided	   a	   theoretical	   solution	   to	   the	   dual	   problem	   of	   the	  alleged	   architectural	   excess	   and	   “façadism”	   of	   the	   Stalin	   era	   and	   the	   postwar	  “housing	  crisis.”	  And	   build	   Saburtalo	   they	   did,	   hoping	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   “quickly,	   well,	   and	  cheaply”	  mantra	  set	  by	  Khrushchev.506	  Coverage	   in	  komunisti	   and	  Zaria	  Vostoka	   in	  the	   late	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   consistently	   lauded	   the	   pace	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	  Georgian	   capital	   and	   typically	   highlighted	   Saburtalo	   explicitly	   as	   the	   building	  program’s	  modern,	  Soviet	  showcase.507	  Yet	  as	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Khrushchev-­‐era	  mass	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  would	  likewise	  provide	  an	  improvement	  over	  the	  “chaotic”	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Vake	  neighborhood	  had	  been	  constructed,	  as	  Tbilisi	  chief	  architect	  T’evdaże	  described,	  “Nepravlennaia	  stenogramma	  3-­‐go	   plenuma	   Tbilisskogo	   Komiteta	   KP	   Gruzii	   ‘o	   khode	   zhilstroitel’stva	   v	   gor.	   Tbilisi,”	   20	   July	   1954,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  35,	  d.	  22,	  ll.	  88-­‐95.	  	  505	  N.	  Dzhashi,	  Arkhitektura	  sotsialisticheskogo	  Tbilisi	  (Tbilisi:	  literatura	  da	  xelovneba,	  1963),	  110.	  506	  A	  certain	  Kutatelaże	  remarked	  on	  the	  inability	  of	  Tbilisi	  builders	  to	  embrace	  this	  ethos	  early	  on,	  “Stenogramma	   sobraniia	   gorodskogo	   partiino-­‐khoziaistvennogo	   aktiva	   ‘o	   khode	   vypolneniia	  gosudarstvennykh	  planov	  stroitel'nymi	  organizatsiiami	  gor.	  Tbilisi,’”	  (9	  August	  1955),	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  35,	  d.	  267,	  l.	  43.	  In	  Georgia,	  this	  phrase	  was	  immortalized	  by	  novelist	  Nodar	  Dumbaże	  in	  his	  short	  story	  “‘vašenot’	  scrap’ad,	  iap'ad	  da…’,”	  which	  tells	  the	  humorous	  story	  of	  two	  Tbilisi	  boys’	  encounter	  with	  these	  new	  apartments	  that	  were	  already	  deteriorating.	  507	  K.	   Zavriev,	   “Stroit’	   po-­‐novomu,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (21	   January	   1955);	   “Po-­‐novomu	   organizovat’	  rabotu	   na	   stroikakh	   Tbilisi,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (14	   January	   1955);	   “Bol’she	   zhilykh	   domov	  trudiashchimsia!,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (28	   September	   1957);	   “Stroitel’stvu	   zhilishch	   -­‐	   povsednevnoe	  vnimanie,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (7	  February	  1957);	  “Protiv	  otstalykh	  tempov	  v	  zhilishchnom	  stroitel’stve,”	  
Zaria	   Vostoka	   (12	   March	   1957);	   “Vozvodit’	   zhilye	   doma	   vysokimi	   tempami,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (7	  February	   1957);	   “O	   zhilishchnom	   stroitel’stve	   v	   Gruzinskoj	   SSR	   v	   1957	   godu,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (19	  February	   1957);	   A.	   Kiknadze,	   “Bol’she	   stroit’	   krupnoblochnykh	   domov	   v	   Tbilisi,”	   Zaria	  Vostoka	   (8	  April	  1958);	  “Nash	  Tbilisi	  budet	  eshche	  krashe,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (10	  December	  1958);	  “Opyt	  stroitelei	  Moskvy	  -­‐	  vsem	  stroiteliam	  Gruzii,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (25	  April	  1959);	  S.	  Mkervalidze	  and	  S.	  Sakvarelidze,	  
	   220	  housing	   construction	  Union-­‐wide,	   the	  process	  of	   constructing	   Saburtalo	  may	  have	  been	   quick,	   but	   often	   failed	   to	  meet	   the	   quality	   and	   cost	   standards	   set	   by	   central	  planners.	  For	  1957	  and	  1958	  alone,	  the	  Tbilisi	  Executive	  Committee	  allotted	  land	  for	  four-­‐	   and	   five-­‐story	   residential	   buildings	   in	   Saburtalo	   to	   house	  workers	   and	   their	  families	  from	  fifty-­‐two	  different	  workplaces,	  ranging	  from	  the	  Georgian	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  to	  the	  Saburtalo	  Brick	  Factory	  to	  the	  GSSR	  Ministry	  of	  Communications.508	  By	   1966,	   the	   larger	  Orjonikiże	  District	   boasted	   a	   housing	   fund	   of	   819,500	   square	  meters,	   from	   217,300	   square	   meters	   only	   a	   decade	   earlier.	   As	   specified	   by	  Khrushchev’s	  housing	  policy,	  most	  of	  the	  housing	  construction	  in	  that	  decade	  was	  of	  four-­‐	  and	  five-­‐story	  buildings,	  though	  in	  Orjonikiże	  District	  between	  1956	  and	  1966	  they	   built	   a	   few	   dozen	   six-­‐,	   seven-­‐	   and	   eight-­‐story	   buildings	   as	   well.509	  In	   1961,	  plans	   were	   even	   announced	   for	   what	   would	   become	   the	   tallest	   building	   in	   the	  Georgian	   SSR,	   a	   sixteen-­‐story	   residential	   building	   on	   Važa-­‐Pšavela	   Avenue	   in	  Saburtalo.510	  Buildings	   were	   constructed	   rapidly,	   yet	   attendant	   utilities	   and	   amenities	  lagged	  behind	  the	  proliferation	  of	  khrushchevki	  proper.511	  In	  late	  1956,	  access	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  “Kirpich?	  Net,	  bloki,	  paneli,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (17	  March	  1961);	  I.	  Chkhenkeli,	  “Tbilisi	  segodnia	  i	  zavtra,”	  
Zaria	   Vostoka	   (31	   August	   1962);	   A.	   Gegechkori,	   “Tbilisskie	   cheremushki,”	   Zaria	   Vostoka	   (15	   April	  1969).	  508	  “Spisok	   vydelennykh	   uchastkov	   zemli	   pod	   stroitel’stvo	   zhilykh	   domov	   v	   kvartale	   kompleksnoi	  zastroiki	  Saburtalo	  za	  1957	  i	  1958	  g.g.,”	  A.	  C’inc’aże,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  37,	  d.	  246,	  l.	  34.	  509	  t’bilisis	  orjonikiżis	  raioni	  ok’tombris	  gzit’:	  statistikuri	  c’nobari	   (Tbilisi:	  sak’art’velos	  ssr	  c’entraluri	  statistikuri	  sammart’velo,	  1968),	  134-­‐135.	  510	  “Pervyi	  shestnadtsatietazhnyi,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (December	  20,	  1961).	  511	  t’bilisis	  orjonikiżis	  raioni	  ok’tombris	  gzit’.	  While	   electricity	   and	   access	   to	   city	  water	  was	   at	   least	  official	   registered	   as	   universal	   in	   the	   district	   by	   1967,	   gas,	   central	   heating,	   and	  private	   bathrooms	  were	   less	   common.	   Such	   problems	  were	   not	   unique	   to	   Tbilisi:	   Steven	  Harris	   describes	   a	   similarly	  uneven	   realization	   of	   utilities	   planning	   in	   Leningrad	   in	   Harris,	   Communism	   on	   Tomorrow	   Street,	  especially	  chapter	  7.	  
	   221	  water	  was	   delayed	   further	   on	  Doliże	   Street	   (one	   of	   the	   first	   streets	   in	   Saburtalo),	  making	   much	   of	   the	   area	   impassable	   and	   leading	   local	   residents	   to	   dispose	   of	  household	   rubbish	   openly	   on	   the	   remaining	   land.512	  In	   late	   1958,	   for	   example,	  Orjonikiże	   District	   Executive	   Committee	   chief	   Qup’araże	   noted	   that	   while	   paved	  roads	  and	  sidewalks	  had	  been	  created,	  trees	  planted,	  and	  gas	  lines	  installed,	  serious	  deficiencies	   remained,	   and	   not	   only	   in	   the	   sewage	   system.	   Saburtalo	   still	   lacked	  stores	  for	  books	  and	  industrial	  goods	  (treated	  as	  equally	  concerning	  problems!),	  and	  access	  to	  electricity	  and	  repair	  services	  remained	  difficult.	  Qup’araże	  cited	  the	  lack	  of	   recent	   arrivals’	   representation	   in	   district	   administration	   for	   new	   housing	  allocation	  and	  the	  centralization	  of	  services	  at	  the	  city	  (rather	  than	  the	  district)	  level	  as	  possible	   reasons	   for	   these	  deficiencies.	  This	   suggests	   an	  administrative	   tension	  between	  newer	  residents	  from	  rural	  areas,	  who	  would	  populate	  Saburtalo,	  and	  the	  already-­‐established	   vakeli	   (resident	   of	   Vake)	   character	   of	   the	   Orjonikiże	   District	  leadership.	  Yet	   even	   if	   Saburtalo	   lacked	  a	  proper	   sewage	   system	  and	  a	  bookstore,	  district	   authorities	   already	   made	   headway	   in	   constructing	   a	   movie	   theatre	   with	  financing	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Culture.513	  In	   this	   Soviet	   neighborhood,	   residents	  might	  not	  be	  able	   to	   rely	  on	  plumbing	  or	  electricity,	  but	   they	   could	   soon	  go	   see	  a	  movie.	  Another	   important	   feature	   of	   the	   postwar	   building	   boom	   was	   the	   parallel	  “individual	   construction”	   of	   single-­‐family	   homes,	   which	   was	   legal	   in	   the	   Soviet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  512	  “sak’art’velos	   kp	   t’bilisis	   organizac’iis	   orjonikiżis	   saxelobis	   raionis	   32-­‐e	   partiuli	   konp’erenciis	  stenograp’iuli	  angariši,”	  29	  December	  1956,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  22,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  126,	  ll.	  139-­‐147.	  513	  “sak’art’velos	   kp	   t’bilisis	   organizac’iis	   orjonokiżis	   sax.	   raionebis	   34-­‐e	   partiuli	   konp’erenciis	  stenograp’iuli	  angariši	  1958	  clis	  29	  noemberi,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  22,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  2,	  ll.	  89-­‐95.	  
	   222	  Union	   until	   1964	   and	   encouraged	   (to	   speed	   relief	   of	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   housing	  fund),	   as	   long	   as	   such	   construction	   projects	   were	   accordingly	   registered	   with	  authorities.514 	  The	   relatively	   open	   spaces	   and	   close	   proximity	   of	   Saburtalo	   to	  developed	  Tbilisi	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  enterprising	  residents	  to	  build	  their	  own	   houses	   (somewhat)	   on	   their	   own	   terms	   and	   theoretically	   escape	   the	  uncertainties	  of	  the	  housing	  waitlist.	  Perhaps	  not	  surprisingly,	  local	  administrators	  struggled	   to	   regulate	   and	   oversee	   an	   increasing	   proliferation	   of	   individual	  construction	  projects	  in	  Saburtalo	  and	  were	  singled	  out	  regularly	  for	  this	  problem.	  Leadership	   in	   Georgia	   attempted	   to	   scale	   back	   and	   eventually	   prohibit	   individual	  construction	   earlier	   than	   all-­‐Union	   counterparts	   (in	   1953	   and	   1956),	   yet	   in	   mid-­‐1958,	   illegal	   individual	   construction	   flourished,	   concentrated	   in	   Saburtalo	   and	  reportedly	   enabled	   by	   the	   same	   local	   police	   charged	   with	   monitoring	   the	  problem.515	  	   Even	   after	   the	   1956	   Georgian	   Council	   of	   Ministers’	   prohibition	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  514	  This	   policy	  was	   primarily	   targeted	   at	   areas	   in	  which	   the	   housing	   stock	   had	   been	   destroyed	   or	  damaged	  during	   the	  war,	   yet	   individual	   construction	  was	   technically	   permitted	   elsewhere	   as	  well,	  such	   as	   Tbilisi.	   As	   the	   Khrushchev	   housing	   reforms	   got	   under	   way,	   individual	   construction	   was	  gradually	   rolled	   back,	   first	   by	   limiting	   the	   size	   and	   financial	   support	   (1958)	   and	   then	   by	   locale,	  making	   it	   illegal	   in	   cities	   with	   more	   than	   100,000	   residents	   (1963).	   From	   then	   on,	   “cooperative”	  rather	   than	   individual	   construction	  was	   the	   legal	   alternative	   to	   apartment	  housing,	  Mark	  B.	   Smith,	  “Individual	  Forms	  of	  Ownership	  in	  the	  Urban	  Housing	  Fund	  of	  the	  USSR,	  1944-­‐64,”	  The	  Slavonic	  and	  
East	  European	  Review	  86,	  no.	  2	  (April	  2008):	  283–305.	  515	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers’	  Commission	  of	  Soviet	  Control	  M.	  Megrelišvili	  to	  Mžavanaże	  and	   Javaxišvili,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   17,	   op.	   37,	   d.	   120,	   ll.	   56-­‐82	   and	   on	   Iqalt’o,	   “DOKLADNAIA	   ZAPISKA,”	  Orjonikiże	  District	  Secretary	  K.	  Gardap’xaże	  to	  Tbilisi	  City	  Committee	  Secretary	  G.A.	  Gegešiże,	  21	  May	  1959,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  37,	  d.	  246,	  ll.	  64-­‐66.	  On	  Italt'o	  alone,	  there	  were	  6	  houses	  being	  constructed	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   report’s	  writing	   (June	  1958),	   two	  of	  which	   boasted	  400	   square	  meters	   and	  550	  square	  meters,	  respectively,	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers’	  Commission	  of	  Soviet	  Control	  M.	  Megrelišvili	   to	  Mžavanaże	  and	   Javaxišvili,	   sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  17,	  op.	  37,	  d.	  120,	   l.	  57.	  See	  also	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	   ‘o	   rezul’tatakh	   proverki	   dokladnoi	   zapiski	   prokurora	   goroda	   Tbilisi	   tov.	   Takidze	   A.E,”	   and	  “Dokladnaia	   zapiska	   ‘o	   rezul’tatakh	   proverki	   zaiavleniia	   gr.	   gr.	   Chinchaladze	   V.E.,	   Gorgadze	   T.S.	   i	  Sulakvelidze	  P.I.,	  na	  gr.	   gr.	  Abashidze	  N.	   i	  Chikovani	  K.,	  prozhivaiushchikh	  po	  2	   tup.	  Arakishvili	  6,’”	  sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   17,	   op.	   39,	   d.	   124,	   ll.	   2-­‐10,	   70-­‐77	   and	   “Dokladnaia	   zapiska,”	   V.	   Siraże	   to	   Georgian	   CC	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  individual	  construction	  –	  at	  which	  point	  there	  were	  2,009	  individually	  constructed	  homes	   in	   Tbilisi	   –	   another	   400	   individual	   construction	   projects	   were	   ongoing.516	  Moreover,	   illegal	   individual	   construction	   did	   not	   necessarily	   reduce	   demand	   for	  apartment	   housing,	   as	   it	   exacerbated	   the	   already	   existing	   Tbilisi	   problem	   of	  possession	   and	   occupancy	   of	   multiple	   residences. 517 	  Illegal	   and	   individual	  construction	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  Tbilisi	  and	  did	  not	  end	  with	  prohibitions	  in	  the	  late	  1950s:	   by	   1974,	   more	   than	   50,000	   homes	   in	   Georgia	   had	   reportedly	   been	   built	  illegally,	   by	   both	   proactive	   individual	   citizens	   and	   state	   institutions	   to	   distribute	  political	  favors	  to	  an	  expanding	  network	  of	  patrons,	  clients,	  and	  family	  members.518	  
	  
Figure	  12:	  Individual-­‐construction	  residences	  on	  Iqalt’o	  Gora,	  overlooking	  Saburtalo,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  
sites	  of	  individual	  construction	  in	  the	  neighborhood.	  	  
Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2013.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Secretary	   Dumbaże,	   f.	   22,	   op.	   26,	   d.	   40,	   ll.	   17-­‐23	   regarding	   city	   court	   cases	   about	   individual	  construction	  in	  Saburtalo	  (1960).	  516	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers’	  Commission	  of	  Soviet	  Control	  M.	  Megrelišvili	  to	  Mžavanaże	  and	  Javaxišvili,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  37,	  d.	  120,	  l.	  57.	  517	  “O	   khode	   vypolneniia	   postanovleniia	   Biuro	   TsK	   KP	   Gruzii	   ot	   9	   iiulia	   1960	   goda	   ‘o	   ser’eznykh	  nedostatkakh	   v	   organizatsii	   kooperativnogo	   i	   individual’nogo	   zhilishchnogo	   stroitel’stva	   v	   gorode	  Tbilisi,’”	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Tbilisi	  City	  Soviet	  CEC	  A.	  Melaże	   to	  Mžavanaże,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	  op.	  35,	  d.	  455,	  ll.	  1-­‐8.	  518	  Henry	  W.	  Morton,	  “Who	  Gets	  What,	  When	  and	  How?	  Housing	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Soviet	  Studies	  32,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1980),	  252.	  
	   224	  	   Complaints	   by	   local	   officials,	   planners,	   and	   residents	   reveal	   the	   challenges	  encountered	   by	   those	   citizens	   attempting	   to	   build	   and	   inhabit	   the	   growing	  neighborhood.	  Some	  of	  these	  challenges	  resembled	  complaints	  voiced	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Khrushchev-­‐era	  building	  boom,	  such	  as	  long	  wait	  times	  on	  the	  housing	  list,	  insufficient	  living	  space	  for	  the	  number	  of	  family	  members	  in	  an	  apartment,	  insufficient	  funds	  to	  complete	  planned	  projects,	  failure	  to	  meet	  projected	  construction	   timelines,	   and	   inadequate	   sewage,	   water,	   and	   electrical	   access.519	  Other	  complaints	  suggested	  problems	  particular	  to	  Georgia	  and	  Tbilisi.	  For	  example,	  Georgian	   architects	   and	   planners	   regularly	   challenged	  Moscow’s	   uniform	  building	  plans,	  which	  they	  viewed	  as	  inadequate	  for	  Georgia’s	  warm	  climate,	  citing	  the	  need	  for	  higher	  ceiling	  norms	  to	  improve	  ventilation	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  spaces	  such	  as	  loggias	   and	   balconies	   for	   a	   family’s	   apartment.	  520	  Moreover,	   unlike	   other	   Union	  locales,	   the	   Georgian	   construction	   industry	   continued	   to	   use	   earlier	   construction	  methods	   alongside	   those	  mandated	   by	  Khrushchev’s	   building	   reforms,	   perhaps	   to	  allow	   for	   climactic	  discrepancies	   and	  other	   local	  departures	   from	  central	  plans.521	  For	  example,	  by	  the	  1970s,	  a	  surplus	  of	  building	  materials	  meant	  that	  planned	  two-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519	  See,	  for	  example,	  complaints	  about	  a	  neighbor’s	  dangerous	  makeshift	  kitchen	  due	  to	  insufficient	  living	  space	  (sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  380,	  ll.	  101-­‐102),	  failure	  to	  give	  up	  one’s	  spot	  in	  the	  housing	  list	   after	   acquiring	   a	   residence	   elsewhere	   (sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   41,	   d.	   378,	   ll.	   34-­‐37),	   request	   for	  housing	  to	  remain	  in	  Tbilisi	  after	  graduation	  from	  the	  Technical	  University	  for	  a	  young	  husband	  and	  wife	   from	   the	   provinces	   (sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   41,	   d.	   378,	   ll.	   116-­‐118),	   and	   request	   for	   larger	   living	  space	  due	  to	  a	  daughter’s	  study	  of	  musical	  instruments	  (sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46,	  d.	  492,	  ll.	  126-­‐127).	  520	  Levan	   Asabashvili,	   “Post	   war	   housing	   in	   Georgia,”	   Urban	   Reactor,	   21	   April	   2012,	   available	  http://urbanreactor.blogspot.com/2012/04/post-­‐war-­‐housing-­‐in-­‐georgia.html.	   Last	   accessed	   16	  April	   2015.	   As	   a	   part	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   fourth	   (IV)	   climactic	   zone,	   some	   of	   the	   peculiarities	   of	  Tbilisi	   residential	   design	   were:	   a	   system	   of	   angular	   airing	   for	   airflow;	   and	   household	   balconies,	  loggias,	   or	   terraces,	   Dzhashi,	   Arkhitektura	   sotsialisticheskogo	   Tbilisi,	   110.	   For	   resident	   complaints	  from	  1966	  about	  loggias	  and	  balconies,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  381,	  ll.	  142-­‐148.	  521	  Asabashvili,	  “Post	  war	  housing	  in	  Georgia.”	  
	   225	  story	  buildings	  in	  northern	  Saburtalo	  and	  the	  new	  Nuc’ubiże	  Plateau	  were	  built	  with	  ten	  and	  sixteen	  stories,	  respectively.522	  	  	   How	   did	   Saburtalo	   residents	   voice	   complaints	   and	   grievances	   to	   local	   and	  republic	   authorities?	   What	   narrative	   strategies	   did	   they	   employ	   to	   provide	  legitimacy	   to	   their	   complaints?	   In	   what	   collectivity	   did	   they	   claim	   membership?	  Residents	  wrote	  letters	  as	  individuals,	  on	  behalf	  of	  family	  members,	  as	  a	  building,	  or	  as	   a	   block	   to	   make	   specific	   claims	   regarding	   living	   space,	   construction,	   and	   the	  housing	   list	   to	  officials	   at	   the	  district	   and	   republic	   level.	  Writers	  often	  established	  their	  political	  and	  personal	   credibility	   through	  biography,	  by	  either	  noting	  service	  during	   the	   Great	   Patriotic	  War,	   status	   as	   an	  Old	   Bolshevik,	   Party	  membership,	   or	  rehabilitation	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  or	  by	  describing	  family	  achievements,	  such	  as	  having	  a	  large	  number	  of	  children.	  Places	  of	  employment	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  –	   and	   responsibility	   for	   dependent	   family	  members	   likewise	   bolstered	   claims	   for	  Saburtalo	   living	   space.	   Letter	   writers	   frequently	   complained	   about	   repeated	   and	  unanswered	  letters	  to	  Orjonikiże	  District-­‐level	  officials,	  having	  turned	  to	  a	  republic-­‐level	  authority	  to	  resolve	  their	  housing	  concerns.	  	  While	   many	   letters	   dealt	   with	   interior	   concerns,	   some	   writers	   sought	  collectively	  to	  improve	  conditions	  in	  the	  larger	  neighborhood.	  For	  example,	  in	  1971	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  522	  Ziegler,	   "Städtebau	   in	   Georgien,"	   105.	   Though	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   the	   following	   occurred	   in	  Saburtalo,	   a	   similar	   example	   from	   1974	   demonstrates	   the	   overzealous	   implementation	   of	  construction	  plans	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  their	  potential	  motives:	  according	  to	  Tbilisi	  Gorkom	  First	  Secretary	  Gilašvili,	   in	   the	   place	   of	   what	   was	   planned	   to	   be	   a	   three-­‐building	   apartment	   complex	   (168	  apartments),	   a	   Tbilisi	   construction	   cooperative	   built	   sixteen	   multi-­‐story	   buildings	   (1,281	  apartments)	   to	   distribute	   not	   only	   among	   themselves	   and	   their	   associates,	   but	   also	   to	   residents	  outside	  of	  Tbilisi	  who	  sought	  to	  move	  to	  the	  capital,	  “Za	  pis’mom	  chelovek,”	  Pravda	  (19	  March	  1974),	  p.	  3.	  
	   226	  a	   group	   of	   residents	   on	   Iosebiże	   Street	   expressed	   their	   pride	   at	   living	   on	   a	   street	  named	  in	  honor	  of	  “Georgian	  female	  hero”	  T’ina	  Iosebiże	  and	  celebrated	  the	  recent	  construction	   of	   a	   seven-­‐story	   building	   and	   a	   high	   school	   on	   the	   street.523	  Yet	  “unfortunately,	   the	   street’s	   public	   amenities	   proceed	   at	   a	   turtle’s	   pace.	   Asphalt	   is	  damaged	  here	  and	  there,	  ponds	  form,	  mud.	  Following	  a	  rain	  shower	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	   pass	   through.”	   Moreover,	   “on	   the	   street	   there	   is	   neither	   a	   garden	   or	   a	   public	  square,”	  a	  “noble	  cause”	  that	  the	  residents	  themselves	  offered	  to	  remedy	  by	  building	  a	  garden	  on	  the	  site	  of	  a	  former	  garage.	  They	  also	  proposed	  to	  construct	  a	  centrally-­‐located	  monument	  to	  their	  Georgian	  female	  hero	  on	  the	  street.524	  Though	  the	  Tbilisi	  City	   Committee	   denied	   their	   offer	   to	   self-­‐construct	   a	   public	   garden,	   the	   city	   did	  resolve	   to	   repair	   the	   sidewalk	   and	   potholes.525	  These	   Iosebiże	   Street	   petitioners	  wrote	  proudly	  as	  Georgians	  committed	  to	  improving	  their	  corner	  of	  the	  developing	  neighborhood	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  its	  many	  residents.	  	   Just	  as	  letter	  writers	  mobilized	  positively	  a	  variety	  of	  collective	  identities	  to	  provide	   legitimacy	  to	   their	  housing	  claims	  (Party	  membership,	  veteran	  status,	  and	  so	   forth),	  one	  Kurdish	  writer	  blamed	  discrimination	  against	  national	  minorities	  as	  the	   reason	   for	   her	   housing	   woes.	   A	   resident	   of	   Važa-­‐Pšavela	   Avenue	   51,	   Zade	  Shakroevna	  Khudoeva	  appealed	  in	  the	  following	  manner	  to	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  24th	  Congress	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  523	  T’ina	  Iosebiże	  was	  a	  hero	  of	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War.	  524	  Residents	  of	  60	  Iosebiże	  Street	  to	  24th	  congress	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CP	  CC,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46,	  d.	  494,	  l.	  76.	  525	  Head	  of	  Department	  of	  Renovation	  Management	  Nakaiże	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  5	  March	  1971,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46,	  d.	  494,	  l.	  75.	  
	   227	  For	  fifteen	  years	  we	  were	  on	  the	  lists	  to	  be	  assigned	  a	  well-­‐maintained	  apartment,	   but	   they	   did	   not	   pay	   attention	   to	   this	   because	   we	   are	  national	  minorities,	   so	  we	  are	  now	  compelled	   to	  reach	  out	   to	  you	  as	  our	  only	  hope.	  By	   order	   of	   the	   highest	   party-­‐Soviet	   organs	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  (Moscow),	   they	   should	   have	   provided	   a	   good	   apartment	   to	   us.	  However	   the	   former	   leadership	   of	   Orjonikiże	   District	   Committee	   of	  the	  city	  of	  Tbilisi	  in	  1961	  assigned	  an	  apartment	  to	  us	  at	  the	  address	  above,	   partially	   underground	   at	   twelve	   steps	   below	   ground	   level,	  damp	   and	   entirely	   uninhabitable.	   Due	   to	   the	   dampness	   and	  unsuitability	  of	  this	  apartment,	  all	  of	  my	  six	  children	  and	  I	  have	  heart	  conditions.	   We	   have	   repeatedly	   appealed	   to	   local	   authorities	   to	  change	   the	   apartment,	   however	   this	   has	   not	   garnered	   human	  attention	  because	  we	  are	  Kurds.	  We	  kindly	  ask	  for	  your	  help	  and	  ask	  that	   you	   instruct	   your	   superiors	   to	   change	   our	   apartment.	   Our	  workers’	  family	  consists	  of	  8	  people.	  We	  ask	  that	  our	  legal	  request	  is	  not	  ignored.526	  	  Orjonikiże	  District	   head	  K.V.	   C’q’itišvili,	  meanwhile,	   claimed	   that	   the	   apartment	   in	  question	  was	   fit	   for	   habitation,	  with	   only	   a	   partial	   dampness	   issue	   that	  would	   be	  resolved	  through	  a	  new	  commission’s	  study	  of	   the	  apartment.	  Khudoeva’s	  charges	  of	  ethnic	  discrimination,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  went	  unmentioned	  in	  C’q’itišvili’s	  brief	  report	   to	   the	  Georgian	  CC	  on	   the	   issue.527	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  district	  official	   addressed	   this	   relatively	   minor	   complaint	   about	   damp	   living	   quarters	   in	  consultation	   with	   the	   CC	   suggests	   the	   extent	   of	   high-­‐level	   Party	   involvement	   in	  quotidian	   affairs	   in	   the	   city.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   know	  whether	   Khudoeva’s	   perceived	  slight	   due	   to	   her	   national	   minority	   status,	   as	   a	   Kurd,	   was	   exceptional	   or	   typical.	  Among	   the	   complaint	   letters	   I	   reviewed	   from	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   hers	  was	   the	  only	  one	  to	  explicitly	  raise	  the	   issue	  of	  nationality	  and	  status.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  526	  “Zaiavlenie,”	  Khudoeva	  Zade	  Shakroevna	  to	  Presidium	  of	  the	  24th	  Congress	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC,	  26	  February	  1971,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46,	  d.	  493,	  l.	  8.	  527	  Orjonikiże	  District	  Secretary	  K.V.	  C’q’itišvili	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  20	  May	  1971,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  46,	  d.	  493,	  l.	  7.	  
	   228	  complaints	  were	   filed	  by	  Georgians,	   in	  Georgian,	   and	  did	  not	  mention	   the	   issue	  of	  nationality	  at	  all.	  As	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  in	  the	  most	  Georgian	  district	  of	  Tbilisi,	  such	  an	  absence	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising.	  Yet	  this	  single	  case	  raises	  an	  important	  question:	  who	  resided	  in	  Saburtalo?	  	  While	   city	   and	   district	   figures	   do	   not	   distinguish	   between	   sub-­‐district	  neighborhoods,	  certain	  trends	  in	  the	  larger	  Orjonikiże	  District	  –	  of	  which	  Saburtalo	  became	   the	   largest	   neighborhood	   –	   are	   suggestive.	   First,	   even	   from	   the	   1930s,	  Orjonikiże	   District	   had	   a	  majority	   Georgian	   population	   (unlike	   Tbilisi	   writ	   large),	  but	  the	  percentage	  of	  Georgians	  in	  the	  district	  had	  grown	  to	  nearly	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	   population	   by	   1970.	   Orjonikiże	   District	   and	   Saburtalo	   had	   multinational	  populations,	   yet	   in	   the	   three	  decades	  of	  development	  depicted	  below,	   the	  entitled	  Georgian	   nationality	   gained	   considerable	   ground	   in	   percentage	   of	   the	   population,	  particularly	  against	  Armenian	  and	  Russian	  corresponding	  decreases.	  
Table	  5:	  Orjonikiże	  District	  Population	  by	  Nationality	  (%)528	  
Nationality	   1939	   1959	   1970	  Georgian	   55.8	   62.9	   74.0	  Armenian	   14.1	   10.3	   7.0	  Russian	   19.2	   15.4	   10.0	  Ossetian	   1.3	   1.9	   2.0	  Kurd	   1.0	   1.5	   1.0	  Azerbaijani	   1.6	   2.2	   2.0	  Jewish	   1.4	   0.8	   1.0	  Greek	   0.7	   1.6	   1.0	  Other	   4.9	   3.4	   2.0	  	  Moreover,	   by	   1970,	   Orjonikiże	   District	   had	   the	   highest	   Georgian	   population	  percentage	   of	   all	   Tbilisi	   districts.	   Nearly	   a	   quarter	   of	   Tbilisi	   residents	   lived	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  528	  Kakuria,	  k’.	  t’bilisis	  mosaxleoba	  1803-­‐1970	  cc.,	  13,	  20,	  34.	  For	  1959,	  see	  also	  Orjonikiże	  District	  State	  Statistical	  Inspector	  K’.	  Axobaże	  to	  Orjonikiże	  District	  Committee,	  t’c’a,	  f.	  79,	  d.	  1291,	  l.	  1.	  
	   229	  Orjonikiże	  District	  by	  1970,	  so	  the	  city’s	  largest	  district	  likewise	  contained	  the	  city’s	  largest	  Georgian	  population.	  	  
Table	  6:	  Georgian	  Population	  of	  Tbilisi	  by	  District	  (%)529	  
District	   1939	   1959	   1970	  Orjonikiże	   55.8	   62.9	   74.0	  26	  Commissars	   26.2	   24.9	   32.0	  Kirov	   30.8	   30.4	   36.0	  Lenin	   57.9	   62.3	   69.0	  1	  May	   46.3	   53.4	   64.0	  Kalinin	   N/A	   58.3	   61.0	  October	   N/A	   48.2	   54.0	  	  
Table	  7:	  Population	  of	  Tbilisi	  by	  District530	  
District	   1939	   1959	   1970	  Orjonikiże	   106,448	   133,269	   213,924	  26	  Commissars	   112,256	   147,941	   198,131	  Kirov	   82,242	   59,393	   55,891	  Lenin	   113,560	   114,386	   176,256	  1	  May	   104,714	   88,645	   113,175	  Kalinin	   N/A	   60,901	   50,999	  October	   N/A	   90,129	   80,644	  TOTAL	   519,220	   694,664	   889,020	  	  Most	   of	   Saburtalo’s	   residents	   were	   Georgian	   by	   nationality,	   but	   this	  uniformity	   masks	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   individual	   experiences	   and	   other	   collective	  identities	  exhibited	  by	  saburt’aloelebi	  (residents	  of	  Saburtalo).531	  Workers,	  students,	  scholars,	   teachers,	   doctors,	   engineers,	   artists,	   Party	   members,	   and	   newly-­‐arrived	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  529	  Kakuria,	  k’.	  t’bilisis	  mosaxleoba	  1803-­‐1970	  cc.,	  	  12-­‐13,	  19-­‐20,	  33-­‐34.	  530	  Ibid.	  531	  This	   section	   is	  based	  on	  a	   series	  of	   interviews	  conducted	  with	   residents	  of	   Saburtalo	   in	  Spring	  2013.	   The	   interviews	   were	   loosely	   structured	   and	   conducted	   in	   Georgian,	   unless	   interviewees	  decided	  to	  switch	  to	  Russian	  (which	  happened	  in	  only	  one	  case).	  I	   identified	  potential	  interviewees	  by	  spending	  time	  in	  Saburtalo	  parks	  and	  green	  spaces	  during	  the	  day	  and	  asking	  if	  older	  individuals	  would	   be	   willing	   to	   speak	   about	   growing	   up	   in	   the	   neighborhood.	   I	   thank	   Levan	   Asabašvili	   for	  acquainting	  me	  with	  Saburtalo’s	  built	  environment	  and	  its	  history;	  and	  for	  his	  help	   in	  coordinating	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  interviews.	  
	   230	  citizens	  from	  the	  regions,	  among	  others,	  all	  called	  Saburtalo	  home.	  Giorgi	  (b.	  1939)	  was	  born	   in	  Saburtalo	  and	  grew	  up	  on	   Iqalt’o	  Gora,	   the	   site	  of	  many	  single-­‐family	  homes	   and	   self-­‐constructed	   residences.	   His	   parents	   moved	   to	   the	   area	   early,	   in	  1926,	  because	  his	   father	  worked	  in	  a	  nearby	  beer	  production	  plant.	  As	  one	  among	  the	   earliest	   native	   saburt’aloelebi,	   Giorgi	   recalled	   that	   “Georgians,	   Armenians,	  Molokans,	  Tatars,	  and	  Ossetians”	   lived	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  and	  that	  young	  people	  mostly	  had	  normal	  relations	  with	  one	  another.	  However,	  he	  had	  to	  go	  to	  school	   in	  nearby	   Vera	   –	   a	   neighborhood	   closer	   to	   downtown	   Tbilisi	   -­‐-­‐	   rather	   than	   in	  Saburtalo,	  most	   likely	  because	   schools	  were	  among	   the	  many	  community	   features	  that	   did	   not	   arrive	   in	   Saburtalo	   until	   the	   1950s.	   Giorgi	   emphasized,	   “We	  were	   all	  neighbors	  up	  to	  Veżisi	  Street	  [on	  the	  northernmost	  end	  of	  Saburtalo,	  CK].	  Everyone	  knew	  each	  other.”	  He	  spoke	   fondly	  of	  his	  youth	  and	  neighborhood	  community	  yet	  distinguished	  between	  these	  collectivities	  and	  “Communists,”	  who	  “were	  very	  kind	  people	  and	  good	  people.”	  This	  was	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “Communists	  ate	  well,	  but	   they	  made	   sure	   that	   the	  workers	   had	   enough	   to	   eat.”	   Giorgi	   did	   not	   consider	  himself	   to	   be	   a	   Communist,	   though	   he	   was	   proud	   of	   his	   family’s	   working-­‐class	  background.	  	  K’et’evan	  L.	   (b.	   1936),	   though	   the	   same	  generation	   as	  Giorgi,	  moved	   to	   the	  neighborhood	  as	  a	  student	  to	  study	  at	  the	  Medical	  Institute	  (also	  in	  Saburtalo).	  She	  became	  a	  surgeon	   in	  Tbilisi	  Hospital	  no.	  8	  and	  proudly	  discussed	  her	  husband,	  an	  
	   231	  engineer,	  who	  led	  work	  on	  three	  metro	  stations	  on	  the	  Saburtalo	   line.532	  However,	  he	   died	   in	   a	  metro	   accident,	   and	  K’et’evan	  was	   given	   an	   apartment	   by	  Metrostroi	  following	  his	  death.	  Born	  in	  Borjomi,	  K’et’evan	  was	  deported	  with	  her	   family	   from	  Axalc’ixe	  to	  Shymkent,	  Kazakhstan	  in	  1951.	  Explaining	  her	  family’s	  deportation,	  she	  simply	  said,	  (in	  Russian)	  “Beria	  did	  it.	  He	  was	  a	  Mingrelian,”	  then,	  switching	  back	  to	  Georgian,	  noted,	  “Stalin	  really	  loved	  the	  Georgian	  people.”	  In	  describing	  her	  own	  life	  story,	  K’et’evan	   frequently	   relied	   on	   the	  Russian	  word	   tiazhelyi	   yet	   also	   conveyed	  great	  pride	  at	  her	  family	  members’	  achievements	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  collective:	  her	  mother,	  a	  mat’-­‐geroina	  (as	  the	  mother	  of	  twelve	  children);	  her	  father,	  who	  fought	  in	  the	  war	  and	  was	  head	  of	  a	  work	  crew	  while	  in	  Central	  Asian	  exile;	  and	  her	  husband,	  who	  helped	  bring	  the	  metro	  to	  Saburtalo.	  K’et’evan	  and	  Giorgi	  arrived	   in	  Saburtalo	   in	  different	  ways,	  yet	   their	  stories	  depict	   several	   important	   dynamics	   at	   play	   in	   Saburtalo	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	  from	  early	  settlement	  of	  Saburtalo	  to	  the	  dislocation	  wrought	  by	  the	  war	  to	  postwar	  urban	  migration	   for	   education	   and	  work.	   Their	   own	   descriptions	   likewise	   depart	  subtly	   from	   those	   of	   a	   younger	   generation	   of	   saburt’aloelebi,	   born	   in	   the	   1960s.	  Zurab	  B.	  (b.	  1965)	  and	  Mamuka	  G.	  (b.	  1967)	  grew	  up	  in	  Saburtalo	  as	  friends,	  though	  Mamuka	  lived	  in	  barracks	  near	  the	  football	  stadium	  as	  a	  young	  child	  until	  his	  family	  moved	   into	   a	   new	   building	   in	   the	   1970s,	   on	   Iosebiże	   Street	   (parallel	   to	   Pekini	  Avenue,	  a	  main	  neighborhood	  thoroughfare).	  Zurab	  B.	  and	  Mamuka	  G.	  identified	  as	  
korpuselebi,	   or	   people	   from	   the	   “blocks,”	   referring	   to	   the	   post-­‐khrushchevki	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  532	  We	  had	  been	  speaking	  in	  Georgian,	  but	  when	  she	  starting	  to	  discuss	  her	  husband,	  she	  switched	  to	  Russian	  and	  continued	  speaking	  in	  Russian	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  conversation.	  	  
	   232	  apartment	  buildings	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Zurab	  B.	  recalled	  that	  his	  parents	  cried	  (tirodnen)	  when	   they	   moved	   to	   Saburtalo	   because	   “it	   was	   not	   a	   prestigious	   place”	   in	   their	  eyes.533	  	  Zurab	  K.	  (b.	  1968),	  by	  contrast,	  was	  (and	   is)	  proud	  of	  his	  status	  as	  a	  native	  resident	  of	  Doliże	  Street,	  or	  a	  doliżeli.	  In	  his	  words,	  “I	  am	  a	  doliżeli.	  I	  was	  born	  here.	  The	  entire	  city	  is	  on	  Doliże	  Street,	  the	  entire	  world.”	  For	  a	  world	  unto	  itself,	  Doliże	  Street	  lacked	  restaurants	  and	  shops,	  in	  Zurab	  K.’s	  telling,	  and	  he	  remembered	  only	  one	  store	  that	  displayed	  fruit	  and	  other	  products	  piled	  up	  high,	  but	  which	  were	  not	  for	  sale	  (to	  him,	  at	   least).	  He	  also	  regularly	  emphasized	  that	  the	  neighborhood	  did	  not	   have	   a	   bazaar.	   For	   this	   self-­‐described	   “boy	   of	   the	   street,”	   Doliże	   was	   a	   very	  Georgian	  place:	  he	  did	  not	  recall	  hearing	  or	  using	  Russian	   in	  everyday	  encounters	  there.	  At	  school	  in	  the	  neighborhood,	  he	  noted	  a	  distinction	  in	  behavior	  between	  the	  “calmer,	   more	   urban”	   korpuselebi	   children	   and	   the	   “louder	   and	   wilder”	   children	  from	  single-­‐family	  homes.	  Elguja	   T.	   and	   Važa	   X.	   lived	   in	   newer	   buildings	   on	   Nuc’ubiże	   Street	   built	  between	   1978	   and	   1986	   while	   they	   worked	   at	   an	   institute	   that	   manufactured	  automobile	  components.	  Because	   they	  had	  Russian	  and	  Armenian	  colleagues,	   they	  spoke	  Russian	  at	  work,	  but	  spoke	  Georgian	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  time.	  Elguja	  identified	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  533	  This	   reflects	   the	   “hierarchy	   of	   prestige”	   among	   Tbilisi	   neighborhoods	   that	   developed	   in	   the	  postwar	   period	   and	   continues	   today:	   “intelligentsia”	   neighborhoods,	   such	   as	   Vake	   and	   old	   Tbilisi	  (Mt’acminda	  and	  Vera)	  “outrank”	  neighborhoods	  such	  as	  Saburtalo	  and	  Didube	  that	  developed	  from	  the	  1950s	  onward,	  Paul	  Manning,	  “The	  City	  of	  Balconies:	  Elite	  Politics	  and	  the	  Changing	  Semiotics	  of	  the	  Post-­‐Socialist	  Cityscape,”	  Kristof	  Van	  Assche,	   Jozeph	  Salukvadze,	  and	  Nick	  Shavishvili,	   eds.,	  City	  
Culture	  and	  City	  Planning	  in	  Tbilisi:	  Where	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  Meet	  (Lewinston:	  The	  Edwin	  Mellen	  Press,	  2009),	  71-­‐102.	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  as	  a	  saburt’aloeli,	  but	  as	  a	  t’biliseli:	  “Tbilisi	  is	  small.	  I	  am	  a	  t’biliseli.”	  The	  picture	  he	  painted	   of	   “Communist	   times,”	   when	   life	   was	   “better”	   and	   “different”	   focused	   on	  interethnic	   relations,	   referring	   to	   neighborly	   and	   friendly	   relations	   between	  nationalities	   because	   “we	   were	   all	   Soviet	   citizens.”	   Moreover,	   “Tbilisi	   was	   a	   city	  shared	  between	  peoples,”	  where	  “life	  took	  place	  in	  the	  courtyard	  (ezo)”.	  The	  different	  generations	  of	  saburt’aloebi	  conveyed	  a	  number	  of	  variations	  in	  how	  they	  understood	  the	  developing	  neighborhood	  and	  its	  communities.	  Yet	  certain	  vocabularies	  were	  common	  to	  everyone	  with	  whom	  I	  spoke.	  Rather	  than	  speaking	  about	   the	   “Soviet	   period”	   or	   other	  markers	   of	   time	   (such	   as	   a	   decade	   [1960s]	   or	  leader	   [Khrushchev-­‐era,	   Brezhnev-­‐era,	   Shevardnadze-­‐era]),	   respondents	   simply	  referred	  to	  the	  period	  under	  discussion	  as	  “in	  Communist	  times”	  (komunistis	  dros)	  or	  “before”	  (adre).	  A	  flattening	  out	  of	  the	  Soviet	  past	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  respondents	  in	  Saburtalo	   or	   Georgia:	   indeed,	   social	   and	   individual	   memory	   does	   not	   necessarily	  adhere	  to	  historians’	  sense	  of	  periodization.534	  Further,	  when	  talking	  about	  housing	  and	  construction	  in	  the	  neighborhood,	  respondents	  always	  described	  a	  building	  by	  its	   number	   of	   stories,	   unprompted	   by	   a	   specific	   question	   in	   that	   regard	   (e.g.	  
orsart’uliani	   [2-­‐story],	   xut’sart’uliani	   [5-­‐story]),	   or	   c’xrasart’uliani	   [9-­‐story]).	   	   Such	  descriptions	  conveyed	  not	  only	  the	  type	  of	  building	  but	  also	  the	  approximate	  period	  when	   the	   building	   was	   constructed,	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   was	   comprehensible	   to	   all	  involved	   in	   the	   conversion	   without	   further	   explanation.	   The	   discursive	   role	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 On	   constructions	   of	   “then,”	   “before,”	   and	   the	   “radiant	   past”	   among	   Russian	   villagers	   in	   the	   far	  north,	   see	   Margaret	   Paxson,	   Solovyovo:	   The	   Story	   of	   Memory	   in	   a	   Russian	   Village	   (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press	  2005),	  Chapter	  4;	  and	  on	  memories	  of	  the	  1930s	  as	  indicative	  of	  the	  Soviet	  experience,	   Irina	  Paperno,	  Stories	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Experience:	  Memoirs,	  Diaries,	  Dreams	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2009). 
	   234	  residential	   buildings	   for	   these	   Saburtalo	   inhabitants	   linked	   them	   with	   their	  compatriots	  who	  resided	  in	  any	  Soviet	  neighborhood	  that	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  postwar	  building	  boom.	  While	  Saburtalo	  was	  to	  serve	  primarily	  as	  a	  residential	  area	  for	  workers	  and	  students,	   the	   requisite	   academic,	   industrial,	   cultural,	   transport,	   and	  entertainment	  institutions	  developed	   alongside	   the	   growing	   apartment	   blocks.535	  As	   Lenin	   Street	  connected	   the	   Vera	   neighborhood	   to	   Saburtalo,	   the	   main	   Pekini	   Avenue	  thoroughfare,	  which	  showcased	  the	  Georgian	  Technical	  Institute	  (1947-­‐1953,	  arch.	  M.	   Šavišvili),	   Sports	   Palace	   (1956-­‐1961,	   arch.	   V.	  Mesxišvili,	   Iu.	   Kasraże),	   Intourist,	  and	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  campus,	  came	  into	  view.	  Heading	  north	  on	  Pekini	  Avenue	  from	  Orjonikiże	  Square	  (1956-­‐1958,	  arch.	  M.	  Neprintsev),	  the	  perpendicular	  Doliże	  Street	  and	   Iqalt’o	  Gora	   featured	  buildings	  emblematic	  of	  various	  periods	  of	   Soviet	  housing	   as	   well	   as	   illegal,	   self-­‐constructed	   homes	   overlooking	   the	   neighborhood.	  Heading	   further	   down	   Pekini,	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   Važa-­‐Pšavela	   Avenue,	   the	  Republic’s	  Central	  Archival	  Administration	  came	  into	  view.	  The	  four-­‐	  and	  five	  story	  apartment	  buildings	  described	  above	  lined	  the	  lengthy	  Važa-­‐P’šavela	  Avenue,	  which	  also	   featured	   Tbilisi’s	   Medical	   Institute	   and	   Hotel	   Abkhazia.	   Further	   down	   Važa-­‐P’šavela,	   the	   newer	   (1970s)	   residential	   developments	   of	   Upper	   and	   Lower	   Delisi	  expanded	  Saburtalo	  westward.536	  An	   Inter-­‐Union	  House	  of	  Culture	  of	   the	  Georgian	  Republican	   Council	   of	   Trade	  Unions	  was	   built	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   Važa-­‐P’šavela	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  535	  For	   a	   contemporary	  walking	   tour	   of	   Saburtalo	   and	   its	   environs,	   see	  Nodar	  Dzhanberidze,	  Meri	  Karbelashvili,	   and	   Simon	   Kintsurashvili,	   Arkhitektura	   Tbilisi:	   Putevoditel'	   (Tbilisi:	   Sabčot'a	  Sak’art’velo,	  1967),	  100-­‐112.	  536	  For	  plans	  for	  the	  1976	  Upper	  Delisi	  project,	  see	  “zemo	  delisis	  detaluri	  dagegmarebis	  proek’ti,”	  (1976),	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  9,	  d	  1313,	  ll.	  1-­‐15.	  
	   235	  and	   the	   Vake-­‐Saburtalo	   highway	   in	   1965,	   which	   combined	   the	   educational	   and	  performance	   functions	   of	   a	   House	   of	   Culture	   and	   athletic	   facilities	   for	   the	  neighborhood’s	  many	  trade	  union	  members.537	  	  Shortly	   thereafter,	   the	  House	  of	  Culture	  would	  sit	  along	   the	   final	  station	  on	  the	  Tbilisi	  metro’s	  “Saburtalo	  line.”	  The	  Tbilisi	  metro	  opened	  in	  1966	  –	  the	  fourth	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  as	  early	  as	  1969	  plans	  were	  underway	  to	  add	  a	  second	  line	  to	  serve	  the	  growing	  Saburtalo	  neighborhood	  via	  a	  transfer	  at	  the	  city’s	  main	  train	  station. 538 	  The	   “Saburtalo	   line”	   began	   operation	   in	   1979,	   cementing	   the	  neighborhood’s	  symbolic	  and	  lived	  significance	  for	  Soviet	  Tbilisi’s	  residents,	  most	  of	  whom	  lived,	  worked,	  studied,	  and/or	  socialized	  in	  the	  neighborhood.	  
	  
Figure	  13:	  Inter-­‐Union	  House	  of	  Culture	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Republican	  Council	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (1965).	  
Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2015.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  537	  On	  building	  plans	  for	  the	  Trade	  Union	  House	  of	  Culture,	  see	  “prop’kavširebis	  kulturis	  saxlis	  mšeneblobis	  proek’ti	  važa-­‐p’šavelas	  prospek’tze,”	  (1965),	  t’c’a,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  2662,	  ll.	  12-­‐47.	  538	  On	  design	  plans	  for	  the	  Ceret'eli	  and	  Technical	  Institute	  vestibules,	  see	  “k’.	  t’bilisis	  metropolitenis	  vagzlis	  moedani-­‐delisis	  monakvet’is	  proek’ti,”	   (1970),	   t’c’a,	   f.	  14,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  1471,	   ll.	  2-­‐8.	  On	  schedule	  and	  funding	  for	  the	  metro’s	  first	  and	  second	  lines,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  322,	  l.	  13	  and	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  532,	   l.	  6.	  For	  a	  history	  of	   the	  Tbilisi	  metro,	   see	  Alek’sandre	  Kočlavašvili,	  Omari	  Xizanišvili,	  and	  Mamia	  Č’orgolašvili,	  t’bilisis	  metropoliteni	  (Tbilisi:	  Sabčot'a	  Sak’art’velo,	  1978).	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Figure	  14:	  Interior	  mosaic	  on	  the	  Saburtalo	  Line’s	  Technical	  Institute	  metro	  station	  platform.	  	  
Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2015.	  	  
	  
Figure	  15:	  	  Adornments	  alongside	  the	  Saburtalo	  Line’s	  Delisi	  metro	  station	  platform,	  in	  Russian	  (R)	  and	  
Georgian	  (L).	  	  
Source:	  Author	  photograph,	  2015.	  	  In	  approximately	  three	  decades	  (1940s-­‐1970s),	  the	  project	  of	  Saburtalo	  had	  progressed	  from	  idea	  to	  practice.	  As	   is	  the	  case	  with	  any	  neighborhood	  –	  even	  the	  centrally-­‐planned	  –	  Saburtalo’s	  development	  was	   rapid,	   if	   uneven,	   and	  not	   always	  according	   to	  plan.	  Yet	  by	   the	   late	  1970s,	   the	   sparsely	  populated	   farmland	   that	   lay	  across	   the	   Varazi	   ravine	   had	   become	   a	   bustling	   residential	   center	   for	   Tbilisi’s	  increasingly	   Georgian	   populace,	   with	   its	   own	   metro	   line,	   universities,	   parks,	   and	  
	   237	  entertainment	   facilities.	   Saburtalo	  may	   have	   lacked	   the	   charm	   and	   allure	   of	   older	  parts	   of	   the	   city	   (which	  were	   simultaneously	   idealized	   and	   Orientalized	   by	   locals	  and	   visitors	   alike),	   but	   what	   it	   lacked	   in	   cobblestones,	   sulfur	   baths,	   and	   wooden	  balconies,	  it	  made	  up	  for	  in	  Georgian	  Sovietness.	  Saburtalo	   continued	   to	   expand	   into	   the	   1980s,	   but	   by	   that	   time,	   Tbilisi	  planners’	  attention	  began	  to	  shift	  in	  other	  directions:	  to	  continuing	  construction	  on	  outlying	  microdistricts	  such	  as	  Gldani;	  and	  returning	  to	  revitalizing	  the	  oldest	  parts	  of	  the	  city.539	  From	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  Tbilisi	  architects	  and	  planners	  began	  to	  address	  structural	   problems	   in	   the	   old	   city.	   Architects	   were	   divided	   between	   those	   who	  sought	  to	  replace	  the	  many	  dilapidated	  buildings	  in	  the	  old	  city,	  with	  its	  organically	  formed	   streets,	   haphazard	   construction,	   and	   wooden	   balconies,	   with	   modern	  structures;	  and	   those	  who	  sought	   to	  preserve	  and	  revitalize	  older	  buildings	   in	   the	  district.	  Local	  residents	  likewise	  fought	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  latter	  view,	  which	  privileged	  renovation	   over	   destruction.	   In	   practice,	   ambitious	   studies	   and	   plans	   for	  improvements	  were	  limited	  to	  the	  areas	  of	  the	  sulfur	  baths,	  the	  old	  city	  wall	  (along	  Barat’ašvili	   Street),	   and	   along	   Leseliże	   Street,	   the	  main	   artery	   from	   Lenin	   Square	  through	   the	   old	   city	   toward	   Metexi	   church.	   As	   Karl	   Ziegler	   has	   argued,	   the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  renovation	  of	  the	  old	  city	  from	  the	  late	  1970s	  emanated	  not	  from	  a	  particular	  form	  or	  style,	  but	  rather	  that	  “the	  goal	  was	  for	  old	  values	  and	  style	  elements	  to	  visibly	  and	  consciously	  re-­‐set	  the	  scene.”540	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539	  Ziegler,	  “Städtebau	  in	  Georgien,”	  115-­‐116.	  540	  Ibid.,	  116.	  
	   238	  Whereas	  Saburtalo’s	  development	  represented	  the	  promises	  of	  Soviet	  urban	  modernity	  at	  its	  apex,	  such	  visions	  failed	  to	  extend	  to	  older	  parts	  of	  Tbilisi,	  creating	  a	   cohabitation	   between	   tradition	   and	  modernity	   as	   displayed	   in	   this	   increasingly	  Georgian	  dedak’alak’i.	  This	  spatial	  cohabitation	   in	  Tbilisi	  offers	  a	  metaphor	   for	   the	  continued	  negotiation	  of	  “traditional”	  and	  “modern”	  practices	  –	  among	  individuals,	  families,	  communities,	  and	  the	  state	  –	  in	  the	  age	  of	  developed	  socialism.	  	  
The	  Reinvention	  of	  Tradition	  and	  Soviet	  National	  Modernity	  	  	   In	   1972,	   Eduard	   Shevardnadze,	   a	   Guria	   native	   who	   had	   risen	   through	   the	  ranks	   of	   Komsomol	   and	   Georgian	   Ministry	   of	   Internal	   Affairs	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	  1960s,	   replaced	   Vasil	   Mžavanaże	   as	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Communist	  Party.	  Mžavanaże’s	  ouster	  is	  typically	  cast	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader,	  Moscow-­‐led	  effort	  to	  clamp	  down	  on	  local	  corruption,	  of	  which	  Mžavanaże	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  flagrant	  example,	   and	   to	  attempt	   to	   revitalize	  a	   stagnant	   licit	   economy.541	  The	  same	   leader	  who	   was	   regarded	   as	   an	   outsider	   to	   Georgia	   in	   the	   1950s,	   over	   his	   nearly	   two	  decades	  at	   the	  republic’s	  helm,	  had	  presided	  over	  a	  deepening	  pyramid	  scheme	  of	  favors,	   nepotism,	   and	   black	   market	   activity	   that	   was	   robust	   enough	   to	   warrant	  intervention	   from	   above,	   in	   a	   brief	   intrusion	   of	   the	   national-­‐social	   contract.542	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  541	  A	  Pravda	  exposé	  about	  problems	  in	  the	  Tbilisi	  City	  Party	  Committee	  subtly	  suggested	  the	  motive	  for	   the	   leadership	  change	   in	  advance,	   though	  an	  explicit	   statement	  of	  Shevardnadze’s	  appointment	  came	   only	   in	   September	   1972,	  without	   further	   details,	   	   “Ob	   organizatorskoi	   i	   politicheskoi	   rabote	  Tbilisskogo	  gorkoma	  Kompartii	  Gruzii	  po	  vypolneniiu	  reshenii	  XXIX	  s”ezda	  KPSS,”	  Pravda	  (6	  March	  1972),	  pp.	  1-­‐2.	  542	  Two	   contemporary	   explanations	   for	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   corruption	   in	   Georgia	   emphasized	   the	  dominance	   of	   friendship	   bonds	   (megobroba)	   and	   family	   ties,	   combined	   with	   an	   erosion	   of	   the	  distinction	   between	   personal	   and	   professional	   roles	   and	   obligations,	   J.W.R.	   Parsons,	   “National	  
	   239	  Corruption	   in	   Georgia	   was	   not	   a	   specifically	   rural	   or	   urban	   problem:	   rather,	  corruption	  and	  patronage	  were	   likely	   furthered	  by	  the	  same	  mechanisms	  of	  rural-­‐to-­‐urban	   migration	   that	   facilitated	   the	   rise	   of	   Saburtalo	   and	   other	   Soviet	   urban	  districts,	   as	   new	   urban	   residents	   maintained	   ties	   to	   their	   native	   villages	   and	  networks.	   Shevardnadze,	   meanwhile,	   owed	   much	   of	   his	   political	   rise	   to	   anti-­‐corruption	  campaigns	  waged	  as	  a	  district	  party	  leader	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  from	  his	  posts	  in	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Internal	  Affairs,	   and	  his	   anti-­‐corruption	   credentials	  made	  him	  a	  suitable	   replacement	   in	   Moscow’s	   eyes	   for	   the	   entrenched	   Mžavanaże.	   It	   is	   not	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  upon	  becoming	  first	  secretary,	  Shevardnadze	  launched	  a	  series	  of	   anti-­‐corruption	   measures	   throughout	   Georgia,	   which	   saw	   varying,	   if	   limited,	  degrees	   of	   success:	   by	   1975,	   25,000	   people	   had	   been	   arrested	   (including	   9,500	  Party	   members)	   in	   Georgia	   as	   part	   of	   Shevardnadze’s	   anti-­‐corruption	   campaign,	  though	  many	  were	  released	  without	  trial.543	  	  	   In	   theory,	   the	   bribery	   and	   corruption	   characteristic	   of	   Mžavanaże-­‐era	  Georgia	  was	  incompatible	  with	  the	  project	  of	  socialist	  modernity	  under	  construction	  in	  Saburtalo	  and	  elsewhere.	  In	  this	  sense,	  theft,	  bribery,	  hooliganism,	  protectionism,	  bureaucratism,	  and	  localism	  were	  cast	  as	  dangerous,	  anachronistic	  practices	  against	  which	   the	   Georgian	   Party	   structure	  waged	   its	   struggle.	   Concurrent	  with	   the	   anti-­‐corruption	  campaigns,	  the	  Georgian	  Party	  also	  initiated	  a	  campaign	  in	  1975	  “against	  harmful	  traditions,	  customs,	  ceremonies,	  holidays,	  and	  the	  universal	  introduction	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Integration	   in	   Soviet	   Georgia,”	   Soviet	   Studies	   34,	   no.	   4	   (October	   1982):	   558-­‐559;	   Gerald	  Mars	   and	  Yochanan	  Altman,	  “The	  Cultural	  Bases	  of	  Soviet	  Georgia’s	  Second	  Economy,”	  Soviet	  Studies	  35,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1983):	  546–60.	  543	  Stephen	  F.	  Jones,	  “Soviet	  Religious	  Policy	  and	  the	  Georgian	  Orthodox	  Apostolic	  Church:	  From	  Khrushchev	  to	  Gorbachev,”	  Religion	  in	  Communist	  Lands	  17,	  no.	  4	  (1989):	  299.	  	  
	   240	  new	  –	  Soviet,	  socialist	  ones.”544	  Both	  efforts	  captured	  the	  broader	  desire,	  couched	  in	  anthropological	   terminology	   that	   recalled	   Union-­‐wide	   anti-­‐religious	   campaigns	   of	  the	  1960s,	  to	  combat	  anti-­‐socialist	  tendencies	  and	  “survivals	  of	  the	  past”	  (perezhitki	  
proshlogo).	   Whereas	   the	   anti-­‐corruption	   efforts	   led	   to	   purges	   of	   institutions	   and	  officials,	   the	   campaign	   against	   harmful	   traditions	   consisted	   of	   extensive	   research	  and	   public	   opinion	   studies	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   new,	   more	   appropriately	   Soviet	  practices	  and	  rituals	  to	  replace	  allegedly	  “harmful”	  ones.545	  Shevardnadze’s	  political	  legitimacy	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Moscow	  lay	  in	  his	  corruption-­‐busting	  credentials,	  so	  the	  broader	  fight	  against	   corruption	  and	   related	  problems	  was	  clearly	  a	  Moscow-­‐led	   initiative.	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  note	  on	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC,	  Shevardnadze	  referenced	  the	  CPSU	  March	   1972	   castigation	   of	   the	   Tbilisi	   Party	   Committee	   and	   mistakes	   of	   the	  Mžavanaże	   leadership	   as	  motivations	   for	   the	   campaign.546	  Yet	   the	  decision	   to	   cast	  the	  corruption	  struggle	  within	  a	  wider	  campaign	  against	  harmful	  practices,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  particular	  to	  Georgia,	  was	  more	  likely	  Shevardnadze’s	  design.	  Moreover,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  544	  Anthropologist	  Christel	  Lane	  argues	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  new	  “rituals”	  in	  this	  period	  “arose	  once	  the	   struggle	   for	   economic	   survival	   and	   the	  deprivations	  of	   the	  early	  postwar	  period	  had	  eased	  up,	  and	  more	  time	  and	  money	  for	  personal	  concerns	  were	  available,”	  Christel	  Lane,	  The	  Rites	  of	  Rulers:	  
Ritual	   in	   Industrial	   Society	   -­‐-­‐	   the	   Soviet	   Case	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   1981),	   34.	  Malte	  Rolf,	  meanwhile,	  points	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  post-­‐Stalin	  festival	  culture	  toward	  the	  private	  sphere	  and	  toward	  local	  and	  national	  collectivities,	  resulting	  in	  a	  "fragmentation	  of	  the	  festive	  landscape,"	  Malte	  Rolf,	   Soviet	   Mass	   Festivals,	   1917-­‐1991,	   trans.	   Cynthia	   Klohr	   (Pittsburgh:	   University	   of	   Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2013),	  189.	  Rolf	  does	  not	  discuss	   this	  process	  at	   length,	  alas,	  but	   it	   seems	  worthy	  of	   further	  scholarly	  inquiry.	  545	  “Protokol	  #166	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  ot	  25	  noiabria	  1975	  g.,	  8g.,	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  s	  vrednymi	  traditsiiami	  i	  obychaiami,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  50,	  d.	  197,	  ll.	  35-­‐48.	  This	  campaign	  has	  been	  mentioned	  selectively	  by	  other	  scholars,	  but	   it	   is	   typically	  mentioned	  only	   in	  passing	  and	  portrayed	   as	   an	   anti-­‐religious	   campaign	   or	   a	   campaign	   to	   introduce	   new	   holidays,	   that	   is,	  considerably	  more	  limited	  in	  scope	  than	  it	  was	  in	  reality,	  Jones,	  “Soviet	  Religious	  Policy”;	  Suny,	  The	  
Making	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Nation.	  546	  “Informatsiia,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  8	  December	  1975,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  50,	  d.	  486,	  ll.	  37-­‐38.	  
	   241	  the	   wider	   net	   provided	   a	   link	   between	   corruption,	   religion,	   traditions,	   and	  criminality,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Georgian	  propagandists.	  	  	   As	  preparation	  for	  this	  campaign,	  between	  1973	  and	  1975,	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  tasked	  its	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation	  with	  researching	  the	  spectrum	  and	  extent	  of	   so-­‐called	   “harmful	   traditions,	   customs”	   et	   al.	   across	   the	   republic.	  By	  1976,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   regular	   reporting	   from	   regional	   leaders	   about	   lingering	  practices	  in	  their	  districts,	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  decided	  to	  enlist	  a	  new	  instrument	  in	  the	  data	   collection	   effort:	   the	   newly	   established	   Study	   of	   Public	   Opinion	   (mosaxleobis	  
sazogadoebrivi	   azris	   šesascavla),	   a	   public	   opinion	   polling	   institution	   created	   by	  Shevardnadze	   that	   was	   the	   first	   of	   its	   kind	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union.547	  Established	   in	  1975,	   the	   so-­‐called	  Public	  Opinion	  Council	   fell	   under	   the	  purview	  of	   the	  Georgian	  CC’s	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation.	  Its	  mandate	  was	  threefold:	  to	  study	  and	  poll	  public	  opinion	   in	  Georgia;	   to	  use	  poll	   results	   for	  recommendations	   to	   the	  Georgian	   CC	   for	   policy	   improvements;	   and	   to	   form	   public	   opinion	   by	   drawing	  attention	  to	  selected	  problems.548	  Attempts	  to	  gather	  public	  opinion	  data	  supported	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  547	  See	  the	  survey	  instrument	  in	  “anketa:	  mavne	  tradic’iebisa	  da	  cesč’veulebat’a	  cinaaġmdeg	  brżolis	  gażlierebis	   ġonisżiebat’a	   ep’ek’turobaze	  mosaxleobis	   sazogadoebrivi	   azris	   šesascavlad	   (1976	   celi),”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  339,	  ll.	  38-­‐39.	  Christel	  Lane	  cites	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  nature	  of	  ritual	  creation	  in	  the	   late	   fifties/early	   sixties	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   USSR,	   as	   lower	   political	   cadres	  most	   likely	   sought	   to	  address	  the	  suggestions	  and	  demands	  of	  their	  citizen	  constituents	  and	  use	  such	  measures	  as	  a	  “tool	  of	  cultural	  management,”	  Lane,	  The	  Rites	  of	  Rulers,	  32-­‐34.	  548	  Darrell	   Slider,	   “Party-­‐Sponsored	   Public	   Opinion	   Research	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union,”	   The	   Journal	   of	  
Politics	  47,	  no.	  1	  (February	  1985):	  209–27.	  Between	  1975	  and	  1982,	  the	  Council	  on	  Public	  Opinion	  (changed	   to	   the	   Center	   for	   Studying,	   Forming	   and	   Forecasting	   Public	   Opinion	   in	   1981)	   led	   70	  research	  projects	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  topics	  and	  garnered	  Union-­‐level	  attention	  for	  its	  innovations	  in	  applied	   sociological	   research.	   For	   examples	   of	   public	   opinion	   studies	   conducted	   by	   this	   body,	   see	  “SPRAVKA	   ob	   itogakh	   issledovaniia	   obshchestvennogo	   mneniia	   trudiashikhsia	   Gruzinskoi	   SSR	   o	  sushchnosti	  chastnosobstvennicheskikh	  tendentsii	  i	  prichinakh	  ikh	  rasprostraneniia,”	  and	  “Spravka	  o	  rezul’tatakh	   izucheniia	   obshchestvennogo	   mneniia	   o	   sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskikh	   prichinakh	   i	  posledstviiakh	  migratsionnykh	  protsessov	  naseleniia	  gornykh	   i	  vysokogornykh	  raionov	  respubliki,”	  
	   242	  the	   broader	   effort	   to	   pursue	   Shevardnadze’s	   reformist	   program	   and,	   especially,	  wage	   the	   campaigns	   against	   certain	   remnants	   of	   the	   past	   (i.e.	   corruption	   and	  harmful	  traditions).	  	  Reports	  to	  Shevardnadze	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation	  depicted	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  practices	  witnessed	  or	  reported	  among	  Georgia’s	  residents,	  from	  the	  culinary	  to	  the	  religious,	  which	  existed	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Georgian	  vision	  of	  modernity.549	  The	   report	   authors	   classified	   the	  practices	   as	  pertaining	   to	  family	  life,	  labor,	  calendar,	  folkloric	  and	  ethnographic	  traditions,	  and	  traditions	  that	  “went	  against	  our	  way	  of	   life,”	   that	   is,	   those	  with	  a	  religious	  component.550	  On	   the	  surface,	   the	   religious	   aspects	   of	   the	   campaign	   resembled	   Khrushchev-­‐era	   anti-­‐religious	  campaigns,	  which	  aimed	  to	  promote	  “scientific	  atheism”	  through	  research	  and	   propaganda.551	  Shevardnadze’s	   effort,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   embedded	   religion	  within	  a	  much	  larger	  spectrum	  of	  cultural	  traditions,	  rituals,	  and	  practices.	  In	  other	  words,	   this	   was	   less	   about	   the	   formal	   institutions	   of	   religion	   in	   Georgia	   than	   the	  more	  quotidian	  expressions	  of	  culture	  and	  ritual	  associated	  with	  religion.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  117,	  d.	  545,	  ll.	  1-­‐20,	  36-­‐50	  for	  studies	  on	  private	  property	  ownership	  and	  opinions	  of	  resettled	  highland	  residents	  from	  T’ušet’i	  on	  their	  living	  conditions.	  549	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  ll.	  1-­‐51.	  For	  local	  level	  reporting	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation	  from	  1975-­‐1979	  on	  this	  campaign,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  50,	  d.	  488;	  f.	  14,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  339,	  339a,	   339b;	   f.	   14,	   op.	   115,	   d.	   432;	   f.	   14,	   op.	   117,	   d.	   337;	   and	   f.	   14,	   op.	   117,	   d.	   338.	  Many	   of	   these	  reports	   seem	  overly	   concerned	  with	   the	  holiday	  aspects	  and	  much	   less	   frequently	   raised	   issues	  or	  denote	  progress	  in	  other	  spheres,	  such	  as	  marriage	  ceremonies,	  funerals,	  or	  feasting.	  550	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  l.	  4.	  551	  On	   Khrushchev-­‐era	   anti-­‐religious	   campaigns	   and	   “scientific	   atheism,”	   see	   especially	   Smolkin-­‐Rothrock,	   “The	  Ticket	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Soul;	  Dobson,	   “The	  Social	  Scientist	  Meets	   the	   ‘Believer’";	  and	   in	  Georgia,	  Jones,	  “Soviet	  Religious	  Policy.”	  
	   243	  	   According	  to	  reports,	  the	  most	  widespread	  religious	  practice	  in	  Georgia	  was	  the	   observance	   of	   religious	   holidays	   such	   as	   saints’	   days	   (Davit’oba,	   Giorgoba,	  Marioba,	   Nanoba);	   Easter;	   and	   local	   holidays	   such	   as	   Alaverdoba,	   Teletoba,	  Zevzaoba,	  Mc’xet’oba,	  Varżioba	  and	  others.552	  These	  holidays	  posed	  a	  problem	  not	  only	   due	   to	   their	   religious	   bases,	   but	   also	   because	   of	   their	   “cult	   origins”	   and,	   at	  times,	   observance	   of	   ritual	   sacrifice.	   Reports	   regularly	   referred	   to	   a	   particularly	  concerning	   practice	   in	   the	   mountainous	   region	   of	   T’ušet’i:	   in	   November	   of	   the	  previous	   year	   for	   the	   holiday	   Samvgto,	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   children,	   villagers	   in	  Gudani	  performed	  a	  sacrificial	  killing	  of	  animals	  in	  which	  they	  cut	  animals’	  necks	  to	  yield	   the	   largest	   possible	   “fountain”	   of	   blood,	  which	  was	   smeared	   on	   the	   faces	   of	  participants.	   This	   practice	   presented	   a	   challenge	   because	   “As	   children,	   the	   youth	  were	  raised	  in	  this	  violence,	  returning	  to	  the	  savagery	  of	  the	  past.”553	  	  Just	  as	  such	  violence	  was	  deemed	  a	  relic	  of	  the	  past,	  so	  too	  was	  the	  lingering	  influence	  of	  Orthodoxy.	  Report	  authors	  took	  care	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  religion	  in	  Georgian	  celebrations	  and	  daily	  life:	  	  We	  know	  that	  no	  one	  can	  impose	  something	  on	  a	  people,	  forced	  into	  its	   culture,	   that	   even	   in	   the	   slightest	   degree	   is	   foreign	   to	   its	   nature,	  history	  and	  spirit,	  yet	  we	  also	  know	  that	  which	  is	  viable	  and	  valuable	  cannot	  be	  discarded	  from	  a	  culture.	  We	  must	  not	  always	  renounce	  all	  traditions,	   even	   if	   the	   tradition	   is	   formed	   on	   a	   religious	   basis,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  552	  I	  attended	   two	  of	   these	   festivals:	  Pankisoba	   (April	  2013)	  and	  Zevzaoba	   (May	  2015).	  The	  saints	  days	   –	   for	   Saints	   Davit’,	   Giorgi,	   Mari,	   and	   Nana	   –	   likewise	   functioned	   as	   name	   days	   for	   those	  Georgians	   who	   shared	   the	   names	   of	   Giorgi,	   et	   al.	   Local	   holidays	   such	   as	   Zevzaoba	   or	   Mc’xet’oba	  commemorated	  a	  local	  (often	  historical)	  event,	  such	  as	  a	  victory	  in	  battle.	  	  553	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  l.	  4.	  
	   244	  provided	   that	   it	   can	   be	   modernized	   to	   use	   it	   against	   its	  “forefathers.”554	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  spirit,	  the	  Party	  had	  introduced	  several	  new,	  annual	  “traditional”	  holidays	  to	  celebrate	  the	  birthdays	  of	   important	  Georgian	  writers	  and	  cultural	   figures,	  such	  as	  Šot’aoba	   (Šot’a	   Rust’aveli),	   Iliaoba	   (Ilia	   Čavčavaże),	   Važoba	   (Važa	   P’šavela),	  Iakoboba	   (Iakob	  Gogebašvili),	   and	  Alek’sandreoba	   (Alek’sandre	  Čavčavaże),	  which	  had	   already	   drawn	   crowds	   in	   villages	   in	   eastern	   and	   central	   Georgia.555	  Report	  authors	   recognized	   that	   local	   holidays	   and	   festivals	   served	   an	   important	   cultural	  function	   and	   emphasized	   their	   genuinely	   “popular”	   origins,	   which	   allegedly	   had	  been	  hijacked	  by	  the	  church	  since	  their	  beginnings	  in	  feudal-­‐era	  Georgia.	  The	  Party’s	  task	   was	   therefore	   to	   re-­‐appropriate	   said	   popular	   holidays	   from	   the	   church	   (e.g.	  Alaverdoba,	   Mc’xet’oba,	   Atigenoba,	   Varżioba),	   restore	   their	   original	   purposes	   and	  “breathe	  into	  them	  a	  modern	  spirit	  and	  new	  content.”556	  	   The	  “survivals”	  of	  religion	  were	  evident	  not	  only	  in	  holidays,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  more	   ritualized	   days	   of	   celebration	   and	   commemoration	   in	   citizens’	   daily	   lives:	  baptisms,	   weddings,	   and	   funerals.	   For	   example,	   in	   1974	   in	   the	   entire	   republic	  14,422	  religious	  ceremonies	  had	  been	  recorded	   in	  official	  statistics,	  or	  4.8	  percent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  554	  Ibid.,	  l.	  6.	  555	  Ibid.,	  l.	  9.	  On	  the	  genesis	  and	  post-­‐Soviet	  transformation	  of	  one	  such	  festival	  in	  the	  Ajarian	  border	  village	   of	   Sarpi,	   Kolxoba,	   see	   Mathijs	   Pelkmans,	   Defending	   the	   Border:	   Identity,	   Religion,	   and	  
Modernity	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   Georgia	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   2006),	   61-­‐69.	   Pelkmans	  observes	  that,	  in	  its	  Soviet	  iteration,	  from	  1979,	  Kolxoba	  “referred	  to	  the	  distant	  past	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  ‘Georgian’	  people	  living	  along	  the	  eastern	  Black	  Sea	  coast”	  while	  being	  simultaneously	  “invested	  with	  socialist	   meaning”.	   The	   local	   reception	   of	   this	   “socialist	   ritual”	   ultimately	   transformed	   it	   “into	   a	  celebration	  of	  ethnic	  and	  national	  identity.”	  556	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   451,	   l.	   10.	   Proposed	   activities	   ran	   the	   gamut	   from	   displaying	   Soviet	  agricultural	  technology	  to	  celebrating	  Georgian	  wine	  and	  tea	  production	  to	  holding	  sporting	  contests	  and	  traditional	  Georgian	  tournaments	  of	  “leloburt’i,”	  a	  ball	  game.	  
	   245	  more	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  The	  number	  of	  baptisms	  likewise	  increased	  by	  6.3	  percent	  (8,609)	  over	  the	  previous	  year.	  One	  thousand	  people	  held	  church	  wedding	  ceremonies	   in	  1974,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  religious	  burials	  and	  memorials	   increased	  by	   13.4	   percent	   from	   1973.	   Moreover,	   these	   figures	   reflected	   only	   the	   official	  figures:	  according	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Tbilisi	  Palace	  of	  Marriage,	  the	  majority	  of	  young	  people	  (circa	  3,000-­‐4,000	  people)	  followed	  their	  legal	  ceremony	  at	  the	  Palace	  with	  a	  visit	   to	   the	  historic	  Svetic’xoveli	  cathedral	   in	  Mc’xet’a	   to	  be	  married	  by	  a	  priest.557	  Even	   if,	   as	   evaluated	   by	   authors	   of	   the	   report,	   religious	   baptisms,	   weddings,	   and	  burials	  had	   less	   to	  do	  with	  genuine	  belief	   in	  religious	  doctrine	   than	  observance	  of	  cultural	   rituals,	   these	   trends	   still	   presented	   challenges	   to	   their	   goals	   for	   the	  transformative	  power	  of	  propaganda	  among	  Georgian	  residents.	  In	  her	  ethnography	  of	   rural	   Rača	   province	   during	   the	   1970s,	   British-­‐Georgian	   anthropologist	   Tamara	  Dragadze	   described	   a	   similar	   process	   of	   “domestication	   of	   religious	   life”:	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   a	   church	   or	   priest,	   neither	   of	   which	   had	   been	   present	   in	   the	   area	   in	  decades,	   village	   (lay)	   residents	   took	   on	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   church	   institutions	  within	  the	  home	  and	  family,	  often	  concerning	  fortune	  and	  fate	  more	  than	  doctrine	  and	  institution.	  “Religious	  practice”	  was	  not	  about	  religion	  per	  se,	  but	  had	  more	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  557	  Ibid.,	  l.	  12.	  Such	  a	  practice	  not	  only	  went	  against	  the	  “Soviet	  way	  of	  life,”	  but	  also	  provided	  profits	  to	   the	   church,	   since	   such	   a	   blessing	   at	  Mc’xet’a	   cost	   50	   rubles.	   The	   church	   received	   an	   estimated	  1,510,398	  rubles	  in	  this	  manner	  in	  1974	  alone.	  More	  quotidian	  concerns	  also	  brought	  young	  people	  to	  the	  church:	  for	  example,	  students	  and	  graduate	  students	  would	  pray	  and	  light	  candles	  in	  churches	  in	  advance	  of	  their	  exams	  for	  good	  luck.	  
	   246	  do	   with	   “Georgian	   traditions”	   and	   “Georgian	   folklore”	   and	   served	   to	   preserve	  stability	  and	  morality	  within	  and	  among	  families.	  558	  	  	   Existing	  state	  institutions	  for	  marriage	  and	  funeral	  ceremonies	  fell	  far	  below	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  populace	  for	  their	  services.	  Palaces	  of	  Marriage	  (the	  Soviet	  Dom	  
brakosochitaniia)	  existed	  only	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Rustavi,	  and	  these	  organs	  served	  merely	  to	   “stamp”	   the	   marriage	   certificate	   rather	   than	   provide	   traditional	   spaces	   for	  banquets	  and	  guests.	  Institutions	  for	  burial	  and	  memorial	  ceremonies,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   were	   nonexistent	   in	   the	   republic.559	  Not	   only	   would	   local	   registry	   offices	  (ZAGS)	  need	  to	  be	  more	  diligent	  about	  actually	  registering	  marriages	  –	  particularly	  in	   rural	   regions	   –	   other	   state	   buildings,	   such	   as	   Houses	   of	   Culture,	   theatres,	   and	  sports	   facilities	  would	  need	   to	   serve	  as	  makeshift	   venues	   for	  proper	  wedding	  and	  funeral	  banquets	  before	  new	  structures	  could	  be	  constructed.560	  	  The	   proposals	   for	   Sovietizing	   the	   traditional	   Georgian	   marriage	   ceremony	  included	   replacing	   the	   newlyweds’	   passing	   under	   a	   cross	  with	   passing	   under	   the	  “national”	   flag	   and	   state	   seal	   and	  encouraging	   them	   to	  wear	  national	   costumes.561	  More	   importantly,	   report	   authors	   suggested	   reserving	   10-­‐15	   percent	   of	   the	   new	  housing	   fund	   to	   distribute	   to	   newlyweds.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Culture	   was	   to	   print	   a	  special	  edition	  of	  Rust’aveli’s	  epic	  vep’xistqaosani	  (The	  Knight	  in	  the	  Panther	  Skin)	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  558	  Dragadze,	   Rural	   Families	   in	   Soviet	   Georgia:	   A	   Case	   Study	   in	   Ratcha	   Province,	   48,	   72-­‐73;	   and	  Tamara	   Dragadze,	   “The	   Domestication	   of	   Religion	   Under	   Soviet	   Communism,”	   in	   Socialism:	   Ideals,	  
Ideologies,	   and	   Local	   Practice,	   ed.	   C.M.	   Hann	   (Oxford:	   Routledge,	   1993),	   148–56.	   This	   view	   –	   of	  religion	  as	  tradition	  –	  was	  shared	  by	  intellectuals,	  villagers,	  and	  officials	  alike,	  in	  Dragadze’s	  account.	  559	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  l.	  13.	  560	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  13,	  17.	  561	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  17-­‐18.	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  give	  as	  a	  gift	  from	  “Soviet	  power”	  to	  newlyweds	  at	  ZAGS	  or	  wedding	  palaces,	  along	  with	   the	   keys	   to	   their	   new	   apartment.	   Rust’aveli’s	   twelfth-­‐century	   epic	   acts	   as	   a	  quasi-­‐sacred	   text	   among	   Georgians,	   as	   it	   contains	   guidelines	   for	   chivalry,	   honor,	  hospitality,	   familial	   relations,	  and	   femininity,	  effectively	  canonized	   from	  the	  1930s	  by	   Soviet	   nation-­‐building	   policies.	   Bestowing	   a	   copy	   of	   this	   work	   with	   a	   set	   of	  apartment	   keys	   to	   a	   newlywed	   couple	   epitomizes	   the	   fusion	   of	   tradition	   and	  modernity	   sought	   by	   Soviet	   Georgian	   leadership	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   	   In	   the	  view	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Agitation	   and	   Propaganda,	   the	   new	   solemn,	   public	  wedding	   ceremony	   should	   “completely	   destroy	   the	   church’s	   plans	   to	   attract	   the	  youth	  to	  its	  traditional	  ritual	  fuss.”562	  For	   burials,	   one	   of	   the	   greatest	   challenges	   was	   to	   combat	   the	   trend	   of	  elaborate	  and	  large	  tombstones	  and	  burial	  plots,	  which	  not	  only	  reflected	  a	  kind	  of	  “bourgeois	  provincialism,”	  but	  also	  departed	  from	  the	  more	  humble	  burial	  markers	  in	  Georgian	  tradition,	   “ignoring	  national	   tact”	   in	   the	  process.	  According	   to	  reports,	  “In	   Georgia,	   for	   centuries	   a	   simple	   but	   expressive	   headstone	   adorned	   the	   burial	  place	   of	   king	   and	   plowman,	   commander	   and	   shepherd	   alike.”	   Instead,	   some	  Georgians	  constructed	   lavish	  burial	  complexes,	  complete	  with	  benches,	   tables,	  and	  electrical	  wiring,	  so	  that	  people	  could	  visit	  at	  any	  time	  of	  day	  and	  open	  a	  bottle	  of	  wine	   in	   memory	   of	   the	   departed.563	  This	   trend	   allegedly	   went	   against	   both	   the	  Georgian	  tradition	  of	  equality	  in	  death	  and	  Soviet	  egalitarian	  values	  and	  presented	  a	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  Ibid.,	  l.	  18.	  563	  Ibid.,	  l.	  20.	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  practical	   challenge	   to	   the	   limited	   cemetery	   land	   in	   a	   growing	   Tbilisi.564	  While	  honoring	  the	  deceased	  with	  a	  visit	  to	  his	  or	  her	  grave,	  perhaps	  with	  a	  bottle	  of	  wine,	  was	  not	  a	  new	  –	  or	  problematic	  practice,	   the	  growing	  expanse	  of	   individual	  grave	  plots	  and	  their	  attendant	  adornments	  posed	  physical	  and	  ideological	  challenges.	  	  	   Commemorating	  the	  deceased	  over	  a	  bottle	  of	  wine	  was	  but	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  feasting	  and	  drinking	  practices	  still	  exhibited	  in	  Georgia	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  While	  celebratory	   feasting	  and	  drinking	  coincided	  with	   the	  aforementioned	  holidays	  and	  life	  milestones,	  Georgians	  likewise	  held	  a	  sup’ra	  (feast)	  “just	  because.”565	  Feasts	  with	  hundreds	   of	   guests	   lasted	   until	   dawn,	   with	   “rivers	   of	   wine,”	   and	   threatened	   the	  sanctity	  of	  weekends	  spent	   in	  more	  cultured	  pursuits,	  such	  as	  reading,	  visiting	  the	  cinema	  or	  theatre,	  or	  participating	  in	  a	  subbotnik.	  This	  was	  not	  “tradition”	  but	  rather	  “drunkenness	  nestled	  behind	  the	  screen	  of	   tradition.”	  The	  practice	  also	  reportedly	  encouraged	  a	   false	  notion	  of	  masculinity	   in	   that	   to	  be	  a	   true	  važ-­‐kac’i	   (courageous	  man)	  one	  had	   to	  be	  able	   to	  drink	  excessively.	  The	   link	  between	   “mass	   feasts”	  and	  violence	   was	   particularly	   problematic,	   as	   fights	   and	   even	   killings	   were	   not	  uncommon	   at	   such	   occasions,	   fueled	   by	   alcohol	   and	   notions	   of	   machismo	   and	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  Ibid.,	   ll.	   21-­‐22.	  This	   trend	  was	   reportedly	  particularly	  acute	   in	  Tbilisi’s	  Vake,	   Saburtalo,	  Diġomi	  neighborhoods	  (with	  Saburtalo	  being	  the	  most	  egregious	  case),	  where	  in	  a	  very	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  most	  of	  the	  land	  in	  neighborhood	  cemeteries	  had	  been	  “claimed”	  in	  advance	  by	  residents.	  Whereas	  the	   state	  norm	   for	   living	   space	  was	  nine	   square	  meters,	   people	  had	   reserved	  burial	  plots	  of	  40-­‐50	  square	  meters.	  Compared	  to	  the	  U.S.’s	  Arlington	  Cemetery,	  “where	  the	  Kennedy	  brothers	  are	  buried,”	  the	  standard	  space	  was	  only	  50x20x20	  centimeters.	  565	  Harsha	  Ram,	  “The	  Literary	  Origins	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Feast:	  The	  Cosmopolitan	  Poetics	  of	  a	  National	  Ritual,”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2014,	  no.	  4	  (2014):	  19–52;	  Paul	  Manning,	  “Domestication	  of	  the	  Wild	  Supra,”	  Ab	  
Imperio	   2014,	   no.	   4	   (2014):	   53–62;	   Paul	  Manning,	  The	  Semiotics	  of	  Drink	  and	  Drinking	   (New	  York:	  Continuum	  International,	  2012);	  Scott,	  “Edible	  Ethnicity.”	  
	   249	  
važkac’oba	   (bravery,	   valor).566	  Party	   members	   were	   not	   immune	   to	   the	   lure	   of	  drunkenness:	   in	   the	  past	  year	   (1974)	  over	   two	  hundred	  Party	  members	  had	  been	  registered	  at	  sobering-­‐up	  stations.567	  	   Yet	   wine	   held	   an	   important	   place	   in	   Georgian	   social	   practice	   and	   in	   the	  Georgian	   viticulture	   “exported”	   for	   consumption	   throughout	   other	   parts	   of	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   (and	   beyond).	   Wine	   was	   closely	   related	   to	   notions	   of	   Georgian	  hospitality,	  akin	   to	   the	  Ukrainian	  and	  Russian	  khleb-­‐sol’,	  yet	  wine	  served	  a	  greater	  purpose	   than	  merely	  adorning	   the	   feast	   table	  and	  providing	   ritual	   comfort:	   it	  was	  the	   means	   of	   existence	   and	   product	   of	   labor	   of	   the	   old	   peasant,	   a	   meaning	  supposedly	  lost	  on	  many	  in	  the	  younger	  generations.	  The	  grapevine	  enjoyed	  a	  cult-­‐like	   status	   among	  Georgian	  peasants	   and	   adorned	   tombstones	   and	   state	   emblems	  and	   institutions.	  Report	   authors	  proposed	  not	   to	  ban	   the	   sup’ra	   altogether,	   but	   to	  “liberate	  it”	  from	  unnecessary	  excess,	  especially	  that	  which	  conveyed	  a	  poor	  image	  of	  Georgian	  culture	  to	  outsiders	  and	  visitors.	  They	  sought	  for:	  …guests	   to	   simply	  order	  a	   tea	  or	   coffee	  with	  pirozhki,	   just	  xinkali	   or	  
xaši,	   xačapuri	   (Ajarian,	   Gurian	   on	   a	   cast	   iron	   pan	   or	   Ossetian	  
khabizgina),	   as	   educated	   people	   did	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   nineteenth	  century,	   when	   Georgian	   cuisine	   and	   Georgian	   hospitality	   were	  influenced	  by	  several	  European	  culinary	  practices	  via	  Russia.	  Yet	  what	  often	   happens	   with	   us?	   They	   invite	   you	   at	   dawn	   for	   xaši,	   serve	   it	  according	  to	  custom	  and,	  together	  with	  it,	  fish	  with	  vodka	  and	  čanaxi	  with	  wine	  for	  the	  entire	  day.568	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  op.	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  d.	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  ll.	  25-­‐26.	  567	  Ibid.,	  l.	  28.	  568	  Ibid.,	   l.	   31.	   Pirozhki	   are	   (typically)	   Russian	   savory	   pastries	   filled	   with	   meat,	   mushrooms,	   or	  cabbage;	  xinkali	  –	  large	  dumplings	  filled	  with	  meat;	  xaši	  –	  a	  chicken	  broth-­‐based	  soup	  often	  used	  as	  a	  hangover	  cure;	  xačapuri	   	   -­‐-­‐	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  made	  with	  very	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  with	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   250	  	  The	  Georgian	   sup’ra	  was	   a	  unique	   traditional	  practice	   that	  had	   served	  as	   a	   site	  of	  early	   Georgian	   justice	   and	   diplomacy.	   The	   institution	   of	   the	   t’amada	   in	   particular	  had	  a	   rich	  history,	   as	   the	  person	  who	  presided	  over	   the	   sup’ra,	  maintained	  order,	  and	  led	  toasting.569	  Yet	  when	  a	  drunken	  t’amada	  himself	  caused	  disorder	  and	  even	  drew	   weapons	   on	   occasion,	   such	   behavior	   flagrantly	   contradicted	   the	   modernity	  and	  norms	  of	  Communist	  morality	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  socialist	  community.570	  	  	   Feasting	   and	   concomitant	   expressions	   of	   masculinity	   (via	   drinking	   or	  fighting)	  were	  not	  the	  only	  spheres	  of	  concern	  regarding	  gender	  roles	  and	  relations.	  From	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  Department	  of	  Propaganda	  and	  Agitation,	   as	  modern,	  Soviet	   citizens,	   Georgian	   women	   held	   the	   responsibility	   for	   instilling	   proper	  attitudes	   toward	   socialist	   traditions	   and	   rituals	   in	   the	   younger	   generations	   and	  fostering	   “civic,	   national,	   and	   human	   values”	   in	   their	   children. 571 	  Yet	   such	   a	  responsibility	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  certain	  minority	  groups	  in	  the	  republic.	  The	  issue	  of	  gender	   inequality	   reportedly	   persisted	   in	   Ajaria,	  Marneuli,	   Axalk’alak’i,	   Calka,	   and	  Dmanisi	  districts,	  exhibited	  by	  such	  “survivals”	  as	  forced	  marriage,	  overwhelmingly	  male	   representation	   in	   local	   leadership	   (while	   women	   were	   consigned	   only	   to	  physically	   demanding	   work),	   continued	   observance	   of	   “religious”	   rituals	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  shape	   and	   preparation;	   and	   čanaxi	   is	   a	   lamb-­‐based	   stew	   with	   abundant	   cilantro	   and	   vegetables	  (rumored	  to	  be	  Stalin’s	  favorite	  dish).	  569	  On	  the	  role	  of	  the	  t’amada	  within	  the	  sup’ra,	  see	  Kevin	  Tuite,	  “The	  Autocrat	  of	  the	  Banquet	  Table:	  The	   Political	   and	   Social	   Significance	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Supra,”	   Conference	   on	   Language,	  History,	   and	  
Cultural	  Identities	  in	  the	  Caucasus,	  Malmö	  University,	  Sweden	  (2005).	  570	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  ll.	  32-­‐33.	  571	  Ibid.,	  l.	  11.	  
	   251	  holidays,	   and	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	   practice	   of	   high	   bride-­‐prices	   during	  marriage	  negotiations.572	  Though	   not	   explicitly	   attributed	   to	   Islam	   in	   the	   lengthy	   report	  submitted	  to	  Shevardnadze,	  these	  districts	  had	  large	  Georgian	  Muslim	  (Ajarian)	  and	  Azerbaijani	   populations.	   Subsequent	   reporting	   discussed	   more	   directly	   the	  continued	  resonance	  of	  Islam	  among	  these	  populations,	  but	  the	  comparative	  lack	  of	  attention	   to	   religious	   and	   ethnic	  minorities	   illustrates	   that	   the	   broader	   campaign	  was	   really	   concerned	   with	   reforming	   practices	   among	   the	   entitled,	   Georgian	  nationality.573	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  572	  “Zapiska	  otdela	  propagandy	  i	  agitatsii	  TsK	  ‘o	  merakh	  po	  usileniiu	  bor’by	  protiv	  vrednykh	  traditsii,	  obychaev,	  obriadov,	  prazdnikov	  i	  povsemestnom	  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  l.	  14.	  573	  Minorities	  –	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  –	  were	  approached	  separately,	  as	  part	  of	  explicitly	  anti-­‐religious	  campaigns	   and	   campaigns	   to	   improve	   the	   situation	   of	   Kurds	   in	   the	   republic.	   On	   Shevardnadze’s	  “measures	  to	  strengthen	  ideological-­‐educational	  work	  among	  the	  Kurdish	  population	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,”	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  51,	  d.	  107,	  ll.	  7-­‐8;	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  695,	  ll.	  1-­‐6,	  8;	  	  and	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d	  343,	  ll.	  2-­‐5.	  For	  letters	  regarding	  the	  situation	  of	  Azerbaijanis	  in	  Georgia,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  43,	  d.	  302,	  ll.	   6-­‐33;	   f.	   14,	   op.	   46,	   d.	   426,	   ll.	   33-­‐34;	   and	   f.	   14,	   op.	   50,	   d.	   488,	   ll.	   11-­‐14;	   and	   from	  Armenians	   in	  Georgia,	  sšssa	  (II),f.	  14,	  op.	  47,	  d.	  393,	  ll.	  41-­‐46,	  58-­‐63.	  	  On	  explicitly	  anti-­‐religious	  propaganda	  work	  in	  1979	  (among	  Orthodox,	  Muslim,	  and	  Jewish	  communities	  as	  well	  as	   the	  “sects”),	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  117,	  d.	  174,	  ll.	  10-­‐17.	  	  
	   252	  Figure	   16.	   Survey	   Form:	   Measures	   to	   strengthen	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   struggle	   against	   harmful	  
traditions	  and	  ceremonies	  by	  the	  Study	  of	  Public	  Opinion574	  1. Do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  celebrate	  your	  birthday	  every	  year?	  2. Do	   you	   think	   it	   is	   proper	   when	   invitees	   bring	   expensive	   gifts	   or	   money	   to	   a	   birthday	  celebration?	  3. Do	  you	  think	  it	   is	  correct	  when	  a	  birthday	  party	  is	  given	  to	  school-­‐age	  or	  younger	  children	  and	  adults	  are	  invited	  to	  the	  party?	  4. What	  new	  holidays	  would	  you	  propose	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  known	  traditional	  holidays?	  a. What	  is	  your	  opinion	  of	  crowded	  wedding	  celebrations:	  i. Is	  it	  necessary	  to	  fight	  against	  this?	  ii. What	   measures	   do	   you	   propose	   to	   prevent	   large-­‐scale	   wedding	  celebrations?	  iii. What	  number	  of	   invitees	  do	  you	  consider	  a	  moderate	  amount,	  which	  does	  not	  exceed:	  60	  persons,	  100	  persons,	  150	  persons,	  200	  persons,	  or	  more	  5. Do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  proper	  to	  arrange	  parties	  for:	  a. Completing	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  house	  [“putting	  a	  roof	  on	  a	  house,”	  CK]?	  b. Moving	  into	  a	  new	  apartment?	  c. Being	  called	  to	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  Soviet	  army?	  6. In	  the	  conditions	  of	  modern	  scientific-­‐technical	  progress,	  how	  do	  you	  explain	  the	  existence	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  population	  of	  a	  belief	  in	  God?	  a. Low	  level	  of	  awareness	  b. Weak	  mass-­‐political	  work	  c. Low	  level	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  atheistic	  propaganda	  d. 	  Other	  reasons	  (specify)	  7. If	  you	  have	  heard	  of	  fate,	  what	  is	  your	  opinion	  toward	  this?	  Is	  there	  someone	  in	  your	  village	  who	  believes	  in	  it?	  Do	  you	  personally	  believe	  in	  it?	  8. Do	  you	  believe	  in	  dreams?	  9. Regarding	  cemetery	  facilities,	  what	  is	  your	  opinion:	  a. Do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  proper	  to	  richly	  and	  excessively	  arrange	  cemeteries?	  b. Does	  a	  careless,	  neglected,	  and	  unattended	  gravesite	  cause	  you	  ire?	  c. Do	   you	   think	   it	   is	   normal	   to	   prepare	   a	   burial	   place	   and	   its	   enclosure	   for	   a	   living	  person	  in	  advance?	  10. Do	  you	  believe	  in	  the	  treatments	  of	  a	  fortuneteller,	  sorcerer,	  or	  by	  charms?	  11. Do	  you	  believe	  in	  miracles?	  12. What	  do	  you	  think	  is	  your	  duty	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  antiquated	  customs?	  13. What	  is	  your	  opinion	  about	  new	  traditions?	  a. Is	  it	  advisable	  to	  hold	  harvest	  or	  labor	  holidays	  every	  year?	  b. Do	  you	  consider	  it	  appropriate	  to	  celebrate	  middle-­‐	  and	  high	  school	  graduates	  with	  periodic	  meetings?	  c. In	  your	  memory,	  how	  many	  people	  retired	  from	  your	  place	  of	  work	  and	  received	  a	  retirement	  party?	  What	  were	  their	  names?	  d. Does	   education	   level	   impact	   the	   younger	   generation	   in	   whether	   high	   school	  graduation	  diploma	  and	  passport	  issuance	  justifies	  having	  a	  party?	  e. Would	  it	  be	  justified	  in	  our	  district’s	  condition	  to	  hold	  flower	  and	  song	  holidays?	  f. Do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  mark	  a	  child’s	  birthdays	  with	  festivities?	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  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  339,	  ll.	  38-­‐39.	  All	  questions	  ask	  for	  yes	  or	  no	  answers,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  
	   253	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  plethora	  of	  examples	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  “harmful	  traditions	  and	  rituals”	  and	  “survivals	  of	  the	  past,”	  anonymous	  polling	  conducted	  by	  the	  Council	  of	   Public	   Opinion	   claimed	   that	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   population	   viewed	   as	   negative	  such	   practices	   as	   the	   funeral	   feast	   (k’elexi),	   lavish	   wedding	   gifts,	   and	   underage	  marriage	  (admittedly,	  a	  diverse	  spectrum	  in	  its	  own	  right).	  Among	  5,529	  residents	  polled	   in	   Abkhazia,	   Ajaria,	   K’ut’aisi,	   and	   the	   K’art’li	   region,	  more	   than	   70	   percent	  viewed	   as	   “abnormal	   the	   current	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   this	   sphere”	   and	   called	   for	  making	  “significant	  changes	  to	  the	  content	  and	  interpretation	  of	  many	  traditions	  of	  the	   past.”	   A	   similar	   survey	   of	   559	   residents	   in	   South	  Ossetia	   AO	   found	   that	  more	  than	  73	  percent	  of	   those	  polled	  were	  against	  “outmoded,	  harmful	  rituals,	  customs,	  and	  holidays.”575	  	  While	  it	  seems	  that	  these	  figures	  were	  for	  internal	  use	  only	  –	  that	  is,	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  and	  its	  departments	  –	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  evaluate	  the	   representativeness	   of	   such	   public	   opinion	   polling.	   The	   purpose	   behind	   the	  polling,	  reporting,	  and	  research	  was	  to	  illustrate	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  current	  state	   of	   affairs	   in	   the	   republic	  with	   regard	   to	   “harmful	   traditions	   and	   rituals”	   and	  “survivals	   of	   the	   past”	   so	   that	   the	   CC	   could	   develop	   its	   policies	   and	   propaganda	  efforts	   accordingly.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   throughout	   reporting	   and	   in	   the	   polling	  figures	  above,	  authors	  suggested	  that	  the	  acceptance	  of	  flagrant	  “survivals”	  was	  an	  exception	  rather	  than	  a	  rule	  among	  Georgia’s	  citizenry.	  	  Such	  a	  tack	  likely	  contained	  more	  propaganda	  value	  than	  a	  perhaps	  honest	  admission	  that	  “harmful	  traditions”	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  i	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  vvedenii	  novykh	  –	  sovetskikh,	  sotsialisticheskikh,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  49,	  d.	  451,	  l.	  27.	  
	   254	  were	   so	   widespread	   as	   to	   be	   nearly	   impossible	   to	   overcome.	   Moreover,	   even	   if	  public	  opinion	  researchers	  endeavored	  to	  provide	  a	  true	  snapshot	  of	  public	  opinion,	  their	   intentions	   did	   not	   guarantee	   that	   anonymous	   survey	   respondents	   would	  answer	  truthfully.	  	  In	  a	  1983	  interview	  in	  Izvestiia,	  head	  of	  the	  Study	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Teimuraz	  M.	  Jafarli	  highlighted	  the	  impact	  of	  research	  conducted	  by	  the	  institute	  pertaining	  to	  the	   campaign	   against	   harmful	   traditions.	   Appropriating	   and	   revising	   “national”	  traditions	  required	  policymakers	  and	  ideological	  workers	  to	  more	  fully	  understand:	  frank	   judgments	   of	   those	   who	   still	   did	   everything	   by	   following	   the	  bandwagon,	   sometimes	   painfully	   clashing	   with	   conscience	   and	  undermining	   the	   family	   budget.	   And	   so?	   74	   percent	   of	   respondents	  recognized	   the	   developing	   situation	   as	   intolerable.	   It	   suggests	   the	  conclusion	   that	   evil	   persists	   through	   the	   efforts	   of	   a	   few.	   However,	  additional	   details,	   polling,	   revealed	   that	   many	   of	   those	   who	  condemned	  harmful	  practices	  in	  these	  surveys	  (sincerely	  condemned,	  as	   the	   surveys	   were	   anonymous),	   continue	   to	   abide	   by	   them	   in	  practice...576	  	  Jafarli’s	  assessment	  touched	  upon	  the	  aforementioned	  caveats	  and	  challenges	  faced	  by	  public	  opinion	  researchers	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  translate	  their	  data	  into	  policy.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   results	   of	   the	   Council’s	   work	  with	   the	   campaign,	   as	   noted	   by	   Jafarli,	  included	   the	   replacement	   of	   the	   religious	   holiday	   “Šuamt’oba”	   (celebrated	   among	  highlanders)	  with	  non-­‐religious	  rituals	  for	  children’s	  name	  days,	  and	  celebration	  of	  gold	  and	  silver	  wedding	  anniversaries.	  He	  also	   lauded	   the	  creation	  of	  Tbilisi’s	   city	  “name	   day”	   celebration,	   t’bilisoba	   (discussed	   below)	   and	   establishment	   of	   new	  rituals	  at	  the	  soldiers’	  home	  in	  Axmet’a,	  both	  which	  served	  to	  increase	  and	  unify	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  576	  T.	  Chanturiia,	  “Po	  nashemu	  mneniiu,”	  Izvestiia	  (21	  August	  1983),	  p.	  2.	  
	   255	  “spiritual	   life	   of	   the	   republic.”577	  The	   results	   of	   the	   campaign	   soon	   bore	   a	   more	  physical	   manifestation:	   a	   huge,	   brutalist	   “Palace	   of	   Rituals”	   on	   the	   banks	   of	   the	  Mtkvari	   River	   (east	   of	   old	   Tbilisi)	   that	   incorporated	   elements	   of	   Georgian	  ecclesiastical	  architecture	  in	  a	  modernist	  guise	  and	  was	  opened	  during	  t’bilisoba	  in	  1984.	  The	  new	  venue	  addressed	  the	  need	  expressed	  during	  the	  campaign	  for	  larger	  and	  better	   facilities	   for	  weddings	  and	  other	  ceremonies	   in	  Tbilisi.	   In	  spite	  of	   these	  achievements,	   even	   Jafarli	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   campaign	   against	   harmful	  traditions	  required	  a	  long-­‐term	  effort	  by	  the	  Party	  and	  its	  propagandists.	  
	  
Figure	  17:	  Tbilisi	  Palace	  of	  Rituals	  (ritualebis	  sasaxle),	  Architect	  Viktor	  Jorbenaże	  (1983-­‐4)	  
Source:	  Vladimer	  Shioshvili,	  2006	  	  The	  Party-­‐led	  effort	  to	  take	  public	  opinion	  into	  account	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  national	  traditions	  and	  Soviet	  modernity	  reflected	  the	  peculiar	  condition	  of	   the	  republic	  by	  the	  late	  1970s,	  when	  the	  national-­‐social	  contract	  reached	  its	  peak,	  as	  Chapter	  6	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 Ibid. 
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  show.	   	   Georgian	   Sovietness	   continued	   to	   be	   a	   process	   of	   negotiation	   and	  compromise	   between	   the	   practices	   of	   the	   republic’s	   citizens,	   the	   intentions	   of	  Georgian	   leadership,	   and	   Moscow-­‐led	   policies.	   This	   process	   of	   negotiation,	   the	  urban	  modernity	   of	   the	   Saburtalo	   project,	   and	   their	   contradictions	   contributed	   to	  the	  variety	  of	  national	  experience	  on	  display	  in	  Georgia	  during	  developed	  socialism.	  *	   *	   *	  	  	   On	   28	   October	   1979,	   Shevardnadze	   and	   Tbilisi	   City	   Committee	   First	  Secretary	  T’.	  N.	  Ment’ešašvili	  opened	  festivities	  at	  the	  inaugural	  t’bilisoba,	  a	  harvest	  festival	   celebrating	   the	   dedak’alak’i,	   its	   history,	   and	   its	   denizens. 578 	  Like	   its	  precursor	   two	   decades	   prior,	   the	   1,500-­‐year	   anniversary	   of	   Tbilisi’s	   founding	   in	  1958,	   t’bilisoba	   emphasized	   the	   city’s	   longevity	   and	   showcased	   a	   series	   of	  performances	   and	   construction	   projects	   for	   the	   occasion.	   	   Speeches	   by	   Party	   and	  cultural	   figures	  alternated	  with	  Georgian	  choral,	  dance,	  and	   theatre	  performances,	  and	   the	  bounty	  of	   the	   fall	  harvest	  was	  on	   full	  display	   for	  attendees.	  Yet	  unlike	   the	  festivities	   in	   1958,	   which	   presented	   a	   fusion	   of	   Tbilisi’s	   resilient	   past	   and	   Soviet	  future,	   t’bilisoba	   marked	   a	   return	   to	   an	   idealized	   and	   rural	   past,	   somewhat	  suspended	   in	   time.	   t’bilisoba	   celebrated	   “old	   Tbilisi”	   (rather	   than	   its	   Saburtalo	  modernity)	  and	  coincided	  with	  its	  revitalization	  campaign,	  from	  renovating	  the	  old	  city	   walls	   along	   Barat’ašvili	   Street	   to	   equipping	   individual	   residences	   with	   new	  facades	  and	  utilities.	  t’bilisoba	  was	  inaugurated	  as	  a	  city	  holiday	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  “campaign	   against	   harmful	   traditions,	   customs,	   ceremonies,	   holidays,	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  578	  t’bilisoba:	  ok’tombris	  dauvicqari	  dġe	  (Tbilisi:	  Sabčota	  Sak’art’velo,	  1981).	  The	  t’bilisoba	  holiday	  is	  still	   celebrated	   annually	   in	   September	   or	   October,	   though	   its	   late	   Soviet	   origins	   and	   links	   to	  Shevardnadze	  are	  deemphasized.	  I	  attended	  the	  festival	  in	  2012.	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  universal	  introduction	  of	  new	  –	  Soviet,	  socialist	  ones,”	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  a	  healthy	  and	   instructive	   expression	   of	   local	   and	   national	   pride.	   If	   the	   1958	   anniversary	  represented	   the	   aspirational	   Georgification	   of	   urban	   Tbilisi’s	   past,	   t’bilisoba	  projected	   a	   rural	   Georgian	   ideal	   on	   an	   urban	   landscape.	   Such	   a	   reinvention	   of	  tradition	   reflected	   the	   lessons	   learned	   in	   the	   ongoing	   campaign	   against	   harmful	  traditions;	   the	  expanding	  migration	  of	  rural	   residents	   to	   the	  city;	  and	   the	  mode	  of	  national	   imaginings	   of	   Georgian	   political	   and	   intellectual	   elites	   in	   the	   age	   of	  developed	  socialism.579	  Moscow	   was	   the	   international	   capital	   of	   the	   communist	   movement,	  Magnitogorsk	  the	  paradigm	  of	  building	  Soviet	  culture	  through	  industrialization,	  and	  Tashkent	  the	  “Moscow	  of	  the	  East”	  (and	  model	  for	  the	  third	  world),	  so	  what	  can	  we	  make	  of	  Tbilisi	  as	  a	  Soviet	  urban	  project	  and	  paradigm?580	  Unlike	  nearby	  Yerevan,	  whose	  symbolic	  geography	  (facing	  Mount	  Ararat)	  coalesced	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  and	  Tashkent,	  whose	  transformation	  was	  as	  much	  about	  altering	  the	  practices	  and	  identities	   of	   its	   residents	   as	   it	  was	   about	  built	   environment,	   Soviet	  Tbilisi’s	   urban	  scheme	  sought	  to	  make	  the	  republic’s	  capital	  truly	  national	  in	  theory	  (via	  narrative	  and	  showcase)	  and	  in	  practice	  (via	  migration	  and	  demographic	  change).581	  Further,	  unlike	   the	   view	   of	   some	   Uzbek	   residents,	   who	   viewed	   the	   “modernization”	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  579	  Eric	  Hobsbawm	  and	  Terence	  Ranger,	  eds.,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Tradition	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1983).	  	  580	  On	   these	   respective	   roles	   of	   Moscow,	   Magnitogorsk,	   and	   Tashkent,	   see	   Michael	   David-­‐Fox,	  
Showcasing	  the	  Great	  Experiment:	  Cultural	  Diplomacy	  and	  Western	  Visitors	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   (New	  York:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2012);	   Katerina	   Clark,	   Moscow,	   the	   Fourth	   Rome:	   Stalinism,	  
Cosmopolitanism,	   and	   the	   Evolution	   of	   Soviet	   Culture,	   1931-­‐1941	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	  Press,	  2011);	  Kotkin,	  Magnetic	  Mountain;	  and	  Stronski,	  Tashkent.	  581	  Lehmann,	  “Apricot	  Socialism,”	  14-­‐17;	  Stronski,	  Tashkent.	  
	   258	  Tashkent	   as	   merely	   transforming	   an	   Uzbek	   capital	   into	   a	   city	   for	   Russians,	   the	  “modernization”	  of	  Tbilisi	  entailed	  constructing	  new	  neighborhoods,	  preserving	  old	  ones,	  and	   increasing	  the	  number	  of	  Georgians	   inhabiting	  the	  capital.582	  Only	   in	   the	  late	  1970s	  did	  attention	   turn	   to	  revitalizing	   the	   façades	  of	  Old	  Tbilisi	  after	  several	  decades	  of	   intensive	   residential	   construction,	   and	  even	   this	  effort	  proved	  shallow:	  Old	  Tbilisi	  may	  have	  been	   the	   symbolic	   center	   of	   a	  Georgian	  nation,	   as	   presented	  since	  1958,	  yet	  the	  lived	  national	  capital	  of	  Soviet	  Georgia	  resided	  in	  Saburtalo,	  Vake,	  and	  its	  environs.	  	  In	   Tbilisi,	   the	   second-­‐	   and	   third-­‐generation	   Soviet	   citizens	   who	   built	   and	  inhabited	  Saburtalo	  participated	  in	  a	  larger	  process	  of	  urbanization	  and	  movement	  to	   modern,	   efficient	   forms	   of	   mass	   housing	   that	   transcended	   Soviet	   borders,	   as	  Steven	   Harris	   has	   shown.	   The	   Soviet	   khrushchevka	   solution	   to	   mass	   housing	   fit	  within	   a	   broader	   trajectory	   that	   had	   roots	   in	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   European	  social	   engineering	   aspirations,	   interwar	   international	   architectural	   collaboration,	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  modern	  welfare	  state	  in	  postwar	  Europe.583	  The	  Soviet	  empire	  of	   design	   and	   planning	   likewise	   exported	   its	   methods	   throughout	   the	   socialist	  world;	  and	  entered	  the	  new	  realm	  of	  Cold	  War	  competition	  in	  design	  and	  consumer	  culture.584	  Yet	   even	  with	   the	  ubiquitousness	  of	   the	  khrushchevka-­‐inspired	   solution	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  582	  Stronski,	  Tashkent,	  225.	  
583 Harris,	  Communism	  on	  Tomorrow	  Street,	  Chapters	  1-­‐2.	   
584 On	   the	   local	   and	   imperial	   dimensions	   of	   postwar	   socialist	   design,	   see	   Mëhilli,	   “The	   Socialist	  Design”;	  and	  on	  the	  corresponding	  impact	  on	  Moscow,	  Monica	  Rüthers,	  “Moskau	  als	  imperiale	  Stadt.	  Sowjetische	   Hauptstadtarchitektur	   als	   Medium	   imperialer	   Selbstbescreibung	   in	   vergleichender	  Perspektive,”	   Jahrbücher	   für	   Geschichte	   Osteuropas	   56,	   no.	   4	   (2008):	   481–506.	   On	   the	   design	   and	  consumer	   Cold	   War,	   see	   especially	   Greg	   Castillo,	   Cold	  War	   on	   the	   Home	   Front:	   The	   Soft	   Power	   of	  
Midcentury	  Design	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2010);	  and	  Susan	  E.	  Reid,	  “Who	  Will	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  to	  mass	  housing	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  empire,	  planners,	  architects,	  and	  officials	  still	  found	  ways	  to	  address	  specifically	  local	  agendas	  through	  urban	  planning,	  whether	  in	  Belgrade,	  Tbilisi,	  Tirana,	  Tashkent,	  Yerevan,	  or	  Prague.585	  	  Moreover,	   the	   story	   of	   Tbilisi’s	   nationalization	   fits	  within	   a	   larger	   story	   of	  postwar	  ethnic	  consolidation	  seen	  in	  the	  republics	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Soviet	  empire.	  Nationalized	  capitals	  and	  polities	  may	  have	  been	  an	  aspiration	  in	  the	  interwar	  period,	  whether	  in	  Poland,	  the	  Baltic	  states,	  Ukraine,	  Hungary,	  Romania,	  or	  the	   Republic	   of	   Georgia,	   but	   states	   and	   republics	   alike	   only	   realized	   such	  nationalization	   projects	   through	   Soviet/socialist	   population	   politics,	   urbanization,	  and	   responses	   to	   the	   postwar	   housing	   crisis.586	  The	   modern	   Lithuanian	   Vilnius,	  Ukrainian	  Lviv,	  and	  Georgian	  Tbilisi	  that	  emerged	  by	  the	  1970s	  from	  what	  had	  been	  multiethnic	   outposts	   of	   empire	   took	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   excision,	   construction,	   and	  national	   imagination	   to	   obtain	   (if	   paradoxically)	   through	   Soviet	   nationalizing	  institutions. 587 	  That	   this	   occurred	   in	   Tbilisi	   without	   the	   violence	   of	   war	   and	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   Whom?	   Soviet	   Popular	   Reception	   of	   the	   American	   National	   Exhibition	   in	   Moscow,	  1959,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  9,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2008):	  855-­‐904. 
585 On	  Belgrade,	  see	  Le	  Normand,	  Designing	  Tito’s	  Capital;	  on	  Tirana,	  Mëhilli,	   “The	  Socialist	  Design:	  Urban	  Dilemmas	  in	  Postwar	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union”;	  on	  Tashkent,	  Stronski,	  Tashkent,	  Chapters	  8-­‐9;	   on	   Yerevan,	   Lehmann,	   Eine	   sowjetische	   Nation,	   Chapter	   5;	   and	   on	   Prague,	   Kimberly	   Ellman	  Zarecor,	   Manufacturing	   a	   Socialist	   Modernity:	   Housing	   in	   Czechoslovakia,	   1945-­‐1960	   (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2011). 
586 Serhy	  Yekelchyk,	  Ukraine:	  Birth	  of	  a	  Modern	  Nation	  (Oxford ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007);	   Case,	   Between	   States;	   Timothy	   Snyder,	   The	   Reconstruction	   of	   Nations:	   Poland,	   Ukraine,	  
Lithuania,	   Belarus,	   1569-­‐1999	   (New	   Haven:	   Yale	   University	   Press,	   2003);	   and	   Padraic	   Kenney,	  Rebuilding	  Poland:	  Workers	  and	  Communists,	  1945-­‐1950	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1997).	   
587 Tarik	  Cyril	  Amar,	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Ukrainian	  Lviv:	  A	  Borderland	  City	  between	  Stalinists,	  Nazis,	  and	  
Nationalists	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2015);	  Snyder,	  The	  Reconstruction	  of	  Nations,	  Chapter	  5;	  and Violeta	  Davoliūtë,	  “Postwar	  Reconstruction	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Sublime	  in	  Vilnius	  during	  Late	  Stalinism,”	  Ab	  Imperio	  2014,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  176–203. 
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  occupation	   that	   transformed	   the	   western	   Soviet	   Union	   makes	   its	   nationalization	  even	  more	  striking.	  The	  burgeoning	  hegemony	  of	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  in	  its	  urban,	  developed	  socialist	  variant	  becomes	  apparent	  when	   looking	  at	   the	  experiences	  of	  Saburtalo’s	  inhabitants.	   At	   least	   in	   the	   field	   of	   housing,	   Georgian	   residents	   of	   Tbilisi	   did	   not	  appeal	   to	   their	  nationality	   for	   legitimacy	  because	   they	  did	  not	  need	  to	  –	  a	  marked	  contrast	   to	   other	   arenas	   of	   discourse	   (such	   as	   language	   rights,	   territory,	   and	  memory	   of	   Stalin)	   and	   in	   other	   locales	   (whether	   Abkhazia,	   minority-­‐dominant	  regions	   of	   Georgia,	   or	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  USSR).588	  Instead,	   a	   combination	   of	   Soviet	  citizenship	  (and	  its	  attendant	  promises)	  and	  local	  or	  family	  ties	  provided	  the	  means	  to	   secure,	   upgrade,	   or	   expand	   housing	   opportunities	   in	   the	   republican	   capital.	  Advancing	   on	   the	   housing	   list,	   securing	   funding	   and	   materials	   for	   individual	  construction,	   keeping	   a	   series	   of	   apartments	  within	   an	   extended	   family	   unit,	   and	  using	   housing	   as	   political	   capital	   took	   advantage	   of	   working	   by	   Georgian	   norms	  within	  the	  Soviet	  institutional	  infrastructure.	  In	  her	  work	  among	  Georgian	  villagers	  in	   1970s	   Rača,	   Dragadze	   observed	   the	   central	   role	   of	   the	   family	   for	   villagers’	  interaction	  with	   and	   promotion	  within	   Soviet	   institutions.	   This	   occurred	   not	   only	  because	   “to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   the	   family	   has	   retained	   its	   autonomy	   and,	   given	   the	  political	  conditions	  in	  Georgia,	  it	  can	  promote	  national	  culture,”	  but	  also	  because:	  It	   is	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  domestic	  unit,	  kinship	  network,	  and	  marriage	  patterns,	  from	  which	  villagers	  are	  able	  to	  derive	  the	  greatest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  588	  Erik	  R.	  Scott’s	  work	  on	  the	  USSR	  as	  an	  “empire	  of	  diasporas”	  emphasizes	   this	   latter	  example	  of	  Georgian	  political,	   culture,	   and	   trade	  networks	  outside	  Georgia,	   forthcoming	  as	  Familiar	  Strangers:	  
The	   Georgian	  Diaspora	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   	   He	   introduces	   some	   of	   these	   themes	   in	   Scott,	   “Edible	  Ethnicity."	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  benefits	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Georgian	   state,	   in	   their	   opinion.	   Kinship	  relations	  provide	  the	  recruiting	  principle	  for	  establishing	  a	  network	  of	  dependable	   allies…[T]hese	   factors	   enable	   villagers	   to	   obtain	   favors,	  the	   most	   important	   of	   which	   are	   information,	   hospitality,	   loans,	  recommendations,	  and	  help	  with	  residence	  permits.589	  	  While	  one	  should	  not	  uncritically	  transpose	  conclusions	  from	  a	  rural	  fieldwork	  site	  onto	  an	  urban	  landscape,	  the	  migration	  of	  rural	  residents	  to	  Tbilisi	  meant	  that	  rural	  communities	   likewise	   became	   more	   closely	   linked	   to	   urban	   counterparts	   and	  continued	  to	  rely	  upon	  local	  networks	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  advantage.590	  	  Georgian	   hegemony	   in	   developed	   socialist	   Tbilisi	   revealed	   the	   contours	   of	  Sovietness	  and	  debates	  about	  urban	  and	  rural	  belonging	  and	  behavior.	  In	  this	  sense,	  postwar	  Tbilisi	  resembles	  the	  Moscow	  “peasant	  metropolis”	  of	   the	  1930s	  depicted	  by	   David	   Hoffman,	   in	   which	   new	   urban	   denizens	   constructed	   their	   own	   social	  identities	  and	  worldviews	  somewhere	  between	   their	  peasant	  pasts,	   the	  designs	  of	  Soviet	  leaders,	  and	  the	  customs	  of	  native	  Muscovites.591	  In	  his	  work	  on	  post-­‐Soviet	  Tbilisi,	  Paul	  Manning	  has	  noted	  the	  “inherited	  cultural	  division	  between	  tbiliseli	  and	  provincial	   Georgian	   villagers”	   in	   political	   fault	   lines	   of	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	  1990s.592	  These	   distinctions	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   most	   dramatically	   from	   the	   1950s	  through	   the	   1970s,	   as	   Saburtalo	   grew	   and	   villagers	   became	   Tbilisians.	   This	  transition	  was	  not	  without	  its	  tensions,	  as	  “The	  status	  distinction	  and	  corresponding	  behavioral	  distinctions	  between	  villagers	  and	  city-­‐dwellers	  under	  socialism	  was,	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  589	  Dragadze,	  Rural	  Families	  in	  Soviet	  Georgia,	  45,	  99.	  590	  Parsons,	   “National	   Integration	   in	  Soviet	  Georgia”;	   and	  Mars	  and	  Altman,	   “The	  Cultural	  Bases	  of	  Soviet	  Georgia’s	  Second	  Economy”	  suggest	  a	  similar	  association	  between	  local	  and	  familial	  networks	  and	  socioeconomic	  capital.	  
591 David	  L.	  Hoffman,	  Peasant	  Metropolis:	  Social	  Identities	  in	  Moscow,	  1929-­‐1941	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1994). 592	  Manning,	  “City	  of	  Balconies.”	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  such	   cyclically	   urban-­‐rural	   Georgians,	   converted	   into	   a	   stylistic	   distinction,	   with	  behaviors	   acceptable	   in	   the	   village	   strongly	   sanctioned	   in	   the	   city.”593	  Yet	   such	  urban-­‐rural	   behavioral	   distinctions	   were	   not	   always	   so	   clear,	   as	   the	   detailed	  reporting	  from	  the	  campaign	  against	  harmful	  traditions	  showed.	  Indeed,	  Mžavanaże	  and	   his	   clients	   were	   viewed	   as	   the	   most	   flagrant	   exhibitors	   of	   such	   outmoded	  practices	  which,	   in	  spite	  of	   the	  political	  value	  of	  such	  an	  attack,	  also	  demonstrates	  the	   extent	   of	   Mžavanaże’s	   own	   successful	   transition	   from	   Georgian	   social	   and	  political	   outsider	   in	   the	   early	   1950s	   to	   patron-­‐in-­‐chief	   by	   the	   early	   1970s.	  Shevardnadze’s	  political	  credibility	  with	  Moscow	  lay	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  purge	  Georgia	  of	  Mžavanaże’s	  allegedly	   corrupting	   influence.	   In	  practice,	  however,	   Shevardnadze	  found	   himself	   in	   a	   constant	   state	   of	   negotiation	   and	   compromise	   between	   the	  interests	  and	  practices	  of	  his	  entitled	  national	  citizenry	  and	  central	  Soviet	  political	  agendas.	  The	  breadth	  of	  the	  national-­‐social	  contract	  in	  the	  1970s	  meant	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  politics	  (as	  Chapter	  6	  will	  show)	  Shevardnadze	  was	  able	  to	  emphasize	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  former.	  As	   Tbilisi	   inhabitants	   reshaped	   the	   contours	   of	   Soviet	   Georgian	  modernity,	  they	   fused	   elements	   of	   Soviet	   mass	   housing	   and	   urban	   development;	   urban	   and	  rural	   behaviors	   and	   networks;	   and	   narratives	   of	   tradition	   and	   modernity.	   The	  “Tbilisi	   myth”	   was	   the	   aspiration	   of	   an	   eternally	   Georgian	   city	   that	   was	   also	   the	  cradle	  of	  a	   timeless,	  unified	  Georgian	  nation.	  Yet	  Georgian	  Tbilisi	  became	  a	  reality	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  Ibid.	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  only	  through	  development	  of	  new	  districts	  in	  the	  postwar	  Soviet	  era	  and	  migration	  of	  Georgian	  villagers	  to	  the	  growing	  capital.	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Chapter	  5:	  What	  Makes	  a	  (Soviet)	  Georgian?	  
The	  Campaigns	  for	  Fereydan	  and	  Saingilo	  
In	   February	   1963,	   a	   group	   of	   prominent	   Georgian	   officials	   and	   academics	  appealed	  to	  Georgian	  CP	  CC	  First	  Secretary	  Vasil	  Mžavanaże	  on	  behalf	  of	  Georgian-­‐speaking	   communities	   in	   the	   Fereydan	   region	   of	   Iran,	   arguing	   “The	   only	   hope	   of	  Fereydanis	   torn	   by	   force	   from	   the	   homeland	   is	   that	   a	   ‘great	   Georgia’	   exists,	   the	  Georgian	  people,	  who	  pay	  attention	  to	  them	  and	  will	  save	  them	  from	  the	  suffering	  they	   experience	   in	   a	   foreign	   land.”594	  Urging	  Mžavanaże	   to	   take	  up	   this	   cause,	   the	  signatories	  emphasized	  the	  “great	  historical	  significance”	  of	  a	  repatriation	  campaign	  and	   noted	   that	   it	   would	   simultaneously	   “increase	   our	   people’s	   love	   and	   respect	  toward	  the	  native	  (mšobliuri)	  Communist	  party.”595	  	  As	  demonstrated	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	  Georgian	  authorities	   and	  citizens	  mobilized	  a	  variety	  of	  state	  institutions	  to	  more	  fully	  nationalize	  the	  republic	  in	  the	  postwar	  era,	  whether	  in	  the	  physical	  landscape	  of	  Tbilisi;	  the	  nationality	  of	  citizens	  who	  inhabited	  it;	  or	  the	  negotiation	  of	  national	  cultural	  practices.	  This	  process	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  republic	  itself.	  Parallel	  efforts	  to	  define	  Georgianness	  beyond	  the	  borders	   of	   the	   republic	   similarly	   employed	   such	   Soviet	   institutions	   to	   pursue	  nation-­‐building	  goals	  and,	  in	  essence,	  attempt	  to	  promote	  and	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  Georgians	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR	  and	  abroad.	  Georgians	  were	  the	  least	  diasporic	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  I.	  Mik’elaże,	  G.	   Jabua,	  T’.	  Davit’aia,	  G.	  Gvelasiani,	   and	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  Aslanikašvili,	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  Mžavanaże,	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  February	  1963,	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  (II)),	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  329,	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  Ibid.,	  l.	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  nationality	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  their	  Armenian	  neighbors.596	  Still,	   Georgian	   officials	   and	   citizens	   pursued	   a	   spectrum	   of	   contact	   with	   their	  diaspora	  that	  ranged	  from	  support	  for	  Georgian-­‐language	  education	  to	  repatriation.	  These	   projects	   more	   broadly	   illustrate	   the	   negotiation	   of	   national	   and	   state	  identities	  through	  the	  connective	  mechanisms	  of	  Soviet	  empire.	  	  Two	   trajectories	   in	  particular	  delineate	   the	  bounds	  of	   official	  Georgianness	  as	   articulated	   in	   the	   postwar	   period.	   The	   first	   was	   a	   Party-­‐led	   effort	   to	   aid	   and	  eventually	   repatriate	   ethnic	  Georgians	   in	   the	  Fereydan	   region	  of	   Iran.	  The	   second	  emerged	  as	  a	  call	  for	  minority	  rights	  by	  local	  activists	  on	  behalf	  of	  Georgians	  living	  in	   northwest	   Azerbaijan,	   an	   area	   known	   to	   Georgians	   as	   Saingilo.	   These	   efforts	  shared	  a	  similar	  chronology	  but	  also	  contained	   important	  asymmetries:	  one	  was	  a	  campaign	  within	  the	  USSR,	  stimulated	  by	  a	  local	  diaspora,	  and	  the	  other	  an	  effort	  to	  reach	   a	   diaspora	   population	   abroad,	   motivated	   by	   Party	   leaders	   in	   Tbilisi.	   The	  realities	  of	  Soviet	  federalism	  and	  Cold	  War	  geopolitics	  complicated	  the	  realization	  of	  campaign	   proponents’	   main	   goals.	   Furthermore,	   they	   represent	   two	   postwar	  applications	  of	  Terry	  Martin’s	  so-­‐called	  “Piedmont	  Principle,”	  or	  the	  “Soviet	  attempt	  to	   exploit	   cross-­‐border	   ethnic	   ties	   to	   project	   political	   influence	   into	   neighboring	  states.”597	  While	   Martin	   restricts	   this	   concept	   to	   the	   korenizatsiia	   era,	   Georgian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  596	  By	  1970,	  97	  percent	  of	  Georgians	  in	  the	  USSR	  lived	  in	  Georgia,	  with	  another	  two	  percent	   in	  the	  RSFSR.	  Armenians,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  the	  lowest	  percentage	  of	  entitled	  nationality	   living	  in	   its	  home	   republic	   (60	   percent	   in	   1970).	   See	   Suny,	   The	   Making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation,	   299.	   While	  Georgians	   themselves	   largely	   remained	   in	   Georgia,	   Georgian	   culture	   enjoyed	   greater,	   pan-­‐Union	  proliferation	   through	   Soviet	   sponsorship.	   On	   this	   process	   and	   Georgian	   cuisine,	   see	   Scott,	   “Edible	  Ethnicity."	  597 	  Terry	   Martin	   refers	   in	   particular	   to	   attempts	   in	   the	   1920s	   to	   lure	   Ukrainians	   in	   Poland,	  Czechoslovakia,	   and	   Romania	   to	   Soviet	   Ukraine	   by	   example.	   Martin	   underscores	   that	   the	   foreign	  
	   266	  policies	  toward	  Fereydan	  and	  Saingilo	  demonstrate	  a	  revival	  of	  this	  approach	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  The	  Georgian	  SSR	  was	  an	  ethnoterritorial	  polity	  within	   the	  broader	   federal	  structure	  of	  the	  USSR.	  The	  legal	  fictions	  of	  Soviet	  federalism,	  including	  the	  extent	  of	  national	  autonomy,	  permitted	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  pursuit	  of	  extraterritorial	  projects	  motivated	  more	   by	   national	   than	   by	   solely	   socialist	   internationalist	   goals.	   	   At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	  structures	  of	  nationality	  constrained,	  by	  design,	  what	  nationalizers	  could	  achieve	  within	   the	  borders	  of	   the	  USSR,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  republics.	  Therefore,	  turning	  “peasants	  into	  Georgians,”	  to	  paraphrase	  Eugen	  Weber,	  proved	  a	  decidedly	  Soviet	   project,	   albeit	   one	   limited	   in	   the	   USSR	   to	   the	   territory	   of	   Georgia.598	  Once	  outside	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   this	   process	   even	   aspired	   to	   turn	   Iranian	  peasants	   into	  (Soviet)	  Georgians.	  	  Over	  time	  the	  indigenous	  vocabulary	  of	  nationality	  in	  some	  instances	  blurred	  and	  in	  others	  reified	  distinctions	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them,”	  homeland	  and	  diaspora,	  Soviet	   and	  national.	   Soviet	  officials	   charged	  with	   investigating	  and	  managing	  both	  efforts	  unsurprisingly	  portrayed	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  and	  the	  Ingilo	  according	  to	  Stalin’s	  highly	  objective	  definition	  of	  a	  nation	  as	  “an	  historically	  constituted,	  stable	  community	   of	   people,	   formed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   common	   language,	   territory,	  economic	   life,	   and	   psychological	   make-­‐up	   manifested	   in	   a	   common	   culture.”599	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  policy	  aims	  of	   the	  Piedmont	  Principle	  were	  an	  “exploitable	  benefit”	  of	  Soviet	  nationalities	  policy	   in	  border	   regions	   rather	   than	   the	   content	   of	   the	   policy	   itself.	   In	   Martin’s	   account,	   Soviet	   authorities	  abandoned	  the	  Piedmont	  Principle	  once	  cross-­‐border	  ethnic	  ties	  became	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  (leading	  up	  to	  World	  War	  Two)	  rather	  than	  an	  advantage,	  Martin,	  The	  Affirmative	  Action	  Empire,	  8-­‐9.	  	  598	  Weber,	  Peasants	  into	  Frenchmen.	  599	  Stalin,	  Marksizm	  i	  natsional’nyi	  vopros,	  51.	  	  
	   267	  Soviet	  “nation-­‐building”	  in	  the	  1920s	  privileged	  territoriality	  and	  language,	  with	  the	  latter	   often	   guiding	  where	   and	  how	  planners	   drew	  borders	   for	   the	   former.600	  The	  Fereydan	  and	  Saingilo	   cases	   illustrate	   an	   attempted	  application	  of	  nation-­‐building	  tools	   beyond	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   republic,	   refining	   the	   meaning	   of	   Georgia	   and	  Georgians	   in	   the	  process.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	  method	  of	   campaigns	   and	  petitions	  developed	  over	  three	  decades,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  individuals	  and	  groups	  articulated	   their	   grievances	   in	   a	   national	   idiom.	   Even	   if	   these	   campaigns	   bore	  minimal	   results	   at	   best,	   the	   intention	   and	   pursuit	   of	   the	   campaigns	   for	   Fereydan	  Georgians	  and	  Ingilo	  by	  Party	  leaders,	  Georgian	  citizens,	  and	  affected	  groups	  in	  Iran	  and	  Azerbaijan	  show	  the	  bounds	  of	  Georgianness	  in	  the	  postwar	  USSR	  as	  well	  as	  the	  range	  and	  limits	  of	  a	  national	  agenda	  within	  the	  structures	  of	  Soviet	  federalism.	  	  
Fereydan	  
	  
Figure	  18:	  Location	  of	  historical	  Fereydan	  region	  (in	  red)	  	  
Source:	  Iran	  map	  from	  Perry	  Castañeda	  Map	  Collection,	  The	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  600	  Smith,	  Red	  Nations,	   73,	   90;	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations;	   and	   Slezkine,	   “The	  USSR	   as	   a	   Communal	  Apartment.”	  
	   268	  	  	   In	   the	   early	   seventeenth	   century,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   conquest	   of	   Georgian	  lands	   by	   the	   Safavid	   Empire’s	   Shah	   Abbas	   I,	   as	   many	   as	   one	   hundred	   thousand	  people	  were	  resettled	  from	  Georgia	  to	  Iran.601	  These	  populations	  settled	  in	  several	  provinces,	   including	   Gilian,	  Mazandaran,	   Fars,	   Khorasan,	   Isfahan,	   and	   Fereydan,	   a	  rural	   region	  approximately	  150	  kilometers	  west	  of	   the	   imperial	   capital	   at	   Isfahan.	  Unlike	   in	   other	   locales,	   the	   Georgian	   population	   in	   Fereydan	   preserved	   their	  language	  in	  the	  face	  of	  neighboring	  Bakhtiari	  and	  Turkic	  populations,	  conversion	  to	  Islam,	   and	   increasing	   centralization	   and	   Persianization	   of	   the	   Safavid	   and,	   then,	  Iranian	   state.602	  The	   Georgian	   “colonies”	   in	   Fereydan	   allegedly	   served,	   in	   Shah	  Abbas’s	   intention,	   not	   only	   to	  weaken	   the	   conquered	   lands	   in	   Kaxet’i,	   but	   also	   to	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  While	   the	   typical	   Georgian	   narrative	   holds	   that	   these	   populations	   were	   forcibly	   resettled	  Christian	  peasants	  from	  Kaxet’i,	  in	  eastern	  Georgia,	  Babak	  Rezvani	  presents	  an	  alterative	  scenario	  in	  which	   the	  Georgians	  were	   actually	  mountain	  nobility	   (from	   the	  T’ianet’i	   region)	  who	   converted	   to	  Islam	  while	  still	  in	  Georgia	  and	  were	  brought	  to	  Iran	  for	  their	  military	  prowess.	  Babak	  Rezvani,	  “The	  Islamization	   and	   Ethnogenesis	   of	   the	   Fereydani	   Georgians,”	  Nationalities	   Papers	   36,	   no.	   4	   (2008):	  593–623.	  My	  purpose	   in	   this	  chapter	   is	  not	   to	  debate	   the	  actual	  origins	  of	   this	  group	  but	  rather	   to	  analyze	   the	   case	   in	   the	   Soviet-­‐era	   imagination	   of	   Georgians	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR.	   The	   lived	  experiences	  of	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  in	  Iran	  may	  indeed	  depart	  from	  Soviet	  protagonists'	  portrayals	  of	  them,	  as	  Rezvani	  shows	  through	  extensive	  interviews	  in	  Iran	  and	  Georgia,	  but	  I	  focus	  my	  attention	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Georgian	  perspective.	  See	  also	  Rezvani,	  “Iranian	  Georgians:	  Prerequisites	  for	  a	  Research,”	  
Iran	   and	   the	   Caucasus	   13	   (2009):	   197–204;	   and	   Ethno-­‐Territorial	   Conflict	   and	   Coexistence	   in	   the	  
Caucasus,	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Fereydan	  (Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  602	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  community	  as	  “Fereydan	  Georgians”	  (p’ereidneli	  k’art’velebi)	  in	  this	  chapter,	  though	  Imperial-­‐	   and	   Soviet-­‐era	   sources	   invoked	   a	   variety	   of	   terms	   for	   this	   group,	   including	   Iranian	  Georgians	   and	   Fereydanis.	   The	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   have	   received	   little	   scholarly	   attention,	  particularly	   in	   English-­‐language	   works.	   For	   Soviet-­‐era	   Georgian-­‐language	   works	   on	   Fereydan,	   see	  Giorgi	   Čipašvili,	   p’ereidneli	   k’art’velebi	   (Tbilisi:	   Sabčota	   Sak’art’velo,	   1963);	   Zurab	   Šarašeniże,	  
p’ereidneli	   “gurjebi”	   (Tbilisi:	   Mec’niereba,	   1979);	   and	   Zurab	   Šarašeniże,	   axali	   masalebi	   p’ereidneli	  
k’art’velebis	  šesaxeb	   (Tbilisi:	  Mec’niereba,	   1969).	   Produced	  under	   the	   auspices	  of	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  Academy	   of	   Sciences,	   these	   works	   comprise	   ethnographic	   studies	   of	   Georgian	   communities	   in	  Fereydan	   in	   the	   Soviet	   ethnographic	   tradition.	   The	   re-­‐emergence	   (after	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s)	   of	  scholarly	   output	   on	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   reflects	   both	   the	   Georgian	   Party	  impetus	   and	   increasing	   popular	   awareness	   of	   and	   interest	   in	   these	   communities	   among	   Soviet	  Georgians.	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  manage	   and	   mollify	   local	   disputes	   and	   threats	   among	   Bakhtiaris	   and	   “Turks”	  already	  residing	  in	  Fereydan.603	  	  According	   to	   a	   1974	   report	   prepared	   by	   the	   Georgian	   Central	   CC’s	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Relations,	  when	  the	  Pahlavi	  dynasty	  took	  power	  in	  1926,	  the	  new	  leaders	  sought	  to	  create	  an	  ethno-­‐national	  state	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  “One	  nation,	   one	   government.”	   For	   ethnic	   Georgians	   and	   other	   non-­‐Persian	   Muslim	  populations,	   this	   meant	   a	   policy	   of	   assimilation.	   For	   Georgians	   in	   Iran,	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  Soviet	  Georgian	  officials,	  these	  policies	  allegedly	  generated	  feelings	  of	  tribal	  and	  linguistic	  unity	  and	  strengthened	  ties	  to	  and	  interest	  in	  Georgia	  proper.604	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Georgian	  interest	  in	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  had	  a	  slightly	  earlier	  manifestation.	  Multiple	   Soviet	   reports	   from	  various	  decades	   regularly	   cited	  writer	  and	   activist	   Lado	   Agniašvili’s	   trips	   to	   Fereydan	   in	   1896	   as	   the	   earliest	   Georgian	  activity	   in	   the	   region.	   Broader	   Georgian	   interest	   in	   the	   Fereydan	   Georgians	  (p’ereidneli	   k’art’velebi)	   coincided	   with	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Georgian	   national	  movement	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century.	   The	   developing	   Georgian	   national	  intelligentsia	   began	   to	   think	   about	   populations	  with	  Georgian	   origins	   primarily	   in	  Turkey	  but	  also	  in	  Iran.605	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  603	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	  i	  prozhivanie),”	  21	  May	  1974,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	  l.	  2.	  Written	  to	  capture	  the	  entire	  scope	  of	  the	  Fereydan	  campaign,	  including	  its	  pre-­‐Soviet	  roots,	  this	  report	  reveals	  much	  about	  how	   Soviet	   Georgian	   institutional	   actors	   understood	   this	   long-­‐term	   effort	   and	   how	   they	   reflected	  upon	  its	  successes	  and	  failures.	  604	  Ibid.,	  l.	  3.	  605	  Fereydan	  immigrants	  to	  Tbilisi	  such	  as	  Iotam	  Onikašvili	  (1871),	  Kolam	  Reza	  Xuc’išvili	  and	  Kolam	  Xossein	   Onikašvili	   (1896),	   I.	   Čeišvili	   (1900),	   and	   Seifola	   Ioseliani	   (1921)	   shed	   further	   light	   on	   the	  Fereydan	  link	  to	  Georgia,	  Ibid.,	  l.	  12.	  	  
	   270	  Known	   in	   Iran	   as	   “gurji,”	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   purportedly	   comprised	   a	  population	  of	  around	  twenty	  thousand,	  spread	  across	  twelve	  to	  thirteen	  villages	  in	  the	  region.606	  Officially,	  all	  Georgian	  villages	  in	  Fereydan	  had	  Iranian	  names,	  but	  the	  local	   residents	   reportedly	   referred	   to	   their	   villages	   by	  Georgian	   names	   –	  many	   of	  which	  were	  named	  after	  villages	  in	  Kaxet’i.	  Georgian	  officials	  and	  scholars	  regularly	  cited	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians’	  preservation	  of	  their	  native	  language	  as	  a	  key	  marker	  of	  nationality,	  yet	  the	   level	  of	   language	  preservation	  varied	  between	  residents	  and	  villages	   in	  Fereydan.	  The	   Iranian	  state	  allegedly	   forbade	  speaking	   in	  Georgian	  and	  confiscated	   Georgian	   books.	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   in	   Axora	   Bala	   (Zemo	   Martqop’i	   in	  Georgian)	   nearly	   the	   entire	   population	   (especially	   women	   and	   children)	   spoke	  Georgian;	   in	   Dombei	   Kamar	   (T’oreli/T’elavi	   in	   Georgian)	   not	   only	   Georgians,	   but	  also	  non-­‐Georgian	  residents	  communicated	  in	  Georgian.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  other	  villages,	  residents	  had	  forgotten	  their	  “native	  language”	  and	  instead	  communicated	  in	   Farsi,	   Turkish,	   or	   Kurdish.	   Most	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   were	   illiterate	   (only	   an	  estimated	   20-­‐30	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   male	   population	   was	   literate),	   and	   literacy	   in	  Georgian	   was	   even	   more	   rare.	   Schools	   in	   general,	   and	   particularly	   Georgian-­‐language	  schools,	  were	  exceedingly	  rare,	  as	  were	  medical	  facilities	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Unlike	   language,	   religion	   proved	   a	  more	  malleable	   national	  marker.607	  The	  “gurji”	   population	   converted	   en	  masse	   to	   Islam	  beginning	   in	   the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century,	  not	  long	  after	  their	  arrival	  in	  Iran,	  when	  Georgian	  churches	  were	  destroyed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  606	  This	  number	  is	  considerably	  smaller	  than	  the	  approximately	  100,000	  Georgians	  initially	  resettled	  to	  Iran	  because	  that	  number	  included	  those	  who	  settled	  in	  locales	  other	  than	  Fereydan.	  607	  “Iranskie	  gruziny	  (kratkaia	  spravka,”	  A.F.	  Aslanikašvili,	  18	  February	  1963,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	  d.	  329,	  ll.	  12-­‐18.	  I	  examine	  Aslanikašvili	  in	  greater	  detail	  below.	  
	   271	  and	   church	   property	   confiscated	   by	   the	   state.608	  Other	   than	   language	   and	   village	  names,	   Soviet	   Georgian	   advocates	   believed	   that	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   maintained	  Georgian	  and	  Christian	  qualities	   in	  daily	   life	   and	   customs.	  Only	   in	  Fereydan	   could	  one	  reportedly	  find	  Georgian-­‐style	  houses	  with	  flat	  roofs	  and	  carved	  columns	  in	  the	  rooms,	  which	   differed	   from	   Iranian	   homes	  with	   domed	   roofs.	   Living	   spaces	  were	  sparsely	   furnished,	   and	  not	   all	   villages	   had	   a	   bathhouse.	   Furthermore,	   a	  Georgian	  man	  would	  not	  marry	  an	  Iranian	  woman	  and	  vice	  versa.	  According	  to	  a	  1963	  report,	  even	  those	  who	  had	  forgotten	  their	  native	  language	  understood	  and	  knew	  that	  their	  ancestors	  were	  Georgian,	  “gurji”,	  and	  were	  proud	  of	  this.609	  	  Interest	  in	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  began	  during	  the	  tsarist	  and	  independent	  periods,	   though	   Soviet	   Georgian	   officials	   used	   newly-­‐created	   institutions	   to	   most	  actively	  pursue	  the	  Fereydan	  project.610	  As	  early	  as	  1923,	  the	  new	  Georgian	  Central	  Extraordinary	   Committee	   requested	   the	   People’s	   Commissar	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	  (PCFA)	  Chicherin	   to	   install	   a	  Georgian	   consul	  or	   secretary	   in	   Isfahan	  explicitly	   for	  work	  among	  “Persian	  Georgians”	  in	  Fereydan,	  whose	  “heroism”	  had	  preserved	  their	  “language,	   customs,	  and	  national	  outlook”	   to	   that	  point.611	  The	  PCFA	  did	  not	  grant	  this	   request,	   however,	   due	   to	   “serious	   considerations	   of	   an	   organizational	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  608	  “SPRAVKA	  o	   gruzinakh	   isfaganskoi	   provintsii	   Irana,”	   USSR	  Vice	   Consul	   to	   Iran	  Ashurov,	   9	   June	  1943,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  253,	  ll.	  46-­‐47.	  609	  “Iranskie	  gruziny	   (kratkaia	  spravka),”	  A.F.	  Aslanikašvili,	  18	  February	  1963,”	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	   d.	   329,	   ll.	   12-­‐18.	   Rezvani	   refutes	   such	   assessments	   of	   living	   conditions	   and	   practices	   among	  Fereydan	  Georgians,	  but	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  departure	  makes	  the	  narrative	  shaped	  by	  Soviet	  Georgian	  officials	  even	  more	  significant	  in	  articulating	  their	  aims	  and	  intentions	  with	  this	  campaign,	  Rezvani,	  “The	  Islamization	  and	  Ethnogenesis	  of	  the	  Fereydani	  Georgians.”	  610	  In	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   and	   early	   twentieth	   centuries,	   trade,	   economic	   migration,	   travel,	   and	  intellectual	   exchange	   between	   the	   Caucasus	   and	   Iran	   were	   common	   and	   frequent,	   Cronin,	   ed.,	  
Iranian-­‐Russian	  Encounters.	  611	  RSFSR	  PCFA	  to	  All-­‐Georgian	  Central	  Executive	  Committee	  (CEC)	  Chairman	  Ttsakaia,	  4	  May	  1923;	  All-­‐Georgian	  CEC	  to	  PCFA	  RSFSR	  Chicherin,	  April	  1923,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  163,	  ll.	  175-­‐178.	  	  
	   272	  character.”612 	  Georgian	   officials	   tried	   a	   different	   tack	   thereafter	   by	   requesting	  assistance	  funds	  for	  schools	  and	  medical	  services	   in	  Fereydan.613	  In	  1926,	  Ambako	  Č’eliże,	   a	   representative	   at	   the	   Soviet	   trade	  ministry	   in	   Iran,	   travelled	   among	   the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  and	  published	  p’ereidneli	  k’art’velebi	  upon	  his	  return	  to	  Tbilisi,	  where	  he	  also	  lectured	  frequently	  about	  his	  experiences	  in	  Fereydan.614	  At	  this	  time,	  among	  Georgians,	   “The	   popularity	   of	   Fereydan	   heated	   up,	   but	   even	   then	   signaled	  that	   the	   real	   Fereydanis	   were	   not	   those	   idealized	   faces	   that	   existed	   in	  representations	  of	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  Georgian	  public.”615	  Following	  the	  mixed	  success	  of	  attempts	   to	  aid	  Georgians	   in	  Fereydan	   in	   the	  1920s,	  however,	  outreach	  efforts	   halted	   for	   the	   next	   two	   decades.	   The	   cause	   for	   the	   diminished	   priority	   of	  Fereydan	  among	  Georgian	  officials	   in	   the	   late	  1920s	  to	   the	  1940s	  remains	  unclear	  (beyond	   failure	   to	   achieve	   sanction	   for	   these	   activities	   from	  Moscow	   and	   nation-­‐building	   priorities	   at	   home),	   though	   the	   new	   geopolitical	   climate	   of	   the	   early	  postwar	  era	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  revive	  this	  effort	  in	  a	  more	  concerted	  way.	  As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   as	  World	  War	   Two	   drew	   to	   a	   close,	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   established	   republic-­‐level	  ministries	   of	   foreign	   affairs	   (MFA)	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  obtain	   as	  many	   seats	   as	   possible	   (even	   if	   this	   goal	  was	   not	   achieved)	   at	   the	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  612	  RSFSR	  PCFA	  to	  All-­‐Georgian	  CEC	  Chairman	  Ttsakaia,	  4	  May	  1923,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  163,	  l.	  176.	  613	  Georgian	  SSR	  People’s	  Commissar	  of	  Enlightenment	  to	  Georgian	  CEC,	  6	  July	  1923,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  163,	  ll.	  180-­‐181.	  614	  Ambako	   Č’eliże,	   p’ereidneli	   k’art’velebi,	   Reprint.	   (Tbilisi:	   Literaturis	  muzeumi,	   2011).	   Originally	  published	  in	  1935.	  615	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	   i	   prozhivanie),’”	   21	  May	  1974,”	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   17,	   op.	  52,	  d.	   678,	   l.	   13.	   Linguists	  Arnold	  Čikobava	   and	   Nikolai	   Marr	   of	   the	   Russian,	   Soviet,	   and	   then	   Georgian	   SSR	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	  likewise	  studied	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  1920s,	  in	  particular	  the	  Fereydan	  dialect	  of	  Georgian.	  
	   273	  United	   Nations.	   From	   1944,	   when	   the	   Georgian	  MFA	  was	   formed,	   this	   institution	  provided	   the	  main	   avenue	   through	  which	   to	   pursue	   projects	   in	   Fereydan,	   largely	  due	   to	   the	   proactive	   efforts	   of	   Foreign	   Minister	   Giorgi	   Kiknaże	   (in	   office	   1944-­‐1953).616	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  issues	  addressed	  by	  the	  Georgian	  MFA	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	   “Fereydan	   question,”	   which,	   at	   that	   point,	   primarily	   involved	   research	   and	  information	  gathering.617	  	  Kiknaże’s	  effort	   took	  advantage	  of	   the	  peculiar	  environment	  created	  by	   the	  Allied	  (Soviet,	  British,	  and	  US)	  occupation	  of	  Iran	  from	  1941-­‐1946.	  For	  the	  Soviets,	  the	   occupation	   included	   the	   support	   for	   the	   1945-­‐1946	   People’s	   Republic	   of	  Azerbaijan	  as	  well	  as	  support	  for	  the	  Iranian	  communist	  Tudeh	  party	  (established	  in	  1941).618	  In	   its	   initial	   iteration,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   view	   the	   Georgian	   interest	   in	  Fereydan	  as	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  Soviet	  effort	  to	  exploit	  ethnic	  and	  class	  fissures	  in	   Iran	   in	   a	   burgeoning	   Cold	  War	   atmosphere.	   The	   Cold	  War	   lens	   has	   dominated	  much	   of	   twentieth-­‐century	   historiography	   about	   Iran,	   which	   views	   British,	  American,	   and	  Russian/Soviet	   interests	   in	   Iran	   as	   part	   of	   a	   revived	   “Great	  Game.”	  This	   standard	   narrative	   portrays	   the	   Gilan	   Republic	   (1920-­‐1),	   the	   1945-­‐6	   Soviet	  occupation	  of	   Iranian	  Azerbaijan,	  and	  Soviet-­‐Tudeh	  relations	   in	  the	  1950s	  through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  616	  In	   this	   role,	   Kiknaże	  was	   also	   a	   key	   figure	   in	   the	   irredentist	   campaigns	   in	   Turkey	   discussed	   in	  chapter	   one.	   It	   is	   interesting,	   however,	   that	  while	   the	  Georgian	  MFA	  participated	   in	   the	   territorial	  irredentist	   claims	   in	   northeastern	   Turkey,	   I	   have	   found	   no	  mention	   of	   a	   repatriation	   effort	   of	   the	  Turkish	  Laz	  minority	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians.	  	  617	  For	  an	  early	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation,	  see	  “SPRAVKA	  o	  gruzinakh	  Isfaganskoi	  provintsii	  Irana,”	  26	  March	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  25,	  d.	  229,	  ll.	  14-­‐32.	  618	  On	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Azerbaijan	  and	  the	  “Azerbaijan	  crisis,”	  see	  Jamil	  Hasanli,	  At	  the	  Dawn	  
of	   the	   Cold	   War:	   The	   Soviet-­‐American	   Crisis	   Over	   Iranian	   Azerbaijan,	   1941-­‐1946	   (Lanham,	   MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2006).	  On	   the	  earlier,	   short-­‐lived	   “Gilan	  Republic”,	   see	  Cosroe	  Chaqueri,	  The	  
Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic	  of	  Iran,	  1920-­‐1921:	  Birth	  of	  the	  Trauma	  (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	   1995).	   On	   the	   social	   bases	   of	   the	   Tudeh	   party,	   see	   Ervand	   Abrahamian,	   Iran	   Between	   Two	  
Revolutions	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1982).	  
	   274	  1970s	  as	  attempts	  to	  subjugate	  parts	  of	  Iran	  to	  Soviet	  interests.619	  Iranian	  scholars	  such	  as	  Touraj	  Atabaki	  and	  Afshin	  Matin-­‐asgari	  have	  argued,	  more	  recently,	  that	  the	  People’s	   Republic	   of	   Azerbaijan	   was	   not	   simply	   an	   empty	   imposition	   by	   a	   great	  power	  but,	  rather,	  had	  some	  basis	  in	  local,	  popular	  grievances	  regarding	  Azerbaijani	  language	   and	   cultural	   rights	   and	   social	   reforms.620 	  Nevertheless,	   the	   Georgian	  advocates	   engaged	   in	   the	   Fereydan	   project	   seemed	   genuinely	   committed	   to	   this	  effort,	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  Soviet	  power	  play	  but	  as	  a	  project	  of	  national	  development	  for	  Georgians.	  In	   October	   1945,	   Kiknaże	   raised	   the	   Fereydan	   issue	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister	  V.M.	  Molotov,	  which	  highlighted	   the	  material	  difficulties	  endured	  in	   Fereydan	   and	   called	   for	   a	   Georgian	   government	   research	   expedition	   to	   better	  facilitate	   “brotherly	   aid”	   and	   further	   cultural	   relations	   between	   Georgia	   and	  Fereydan	   to	   benefit	   those	   20,000	   Fereydan	   Georgians	  who	   “to	   this	   point	   had	   not	  assimilated	  with	   the	   Iranian	  population	  and	   still	  maintained	   their	  native	   language	  and	   national	   particularity.”621	  Kiknaże	   also	   emphasized	   the	   need	   for	   a	   Georgian	  representative	   in	   the	   Soviet	   consulate	   in	   Isfahan	   to	   work	   among	   the	   Fereydan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  619	  For	  examples	  of	  this	  perspective,	  see	  George	  Lenczowski,	  Russia	  and	  the	  West	  in	  Iran,	  1918-­‐1948:	  
A	  Study	  in	  Big-­‐Power	  Rivalry	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1949)	  and	  Bruce	  Robellet	  Kuniholm,	  
The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Near	  East:	  Great	  Power	  Conflict	  and	  Diplomacy	  in	  Iran,	  Turkey,	  and	  
Greece,	   Revised	  Ed.	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	   1994).	  Hasanli,	  At	  the	  Dawn	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  and	  Louise	  L’estrange	  Fawcett,	  Iran	  and	  the	  Cold	  War:	  The	  Azerbaijan	  Crisis	  of	  1946	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992)	  adopt	  a	  similar	  view	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Azerbaijan	  Crisis.	  620	  See	  especially	  Touraj	  Atabaki,	  Azerbaijan:	  Ethnicity	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Power	  in	  Iran	  (New	  York:	  I.B.	   Tauris,	   2000);	   Afshin	   Matin-­‐asgari,	   “Marxism,	   Historiography	   and	   Historical	   Consciousness	   in	  Modern	   Iran:	  A	  Preliminary	   Study,”	   in	  Touraj	  Atabaki,	   ed.,	   Iran	   in	  the	  20th	  Century:	  Historiography	  
and	   Political	   Culture	   (New	   York:	   I.B.	   Tauris,	   2009):	   199-­‐232;	   and	   idem.	   “The	   Impact	   of	   Imperial	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  Qajar	  and	  Pahlavi	  Iran:	  Notes	  Toward	  a	  Revisionist	  Historiography,”	  in	  Cronin,	  ed.,	  Iranian-­‐Russian	  Encounters:	  11-­‐46..	  621	  Kiknaże	  to	  Molotov,	  1945,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  19,	  d.	  209,	  ll.	  44-­‐45.	  
	   275	  population.	   In	  February	  1946,	  Molotov	  authorized	  Kiknaże	   to	  establish	  a	  Georgian	  Society	   for	  Cultural	  Relations	  with	  Foreign	  Countries	   (GOKS),	  modeled	  on	   the	  All-­‐Union	  Society	   for	  Cultural	  Relations	  with	  Foreign	  Countries	   (VOKS)	  established	   in	  1925.622 	  GOKS	   would	   provide	   a	   further	   institution	   to	   promote	   relations	   with	  Fereydan	   Georgians	   through	   radio,	   literature,	   and	   music.	   This	   period	   (1945-­‐46)	  marked	   the	   high	   point	   of	   Soviet-­‐Iranian	   cultural	   relations,	   though	   scholars	   have	  emphasized	  the	  ethnicized	  nature	  of	  the	  effort,	  promoting	  Russian	  (or	  Azeri,	  Tajik,	  etc.)	  historical	  links	  to	  Iranian	  culture	  rather	  than	  a	  more	  appropriately	  proletarian	  internationalist	   form.623	  For	   this	   reason,	   Georgian	   cultural	   overtures	   to	   Iran	   could	  emphasize	  the	  national	  over	  the	  Soviet,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  muddle	  the	  distinction	  as	  was	   the	  case	  with	  Georgian-­‐language	  editions	  of	  Stalin’s	  works	  and	  biographies	  of	  Stalin	  sent	  to	  Fereydan.	  In	   Kiknaże’s	   telling,	   the	   20,000	   Georgians	   in	   Fereydan	   “preserved	   their	  native	  language	  and	  customs	  and	  continue	  to	  consider	  themselves	  Georgian,	  though	  the	  majority	  adopted	  the	  Muslim	  religion.”	  During	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War,	  Fereydan	  Georgians	   reportedly	   expressed	   a	   great	   interest	   in	   and	   sympathy	   toward	   the	  “homeland	  of	   their	  ancestors	  –	  Soviet	  Georgia”	  and	  the	   idea	  of	  resettlement	   to	   the	  “homeland”	   began	   to	   circulate	   among	   them	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   their	   “neighbor”	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  Kiknaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  18	  February	  1946,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  253,	  l.	  1.	  On	  the	  early	  history	  of	  VOKS	  as	  a	  means	  of	  cultural	  diplomacy,	  see	  David-­‐Fox,	  Showcasing	  the	  Great	  Experiment,	  Chapter	  2.	  623	  Lisa	  Yountchi	  has	  made	  this	  point	  regarding	  Tajikistan	  in	  “Beyond	  Mere	  Translation:	  Abulqasim	  Lahuti,	   Soviet	   Tajik	   Translators,	   and	   1940s	   Iran,”	   presented	   at	   the	   Association	   for	   Slavic,	   East	  European,	   and	   Eurasian	   Studies	   Annual	   Convention,	   22	   November	   2013.	   In	   1946,	   the	   Iran-­‐Soviet	  Cultural	  Relations	  Society	  organized	  the	   first	  national	  congress	  of	   Iranian	  writers,	  argued	  to	  be	  the	  peak	   of	   Soviet-­‐Tudeh	   influence.	   See	   Afshin	   Matin-­‐asgari,	   “Marxism,	   Historiography	   and	   Historical	  Consciousness	  in	  Modern	  Iran:	  A	  Preliminary	  Study,”	  220.	  
	   276	  Iranian	  Armenians,	  who	   had	   recently	   been	   resettled	   to	   Soviet	   Armenia,	   discussed	  further	   below.	   Though	   Kiknaże	   had	   pressed	   Molotov	   for	   a	   Georgian	   research	  expedition	  to	  Fereydan	  the	  previous	  year,	  this	  request	  was	  denied,	  allegedly	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  conflict	  it	  posed	  for	  Soviet-­‐Iranian	  relations.	  Kiknaże	  continued	  to	  push	  for	   an	   expedition,	   however,	   emphasizing	   instead	   the	   “humane	   goals”	   (access	   to	  medical	  care,	  Georgian	  language	  schools)	  and	  cultural	  ties	  to	  Iranian	  authorities.	  In	  reality,	   as	   he	   detailed	   to	   Č’arkviani,	   the	   expedition	   would	   permit	   the	   further	  exploration	  of	  “resettling”	  willing	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  to	  Soviet	  Georgia.624	  Kiknaże	  also	  noted	  to	  Č’arkviani	  that	  he	  had	  received	  a	  report	  from	  the	  Soviet	  vice-­‐consul	  in	  Isfahan,	   Ashurov,	   from	   1943	   that	   described	   the	   Iranian	   approach	   to	   Fereydan	  Georgians:	  One	  of	  the	  political	  aims	  of	  the	  Iranian	  powers	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	   Georgian	   population	   was	   the	   ambition	   to	   completely	   eradicate	  from	  its	  consciousness	  the	  idea	  about	  Georgia	  and	  infeasibility	  of	  links	  with	  Georgia,	  in	  whatever	  form	  it	  materialized.	  Residents	  of	  Georgian	  villages	   tell	   about	   many	   memorable	   cases	   of	   zealous	   and	   brutal	  persecution	   of	   all	   Georgians	   that	   fell	   upon	   Fereydan	   by	   accident	   or	  otherwise.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   arrest	   and	   expulsion	   of	   those	   persons	  from	   Fereydan,	   the	   peasants	   themselves	   were	   warned	   against	   ties	  with	   Turkey	   or	   individual	   Georgians	   by	   all	   sorts	   of	   repressive	  measures.625	  	  	  For	  his	  early	  appeals	  to	  Molotov	  and	  Č’arkviani,	  Kiknaże	  relied	  largely	  upon	  an	  account	  from	  Fereydan	  delivered	  to	  the	  Soviet	  embassy	  in	  Tehran	  in	  May	  1946	  by	   two	  Georgian	   émigrés	  who,	  while	   looking	   for	  work,	   spent	   ten	  months	   in	   1945	  living	  in	  the	  Fereydani	  village	  of	  T’oreli.	  From	  August	  1945,	  Kote	  P’ruiże	  and	  Mose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  624	  Kiknaże	   to	   Č’arkviani,	   “O	   Fereidanskikh	   gruzinakh,”	   10	  August	   1946,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   20,	   d.	  253,	  ll.	  30-­‐32.	  625	  “SPRAVKA	  o	   gruzinakh	   isfaganskoi	   provintsii	   Irana,”	  USSR	  Vice	   Consul	   to	   Iran	  Ashurov,	   9	   June	  1943,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  253,	  l.	  50.	  
	   277	  Natrošvili	   lived	   among	   T’oreli	   villagers	   who,	   while	   initially	   suspicious	   of	   their	  intentions,	  came	  to	  reveal	  their	  plight	  to	  the	  visitors.	  Though	  P’ruiże	  and	  Natrošvili	  estimated	  that	  there	  were	  twelve	  Georgian	  villages	  in	  Fereydan	  with	  a	  population	  of	  around	  23,000	  people,	   “Residents	  say	  that	  besides	  their	  district,	   there	  are	  an	  even	  greater	  number	  of	  locales	  with	  Georgian	  populations	  on	  the	  Iranian	  territory.	  But	  in	  most	  cases	  they	  have	  forgotten	  the	  language	  and	  were	  forcibly	  Islamicized,	  Christian	  names	  became	  Muslim	  and	  only	  national	  memory	  preserves	  memories	  about	  their	  Georgian	  origin.”626	  	  The	  residents	  of	  T’oreli,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  a	  combination	  of	  Persian	  and	  Georgian	  names.	  The	  population	  largely	  conversed	  in	  an	  old	  eastern	  Georgian	  language,	  with	  some	  Persian	  loan	  words.	  The	  villagers	  were	  Muslim,	  wore	  “Persian	  clothes,”	  and	  women	  moved	  about	  freely,	  though	  they	  did	  cover	  their	  faces	  and	   heads	   when	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   strangers.627	  In	   T’oreli,	   there	   were	   no	   official	  institutions,	   schools,	   or	   medical	   clinics,	   and	   the	   villagers	   lived	   under	   the	   rule	   of	  landlords.	  As	  a	  result,	  “Without	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  land,	  people	  find	  their	  happiness	  in	   religion.”628	  Yet	   remnants	   of	   a	   traditional	   Georgian	   culture	   survived,	   including	  Georgian	   national	   holidays.	   Moreover,	   “Each	   knows	   that	   he	   is	   a	   Georgian	   and	   is	  proud	   of	   it,	   tries	   to	   avoid	   mixing	   with	   the	   local	   population,	   tries	   to	   preserve	  language	   and	   customs,	   but	   under	   pressure	   of	   local	   powers	   forfeited	   religion.”629	  According	  to	  P’ruiże	  and	  Natrošvili,	  “Upon	  leaving,	  peasants	  saw	  us	  off,	  with	  tears	  in	  their	  eyes,	  and	  they	  asked	  us	  to	  find	  the	  General	  Consulate	  in	  Tehran	  and	  tell	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  626	  “Fereydan,”	  Kote	  P’ruiże	  and	  Mose	  Natrošvili,	  15	  May	  1946,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  20,	  d.	  253,	  l.	  37.	  627	  Ibid.,	  l.	  38.	  628	  Ibid.,	  l.	  41.	  629	  Ibid.	  
	   278	  their	   life	   in	   this	  hell…finally	   they	  asked	   to	   transmit	   to	   the	  great	  and	  older	  brother	  Stalin	  how	  they	  live	  and	  suffer	  in	  captivity,	  ‘Georgians	  forgotten	  by	  God	  and	  forcibly	  torn	  from	  their	  homeland.’”630	  	  At	   this	   time,	   Soviet	   authorities	   sought	   to	   repatriate	   Georgians	   who	   had	  immigrated	  to	  Iran	  in	  the	  Tsarist	  and	  early	  Soviet	  periods.631	  To	  address	  these	  tasks,	  in	  1946	   the	  Georgian	  MFA	  dispatched	   two	  agents	   from	   its	  political	  department	   to	  Iran:	   A.	   Aslanikašvili,	   who	  was	   charged	  with	   handling	   repatriation	   of	   Tsarist	   and	  Soviet	   Georgian	   émigrés,	   and	   V.	   Grżeliże,	   who	   worked	   among	   the	   Fereydan	  Georgians	  from	  the	  Soviet	  consulate	  in	  Isfahan.	  Grżeliże	  remained	  in	  Iran	  for	  only	  a	  brief	   time	  because	  the	   Isfahan	  consulate	  was	  closed	  shortly	  after	  his	  arrival,	  so	  he	  was	  not	  even	  able	  to	  deliver	  to	  Fereydan	  the	  educational	  literature	  he	  brought	  from	  Georgia.	  Aslanikašvili,	  however,	  expanded	  his	  mandate	  from	  the	  embassy	  in	  Tehran	  to	   include	   investigating	   the	   “Fereydan	   question,”	   in	   particular	   the	   possibility	   of	  repatriating	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  to	  the	  Georgian	  SSR.632	  This	  information	  would	  aid	  the	   “government	   of	   Georgia”	   in	   determining	   how	   to	   repatriate	   or	   further	   aid	  Fereydan	   Georgians.	   Though	   in	   June	   1947	   the	   USSR	   MFA	   advised	   against	  Aslanikašvili’s	   efforts	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   Fereydan	   due	   to	   the	   current	   political	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  Ibid,,	  l.	  36.	  631	  This	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  phenomenon	  of	  postwar	  repatriation	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  population	  exchange.	  This	  included	  not	  only	  those	  Soviet	  citizens	  who	  served	  in	  the	  Red	  Army	  in	  Europe,	  those	  imprisoned	  in	  camps	  or	  deported	  to	  Germany	  and	  its	  environs,	  or	  those	  otherwise	  displaced	  by	   the	  war,	  but	   also	  attempts	  at	  outreach	  and	   repatriation	   to	   émigrés	   from	   the	   Imperial	  and	   early	   Soviet	   periods.	   For	   example,	   the	   Georgian	   Party	   also	   approached	  Menshevik	   émigrés	   in	  Paris	  around	  this	  time,	  “k’art’velebi	  sap’ranget’ši,”	  24	  February	  1948,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  22,	  d.	  412,	  ll.	  3-­‐4.	  632	  “Dokladnaia	   zapiska,”	   A.F.	   Aslanikašvili	   to	  Kiknaże,	   13	   January	   1948,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   22,	   d.	  412,	  l.	  36.	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  situation,	  he	  continued	  to	  work	  among	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  living	  in	  Tehran	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  year.633	  	  Based	   on	   his	   experiences,	   Aslanikašvili	   concluded	   that	   Fereydan	  Georgians	  had	   a	   “genuine	   desire”	   to	   return	   to	   “mother	   Georgia”	   (deda	   sak’art’velo).	   Reza	  Onikašvili,	  one	  of	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  Aslanikašvili	  met	  in	  Tehran,	  said	  that	  even	  if	  not	  all	  Georgians	  could	  leave	  Fereydan	  at	  that	  moment,	  they	  should	  at	  least	  send	  twenty	  young	  people	   “so	   that	   they	  would	  grow	  up	  on	   the	  native	  soil,	   so	   that	   their	  eyes	  would	   be	   opened	   and	   they	  would	   see	   the	   homeland.”634	  Even	   if	   residents	   of	  Fereydan	   proved	   willing	   to	   emigrate,	   a	   position	   that	   Aslanikašvili	   advocated,	   he	  likewise	  anticipated	  difficulties	   in	   implementing	  such	  a	  policy.	  First,	   the	  Armenian	  precedent	   to	  which	   Soviet	   officials	   and	   Fereydan	   residents	   appealed	   could	   not	   be	  applied	   precisely	   to	   the	   Georgian	   case.	   After	   1946,	   nearly	   90,000	   Armenians	   (or,	  about	   ten	   percent	   of	   all	   Armenians	   outside	   the	   USSR)	   “repatriated”	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   to	   help	   build	   the	   homeland	   alongside	   their	   Soviet	   brethren.	   However,	   the	  ancestors	   of	   those	   repatriated	   had	   in	   most	   cases	   never	   lived	   on	   the	   territory	   of	  Soviet	   Armenia.	   Most	   of	   the	   Armenian	   repatriates	   emigrated	   from	   Syria	   and	  Lebanon	  (32,000),	   Iran	   (20,000),	  and	  Greece	   (18,000)	  between	  1946	  and	  1948.635	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  Kiknaże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  25	  May	  1948,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  22,	  d.	  412,	  l.	  33.	  	  634	  “Dokladnaia	   zapiska,”	   A.F.	   Aslanikašvili	   to	  Kiknaże,	   13	   January	   1948,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   22,	   d.	  412,	  l.	  46.	  635	  Lehmann,	  “A	  Different	  Kind	  of	  Brothers.”	  On	  the	  repatriation	  campaign,	  see	  also	  Joanne	  Laycock,	  “The	  Repatriation	  of	  Armenians	   to	  Soviet	  Armenia,	  1945-­‐59,”	   in	  Peter	  Gatrell	  and	  Nick	  Baron,	  eds.,	  
Warlands:	  Population,	  Resettlement,	  and	  State	  Reconstruction	  in	  the	  Soviet-­‐East	  European	  Borderlands,	  
1945-­‐1950,	   2009:	   140-­‐161.	   As	   Lehmann	   notes,	   shortly	   following	   their	   “return”	   to	   Armenia,	   nearly	  half	  of	  the	  repatriates	  were	  subsequently	  deported	  to	  Siberia	  and	  Central	  Asia	  as	  potentially	  disloyal	  nationals.	   I	   examined	   a	   similar	   process	   in	   Georgia	   in	   1949	   in	   Chapter	   2	   that	   affected	   not	   only	  Armenians,	  but	  also	  Greeks	  and	  Turks.	  	  
	   280	  Though	   many	   of	   the	   “repatriated”	   Armenians’	   families	   had	   lived	   in	   the	   Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  fell	  victim	  to	  the	  1915	  genocide,	  Iranian	  Armenians	  had	  been	  resettled	  to	  Iran,	  like	  the	  Georgians,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Iranian	  conquest	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  in	  the	  early	  seventeenth	  century.	  In	   Aslanikašvili’s	   opinion,	   the	   issue	   of	   Armenian	   repatriation	   had	   a	   wider,	  more	   international	   resonance	   than	   the	   Georgian	   case,	   so	   the	   Iranian	   government	  was	  more	   likely	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   former	   effort	   than	   the	   latter.636	  Iranian	   state	  structures	   and	   the	   current	   Soviet-­‐Iran	   relationship	   posed	   further	   challenges.	  Repatriating	  Georgians	   from	  Fereydan	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	   than	   the	  Armenian	  project	   had	   been	   because,	   according	   to	   Iran,	   the	   Fereydan	   residents	   were	   not	  Georgians,	  but	  Muslim	  “Persians	  of	  Georgian	  origin.”	  According	  to	  the	  1923	  Iranian	  state	   census,	   for	   example,	   the	   Fereydan	   region	   contained	   Persian,	   Turkish,	   and	  Armenian	   populations,	   but	   no	   Georgians.	   As	   a	   result,	   both	   religious	   and	   state	  authorities	  would	  likely	  oppose	  Georgian	  emigration	  from	  Fereydan.	  Unlike	  Iranian	  Armenians,	   who	   remained	   Christian	   and	   therefore	   comprised	   a	   compact	   entity	  distinct	  from	  the	  Muslim	  majority,	  Muslim	  Georgians	  represented	  a	  population	  to	  be	  further	   assimilated	   into	   the	   majority	   by	   expunging	   their	   Georgian	   language	   and	  national	   identity	   over	   time.	   Furthermore,	   Aslanikašvili	   argued	   that	   the	   Georgians	  provided	   valuable	   roles	   in	   Fereydan	   as	   high-­‐quality	   laborers,	   builders,	   and	  agricultural	   workers;	   as	   soldiers	   in	   the	   Iranian	   military;	   and	   mediators	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  636	  Ibid.,	  l.	  48.	  
	   281	  protectors	   in	   the	   province	   against	   banditry.637 	  For	   these	   reasons,	   repatriating	  Georgians	   to	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   presented	   a	   greater	   challenge	   than	   the	   Armenian	  precedent.	  In	   spite	   of	   these	   challenges,	   Aslanikašvili	   urged	   Kiknaże	   and,	   therefore,	  Č’arkviani,	  to	  pursue	  the	  repatriation	  project	  immediately	  by	  further	  cultivating	  ties	  to	   Fereydani	   villages,	   spreading	   Georgian	   cultural	   knowledge	   and	   products	   via	  GOKS	  in	  Tehran	  and	  Isfahan,	  combatting	  Iranian	  efforts	  to	  curb	  Georgian	   language	  use,	   installing	   Georgian	   agents	   in	   the	   Soviet	   embassy	   in	   Tehran	   and	   consulate	   in	  Isfahan,	  and,	  finally,	  by	  including	  10-­‐20	  young	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  among	  the	  group	  of	   Armenians	   to	   be	   repatriated	   in	   1948	   so	   that	   they	   may	   study	   in	   Georgia.638	  According	   to	   Natrošvili	   and	   P’ruiże,	   knowledge	   about	   the	   recent	   resettlement	   of	  Armenians	  to	  Soviet	  Armenia	  	  awakened	   the	   dormant	   dream	   of	   Georgian-­‐peasants	   about	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   better	   life.	   Simple	   people	   with	   tears	   in	   their	   eyes	  asked:	   why	   did	   Armenia	   remember	   its	   Armenians	   living	   in	   Iran,	  whose	  ancestors	  were	  driven	  into	  slavery	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  why	  does	  Georgia	  not	  remember	  them	  and	  will	  not	  also	  accept	  them	  as	  Armenia	  accepts	  its	  sons.639	  	  	  Unfolding	  geopolitical	  alignments	  between	  Iran,	  Turkey,	  and	  western	  powers	  in	  the	  early	   years	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   most	   likely	   prevented	   the	   Georgian	   repatriation	  alongside	   that	   of	   the	   Armenians.640	  Though	   a	   Fereydan	   Georgian	   repatriation	   did	  not	  come	  to	  fruition	  in	  the	  late	  1940s,	  the	  propaganda	  efforts	  initiated	  at	  that	  time	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  Ibid.,	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  639	  Ibid.,	  l.	  42.	  640	  On	  the	  Caucasus	  as	  an	  early	  Cold	  War	  sites	  of	  contestation	  between	  Iran	  and	  Turkey,	  see	  	  Gasanly,	  
SSSR-­‐Turtsiia;	  Hasanli,	  At	  the	  Dawn	  of	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  found	  greater	  resonance	  and	  advocates	  by	  the	  1960s,	  when	  the	  Fereydan	  project	  re-­‐emerged,	  this	  time	  from	  below,	  as	  a	  Georgian	  policy	  goal.	  	  	   	  	   The	   lapse	   in	   focus	   on	   Fereydan	   by	   Georgian	   authorities	   could	   be	   due	   to	  several	   factors,	   including	   not	   only	   Moscow’s	   reluctance	   to	   pursue	   repatriation	   to	  Georgia,	  but	  also	  major	  shifts	  in	  leadership	  in	  both	  Tbilisi	  and	  Moscow	  following	  the	  Mingrelian	  affair	  and	  Stalin’s	  death.	  Kiknaże	  and	  Č’arkviani	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  close	  working	   relationship	   and,	   as	   one	   of	   Stalin’s	   childhood	   confidants,	   Č’arkviani’s	  personal	   links	   to	   Stalin	   (and	  Beria)	   certainly	   colored	  postwar	  national	   projects	   in	  Georgia,	   such	   as	   the	   territorial	   irredentism	   attempts	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   1	   and	  national	   deportations	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   Vasil	   Mžavanaże,	   Č’arkviani’s	   replacement	   as	  First	   Secretary,	   though	   Georgian,	   was	   a	   Khrushchev	   protégé	   who	   had	   built	   his	  career	  outside	  Georgia	  and	  was	  regarded	  by	  many	  Georgians	  early	  in	  his	  tenure	  as	  republic	   and	   national	   “outsider,”	   unfamiliar	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   Georgians.	   The	  more	  hands-­‐off	  policy	  pursued	  by	  Moscow	  toward	  Georgia	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  March	  1956	  events	  perhaps	  also	  permitted	  the	  Fereydan	  issue	  to	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  once	  again,	  albeit	  only	  after	  more	  immediate	  grievances	  against	  de-­‐Stalinization	  had	  been	   addressed.	   Finally,	   a	   subsequent	  wave	   of	   Armenian	   repatriation	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1960s	  likewise	  could	  have	  inspired	  Georgians	  to	  reinvigorate	  their	  own	  repatriation	  efforts.641	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  641	  See	  “Vozvrashchenie	  na	  rodinu,”	  Pravda	  (11	  February	  1963),	  p.	  4,	  included	  in	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	   d.	   329,	   l.	   9.	   Even	  with	   this	   smaller,	   later	  wave	   of	   Armenian	   “repatriation”	   in	   the	   1960s,	   Soviet	  authorities	   as	   high	   as	   V.	   Semichastnyi,	   head	   of	   the	   KGB,	   acknowledged	   the	   challenges	   of	  incorporating	   Armenians	   from	   abroad	   into	   Soviet	   society	   due	   not	   only	   to	   language	   issues	   and	  continued	   ties	   to	   relatives	   in	   capitalist	   countries,	   but	   also	   to	   ideological	   work	   and	   housing	  
	   283	  The	  break	  in	  effort	  similarly	  conforms	  to	  the	  highs	  and	  lows	  in	  Soviet-­‐Iranian	  relations	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s:	  after	  Stalin’s	  death,	  the	  removal	  of	  Mossadeq,	  and	  the	   signing	   of	   the	   British-­‐aligned	   Baghdad	   Pact	   between	   1953-­‐1955,	   Soviet-­‐Iran	  relations	  reached	  a	  nadir.	  	  Not	  only	  the	  political,	  but	  also	  the	  cultural	  realm	  suffered	  as	  a	   result,	   limiting	  what	  VOKS,	  GOKS,	   and	  other	  organs	   could	  accomplish	   in	   Iran.	  With	   the	   1963	   Iranian	   “White	   Revolution”	   reforms,	   relations	   with	   the	   USSR	  improved	   considerably	   on	   a	   number	   of	   fronts,	   from	   trade	   and	   political-­‐military	  affairs	  to	  resumption	  of	  cultural	  relations.642	  	   Whereas	   the	   earlier	   effort	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   largely	   Kiknaże’s	   own	  initiative,	   with	   little	   impetus	   “from	   below,”	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   letter	   writing	   and	  petitioning	   campaigns	   inspired	   further	   support	   for	   aid	   to	   Fereydan	   Georgians.	   In	  1963,	   Georgian	   First	   Secretary	   Mžavanaże	   and	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   Chairman	  Javaxišvili	  appealed	  to	  Khrushchev	  for	  repatriation,	  noting	  that	  the	  groundwork	  had	  been	  laid	  in	  the	  1940s,	  and	  cited	  not	  only	  the	  Armenian	  repatriation,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  Ukrainians	   and	   Cossacks	   as	   comparative	   successful	   policies.	   According	   to	  Mžavanaże	  and	  Javaxišvili,	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  wished	  to	  “return	  to	  the	  motherland	  and	  join	  in	  the	  building	  of	  Communism.”643	  This	  letter,	  based	  on	  the	  one	  written	  in	  Georgian	   to	   Mžavanaże	   (in	   the	   chapter’s	   opening	   paragraph),	   conveyed	   a	   similar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  deficiencies	  in	  Armenia,	  Semichastnyi	  to	  CPSU	  CC,	  11	  August	  1964,	  RGANI,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  31,	  d.	  236,	  ll.	  89-­‐92.	  642	  Afshin	  Matin-­‐asgari,	   “The	   Impact	  of	   Imperial	  Russia	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  Qajar	  and	  Pahlavi	  Iran.”	  643	  Mžavanaże	  and	  Javaxišvili	  to	  Khrushchev,	  February	  1963,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	  d.	  329,	  ll.	  6-­‐8.	  	  
	   284	  agenda	  stripped	  of	   its	  passionate	  appeals	   to	   the	  nation	  and	  historical	   injustices.644	  This	  break	  –	  from	  what	  was	  conveyed	  in	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  –	  appeared	  regularly	  in	  other	  letters	  as	  well.	  This	  was	  not	  simply	  an	  issue	  of	  translation,	  but	  of	  audience	  and	  persuasion.	  	  Even	   if	   Kiknaże	   no	   longer	   commanded	   the	   Fereydan	   project,	   officials	   still	  turned	  to	  Aslanikašvili	  as	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  1960s.645	  Indeed,	  Mžavanaże	  noted	  to	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister	  Gromyko	  that	  numerous	  Georgian	  institutions	  had	  received	   letters	   from	   citizens	   about	   the	   “Fereydan	   question”	   and	   that	   Fereydanis	  had	  also	  penned	  a	  letter	  requesting	  aid	  and	  the	  right	  to	  “return	  to	  the	  motherland”	  to	  the	  Soviet	  embassy	   in	  Tehran.646	  Soviet	  Georgians	   likewise	  appealed	  to	  republic	  authorities	  for	  aid	  to	  “the	  centuries-­‐old	  dream	  of	  Georgia’s	  native	  land’s	  (mica-­‐cqali)	  children,	  who	  are	  tortured	  and	  suffering	  on	  the	  Turkish	  and	  Iranian	  territory,	  about	  the	  immigration	  to	  their	  homeland	  (samšoblo).”647	  An	  anonymous	  letter	  from	  Tbilisi	  to	  Mžavanaże	  from	  “your	  people”	  similarly	  urged	  resettlement	  or,	  if	  that	  proved	  too	  “difficult”	  a	  task,	  aid	  for	  education	  among	  Georgians	  in	  Iran.	  This	  would	  remove	  this	  people	  from	  the	  “path	  of	  extermination”	  and	  Mžavanaże	  will	  have	  done	  a	  “glorious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  644	  I.	  Mik’elaże,	   G.	   Jabua,	   T’.	   Davit’aia,	   G.	   Gvelasiani,	   and	  A.	   Aslanikašvili	   to	  Mžavanaże,	   1	   February	  1963,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	  d.	  329,	  ll.	  1-­‐5.	  645	  “Iranskie	  gruziny	  (kratkaia	  spravka),”	  A.	  F.	  Aslanikašvili,	  18	  February	  1963,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  38,	  d.	  329,	  ll.	  10-­‐18.	  646	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	   i	  prozhivanie),’”	  21	  May	  1974,”sšssa	   (II),	   f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	   l.	  18	  and	  Mžavanaże	   to	  Gromyko,	  June	  1965	  (secret),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  280,	  ll.	  18-­‐20.	  647	  Group	  petition	  to	  Mžavanaże,	  1965	  (115	  signatories),	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  288,	  ll.	  24-­‐29.	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  (sašvilišvilo)	   deed	   for	   the	   people,	   and	   [his]	   name	   will	   be	   indelible	   in	   Georgians’	  hearts.”648	  	  The	   new	   Georgian	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   A.	   Gigošvili,	   obtained	  permission	  from	  the	  Soviet	  MFA	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  Fereydan	  question.	  He	  reported	  that	   the	  Shah	  did	  not	  oppose	  repatriation	  of	   individual	  Georgians	   in	  principle,	  but	  that	   he	   required	   authorization	   from	   the	   Majlis	   (parliament)	   to	   permit	   mass	  repatriation.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Iranian	   position	   maintained	   that	   the	   Georgian	  population	  in	  Iran	  was	  Muslim	  and,	   therefore,	  was	  Iranian	  by	  nationality.649	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  GOKS	  work	  among	  Georgians	  in	  Iran	  continued	  apace,	  ostensibly	  toward	  goals	   other	   than	   repatriation.	   As	   part	   of	   this	   effort	   to	   foster	   cultural	   exchange,	   in	  1969	   filmmaker	   G.	   Pataraia	   brought	   a	   film	   crew	   to	   Iran	   to	   study	   the	   “Georgian	  question”	   and	   was	   permitted	   to	   shoot	   in	   Fereydan,	   where	   he	   agitated	   for	  resettlement	   in	   Georgia	   and,	   upon	   his	   return,	   appealed	   to	   Mžavanaże	   in	   favor	   of	  repatriation.	   His	   film,	   “šoria	   gurjistanamde,”	   was	   released	   in	   Tbilisi	   in	   1970.650	  Finally,	   as	  Pataraia’s	   film	  was	   released,	   the	  Georgian	  MFA	   received	  approval	   from	  the	  USSR	  MFA,	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  Iranian	  MFA,	  to	  repatriate	  the	  first	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  (17	  families,	  consisting	  of	  109	  people)	  who	  wished	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  648	  Anonymous	  petition	  from	  “Georgians”	  in	  Tbilisi	  to	  Mžavanaże,	  29	  January	  1965,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  218,	  l.	  175.	  649	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	  i	  prozhivanie),’”	  21	  May	  1974,”sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	  l.	  18.	  650	  “šoria	  gurjistanamde”	   film,	  G.	  Pataraia,	  dir.,	   (1970).	  The	  short	   film	   includes	   footage	  of	  Georgian	  villages	   in	  Fereydan	  and	   their	  mountainous	  environs	  as	  well	  as	   conversations	  with	   local	   residents,	  conducted	  in	  Georgian.	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  to	  immigrate	  to	  Georgia.651	  Their	  arrival	  was	  scheduled	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  of	  Soviet	  power	   in	  Georgia	   to	  achieve	  an	  expected	  “sensational	  effect”	  among	   Soviet	   Georgians,	   according	   to	   Kikvaże	   and	   Šošitaišvili’s	   1974	   summary	  report.652	  	  After	   a	   nearly	   thirty-­‐year	   campaign,	   seventeen	   families	   would	   finally	   be	  repatriated	   to	   Georgia.	   Though	   this	   group	  was	   dramatically	   smaller	   than	   both	   its	  Armenian	  counterpart	  and	  the	  ambitions	  of	  republican	  leaders	  (by	  the	  1970s,	  they	  were	  citing	  as	  many	  as	  50,000	  Georgians	   in	  Fereydan),	   the	  achievement	  seemed	  a	  victory,	  if	  small,	  for	  its	  proponents	  in	  Georgian	  institutions	  and	  society.	  However,	  in	  spite	  of	   the	   long-­‐term	  campaign	   for	  repatriation,	   little	   to	  no	  planning	  occurred	   for	  actually	  relocating	  and	  integrating	  the	  immigrants	  into	  Soviet	  Georgia.	  The	  Georgian	  MFA	  to	  this	  point	  had	  managed	  repatriation	  advocacy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  diplomatic	  and	  operational	  side	  of	  moving	  these	  individuals	  from	  Iran	  to	  Georgia.	  Once	  within	  the	  USSR,	   the	  Georgian	  Party	  decided	   to	   settle	  most	  of	   the	   families	   in	  Kaxet’i	   because	  their	   ancestors	   had	   purportedly	   been	   resettled	   to	   Iran	   from	   that	   region.653	  An	  additional	   three	   families	   lived	   in	   Tbilisi	   but	   were	   given	   dachas	   in	   Gurjaani	   and	  Sagarejo.	   Once	   in	   Kaxet’i	   and	   Tbilisi,	   the	   repatriates	   became	   the	   responsibility	   of	  local	   Party	   organs,	   which	   oversaw	   housing,	   work	   assignments,	   and	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  651	  Mžavanaże	  to	  Gromyko,	  5	  June	  1970;	  Mžavanaże	  to	  Brezhnev,	  20	  May	  1970,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  45,	  d.	  388,	  ll.	  5-­‐6.	  652	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	  i	  prozhivanie),’”	  21	  May	  1974,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	  l.	  21.	  653	  Fereydan	   Georgian	   families	   lived	   in	   the	   following	   villages:	   In	   Gurjaani	   district	   -­‐-­‐	   Šašiani	   (2	  families),	  Vażisubani	  (3	  families),	  Axašeni	  (3	  families),	  Č’umlaqi	  (3	  families),	  Čandari	  (3	  families);	  in	  Sagarejo	  district	  -­‐-­‐	  Sagarejo	  (3	  families),	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	  l.	  23.	  
	   287	  education	   activities	   among	   the	   Fereydan	   Georgians.654	  In	   Kaxet’i,	   the	   repatriated	  families	  were	  provided	  two-­‐story,	  six	  room	  houses	  with	  a	  kitchen,	  a	  garden	  planted	  with	  fruit	  trees,	  a	  cow	  and	  five	  sheep,	  and	  a	  small	  personal	  plot	  with	  a	  vineyard.	  The	  houses	   included	   furniture,	   radios,	   refrigerators,	   and	   televisions.	   Each	   family	  received	   a	   one-­‐time	   payment	   of	   500-­‐600	   rubles.	   Children	   were	   immediately	  enrolled	   in	   kindergartens	   and	   schools,	   and	   older	   students	   enrolled	   in	   the	   Tbilisi	  Medical	   Institute	   and	   the	   Tbilisi	   State	   University	   faculty	   of	   oriental	   studies.	  Repatriates	  could	  work	  in	  their	  desired	  specialty,	  though	  most	  had	  been	  farmers	  in	  Iran.655	  	   As	  part	  of	  local	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  Fereydan	  communities	  into	  life	  in	  Kaxet’i,	  the	  GSSR	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	   initiated	  research	  projects,	   led	  by	   the	   Iv.	   Javaxišvili	  Institute	   of	   History,	   Archeology	   and	   Ethnography,	   to	   work	   among	   the	   newly-­‐repatriated	   Georgians	   in	   the	   1970s.656 	  Conversations	   between	   researchers	   and	  repatriates	   reveal	   some	   of	   the	   complexities	   and	   difficulties	   encountered	   once	   in	  Georgia.	   For	   example,	   Rezo	   Xuc’išvili	   from	   Čandari	   distinguished	   between	   “...Your	  family,	   your	   ancestral	   place	   (mamapapuri)	   [in	   Fereydan,	   CK]”	   and	   the	   homeland,	  “because	  samšoblo	  is	  here	  [in	  Georgia,	  CK].”	  For	  Xucišvili,	  	  It	   is	   a	   bitter	   fate,	   in	   Iran	  we	  were	   ‘Gurji,’	   in	   Georgia	   ‘Tatars.’	   Still,	   it	  seems	   we	   are	   already	   others	   (sxvebi)…and	   this	   really	   hurts	   our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  654	  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	  i	  prozhivanie),’”	  21	  May	  1974,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  54,	  d.	  95.	  655	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  23-­‐24.	  656 	  See,	   for	   example,	   “iv.	   javaxišvilis	   saxelobis	   istoriis,	   ark’eologiisa	   da	   et’nograp’iis	   institutis	  sak’art’velos	  et’nograp’iis	  ganqop’ilebis	  1973	  clis	  mušaobis	  angariši,”	  12	  September	  1973,	  smeaa,	  f.	  9,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  1372,	  l.	  5.	  
	   288	  children,	  grandchildren,	  even	  in	  Iran	  we	  were	  Georgians.	  It	  would	  be	  better	  to	  be	  ‘Gurji’	  in	  Iran	  than	  Tatars	  in	  Georgia.657	  	  	  Xuc’išvili	  later	  noted,	  “There	  was	  also	  such	  an	  incident	  when	  they	  asked	  the	  newly-­‐arrived	   directly,	   ‘Why	   do	   you	   not	   eat	   pork	   (ġoris	   xorc’i)	   if	   you	   are	   a	   Georgian’	   or	  ‘What	   kind	   of	   Georgian	   are	   you	   that	   does	   not	   drink	   wine.’”658	  A	   letter	   to	   First	  Secretary	  Shevardnadze	  expressed	  a	   similar	   sentiment:	   “It	   is	  difficult	   to	   live	   there	  (ik’),	  where	  you	  cannot	  feel	  like	  a	  neighbor	  and	  cannot	  feel	  the	  people’s	  warmth	  and	  support,	  where	   in	  your	  mind	  you	  have	  concluded	  you	  are	  guilty	  and	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  correct	  the	  situation.”659	  	  	   Other	   repatriates	   had	   more	   positive	   impressions	   of	   Georgian	   life.	   P’arviz	  Mik’elani	   emphasized	   material	   improvements,	   noting,	   “I’m	   very	   satisfied,	   believe	  me,	  I	  am	  very	  well,	  the	  children	  are	  well…I	  have	  a	  vineyard.	  There	  we	  did	  not	  have	  a	  courtyard	  (ezo).	  For	  my	  children	  I	  did	  a	  great	  thing.”660	  Reza	  Mik’elaże	  in	  Sagarejo,	  meanwhile,	  highlighted	  the	  broader	  meaning	  of	  Georgia	   in	  Fereydan:	  “In	  Fereydan	  the	   children	   were	   completely	   interested	   in	   the	   Georgians	   (k’artveloba),	   who	   we	  were,	  what	   our	   history	  was	   like,	   how	  we	   got	   here,	  what	   Georgia	  was	   like,	  we	   all	  dreamed	  that	  in	  the	  end	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  end	  up	  in	  Georgia...”661	  Party	  officials	   likewise	   noted	   local	   residents’	   interest	   in	   their	   new	   neighbors	   as	  well	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  657	  T’amila	   C’agareišvili,	   p’ereidnelebi	   sak’art’veloši	   (Tbilisi:	   mec’niereba,	   1981),	   34.	   In	   this	   usage,	  “Gurji”	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  status	  and	  prestige	  in	  Iran,	  contrasts	  with	  the	  derogatory	  “Tatar.”	  Though	  Tatars	  comprised	  an	  ethnic	  group	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  here	  it	  more	  likely	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  Muslims,	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  were	  regarded	  as	  –	  or	  felt	  themselves	  to	  be	  -­‐-­‐	  non-­‐Georgian	  once	  actually	  living	  in	  Kaxet’i.	  658	  Ibid.,	  38.	  659 	  Deputy	   Georgian	   Foreign	   Minister	   T’.	   Gordelaże	   to	   Georgian	   CC	   member	   V.M.	   Siraże,	   24	  November	  1977,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  437,	  l.	  10.	  660	  C’agareišvili,	  p’ereidnelebi	  sak’art’veloši,	  34.	  661	  Ibid.,	  35.	  
	   289	  initial	  points	  of	  conflict	  that	  centered	  on	  Georgian	  hospitality	  practices.	  In	  Gurjaani	  district,	  	  Local	   residents	   paid	   much	   attention	   to	   them,	   their	   immediate	  neighbors,	   but	   mostly	   either	   in	   the	   form	   of	   lavish	   gifts	   of	   food	   or	  invitations	   to	   their	   traditional	   Georgian	   dinners	   and	   suppers	   with	  consumption	  of	  incredible	  amounts	  of	  Kaxet’ian	  wine.	  Local	  residents	  evidently	   were	   genuinely	   convinced	   that	   for	   the	   repatriates	   wine	  drinking	  was	  the	  shortest	  and	  most	  proven	  path	  to	  their	  assimilation.	  When	   the	  Muslim	   repatriates	   refused	   this	   pursuit,	   Kaxet’ians	   found	  themselves	   offended…and	   at	   times	   changed	   their	   good	   attitude	  toward	  them.662	  	  	  The	   challenges	   of	   incorporation	   into	   Soviet	   Georgian	   life	   led	   many	   of	   the	  repatriates	   to	   request	   re-­‐repatriation	   to	  Fereydan	  as	  early	  as	  1974.	   In	  addition	   to	  acknowledging	  mistakes	   and	   poor	   planning	   by	   the	   Party	  with	   regard	   to	   life	   after	  repatriation,	  N.	  Kikvaże	  and	  Z.	  Šoštaišvili	  admitted	  that	  Georgians	  had	  idealized	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  underestimated	  the	  cleavages	  created	  by	  350	  years	   of	   differing	   economic,	   political,	   cultural,	   and	   social	   development. 663	  Furthermore,	  they	  underestimated	  as	  well	  the	  religious	  devotion	  of	  the	  repatriates	  and	   its	   impact	   on	   their	   philosophy	   and	  way	  of	   life.664	  In	   total,	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐three	  families	  that	  repatriated	  from	  Fereydan	  to	  Georgia,	  by	  1978	  nine	  of	  them	  sought	  to	  return	  to	  Iran.665	  Though	  the	  families	  stayed	  in	  Kaxet’i	  through	  the	  1970s,	  according	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  “Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  otdela	  zarubezhnykh	  sviazi	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	   ‘o	  problem	  fereidanskikh	  gruzin	  (repatriatsiia	  i	  prozhivanie),’”	  21	  May	  1974,”sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  17,	  op.	  52,	  d.	  678,	  l.	  25.	  663	  Ibid.,	  l.	  28.	  664	  Ibid.,	  l.	  31.	  665 	  Deputy	   Georgian	   Foreign	   Minister	   T’.	   Gordelaże	   to	   Georgian	   CC	   member	   V.M.	   Siraże,	   24	  November	  1977,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  437,	  l.	  8.	  
	   290	  to	  a	  Tbilisi-­‐based	  advocate	  for	  Georgian-­‐Fereydani	  ties,	  in	  2013	  only	  two	  Fereydani	  families	  remain	  in	  Georgia	  from	  the	  repatriation	  campaign,	  in	  Sagarejo.666	  	  	  
Saingilo	  
	  
Figure	  19:	  Location	  of	  Qax,	  Zaqatala,	  and	  Balakan	  Districts	  in	  Azerbaijan	  SSR	  	  
Source:	  Azerbaijan	  map	  from	  Perry-­‐Castañeda	  Library	  Map	  Collection,	  	  
The	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin	  	  	   Whereas	  the	  presence	  of	  Georgians	  in	  Fereydan	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  entice	  co-­‐ethnics	  back	  to	  “mother	  Georgia”	   from	  abroad,	   the	  plight	  of	  Georgians	   in	  Saingilo	  posed	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  Soviet	  federalism,	  national	  rights,	  and	  the	   sincerity	   of	   the	   “friendship	   of	   the	   peoples”	   trope	   that	   dominated	   Soviet	  nationality	   discourse.	   Located	   in	   the	   Qax,	   Zaqatala,	   and	   Balakan	   districts	   of	  northwest	  Azerbaijan,	  communities	  in	  Saingilo	  (or	  “land	  of	  the	  Ingilo”)	  were	  part	  of	  the	   larger	   eastern	   Kaxet’i	   region,	   centered	   around	   the	   Alazani	   river	   valley.	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  666	  Author	   personal	   communication	  with	  Giorgi	   Alaverdašvili,	   editor	   of	  www.fereidan.ge,	   Tbilisi,	   5	  February	   2013.	   Since	   the	   mid-­‐2000s,	   Georgian-­‐Iranian	   trade	   and	   travel	   relations	   have	   increased	  considerably,	  and	  some	  Georgians	  have	  eagerly	   taken	  up	   the	  cause	  of	   the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  as	  a	  way	  to	  foster	  such	  links,	  including	  former	  president	  Mikheil	  Saakashvili.	  	  
	   291	  Georgians	  regarded	  Saingilo	  as	  a	  “significant	  part	  of	  the	  Georgian	  land,”667	  following	  the	  Red	  Army's	  victory	  over	   independent	  Georgia	   in	  1921,	   the	  Zaqatala	  region	  (as	  these	  three	  districts	  were	  called	  from	  1860,	  when	  it	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Tiflis	  Guberniia)	  was	  moved	  from	  Georgia	  to	  the	  Azerbaijan	  SSR	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  re-­‐drawing	  of	  borders	  across	  the	  Caucasus.668	  	  The	   term	   “Ingilo”	   (Georgian	   “ingiloeli”)	   is	   a	   self-­‐designation	   for	   these	  Georgian-­‐speakers,	   derived	   from	   the	   Old	   Turkish	   word	   for	   “newly	   converted”	  (yangili).669	  Though	  Georgian	  Orthodox	   churches	   dotted	   the	   landscape	   of	   Saingilo,	  beginning	   in	   the	   seventeenth	   century,	  Persian	  and,	   subsequently,	  Dagestani	   rulers	  Islamicized	  most	  of	  the	  region,	  as	  the	  remaining	  Georgian	  population	  not	  resettled	  to	  Iran	  was	  forcibly	  converted	  to	  Islam.670	  Some	  villages	  in	  Qax	  remained	  Christian,	  while	   Sunni	  Muslim	   Ingilo	   villages	   existed	   in	   Qax,	   Zaqatala,	   and	   Balakan	   districts	  into	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   Soviet	   Georgian	   historian	   Nikoloz	  Berżenišvili,	  “In	  short,	  only	  in	  one	  part	  of	  Saingilo	  has	  the	  historical	  evil,	  sown	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  by	  the	  bloody	  enemy	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people	  Shah	  Abbas,	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  667	  “Istoricheskaia	  spravka	  o	  Saingilo,”	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  28	  February	  1951,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  l.	  118.	  668	  On	   the	   Sovietization	   of	   the	   Caucasus,	   see	   Richard	   Pipes,	   The	   Formation	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union:	  
Communism	   and	   Nationalism,	   1917-­‐1923	   (rev.	   ed.)	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1997);	  Jones,	  “The	  Establishment	  of	  Soviet	  Power	  in	  Transcaucasia";	  and	  Baberowski,	  Der	  Feind	  ist	  Überall.	  On	   the	   role	   of	   the	   “Georgian	   affair”	   in	   creating	   Soviet	   nationality	   policy,	   see	   Smith,	   “The	   Georgian	  Affair	  of	  1922.”	  669	  Nugzar	  Mgeladze,	  “Ingilos”	  in	  David	  Levinson,	  ed.,	  Encyclopedia	  of	  World	  Cultures,	  vol.	  VI:	  Russia	  and	  Eurasia/China	   (New	  York:	  G.K.	  Hall,	  1994),	  149.	   I	  use	   the	   terms	   “Ingilo”	  and	   “Saingilo”,	   except	  when	   citing	   direct	   quotes,	   in	   this	   chapter	   to	   more	   easily	   distinguish	   between	   the	   non-­‐entitled	  population	   in	   Azerbaijan	   and	   the	   entitled	   population	   in	   Georgia,	   though	   many	   of	   the	   Georgian	  officials	  and	  petitioners	  examined	  in	  this	  chapter	  used	  the	  terms	  interchangeably.	  	  670	  Ingilo	   advocates	   connected	   these	   two	   histories	   in	   their	   letters,	   e.g.	   Gamxarašvili	   to	   Stalin,	   10	  January	  1947,	  RGASPI,	  f.	  558,	  op.	  11,	  d.	  896,	  l.	  20.	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  eradicated.”671	  Like	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians,	  the	  Ingilo	  reportedly	  “waged	  the	  strong	  struggle	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   their	   national	   traditions,	   Georgian	   language,	  Georgian	  culture,	  in	  which	  they	  really	  had	  significant	  success”	  against	  Russification	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.672	  However,	  the	  local	  realities	  of	  the	  Soviet	  multinational	  state	  presented	  perceived	  threats	  of	  “becoming	  Lezgin”	  or	  “becoming	  Tatar”	  among	  the	  Ingilo	  and	  their	  advocates.673	  	  As	   early	   as	   the	   1930s,	   Georgian-­‐speakers	   in	   Saingilo	   complained	   about	   the	  lack	  of	  educational	  opportunities	   in	   local	  schools,	  which	  catered	  to	  Azeri	  speakers.	  By	   1937,	   seven	   Georgian	   language	   schools	   operated	   among	   Ingilo	   Christian	  communities	   in	  Qax	  district,	  but	  equivalent	  opportunities	  did	  not	  exist	   for	  Muslim	  Ingilo	   children	   in	   Zaqatala	   and	   Balakan	   districts.	   The	   first	   Georgian-­‐language	  schools	  opened	   in	   these	  districts	   in	  1937,	  but	   local	  authorities	  closed	  them	  after	  a	  year.674	  According	   to	   A.	   Janašvili,	   who	   reported	   on	   conditions	   in	   Saingilo	   to	   the	  People’s	   Commissariat	   for	   Enlightenment	   (PCE,	   later	   Ministry	   of	   Enlightenment,	  ME)	   in	   1944,	   a	   local	   educational	   commission	   justified	   closing	   Georgian-­‐language	  schools	  in	  some	  “Ingilo-­‐Muslim”	  villages	  because,	  when	  asked	  “Who	  are	  you?”	  locals	  answered	   “We	   are	   Azerbaijani.”	   However,	   Janašvili	   observed	   an	   important	  situational	  distinction	  in	  how	  locals	  self-­‐identified	  to	  outsiders.	  When	  questioned	  in	  a	  group	  of	  several	  “Ingilo-­‐Muslims”	  about	  their	  “tribal	  belonging,”	  they	  said,	  looking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  671	  “Istoricheskaia	  spravka	  o	  Saingilo,”	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  28	  February	  1951,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  l.	  134.	  I	  examined	  Berżenišvili’s	  career	  and	  influence	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  1	  and	  3.	  672	  Ibid.	  673	  “Istoricheskaia	  spravka	  o	  Saingilo,”	  N.	  Berżenišvili,	  28	  February	  1951,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  ll.	  135-­‐6.	  674	  This	  was	  blamed	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  only	  Georgian-­‐speaking	  teachers	  were	  mobilized	  into	  army,	  Bagirov	  and	  Č’arkviani	  	  to	  Stalin,	  May	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  l.	  6.	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  at	  each	  other,	   that	   they	  were	  Azerbaijani.	  When	  questioned	   individually,	  however,	  each	   said	   he	   was	   Ingilo,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   the	   individual	   had	   a	   command	   of	  Georgian	  or	  spoke	  only	  Azeri.675	  This	  encounter	  reveals	  that	  those	  individuals	  who,	  in	  private,	  categorized	  themselves	  as	  Ingilo	  were	  at	  times	  compelled	  by	  fear	  of	  local	  authorities	  to	  identify	  as	  Azerbaijani	  in	  official	  settings.	  For	   the	   1944-­‐1945	   school	   year,	   a	   joint	   Georgian-­‐Azerbaijani	   Party	  commission	  explored	  the	  possibility	  of	  opening	  more	  Georgian-­‐language	  schools	  in	  the	  three	  districts.	  Headed	  by	  First	  Secretaries	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Bagirov,	  who	  reported	  their	  findings	  to	  Beria	  and	  Stalin,	  most	  of	  the	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  investigative	  duties	  lay	  with	   each	   republic’s	   PCE.	   The	   commission	   recommended	   opening	   Georgian-­‐language	   schools	   in	   all	   three	   districts,	   improving	   existing	   school	   facilities	   in	   Qax	  district,	  and	  recruiting	  and	  training	  qualified	  Georgian	  speakers	  to	  teach,	  especially	  in	   Zaqatala	   and	   Balakan	   districts.676 	  Access	   to	   titular-­‐language	   education	   was,	  indeed,	  a	  tangible	  issue	  that	  officials	  in	  both	  Tbilisi	  and	  Baku	  could	  remedy,	  even	  if	  it	  required	  devoting	   time	  and	  resources	   to	   the	  effort	  during	   the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War.	  However,	   this	   issue	  was	   only	   one	   of	  many	   grievances	   expressed	   by	   Ingilos	   in	   the	  mid-­‐	   to	   late	   1940s.	   The	   question	   of	   education	   provided	   an	   opening	   for	   the	  expression	   of	   a	   wider	   spectrum	   of	   grievance,	   even	   if	   at	   this	   time	   Party	   officials	  addressed	  only	   the	   former.	  As	   the	  PCE	  took	  up	   the	  schools	   issue	   in	  earnest,	   Ingilo	  advocates	   appealed	   to	   officials	   in	   Tbilisi	   and	   Moscow	   for	   help	   with	   problems	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  675	  “Saingilo,”	  A.	  Janašvili,	  6	  April	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  ll.	  49-­‐50.	  676	  Bagirov	  and	  Č’arkviani	  to	  Stalin,	  May	  1944,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	   ll.	  6-­‐7	  and	  Ibragimov,	  Aliev,	  Obolaże,	  and	  Kvačaże	  to	  Bagirov	  and	  Č’arkviani,	  ll.	  13-­‐20.	  See	  also	  uic’a,	  f.	  600,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  7243,	  l.	  92-­‐94,	  117-­‐121.	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  diverse	  as	  access	  to	  Georgian	  print	  media,	  poor	  clinic	  and	  medical	  facilities,	  lack	  of	  Georgian	  cadre	  representation,	  poor	  quality	  of	  Georgian-­‐speaking	   teachers,	   lack	  of	  employment	   possibilities,	   destruction	   of	   Georgian	   historical	   monuments,	   and	  discouragement	  of	  speaking	  Georgian,	  even	  at	  home.	  	  In	   this	   early	   period,	   one	   man	   emerged	   as	   the	   primary	   voice	   of	   Ingilo	  grievance:	   Giorgi	   Semenovich	   Gamxarašvili,	   a	   native	   of	   Qax	  who	  was	   educated	   in	  Moscow	  and	   spent	  his	   career	  working	  as	   an	  agronomist	   in	  Tbilisi.	  Though	  he	  had	  lived	   in	   Tbilisi	   for	   over	   three	   decades,	   he	  maintained	   relationships	  with	   relatives	  and	   friends	   in	   Qax.	   A	   non-­‐Party	   member,	   between	   1943	   and	   1950,	   Gamxarašvili	  wrote	  regular,	  lengthy	  letters	  to	  Tbilisi-­‐	  and	  Moscow-­‐based	  officials,	  including	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani,	  Bak’raże,	  Baramia,	  Stalin,	  and	  Poskrebyshev.	  Gamxarašvili	  also	  twice	  met	   with	   relevant	   officials	   about	   this	   issue	   in	  Moscow,	   though	   at	   this	   time	  Gamxarašvili	  was	   convinced	   that	   Stalin	   alone	   could	   resolve	   this	   problem.677	  As	   an	  individual,	   Gamxarašvili	   achieved	   a	   remarkable	   level	   of	   access	   to	   republic-­‐level	  figures,	   such	   that	   First	   Secretary	   Č’arkviani	   discussed	   the	   encounters	   in	   his	  memoirs.678	  Gamxarašvili’s	   letters	   combined	   reporting	   on	   the	   history	   and	   current	  condition	   of	   Ingilo	   communities	   with	   specific	   grievances	   against	   local	   powers	   in	  Azerbaijan.	  Unlike	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians,	  whose	  existence	  and	  plight	  were	  widely	  publicized	   in	   Georgia,	   Gamxarašvili	   acknowledged	   that	   “Georgian	   society	   knows	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  677	  Gamxarašvili	  to	  Poskrebyshev,	  12	  January	  1947,	  RGASPI,	  f.	  558,	  op.	  11,	  d.	  896,	  l.	  17.	  678	  Č’arkviani,	  ganc’dili	  da	  naazrevi,	  500.	  I	  thank	  Krista	  Goff	  for	  this	  reference.	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  very	  little	  about	  this	  region	  and	  population.”679	  Appealing	  to	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Bak’raże	  as	  “leading	  the	  life	  of	  Georgian	  tribes”	  in	  1943,	  Gamxarašvili	  complained	  specifically	  regarding	   Georgian	   school	   closures	   in	   the	   three	   districts	   but	   put	   forth	   a	   broader	  complaint	   that	   the	   region	   “breaks”	   and	   “Turkifies”	   the	   Georgian	   population.680	  He	  referred	  to	  this	  population	  as	  Georgians	  (or	  Georgian-­‐Christians,	  Georgian-­‐Muslims)	  rather	  than	  as	  Ingilo.	  For	  him,	  Zaqatala,	  Balakan,	  and	  Qax	  districts	  were	  historically	  Georgian	  regions,	  economically	  and	  culturally	  more	  tied	  to	  Tbilisi	  than	  Baku.	  In	  spite	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   arrival	   of	   Soviet	   power	  moved	   these	   districts	   from	  Georgia	   to	  Azerbaijan, 681 	  Gamxarašvili	   appealed	   to	   abstract	   Soviet	   values	   to	   rectify	   the	  problem.	   The	   issue	   lay	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   “local	   Azerbaijani	   powers	   carry	   out	   un-­‐Soviet	   policies,	   a	   policy	   of	   Turkification	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Muslim	   and	   Christian	  population.”682	  Furthermore,	  	  among	   Georgians,	   faith	   in	   the	   elementary	   justice	   of	   Azerbaijani	  authorities	   has	   absolutely	   atrophied.	   Literally	   100	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  Georgian	   population	   complains	   of	   endless	   injustice	  (nespravedlivost’)…Where,	   finally,	   is	   the	   socialist	   nationality	   policy,	  proclaimed	  by	  the	  works	  of	  Lenin	  and	  Stalin?683	  	  	  Gamxarašvili	   raised	   his	   concerns	   in	   an	   abstractly	   Soviet	   fashion,	   invoking	   Stalin’s	  decision-­‐making	   authority	   and	   Stalinist-­‐Leninist	   nationality	   policy,	   and	   drawing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  679	  Gamxarašvili	  to	  Č’arkviani	  and	  Bak’raże,	  18	  December	  1943,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  l.	  30.	  680	  Ibid.,	  l.	  31.	  681	  See	  agreement	  signed	  by	  F.	  Maxaraże	  and	  N.	  Narimanov	  in	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  l.	  28.	  The	  three	   districts	   were	   part	   of	   independent	   Georgia	   from	   1918-­‐1921,	   but	   following	   the	   Bolshevik	  takeover	  of	   the	  Caucasus	  by	  1921,	   the	  area	  was	  re-­‐districted	  to	   the	  new	  Azerbaijan	  S.S.R.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  many	  complicated	  Caucasus	  border-­‐making	  efforts	  in	  this	  period,	  which	  some	  scholars	  argue	  was	  motivated	  by	  efforts	  to	  limit	  “great	  power	  chauvinism”	  among	  Georgians	  and	  Armenians	  in	  the	  region.	  On	  this	  debate,	  see	  Smith,	  The	  Bolsheviks	  and	  the	  National	  Question,	  1917-­‐23.	  682	  Gamxarašvili	  to	  Stalin,	  10	  January	  1947,	  RGASPI,	  f.	  558,	  op.	  11,	  d.	  896,	  l.	  21.	  683	  Ibid.,	  l.	  28.	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  upon	  the	  familiar	  practice	  of	  heavily	  biographical	  expressions	  of	  grievance.684	  More	  often,	   Gamxarašvili	   embedded	   his	   depictions	   of	   Georgians	   in	   Azerbaijan	   within	   a	  longer-­‐term	   trajectory	  of	  historical	   injustice	  and	  violation	  of	  Georgian	   culture	  and	  tradition	  rather	  than	  citing	  violation	  of	  specific	  Soviet	  laws	  or	  constitutional	  rights.	  Though	  Gamxarašvili	  wrote	  most	   frequently	   in	   support	   of	   the	   Ingilo,	   other	  Tbilisi-­‐based	   citizens	   took	   up	   the	   Ingilo	   cause	   in	   the	   late	   Stalin	   era.	   Like	  Gamxarašvili,	   their	   complaints	   extended	   beyond	   the	   issue	   of	   Georgian-­‐language	  schools. 685 	  They	   included	   not	   only	   citizen	   activists,	   but	   also	   government	  functionaries	  such	  as	  a	  certain	  Isašvili,	  a	  native	  of	  Qax	  who	  was	  a	  lieutenant	  colonel	  in	  the	  Georgian	  MGB.	  In	  1950,	  he	  returned	  to	  his	  birthplace	  to	  report	  on	  conditions	  there	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   MGB	   to	   Č’arkviani.	   The	   “derogation	   of	   civil	   rights	   and	  systematic	   insult	   of	   the	   Georgian	   population’s	   national	   feeling” 686 	  in	   Saingilo	  encompassed	   such	   disparate	   efforts	   as	   attempts	   to	   limit	   spoken	   Georgian,	  resettlement	  of	  Azerbaijanis	  to	  Saingilo,	  and	  destruction	  of	  vineyards	  and	  fruit	  and	  nut	   gardens	   in	   Georgian	   villages.687	  Furthermore,	   local	   Party	   organs	   limited	   the	  membership	  possibilities	  for	  such	  candidates	  as	  Alat’emuri	  Tartarašvili,	  because	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  684	  Goff,	   “‘Why	  Not	  Love	  Our	  Language	  and	  Our	  Culture?’”	  Goff	   characterizes	  Gamxarašvili’s	  Stalin-­‐era	   letters	   as	   those	   from	  a	   “supplicant”	   position	   rather	   than	   that	   of	   a	   citizen,	   drawing	   from	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Supplicants	  and	  Citizens.”	  685	  For	  other	  letters,	  see	  also	  Janašvili	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  20	  October	  1950	  and	  Kutubiże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  22	  November	  1950,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  ll.	  143-­‐165	  and	  f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  ll.	  35-­‐42,	  68-­‐85.	  686	  Kutubiże	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  22	  November	  1950,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  l.	  38.	  687	  Georgian	  MGB	  officer	  Isašvili	  to	  Č’arkviani,	  4	  December	  1950,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  24,	  d.	  296,	  ll.	  41,	  49.	   Authorities	   allegedly	   blamed	   the	   vineyard	   destruction	   on	   the	   need	   to	   eradicate	   phylloxera,	  though	  there	  had	  been	  no	  recorded	  cases	  of	  this	  grapevine	  disease	  in	  the	  region,	  l.	  43.	  See	  also	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  18,	  d.	  180,	  l.	  148.	  While	  resettlement	  campaigns	  and	  language	  rights	  are	  familiar	  causes	  for	   complaint,	   the	   vineyard	   issue	   struck	   a	   special	   chord	  with	   Ingilo	   and	  Georgian	   advocates.	  Wine	  cultivation	  and	  winemaking	  are	  indigenous	  to	  Georgia	  (ca.	  eight	  to	  ten	  millennia	  old)	  and	  a	  source	  of	  great	  national	  and	  cultural	  pride.	  Family	  vineyards	  (venaxi),	  even	  if	  very	  small,	  were	  highly	  valued,	  particularly	  in	  Kax’et’i,	  the	  main	  wine-­‐producing	  region	  of	  Georgia.	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  “considers	   himself	   Georgian,	   often	   goes	   to	   Georgia	   and	   tries	   to	   put	   the	   Ingilo	  population	  on	  a	  path	  of	  Ingiloization.688	  As	  of	  1950,	   local	  powers	  in	  Azerbaijan	  not	  only	   facilitated	   the	   “derogation	   of	   the	   national	   interests	   of	   Georgians	   and	   their	  rebirth	  as	  Azerbaijanis,”	  but	  violated	  “the	  rights	  of	  Soviet	  citizens,	  provided	  by	  the	  Stalin	   Constitution,	   in	   particular,	   the	   section	   about	   the	   inviolability	   of	   the	   person	  (neprikosnovennosti	  lichnosti)	  of	  the	  Soviet	  citizen.”689	  	  Like	  the	  Fereydan	  question,	  the	  issue	  of	  rights	  for	  Georgians	  in	  Saingilo	  was	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  initiative	  of	  Georgian	  First	  Secretary	  Č’arkviani,	  as	  he	  revealed	  in	  his	   lengthy	  memoir.	   According	   to	   Č’arkviani,	  when	   he	   discussed	   the	   possibility	   of	  transferring	  the	  territory	  of	  Saingilo	  to	  Georgia,	  Stalin	  replied,	  “Let	  us	  consider	  how	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue.	  If	  we	  annexed	  southern	  Azerbaijan	  [referring	  to	  northern	  Iran,	  
CK],	   we	   would	   also	   solve	   your	   Saingilo	   problem.”	   Stalin’s	   cartographic	   ambitions	  reveal	   an	   understanding	   that	   territorial	   adjustments	   between	   Union	   republics,	   in	  this	   instance	   required	   mutually	   beneficial	   terms,	   whereby	   Azerbaijan	   would	   not	  merely	   cede	   territory	   to	   Georgia.	   Yet	   as	   Č’arkviani	   lamented	   in	   his	   memoir,	   “We	  could	   not	   annex	   southern	   Azerbaijan.	   Saingilo’s	   fate	   likewise	   remained	  unchanged.”690	  During	   a	   tour	   of	   Saingilo	   with	   Azerbaijan	   First	   Secretary	   Bagirov	  related	  to	  the	  education	  project,	  Bagirov	  allegedly	  told	  Č’arkviani	  that	  he	  would	  only	  give	  up	  these	  territories	  in	  exchange	  for	  Borč’alo	  and	  “northern	  Azerbaijan”	  districts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  688	  Ibid.,	  l.	  42.	  689	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  43,	  47.	  690	  Č’arkviani,	  ganc’dili	  da	  naazrevi,	  500.	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  in	  Georgia.691	  As	  had	  been	  the	  case	  with	  Fereydan,	  Č’arkviani’s	  removal	  from	  power	  in	  1951	  and	  Stalin’s	  death	  led	  to	  a	  similarly	  quiet	  period	  in	  the	  1950s	  with	  regard	  to	  Ingilo	   activism,	   at	   least	   toward	   officials	   (and	   letter	   recipients)	   in	   Tbilisi.	   	   Though	  geopolitical	   considerations	   did	   not	   hinder	   Ingilo	   activists’	   pursuits	   in	   the	   same	  manner	  as	  Fereydan	  Georgians’	  advocates,	  major	  shifts	  in	  Soviet	  politics	  and	  society	  affected	  how	  and	  when	  Ingilo	  issues	  could	  come	  to	  light.	  In	  particular,	  the	  discourse	  shift	  and	  de-­‐Stalinization	  processes	  made	  possible	  by	  Khrushchev’s	  secret	  speech	  at	  the	  CPSU	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	   in	  1956	  and	  de-­‐centralization	  of	  control	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  republics	  led	  to	  greater	  autonomy	  for	  Georgia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  and,	  further,	  a	  period	  of	  more	  concerted	  Azerbaijani	  nationalization	   in	   the	  1950s.692	  This	  process	  peaked	  in	  1959,	  when	  Azerbaijan	  First	  Secretary	  I.D.	  Mustafaev	  and	  I.A.	   Ibragimov	  were	   removed	   from	   power	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   temper	   official	   nationalism	   linked	   to	  language	  policy	  and	  education	  reforms.693	  	  In	  this	  atmosphere,	  the	  Ingilo	  issue	  reemerged	  as	  citizens	  in	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Georgia	   protested	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   Ingilos	  were	   categorized	   in	   the	   1959	   all-­‐Union	  census.	  “Ingilo”	  did	  not	  appear	  as	  a	  category	  in	  any	  Soviet	  census,	  so	  the	  issue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  691	  Ibid.,	   502.	   “Northern	   Azerbaijan”	   most	   likely	   refers	   to	   the	   K’vemo	   K’art’li	   district	   of	   Georgia,	  which	  had	  a	  large	  Azerbaijani	  population.	  The	  region’s	  historical	  name	  was	  Borč’alo.	  692	  On	  the	  March	  1956	  events	  in	  Georgia,	  see	  Chapter	  3.	  On	  Khrushchev’s	  de-­‐centralization	  drive	  and	  its	   impact	  on	   the	  republics,	   see	  Simon,	  Nationalism	  and	  Policy	  and	  Smith,	  Red	  Nations,	  189-­‐215.	  On	  Azerbaijan	   in	   the	   1950s,	   see	   Gasanly,	   Khrushchevskaia	   “ottepel”	   i	   natsional’nyi	   vopros	   v	  
Azerbaidzhane;	   El’dar	   Ismailov,	   Vlast’	   i	   narod:	   Poslevoennyi	   stalinizm	   v	   Azerbaidzhane,	   1945-­‐1953	  (Baku:	   Adil’ogly,	   2003);	   and	   Ismailov,	   Azerbaidzhan	   -­‐	   1953-­‐1956	   pervye	   gody	   "ottepeli”	   (Baku:	  Adil’ogly,	  2006).	  693	  The	  purges	  in	  Azerbaijan	  were	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  replacement	  of	  republican	  leadership	  in	  1958-­‐59	  that	  affected	  Turkmenistan,	  Uzbekistan,	  Latvia	  and	  (in	  1961)	  Moldova	  and	  Tajikistan.	  The	  Georgian	  Party	   avoided	   such	   a	   purge,	   perhaps	   due	   to	  Mžavanaże’s	   close	   relationship	   with	   Khrushchev	   and	  other	   “Ukrainians”	   in	  Moscow.	  See	  Simon,	  Nationalism	  and	  Policy,	  251-­‐254	  and	  Smith,	  Red	  Nations,	  200-­‐215.	  	  
	   299	  was	  whether	  these	  populations	  were	  categorized	  as	  Georgian,	  “Tiurk”	  (1926,	  1937),	  or	   “Azerbaijani”	   (1939,	   1959).694	  According	   to	  Gamxarašvili,	   in	   the	  1939	  all-­‐Union	  census,	  Qax,	  Balakan,	  and	  Zaqatala	  districts	  contained	  a	  total	  population	  of	  105,538,	  comprised	   of	   the	   following	   nationalities:	   Lezgin-­‐Avar	   (55,000);	   Georgian-­‐Muslims	  (20,000)	   and	  Georgian-­‐Orthodox	   (12,000);	   Turks	   and	  Mugals	   (12,000);	   and	  6,538	  others	  (Russians,	  Armenians,	  etc.).695	  In	  his	  earlier	  appeals	  to	  Stalin	  and	  Č’arkviani,	  Gamxarašvili	  used	  these	  figures	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  large	  Georgian	  populations	  were,	   in	   fact,	   Georgian	   and	   not	   Azerbaijani.	   This	   correction	   applied	   especially	   to	  Georgian-­‐Muslims.696	  According	   to	   the	   1959	   census,	   Balakan,	   Zaqatala,	   and	   Qax	  districts	  had	  a	  combined	  population	  of	  108,832,	  of	  which	  5,077	  (4.7	  per	  cent)	  were	  Georgians	  by	  nationality.	  A	  group	  of	  Georgian	   Ingilo	  petitioners	   insisted,	  however,	  that	  the	  number	  of	  Georgians	  in	  these	  three	  districts	  was	  really	  between	  27,000	  and	  33,000	  people,	   or	  25-­‐30	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  population	   (and	  a	  number	   comparable	   to	  that	  of	   the	  1939	   census).	  These	  petitioners	   in	  particular	  highlighted	   the	  primarily	  Georgian	   villages	   of	   Aliabad	   and	   Mosul	   (Zaqatala	   district),	   where	   of	   2,584	   total	  residents,	   1,947	   claimed	   to	   be	  Azerbaijani	   and	  only	   318	  Georgian.697	  According	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  694	  On	  the	  evolution	  of	  Soviet	  national	  categorization	  and	  nomenclature	  see	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations	  and,	  with	  regard	  to	  categories	  in	  Georgia,	  Chapter	  1	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  695	  It	  is	  unclear	  how	  Gamxarašvili	  arrived	  at	  these	  figures,	  as	  they	  differ	  from	  the	  figures	  published	  by	   the	   Central	   Statistical	   Administration	   (CSA).	   According	   to	   the	   CSA	   figures,	   in	   1939	   there	   were	  10,196	  Georgians	   in	  Azerbaijan,	   and	   in	   1959	  only	   9,526	  Georgians	   in	  Azerbaijan.	   See	  Vsesoiuznaia	  
perepis’	  naseleniia	  1939	  goda,	   71,	   and	  Tsentral’noe	   Statisticheskoe	  Upravlenie	  pri	   Sovete	  Ministrov	  SSSR,	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia:	   Azerbaidzhanskaia	   SSR	   (Moscow:	   Gosizdat,	   1963),	   134-­‐135.	  696	  “SPRAVKA	   o	   Belakanskom,	   Zakatal’skom	   i	   Kakhskom	   raionakh,”	   G.S.	   Gamxarašvili,	   15	   January	  1944,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   18,	   d.	   180,	   l.	   41.	   In	   the	   1926	   census,	   for	   example,	   it	   seems	   that	   only	  Georgian-­‐Christians	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Qax	  were	  counted	  as	  Georgian.	  697	  Head	   of	   USSR	   Central	   Statistical	   Administrations	   Starovskii	   to	  Mžavanaże,	   11	   December	   1959,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  ll.	  1-­‐3.	  
	   300	  Ildrim	  Musaev,	  a	  Georgian	  Ingilo	  student	  at	  Tbilisi	  State	  University,	  Georgians	  were	  registered	   as	   Azerbaijanis	   “under	   pressure”	   and	   did	   not	   fill	   out	   the	   census	   forms	  individually	  or	  according	  to	  their	  own	  wishes.698	  M.	  Shabanov,	  a	  census	  worker	  and	  resident	  of	  Aliabad,	  similarly	  noted,	  “We	  are	  afraid	  and	  cannot	  speak	  the	  truth.”699	  A	  colleague	  elaborated	   that	   “We	  are	  afraid	  of	   the	   local	  powers,	  we	  cannot	  speak	   the	  whole	  truth,	  but	  if	  we	  say	  everything,	  then	  they	  will	  remove	  us	  from	  our	  posts	  and	  expel	   us	   from	   the	   district.”700	  Later	   that	   year,	   as	  Musaev	   and	   others	   continued	   to	  write	  petitions,	  Gamxarašvili	  likewise	  joined	  the	  cause.	  	  The	  petitioners	  addressed	   their	   letters	   to	   the	  USSR	  and	  Azerbaijani	  Central	  Statistical	  Administrations	  (CSA),	  as	  this	  organ	  managed	  the	  census-­‐taking	  process.	  Thus,	   the	  appeals	   focused	  on	  violation	  of	   census-­‐taking	  procedure	  rather	   than	   the	  nationally	   motivated	   rights-­‐talk	   that	   underscored	   previous	   letter	   campaigns.	  Furthermore,	  though	  local	  authorities	  in	  the	  three	  Saingilo	  districts	  received	  most	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  these	  “mistakes,”	  Gamxarašvili	  likewise	  implicated	  the	  recently	  ousted	  Azerbaijani	   First	   Secretary	   Mustafaev	   in	   the	   affair. 701 	  In	   spite	   of	   Musaev,	  Gamxarašvili,	  and	  others’	  efforts,	  V.	  Starovskii,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  of	  the	  USSR	  CSA,	  concluded	  that	  no	  such	  mistakes	  had	  occurred,	  citing	  the	  five	  thousand	  Georgians	  in	  the	  three	  districts	  who	  had	  self-­‐identified	  in	  the	  census	  as	  Georgian	  by	  nationality,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  698	  Ildrim	  Musaev	  to	  Pod’iachikh,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  l.	  11.	  699	  “Poiasnenie	   na	   pis’mo	   Zamestitelia	   Nachal’nika	   Glavnogo	   SU	   tov.	   P.	   Pod”iachikh	   ot	   21	   avgusta	  1959	  goda,”	  Emeedina	  Dzhafarovich	  Shabanov,	  census-­‐taker	  and	  resident	  of	  the	  village	  of	  Aliabad,	  29	  September	  1959,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  l.	  10.	  700	  Ildrim	  Musaev	  to	  Pod’iachikh,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  l.	  11.	  701	  Gamxarašvili	  to	  Starovskii	  and	  Kozlov,	  10	  October	  1959,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  ll.	  4-­‐9.	  
	   301	  challenging	  the	  assertion	  that	  others	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  local	  authorities.702	  Only	   at	   this	   point	   (December	   1959)	   did	   the	   CSA	   involve	   Georgian	   First	   Secretary	  Mžavanaże	  in	  this	  issue,	  most	  likely	  due	  both	  to	  the	  Georgian	  nationality	  in	  question	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  petitioners	  wrote	  from	  Tbilisi.	  	  The	   issue	   resurfaced	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1970	   all-­‐Union	   census,	   when	   G.	  Č’angašvili,	   a	   geographer,	   alleged	   that	   the	   census	   forms	   of	  Georgian-­‐Muslims	  who	  refused	   to	   write	   “Azerbaijani”	   as	   their	   nationality	   were	   destroyed	   and	   rewritten.	  This	   “forced	   assimilation”	   also	   applied	   to	   “Dagestanis”	   (primarily	   Lezgins)	   of	   the	  district,	  in	  addition	  to	  Georgian-­‐Muslims.703	  Č’angašvili	  used	  the	  census	  episodes	  as	  an	  example	  of	  crimes	  and	  violations	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Constitution	  and	  Party	  policies	  by	  Azerbaijani	   authorities.	   A	   lengthy,	   signed	   petition	   from	   a	   group	   of	   residents	   from	  Zaqatala	   and	  Balakan	   districts	   in	   1972	   elaborated	   on	   the	   census	   complaints.	   This	  petition	   is	  worth	   examining	   in	   greater	   detail	   for	   several	   reasons.	   Not	   only	  was	   it	  written	   and	   signed	  by	   several	   current	   residents	   of	   Saingilo,	   it	  was	   also	  written	   in	  Georgian	   and	   addressed	   to	   a	   Georgian	   official	   (G.	   Jiblaże,	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Education),	   unlike	   the	   largely	   Russian-­‐language	   complaints	   issued	   to	   Moscow	   or	  Baku	   or,	   during	   the	   Stalin	   era,	   to	   Tbilisi.	   As	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   the	   1940s,	   the	  petitioners’	  primary	  complaint	  remained	  rights	  to	  language	  and	  education,	  yet	  they	  embedded	   these	   issues	   within	   a	   broader	   grievance	   about	   national	   and	   cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  702	  Starovskii	  to	  Mžavanaże,	  11	  December	  1959,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  34,	  d.	  242g,	  l.	  3.	  703	  “DANNYE	  o	  polozhenii	  gruzinskogo	  naseleniia	  Belokanskogo,	  Zakatal’skogo	  i	  Kakhskogo	  raionov	  AzSSR,”	  G.	  Č’angašvili,	  6	  March	  1972,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  47,	  d.	  379,	  l.	  6.	  
	   302	  rights	   for	   minorities	   (including	   their	   Lezgin	   neighbors)	   in	   Soviet	   Azerbaijan.	   For	  instance,	  the	  petitioners	  argued,	  	  We	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  (up’leba)	  to	  say	  we	  are	  Ingilo	  or	  Georgian,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  bear	  a	  Georgian	  surname,	  call	  our	  children	  by	  Georgian	  names,	  educate	  our	  kindergarten-­‐aged	  children	  in	  Georgian	  kindergartens;	   Georgian-­‐educated	   Ingilos	   do	   not	   have	   the	   right	   to	  work	   in	   the	   District	   Committee,	   Executive	   Committee,	   in	   education,	  the	  police,	  the	  procuracy,	  and	  so	  forth.704	  	  Their	   complaints	   regarding	   the	   1959	   and	   1970	   censuses	   likewise	   fit	   into	   this	  framework.	   According	   to	   the	   petition,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1970	   census,	   in	   lieu	   of	  writing	   “Georgian”	   for	   native	   language	   (mšobliuri	   ena),	   census	   takers	   entered	  “Azerbaijani”;	   and	   rather	   than	   entering	   “Georgian”	   or	   “Ingilo”	   for	   nationality	  (erovneba),	   they	  wrote	   “Azerbaijani.”	  This	   caused	   “outrage”	   among	   the	  population	  and	  caused	  the	  census	  to	  be	  suspended	  for	  several	  days.	  A	  group	  from	  Zaqatala	  tried	  to	   send	   telegrams	   about	   this	   to	   Moscow	   from	   Lagodexi	   (across	   the	   border	   in	  Georgia)	  without	  success,	  and	  they	  accused	  district	  leaders	  of	  falsifying	  census	  cards	  not	  only	  for	  Ingilos,	  but	  also	  for	  Lezgins.705	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  conditions	  by	  the	  1970s	  for	  Georgians	  in	  Saingilo	  appear	  to	  have	   deteriorated	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   to	   generate	   appeals	   from	   Ingilo	   citizens	  themselves	   (rather	   than	   urban	   interlocutors	   in	   Georgia)	   for	   help	   to	   officials	   in	  Tbilisi,	  albeit	  without	  much	  success.	  Alternatively,	  this	  shift	  could	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  growing	  culture	  of	  participatory	  citizenship	  cultivated	  in	  the	  Khrushchev	  era,	  as	  Krista	  Goff	  has	   shown,	   that	   compelled	  a	  more	   literate,	   active	  populace	   to	  hold	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  704	  “mokled	  ingilot’a	  mdgomareobaze	  saingiloši,”	  to	  G.	  Jiblaże,	  10	  April	  1072,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  47,	  d.	  383,	  l.	  11.	  705	  Ibid.,	  l.	  16.	  
	   303	  state	   accountable	   for	   defense	   of	   their	   rights,	   both	   national	   and	   Soviet.706	  As	   the	  group	   petition	   from	   Zaqatala	   and	   Balakan	   claimed,	   “In	   the	   past	   12-­‐15	   years	   the	  Tatar	   more	   grossly	   violates	   our	   national	   rights	   (erovnuli	   up’lebi).	   Some	   bold	   and	  activist	   Ingilos,	   who	   resisted	   their	   policies	   of	   assimilation,	   were	   also	   physically	  assaulted.”707	  Aside	  from	  offering	  modest	  support	  for	  Georgian-­‐language	  schools	  in	  the	  region,	  Georgian	   institutions	  and	   individuals	  could	  effect	   little	  change	  for	  their	  Ingilo	   counterparts.	   Even	   a	   1970	   Georgian	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   ethnographic	  expedition	   to	   study	   life	   and	   culture	   in	   Saingilo	   encountered	   problems	   from	  authorities	   once	   in	   Azerbaijan	   and	   was	   recalled	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   project	   from	  Lagodexi	  instead.708	  	  Whereas	   supporting	   the	   rights	   of	   co-­‐nationals	   across	   republic	   borders	  through	   official	   channels	   grew	   more	   difficult	   as	   republican	   autonomy	   increased,	  these	   issues	   provided	   potential	   fodder	   for	   nationalist	   dissidents	   in	   the	   late	   Soviet	  era.	   As	   late	   as	   1988,	   the	   Georgian	   KGB	   acknowledged	   the	   similarity	   between	   the	  “Ingilo	  question”	  and	  events	  unfolding	   in	  Nagornyi	  Karabakh.	  Georgian	  nationalist	  dissidents	   such	   as	   Merab	   Kostava	   and	   Zviad	   Gamsaxurdia	   argued,	   echoing	  Gamxarašvili’s	  earliest	  appeals,	  that	  “Saingilo,	  a	  genuinely	  Georgian	  land	  that	  is	  now	  located	   as	   part	   of	   Azerbaijan,	   should	   belong	   to	   Georgia.	   This	   territory	   was	   [like	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  706	  Goff,	  “‘Why	  Not	  Love	  Our	  Language	  and	  Our	  Culture?’”,	  37-­‐39.	  707	  “mokled	   ingilot’a	   mdgomareobaze	   saingiloši,”	   signed	   group	   petition	   “in	   the	   name	   of	   Zaqatala-­‐Balakan	  districts	  Ingilos”	  to	  G.	  Jiblaże,	  10	  April	  1072,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  47,	  d.	  383,	  l.	  11.	  In	  addition	  to	  education	  and	  language	  rights	  and	  census	  practices,	  protection	  of	  Georgian	  cultural	  monuments	  in	  Saingilo	   provided	   a	   further	   complaint	   around	   which	   petitioners	   built	   broader	   claims.	   See,	   for	  example,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  44,	  d.	  341,	  ll.	  3-­‐14.	  708	  “Otchet	  raboty	  Otdela	  etnografii	  Gruzii	  sektora	  etnografii	  Instituta	  istorii,	  arkheologii	  i	  etnografii	  im.	   I.A.	   Dzhavakhishvili	   za	   1970	   g.,”	   smeaa,	   f.	   9,	   op.	   1,	   d.	   820	   and	   smeaa	   f.	   9,	   op.	   1,	   d.	   803.	   This	  expedition	  was	  a	  project	  of	  the	  Ivane	  Javaxišvili	  Institute	  of	  History,	  Archeology,	  and	  Ethnography.	  	  
	   304	  Karabakh,	   CK]	   also	   transferred	   immediately	   after	   Sovietization.”709	  Conflict	   over	  Saingilo	   did	   not	   materialize	   as	   it	   did	   in	   Nagornyi	   Karabakh,	   Abkhazia,	   or	   South	  Ossetia	   as	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   unraveled.	   Yet	   the	   structures	   of	   grievance,	   desire	   to	  remedy	   historical	   injustice,	   and	   space	   between	   rights	   of	   entitled	   and	   non-­‐entitled	  populations	   in	   many	   ways	   resemble	   the	   mobilization	   of	   an	   Abkhaz	   national	  movement,	  examined	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
Peasants	  into	  Georgians?	  	   For	  all	  their	  efforts,	  the	  campaigns	  for	  Fereydan	  and	  Ingilo	  Georgians	  fell	  far	  short	   of	   their	   proponents’	   intentions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Fereydan,	   the	   international	  political	  situation	  and	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  priorities	  delayed	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  repatriation	  effort	  and	  perhaps	  also	  limited	  the	  total	  number	  eligible	  for	  “return”	  to	  Georgia.	  However,	  the	  realities	  of	  life	  in	  Kaxet’i	  for	  the	  repatriates	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  just	  as	  jarring	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  as	  they	  found	  it	  in	  the	  1970s.710	  The	  tenacity	  of	  Georgian	  officials	  and	  bureaucrats	  in	  pursuing	  the	  “Fereydan	  question”	  nevertheless	  reveals	  the	  bounds	  of	  Georgian	  nationality	  as	  conceived	  and	  promoted	  by	  republic	  officials	   as	  well	   as	   the	  possibilities	   for	   engaging	   in	   nation-­‐state-­‐like	   foreign	  policy	  practices	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   Soviet	   federalism.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Saingilo,	   the	  concurrent	   postwar	   nationalization	   projects	   of	   neighboring	   Soviet	   republics	  muddled	   the	   reach	   of	   Tbilisi-­‐based	   assistance	   for	   the	   Georgian	   minority	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  709	  Chairman	  of	  Georgian	  KGB	  A.I.	  Inauri	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  14	  March	  1988,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  129,	  d.	  169,	  l.	  40.	  	  710	  Repatriated	  Armenians	  faced	  similar	  challenges	  and	  disillusionment	  with	  their	  “return”	  to	  Soviet	  Armenia,	  albeit	  in	  far	  greater	  numbers.	  See	  Lehmann,	  “A	  Different	  Kind	  of	  Brothers.”	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  Azerbaijan.	   Unlike	   the	   Fereydan	   campaign,	   however,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   decisive	  factor	   in	   limiting	   Georgian	   activity	   toward	   the	   Ingilo	   lay	  with	   authorities	   in	   Baku	  rather	  than	  in	  Moscow.	  The	  tangible	  republican	  limits	  of	  Soviet	  federalism	  come	  to	  light	  in	  this	  instance.	  	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   “Piedmont	   Principle,”	   coined	   to	   describe	   Soviet	   outreach	  toward	   non-­‐Soviet	   Ukrainians	   in	   the	   1920s,	   helps	   to	   illustrate	   postwar	   Georgian	  aims	   in	  Fereydan	  and	  Saingilo.	  The	   repatriation	   campaign	   for	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  appears	  as	  the	  clearest	  example	  of	  this,	  though,	  as	  was	  also	  the	  case	  in	  Ukraine,	  the	  Piedmont	   approach	   likewise	   inspired	   territorial	   claims	   against	   other	   Soviet	  republics. 711 	  Č’arkviani’s	   and	   Gamxarašvili’s	   appeals	   to	   Stalin	   to	   re-­‐join	   Qax,	  Zaqatala,	  and	  Balakan	  districts	  to	  Georgia	  from	  Azerbaijan	  reflect	  a	  similar	  intent	  to	  Ukrainian	   territorial	   ambitions	   in	   the	   1920s.	  712	  An	   important	   distinction	   remains,	  however.	  While	  Martin	  depicts	   a	   progression	   (or	  de-­‐evolution,	   depending	  on	  how	  one	  views	  it)	  from	  the	  Piedmont	  Principle	  in	  the	  1920s	  to	  “Soviet	  xenophobia”	  in	  the	  1930s,	  postwar	  Georgian	  policies	  present	  a	  more	  multifaceted	  picture.	  	  In	  the	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s,	  Georgian	  officials	  and	  citizens	  adopted	  a	  “Piedmont”	  ethos	  toward	  co-­‐ethnics	   in	   Iran	  and	  adjacent	   territory	   in	  Azerbaijan.	  Meanwhile,	   new	  perceived	  threats	   in	   the	   early	   Cold	   War	   environment	   precipitated	   a	   revised	   “Soviet	  xenophobia”	   that	   caused	   further	   nationally-­‐based	   deportations	   in	   the	   postwar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  711	  Territorial	   claims	  were	  only	  one	  of	  many	   tools	  available	   for	  pursuing	   the	   “Piedmont	  Principle,”	  including	  also	  population	  transfers	  and	  sustained	  outreach	  to	  diasporic	  communities.	  712	  For	   example,	  Martin	   notes	   the	   (ultimately	   unsuccessful)	   attempt	   advocated	   by	   Ukrainian	   First	  Secretary	   Skrypnyk	   in	   1924	   to	   eventually	   annex	   not	   only	   “Polish	   Ukraine,”	   but	   also	   neighboring	  territories	   in	   the	   RSFSR	   with	   majority	   Ukrainian	   populations.	   See	   Martin,	   The	   Affirmative	   Action	  
Empire,	  278-­‐291.	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  period,	   described	   in	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   Expanding	   on	   Francine	   Hirsch’s	   point,	   I	  argue	   that	   dual	   pursuit	   of	   these	   aims	   in	   the	   postwar	   period	   affirms	   rather	   than	  retreats	   from	   Soviet	   long-­‐term	   goals,	   whereby	   smaller	   ethnic	   groups	   were	   to	   be	  amalgamated	   into	  a	  more	   limited	  number	  of	  developed	   “Soviet”	  nationalities	  over	  time.713	  	   In	   the	   post-­‐Stalin	   period,	   when	   the	   Party-­‐state	   abandoned	   the	   tools	   of	  terror,	  such	  as	  nationally-­‐based	  deportations,	  that	  had	  operationalized	  xenophobia	  in	  the	  Stalin	  era,	  a	  participatory,	  more	  popular	  form	  of	  nation-­‐building	  encouraged	  Soviet	   Georgians	   to	   engage	   with	   and	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	   “Piedmonts”	   in	   more	  productive	   ways	   as	   the	   territory	   of	   Georgian	   underwent	   its	   own	   form	   of	  nationalization.	  Concurrent	  nationalization	  processes	  in	  Azerbaijan	  from	  the	  1950s	  onward	   limited	   the	  possibilities	   of	   access	   to	   the	   Saingilo	   “Piedmont,”	  whereas	   the	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  provided	  a	  tempting	  potential	  not	  only	  to	  inject	  Soviet	  cultural	  and	   economic	   resources	   and	   expertise	   into	   this	   rural	   region	   of	   Iran,	   but	   also	   to	  eventually	  incorporate	  these	  brethren	  from	  abroad	  into	  Soviet	  Georgian	  society.	  	  	   The	  question	  of	  nationality	  drove	  efforts	  in	  both	  Fereydan	  and	  Saingilo.	  The	  Georgian	   nation	   toward	   which	   Tbilisi	   officials,	   local	   advocates,	   and	   petitioners	  worked	  adhered	  to	  an	  increasingly	  primordial	  conception	  of	  nationhood	  propagated	  from	   the	   mid-­‐1930s,	   with	   an	   emphasis	   on	   a	   shared	   language	   and	   community	   of	  culture.714	  This	   is	   especially	   relevant	   in	   the	   Georgian	   case	   considering	   the	   high	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  713	  Hirsch,	   Empire	   of	   Nations,	   8-­‐9.	   Hirsch	   directly	   refutes	   Martin’s	   portrayal	   of	   this	   process	   as	   a	  “retreat”	  from	  affirmative	  action	  and	  nation-­‐building	  policies	  pursued	  in	  the	  1920s.	  714As	   noted	   above,	   scholars	   of	   Soviet	   nationality	   policies	   disagree	   regarding	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  increasing	  primordialism	  and	  the	  reduction	  in	  numbers	  of	  nationalities	  constituted	  a	  “retreat”	  from	  the	  “ethnophilia”	  of	  the	  1920s.	  See	  in	  particular	  Martin,	  The	  Affirmative	  Action	  Empire;	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  
of	  Nations;	  Suny,	  “Constructing	  Primordialism";	  and	  Smith,	  Red	  Nations.	  	  
	   307	  geographic	   concentration	   of	   Georgians	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Descriptions	   of	   the	  populations	  in	  Fereydan	  and	  Qax,	  Zaqatala,	  and	  Balakan	  districts	  by	  Soviet	  officials	  highlighted	   cultural	   practices	   that	   would	   convincingly	   link	   these	   communities	   to	  “homeland”	   Georgians,	   from	   music	   and	   dance,	   viticulture,	   and	   cuisine	   to	  architecture.	  But	  in	  both	  cases,	  language	  provided	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  legitimacy	  for	   inclusion	   in	   the	   Georgian	   nation	   and	   justification	   for	   intervention	   by	   Tbilisi.	  Religion,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  theoretically	  a	  remnant	  of	  pre-­‐socialist	  society,	  was	  a	  distinction	   to	   be	   overcome	   through	   contact	   with	   Soviet	   Georgia.	   Like	   Georgian	  Muslims	  in	  Ajaria,	  Georgian	  Muslims	  in	  Fereydan	  could,	   in	  theory,	  be	  incorporated	  into	  Soviet	  Georgian	  society	  due	  to	  more	  privileged,	  shared	  markers	  of	  nationality	  such	  as	  language	  and	  historical	  territory.	  In	  Saingilo,	  the	  ascribed	  national	  cleavages	  imposed	  by	   local	  authorities,	  whereby	  Georgian	  Muslims	  “became”	  Azerbaijani	  yet	  Georgian	  Christians	   remained	  Georgian	   (even	   if	   both	   groups	   comprised	  Georgian-­‐speakers),	   inspired	   action	   from	   Tbilisi	   and	   by	   local	   petitioners.715	  These	   markers	  evoked	   a	   pre-­‐modern	  Georgian	   cultural	   community,	  when	   ancestors	   of	  Georgians,	  Fereydan	   Georgians,	   and	   Ingilo	   purportedly	   lived	   together	   in	   a	   shared	   Kaxet’ian	  territory.	   Soviet	   Georgian	   nation-­‐builders	   endeavored	   not	   only	   to	   identify	   such	  linkages,	  but	  also	  awaken	  these	  communities	  to	  consciousness	  as	  Georgians	  outside	  their	  “homeland.”716	  In	  their	  intentions,	  Georgian	  officials	  and	  advocates	  recalled	  the	  nation-­‐building	   ethos	   of	   the	   korenizatsiia	   era.	   Extraterritorial	   Georgian	   nation-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  715	  In	  this	  sense,	   the	  approach	  of	  Azerbaijani	  officials	  resembles	  that	  of	   Iran,	  which	  considered	  any	  Muslim	   citizen	   Iranian	   yet	   distinguished	   between	   other	   ethno-­‐religious	   communities,	   such	   as	  Armenians.	  716	  The	   idea	   of	   self-­‐consciousness	   (samosoznanie)	   as	   a	   Georgian	  was	   particularly	   important	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Fereydan,	  according	  to	  reporting	  from	  Soviet	  Georgian	  officials.	  
	   308	  building,	   therefore,	   privileged	   language	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   nationality	   that	   justified	  protection	  and	  propagation	  through	  Soviet	  Georgian	  institutions.	  	   The	   categories	   used	   to	   describe	   these	   populations	   reflect	   the	   centrality	   of	  nationality	  as	  a	  category	  in	  inspiring	  the	  campaigns.	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  described	  themselves	  simply	  as	   “Georgians.”	   In	  Soviet	  official	   correspondence	  with	  Tbilisi	  or	  Moscow,	   they	   were	   either	   “Iranian	   Georgians,”	   “Fereydan	   Georgians,”	   or	  “Fereydanis,”	   but	   the	   question	   of	   their	   authentic	   “Georgianness”	   during	   the	  campaign	   did	   not	   arise.	   This	   issue	   emerged	   only	   once	   repatriates	   struggled	   to	  integrate	   into	  Kaxet’ian	   society	  due	   to	   their	   Iranian	  and	  Muslim	  cultural	  practices	  (including	   abstaining	   from	   alcohol	   and	   pork,	   sitting	   on	   the	   ground,	   and	   veiling	  women),	   causing	   some	   to	   feel	   (derogatively)	   like	   “Tatars”	   in	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   yet	  like	   the	   venerable	   “Gurji”	   in	   Iran.717	  Still,	   Fereydan	   Georgians	   and	   their	   Soviet	  advocates	   unambiguously	   viewed	   the	   territory	   of	   Georgia	   as	   samšoblo,	   or	   the	  homeland,	  and	  the	  Fereydan	  region	  as	  a	  place	  of	  exile.	  	  This	  common	  theme	  in	  Georgian	  national	  discourse	  did	  not	  appear	  in	  appeals	  from	   Saingilo	   because,	   for	   Ingilo	   advocates,	   Qax,	   Zaqatala,	   and	   Balakan	   districts	  were	   already	   culturally	   and	   historically	   a	   part	   of	   Georgia,	   if	   a	   victim	   of	   Soviet	  border-­‐making.	   Calls	   to	   move	   these	   districts	   to	   Georgia	   decreased	   over	   time	   as	  petitioners	   turned	   their	   attention	   to	   demanding	   their	   rights	   as	   Soviet	   citizens.718	  Ingilo	  categorization	  and	  self-­‐categorization	  proved	  more	  complicated	  than	  for	  the	  Fereydan	  Georgians.	  Tbilisi-­‐based	  advocates	  described	  this	  population	  as	  Georgian,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  717	  C’agareišvili,	  p’ereidnelebi	  sak’art’veloši,	  34.	  718	  Goff,	  “‘Why	  Not	  Love	  Our	  Language	  and	  Our	  Culture?’”,	  34-­‐39.	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  Muslim-­‐Georgian,	   Christian-­‐Georgian,	   or	   Ingilo;	   petitioners	   in	   Qax,	   Zaqatala,	   and	  Balakan	   districts	   called	   themselves	   either	   Georgian	   or	   Ingilo.	   The	   “Georgian-­‐speaking	  Azerbaijani”	  category	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  local	  authorities	  in	  Azerbaijan	  to	  count	  Muslim	  Georgians	  among	  the	  entitled	  Azerbaijani	  population	  and	  justify	  the	  closure	   of	   non-­‐Azerbaijani	   schools	   in	   the	   region.	   Letter	   writers	   and	   petitioners	  contrasted	  Georgians	  and	  Ingilos	  with	  the	  “Turks,”	  “Tatars,”	  and	  “Mullahs”	  allegedly	  attempting	  to	  forcibly	  assimilate	  them	  into	  an	  “Azerbaijani”	  nationality	  category.	  	  In	  a	  Soviet	  state	  where	  nationality	  remained	  a	  –	  if	  not	  the	  –	  most	  important	  societal	  marker,	  endowed	  with	  certain	  rights	  and	  privileges	  depending	  on	  entitled	  status,	   Georgian	   officials,	   bureaucrats,	   and	   petitioners	   sought	   to	   mobilize	   the	  institutional	   tools	   of	   their	   republic	   to	   expand	   the	   breadth	   of	   “Georgianness”	   as	   a	  category	   and	   defend	   those	   communities	   included	   in	   this	   purview.	   Again,	   intent	  reveals	   more	   than	   results	   in	   this	   case.	   New,	   postwar	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  Georgian	   MFA	   pursued	   the	   Fereydan	   question	   on	   a	   strategic	   level,	   negotiating	  among	  Moscow’s	  imperatives,	  relations	  with	  Iran,	  and	  explicitly	  Georgian	  goals.	  As	  the	   primary	   institutional	   advocate	   for	   repatriation,	   the	   Georgian	   MFA	   tested	   the	  parameters	  of	   its	  mandate	  and	  achieved	  a	   limited	  degree	  of	  operational	  success	   in	  doing	   so.	   A	   Georgian	   foreign	   policy	   that	   embraced	   Soviet	   structures	   yet	   operated	  somewhat	   independently	   contrasts	   with	   the	   assumed	   fictive	   capacity	   of	   the	  republican	   MFAs	   to	   pursue	   a	   national	   agenda.	   GOKS	   and	   the	   Georgian	   ME	  contributed	  to	  the	  Fereydan	  campaign	  through	  supportive,	  sustained	  roles	   in	   Iran.	  The	   Georgian	   ME	   played	   a	   considerably	   greater	   role	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   “Ingilo	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  question,”	  as	  access	  to	  Georgian-­‐language	  education	  remained	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  complaint	   among	   Ingilo	   advocates	   and	   residents	   of	   Qax,	   Zaqatala,	   and	   Balakan	  districts.	   The	   Georgian	   ME	   provided	   teachers,	   training,	   and	   Georgian-­‐language	  materials;	   facilitated	   study	   in	   Georgian	   institutes	   of	   higher	   education	   for	   Ingilo	  students;	  and	  served	  as	  a	  logical	  addressee	  for	  petitioners.	  	  Engagement	   with	   these	   institutions,	   whether	   as	   a	   proactive	   official	  (Č’arkviani,	   Kiknaże,	   and	   Aslanikašvili),	   concerned	   citizen	   (Gamxarašvili),	   or	  anonymous	  petitioner	  strengthened	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  republic-­‐level	  organs	  for	  national	  purposes.	  Patron-­‐client	  networks	  and	  personal	  interests	  in	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Georgian	  affairs	  permitted	   the	  activist	  approach	   toward	  co-­‐nationals	   in	   the	   late	  Stalin	  era.	  With	  the	  subsequent	  loss	  of	  clear	  advocates	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Tbilisi,	  in	  the	  Thaw	  era	  and	  beyond,	  citizens	  themselves	  had	  to	  become	  the	  leading	  advocates	  for	  Fereydan	   and	   Ingilo	   Georgian	   issues.	   Pursuing	   local	   agendas	   through	   official	  channels	   further	   rooted	   Soviet	   power	   in	   the	   only	   prewar	   republic	   that	   had	   truly	  been	   conquered	   from	  without	   by	   the	   Red	   Army	   (in	   1921).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  limited	   success	   of	   the	   campaigns	   for	   Fereydan	   and	   Saingilo	   strengthened	   the	  territorial	   borders	   as	   institutions	   between	   Georgia	   and	   Azerbaijan.	   Compared	   to	  protests	   over	   borders	   and	   sovereignty	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	   Nagornyi	   Karabakh,	   for	  example,	   the	   border	   between	   Georgia	   and	   Azerbaijan	   achieved	   a	   certain	   fixity	  through	  institutional	  interactions	  such	  as	  those	  elaborated	  above.	  Over	   time,	   Ingilo	  activists	  and	  petitioners	  embraced	   the	  discourse	  of	  Soviet	  rights	   as	   a	   way	   to	   protest	   encroachments	   by	   local	   authorities	   in	   Azerbaijan.	   As	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  rights-­‐speak	   evolved,	   so	   too	   did	   the	   specificity	   of	   their	   claims.	   Fereydan	  Georgian	  advocates,	   meanwhile,	   turned	   to	   Soviet	   ideology	   to	   justify	   their	   nation-­‐building	  efforts.	   Lingering	   “feudal”	   social	   structures,	   lack	   of	   educational	   opportunities,	  illiteracy,	   repression	   of	   women,	   poor	   sanitary	   and	   medical	   facilities,	   and	   the	  prevalence	  of	  Islam	  among	  Fereydan	  Georgians	  presented	  problems	  to	  be	  resolved	  by	   bringing	   these	   co-­‐nationals	   into	   the	   Soviet	   orbit,	   whether	   by	   local	   activism	   in	  Fereydan	  or	  repatriation.	  Admittedly,	  Ingilo	  activists	  described	  similar	  conditions	  in	  Qax,	  Balakan,	  and	  Zaqatala	  districts,	  but	  for	  them	  the	  solution	  lay	  in	  corrective	  rights	  claims	   rather	   than	   appeals	   to	   building	   socialism.	   	   As	   the	   entitled	   nationality,	  Georgians	   in	   the	   postwar	   period	   sought	   to	   remedy	   perceived	   historic	   injustices	  through	   newly	   available	   (or	   newly	   endowed)	   polity-­‐level	   institutions.	   Whether	  these	   perceived	   injustices	   stemmed	   from	   centuries-­‐old	   deportations,	   policies	   of	   a	  modernizing	   Iranian	   state,	   early	   Soviet	   border-­‐making,	   or	   discrimination	   by	   local	  authorities,	   advocates	   for	   Fereydan	   and	   Ingilo	   Georgians	   looked	   toward	   Soviet	  frameworks	  and	  Soviet	  ideology	  for	  compensatory	  solutions.719	  Nationalizing	  efforts	  within	   the	   territory	   of	   Georgia	   proved	   considerably	   more	   successful	   than	   these	  attempts	  at	  extraterritorial	  nation-­‐building.	  Yet	  for	  their	  lack	  of	  results	  outside	  the	  republic,	   pursuit	   of	   the	   Fereydan	   and	   Saingilo	   “questions”	   contributed	   to	   the	  development	   of	   a	  meaningful	   symbiosis	   of	   the	   national	   and	   the	   Soviet	   in	   postwar	  Georgia.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  719	  Here,	  I	  am	  adapting	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  83-­‐84.	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Chapter	  6:	  Entangled	  Nationalisms:	  
Language,	  Autonomy,	  and	  the	  Brezhnev	  Constitution,	  1977-­‐1978	  	  	   In	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  1978	  Constitutional	  Commission	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  a	  body	  charged	  with	   drafting	   and	   adopting	   a	   document	   to	   replace	   the	   1937	   constitution,	  citizen	  M.	  Čanturia	  argued,	  	  The	   Georgian	   language	   belongs	   to	   the	   whole	   Georgian	   people	  (k’art’veli	  xalxi),	   is	   its	   blood	   and	   flesh,	   and	   is	   the	   glory	  of	   the	  nation	  (eri),	   therefore	   the	   people	   itself	   should	   decide	   its	   fate	   and	   not	  individual	   members…Long	   live	   the	   Georgian	   people!	   Long	   live	   the	  new,	   exceptionally	   real	   and	   democratic	   constitution	   of	   the	   Georgian	  SSR!720	  	  Citing	  the	  Georgian	  language	  as	  the	  “blood	  and	  flesh”	  of	  the	  Georgian	  people	  evokes	  a	   certain	   völkisch	   sentiment	   reminiscent	   of	   nineteenth-­‐century	   nationalists	   in	   the	  Herderian	  tradition.	  Yet	  Čanturia’s	  passionate	  appeal	  to	  retain	  Georgian	  as	  the	  state	  language	  of	   the	  republic	  employed	  a	  key	  Soviet	  practice	  –	  citizen	  petitioning	  –	   for	  policy	   changes	   within	   a	   hallmark	   institution	   of	   Soviet	   life	   –	   the	   all-­‐Union	   and	  corresponding	   union	   republic	   constitutions.	   In	   a	   Soviet	   state	   that	   was	   avowedly	  anti-­‐nationalist	   by	   design,	   Čanturia’s	   remarks	   at	   first	   might	   seem	   brazen	   and	   ill-­‐equipped	  to	  persuade	  republic	  and	  Union	  leaders	  to	  accede	  to	  his	  request.	  However,	  similar	   appeals	   in	   hundreds	   of	   petitions	   and	   from	   thousands	   of	   demonstrators	  convinced	  republic	  and,	  ultimately,	  Union	  authorities	  to	  do	  just	  that.	  	  CPSU	  General	  Secretary	  Leonid	  Brezhnev	  already	  proclaimed	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  single	  sovetskii	  narod	  (Soviet	  people)	  at	  the	  twenty-­‐fourth	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU	  in	  1971.	   Yet	   by	   the	   late	   1970s,	   the	   (unintended)	   success	   of	   “affirmative	   action”	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  720	  M.	  Čanturia	  to	  GSSR	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  ll.	  158-­‐160.	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  ethnic	   amalgamation	   policies	   had	   created	   relatively	   wide	   spheres	   of	   national	  autonomy,	  provided	  republic	  authorities	  kept	  purported	  anti-­‐Soviet	  nationalism	  in	  check.	   Officially,	   the	   goal	   of	   sblizhenie	   (drawing	   together)	   remained	   in	   effect,	   and	  linguistic	   Russification	   policies	   did	   indeed	   occur	   in	   some	   republics.	   In	   practice,	  however,	  the	  national-­‐social	  contract	  in	  developed	  socialism	  allowed	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	   national	   cultural	   and	  political	   interests	   as	   long	   as	   it	   took	   place	   through	   Soviet	  institutions.721	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  examined	  aspirations	  and	  experiences	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  housing,	  urban	  development,	  and	  cultural	  practices	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  broadened	  space	  for	  discourse	  and	  practice	  after	  1956.	  That	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  cultural	  and	   the	   everyday,	   but	   the	   same	   developments	   facilitated	   by	   the	   national-­‐social	  contract	   in	   Georgia	   likewise	   made	   possible	   mass,	   national	   mobilizations	   toward	  political	  interests.	  As	  Rogers	  Brubaker	  argues,	  	  Institutional	   definitions	   of	   nationhood	   did	   not	   so	   much	   constrain	  action	  as	  constitute	  basic	  categories	  of	  political	  understanding,	  central	  parameters	  of	  political	  rhetoric,	  specific	  types	  of	  political	  interest,	  and	  fundamental	   forms	   of	   political	   identity.	   As	   political	   space	   expanded,	  they	   made	   specific	   types	   of	   political	   action	   conceivable,	   plausible,	  even	  compelling...722	  	  Though	  Brubaker	  uses	  this	  description	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  USSR	  along	   ethnoterritorial	   lines,	   I	   argue	   throughout	   the	   dissertation	   that	   such	   an	  expansion	  of	  political	  space	  occurred	  earlier	  in	  Georgia	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  March	  1956	  events.	  Moreover,	   the	  expanded	  cultural-­‐political	  space	  of	   the	  developed	  socialism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  721	  This	  argument	  goes	  against	  earlier,	  binary	  portrayals	  of	  this	  period	  as	  one	  of	  Russification	  from	  above	   and	   resistance	   from	   below,	   such	   as	   Nahaylo	   and	   Swoboda,	   Soviet	  Disunion:	  A	  History	  of	   the	  
Nationalities	  Problem	  in	  the	  USSR.	  While	  Russification	  policies	  and	  national	  dissent	  did	  occur	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  example	  of	  Georgia	  does	  not	  adhere	  to	  this	  paradigm	  for	  the	  1970s.	  722	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  24.	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  national-­‐social	   contract	   meant	   that	   national	   mobilization	   could	   occur	   within	   and	  toward	   Soviet	   bounds	   because,	   by	   the	   late	   1970s,	   Georgian	   Sovietness	   had	  developed	  its	  own	  self-­‐perpetuating	  set	  of	  norms	  and	  practices.723	  In	  Georgia,	  the	  increasing	  consolidation	  of	  the	  entitled	  national	  populace	  on	  the	  republic’s	   territory	   took	  place	  over	   the	  course	  of	   the	  postwar	  period,	  reaching	  its	   peak	   by	   the	   late	   1970s.	   As	   the	   entitled	   nationality,	   Georgians	   increased	   in	  number	   and	   in	   percentage	   of	   the	   republic’s	   population	   over	   time	   due	   to	  outmigration	  of	  prominent	  minorities	  such	  as	  Armenians	  and	  Russians.	  
Table	  8:	  Population	   Increase	  of	  Entitled	  Nationals	   in	  Georgian	  SSR	  according	   to	  All-­‐
Union	  Censuses,	  1939-­‐1979724	  	   1937	   1939	   1959	   1970	   1979	  Georgians	   1,991,962	   2,173,922	   2,600,588	   3,130,741	   3,433,011	  Total	  GSSR	  Population	   3,378,064	   3,540,023	   4,044,045	   4,686,358	   4,993,182	  Percent	  Georgian	   58.97	   61.4	   64.3	   66.8	   68.8	  	  Yet	   demographic	   data	   tell	   only	   part	   of	   the	   story:	   the	   meaning	   of	   nationality	   and	  expression	   of	   national	   identities	   among	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	  was	   as	   –	   if	   not	  more	  –	  important	  to	  the	  making	  of	  the	  modern	  Georgian	  nation	  in	  its	  Soviet	  form.	  	  	  This	   chapter	   shows	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   negotiations	   over	   what	   it	  meant	  to	  be	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	  in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  by	  focusing	  on	  two	  movements	  related	   to	   discussions	   of	   the	   draft	   1977	   All-­‐Union	   and	   1978	   Georgian	   SSR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  723	  This	   presents	   a	   much	   different	   picture	   of	   national,	   political	   mobilization	   than	   that	   chronicled	  most	   notably	   by	  Mark	   Beissinger	   regarding	   the	   1989-­‐1991	   period,	  Mark	   R.	   Beissinger,	  Nationalist	  
Mobilization	  and	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  State,	  	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  	  724	  Compiled	   from	   Iu.	   A.	   Poliakov,	   ed.,	   Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1937	   goda:	   Obshchie	   itogi:	  
Sbornik	   dokumentov	   i	  materialov	   (Moscow:	   ROSSPEN,	   2007);	  Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1939	  
goda;	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	   1959	   goda:	   Gruzinskaia	   SSR;	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	  
naseleniia	   1970	   goda,	   vol.	   4;	   Chislennost’	   i	   sostav	   naseleniia	   SSSR:	   Po	   dannym	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	  
naseleniia	  1979	  goda.	  
	   315	  Constitutions.	   The	   first	   section	   examines	   the	  public	   reaction	   to	   a	   perceived	  policy	  change	  regarding	   the	  status	  of	  Georgian	  as	   the	  republic’s	  official	   language	   in	  early	  1978.	   The	   second	   section	   explores	   a	   concurrent	   mobilization	   movement	   among	  Abkhaz	  intellectuals	  and	  activists	  that	  expressed	  a	  plethora	  of	  grievances	  regarding	  entitled	  nationality	  rights	  in	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  concessions	  made	  in	  favor	   of	   Georgian	   petitioners	   and	   demonstrators	   in	   1978	   show	   the	   Brezhnev	  national-­‐social	   contract	   at	   its	   apogee	   –	   a	   contract	   that	   created	   official	   “controlled	  spheres	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  non-­‐Russian	  national	  identities”	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cultivated	  deep,	   largely	  autonomous	  national	  republic-­‐level	  polities.725	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   the	   realization	  of	   this	  national-­‐social	   contract	   in	  Georgia	  entailed	  privileging	  the	  Union	  republic-­‐level	  entitled	  nationality	  (Georgians)	  over	  sub-­‐republic	  entitled	  groups,	   such	   as	   the	   Abkhaz,	   who	   likewise	   used	   discussions	   surrounding	   the	  constitution	   to	   mobilize	   their	   own	   national	   agenda	   and,	   unsuccessfully,	   call	   for	  territorial	  transfer	  to	  the	  RSFSR.	  	  The	  attitudes	  expressed	  and	  actions	  undertaken	  in	  Georgia	  and	  Abkhazia	  in	  1978	  around	  the	  draft	  constitution	  contrast	  sharply	  with	  the	  “stagnation”	  caricature	  of	   the	   late	   Brezhnev	   era.726	  While	   most	   recent	   scholarship	   on	   the	   Brezhnev	   era	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  725	  According	   to	   Stephen	   Hanson,	   the	   Brezhnev	   social	   contract	   consisted	   of	   five	   elements:	   job	  security,	  low	  prices,	  toleration	  of	  a	  “second	  economy,”	  limited	  social	  mobility,	  and	  limited,	  controlled	  expression	  of	  non-­‐Russian	  entitled	  national	  identities.	  James	  Millar	  referred	  to	  the	  tacit	  toleration	  of	  a	   range	   of	   petty	   private	   economic	   activities	   among	   the	   Soviet	   urban	   population	   as	   a	   “little	   deal,”	  building	  off	  of	  Vera	  Dunham’s	  “big	  deal”	  which	  saw	  the	  accommodation	  by	  revolutionary	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	   of	   the	   materialistic	   impulses	   of	   the	   new	   Soviet	   middle	   class	   under	   Stalin.	   Hanson,	   “The	  Brezhnev	  Era”;	   James	  R.	  Millar,	   “The	  Little	  Deal:	  Brezhnev’s	  Contribution	   to	  Acquisitive	  Socialism,”	  
Slavic	  Review	  44,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  1985):	  694–706;	  Vera	  S.	  Dunham,	  In	  Stalin’s	  Time:	  Middleclass	  Values	  
in	  Soviet	  Fiction	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1976).	  726	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  applied	   the	   “stagnation”	   (zastoi)	   term	   to	   the	  Brezhnev	  era	   in	  order	   to	  more	  effectively	   contrast	   it	  with	  his	   own	  envisioned	   reforms.	  While	   contemporary	   Sovietologists	   largely	  
	   316	  refutes	   –	   or	   at	   least	   complicates	   –	   Gorbachev’s	   characterization,	   the	   politically	  engaged	   citizens	   highlighted	   in	   this	   chapter	   depart	   from	   the	   dissidents	   and	   black	  marketeers	   typically	   shown	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   movement	   and	   vitality	   of	   the	  Brezhnev	   years.	   Rather	   than	   operating	   (or	   seeking	   to	   operate)	   outside	   Soviet	  structures,	   policies,	   and	   identities,	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	   actively	   appealed	   to	   such	  institutions	   to	   defend	   their	   entitled	   national	   rights	   as	   enshrined	   in	   Soviet	   and	  republic	   constitutions. 727 	  The	   cases	   examined	   below	   therefore	   complicate	  assumptions	  that	  national	  expressions	  and	  interests	  necessarily	   implied	  resistance	  to	   Soviet	   structures.	   Rather,	   Georgian	   political	   mobilization	   and	   the	   republic	  leadership’s	  management	   of	   the	   situation	   reveal	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   space	   of	  discourse	   and	   practice	   of	   the	   Soviet	   among	   Georgians	   had	   enlarged	   by	   the	   late	  1970s.	   This	   broadened	   sense	   of	   the	   Soviet	   was	   one	   iteration	   of	   the	   varieties	   of	  national	  experience	  facilitated	  by	  the	  national-­‐social	  contract.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  adhered	   to	   the	   “stagnation”	   paradigm,	   much	   recent	   historical	   scholarship	   has	   challenged	   this	  portrayal.	   An	   important	   early	   exception	   to	   the	   “stagnation”	   paradigm	   was	   Moshe	   Lewin,	   The	  
Gorbachev	   Phenomenon:	   A	  Historical	   Interpretation,	   Revised	   ed.	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	  Press,	   1991).	   For	   historiographical	   assessments	   of	   recent	   scholarship,	   see	   Edwin	   Bacon	   and	  Mark	  Sandle,	   eds.,	   Brezhnev	   Reconsidered	   (New	   York:	   Palgrave,	   2002);	   Polly	   Jones,	   “Socialist	   Worlds	   of	  Dissent	  and	  Discontent	  after	  Stalinism,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  15,	  no.	  3	  (Summer	  2014):	  637–52;	  Julianne	  Fürst,	  “Where	  Did	  All	  the	  Normal	  People	  Go?:	  Another	  Look	  at	  the	  Soviet	  1970s,”	  Kritika:	  Explorations	  in	  Russian	  and	  Eurasian	  History	  14,	  no.	  3	   (Summer	  2013):	  621–40;	  and	  Platt	  and	  Nathans,	  “Socialist	  in	  Form,	  Indeterminate	  in	  Content.”	  	  727	  Calls	   to	  uphold	   the	  rights	  outlined	   in	   the	  1936	  Stalin	  constitution	   likewise	  provided	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  around	  which	  early	  human	  rights	  defenders	  rallied,	  which	  included	  working	  within	  the	  Soviet	   system	   of	   constitutional	   and	   juridical	   norms.	   The	   “birth”	   of	   the	   dissident	  movement	   at	   the	  Pushkin	  Square	  protest	   in	  December	  1965	   is	   the	  clearest	  example	  of	   this	  strategy,	  and	   it	  became	  a	  common	   feature	   in	   many	   early	   Soviet	   movements	   for	   national	   and	   human	   rights.	   On	   the	   “rights-­‐based	  strategy	  of	  dissent,”	  see	  Benjamin	  Nathans,	  “The	  Dictatorship	  of	  Reason:	  Aleksandr	  Vol’pin	  and	  the	  Idea	  of	  Rights	  under	  ‘Developed	  Socialism,’”	  Slavic	  Review	  66,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  2007):	  630-­‐663;	  and	  Liudmila	   Alekseeva,	   Soviet	   Dissent:	   Contemporary	   Movements	   for	   National,	   Religious,	   and	   Human	  
Rights,	   (Middletown,	  Conn:	  Wesleyan	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  On	   the	  broader	  emergence	  of	   Soviet	  “rights-­‐talk”	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   all-­‐Union	   discussions	   of	   the	   constitution,	   see	   Benjamin	   Nathans,	  “Soviet	  Rights	  Talk	  in	  the	  Post	  Stalin	  Era,”	  Stefan-­‐Ludwig	  Hoffman,	  ed.,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  
Century	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  
	   317	  I	  use	  letters	  and	  petitions	  alongside	  an	  examination	  of	  mass	  demonstrations	  to	  explore	  by	  what	  means	  Soviet	  citizens	  in	  Georgia	  sought	  to	  effect	  policy	  changes	  in	   the	   period	   of	   developed	   socialism.	   Whether	   writers	   wrote	   candidly	   or	   merely	  demonstrated	   their	   fluency	   in	   “speaking	   Soviet,”	   these	   letters	   provide	   a	   cross-­‐section	  of	   interpretations	  and	  critiques	  of	  proposed	  policy	  changes	  assumed	   to	  be	  acceptable	  in	  Soviet	  Georgian	  society.728	  This	  allows	  one	  to	  trace	  the	  boundaries	  of	  what	   citizens	   deemed	   acceptable	   discourse	   as	   well	   as	   what	   constituted	   accepted	  
practices	   for	   expressing	   said	   discourse.	   The	   ways	   in	   which	   expressed	   beliefs	   and	  interpretations	   adhered	   to	   or	   departed	   from	   “official”	   scripts	   show	   the	   peak	   of	  coexisting	   national	   and	   Soviet	   identities	   since	   1956	   yet	   simultaneously	   reveal	   the	  distinctiveness	  of	  experienced	  Georgian	  Sovietness.729	  	  
Reform	  without	  Change:	  Tbilisi	  	   With	  its	  unique	  alphabet	  and	  distinct	  linguistic	  roots,	  the	  Georgian	  language	  (k’art’uli	   ena)	   served	   as	   a	   key	   marker	   of	   official	   nationality	   and	   lived	   national	  identity	  among	  Georgians	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  period.	  Though	  Russian	  served	  as	  the	   lingua	   franca	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   by	   the	   late	   1970s	   professed	   proficiency	   in	  Russian	  as	  a	  second	  language	  among	  entitled	  nationals	  in	  Georgia	  remained	  rather	  low,	  in	  spite	  of	  Union-­‐wide	  attempts	  to	  bolster	  Russian	  language	  knowledge	  in	  that	  decade.	  By	  1979,	  entitled	  Georgians	  trailed	  only	  Turkmens	  and	  Estonians	  among	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  728	  On	  the	  practice	  of	  “speaking	  Bolshevik,”	  see	  Kotkin,	  Magnetic	  Mountain.	  	  729	  On	   the	   routinization	   and	   internalization	   of	   such	   scripts	   in	   the	   late	   Soviet	   period,	   see	   Yurchak,	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  More.	  
	   318	  the	   Union	   republics’	   entitled	   nationalities	   in	   their	   lack	   of	   professed	   Russian	  proficiency.730	  According	  to	  the	  1979	  All-­‐Union	  Census,	  25.5	  percent	  of	  Georgians	  in	  Georgia	   claimed	   Russian	   as	   a	   second	   language,	   compared	   to,	   for	   example,	   34.2	  percent	   of	   entitled	   Armenians,	   52.2	   percent	   of	   Lithuanians,	   and	   52.9	   percent	   of	  Uzbeks.	  With	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  “Constitution	  (Fundamental	  Law)	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  Soviet	   Socialist	  Republics”	   in	   the	  USSR	  Supreme	  Soviet	   in	  October	  1977,	   republic-­‐level	   leadership	  initiated	  the	  subsequent	  process	  to	  draft	  and	  ratify	  corresponding	  constitutions	   in	   their	   respective	   territories.	   Though	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   USSR	  provided	  the	  structures,	  principles,	  and	  rights	  governing	  the	  Union	  as	  a	  whole,	  each	  non-­‐Russian	   republic	   likewise	   had	   had	   its	   own	   discrete	   foundational	   document	  following	   the	  prior	   iterations	  of	   the	  Soviet	   constitution	   in	  1924	  and	  1936	  (the	  so-­‐called	   “Stalin	   constitution”).	   Republic	   constitutions	   resembled	   the	   all-­‐Union	  constitution	  yet	  also	  outlined	  territorial	  arrangements	  and	  language	  rights	  specific	  to	   that	   particular	   republic.	   This	   arrangement	   reflected	   the	   federative	   relationship	  between	  the	  republics	  and	  the	  Union,	  enshrined	  most	  notably	  in	  Article	  72	  (Article	  17	   of	   the	   1936	   constitution)	   granting	   republics	   the	   right	   to	   secede	   from	   the	  Union.731	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  730	  This	  figure	  is	  even	  more	  remarkable	  considering	  the	  very	  high	  levels	  of	  education	  in	  Georgia.	  By	  contrast,	   in	   1979	   74.7	   percent	   of	   entitled	   Abkhaz	   and	   49.5	   percent	   of	   entitled	   Ossetians	   claimed	  knowledge	   of	   Russian	   as	   a	   second	   language,	   Robert	   John	   Kaiser,	   The	  Geography	   of	  Nationalism	   in	  
Russia	  and	  the	  USSR	  (Princeton,	  N.J:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  290-­‐292.	  These	  census	  figures	  perhaps	  say	  as	  much	  about	  the	  sociopolitical	  significance	  of	  self-­‐identifying	  as	  a	  Russian	  speaker	  as	  actual	  language	  proficiency.	  	  731 	  Konstitutsiia	   (Osnovnoi	   Zakon)	   Soiuza	   Sovetskikh	   Sotsialisticheskikh	   Respublik	   (Moscow:	   Izd.	  “Izvestiia	  Sovetov	  narodnikh	  deputatov	  SSSR,”	  1978).	  On	  the	  federation	  issue,	  see	  A.	  Shtromas,	  “The	  
	   319	  	   One	  of	   the	  distinguishing	   features	  of	   the	  Georgian	  SSR’s	   constitution	   (in	   its	  1922,	   1927	   and	   1937	   versions)	   was	   a	   clause	   (Article	   156)	   explicitly	   declaring	  Georgian	  as	   the	  official	   language	  of	   the	  republic.	  The	  contemporary	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	  constitutions	  contained	  a	  similar	  provision,	  but	  this	  feature	  was	  unique	  to	   the	   Caucasian	   republics	   within	   the	   Soviet	   Union.732 	  When	   the	   draft	   of	   the	  proposed	  1978	  Georgian	  SSR	  constitution	  was	  published	  in	  republican	  newspapers	  on	   24	   March	   1978,	   careful	   readers	   noticed	   that	   the	   provision	   about	   the	   official	  language	  no	  longer	  appeared.733	  Instead,	  the	  draft	  language	  explained,	  in	  Section	  7,	  Article	  75:	   The	  Georgian	  SSR	  guarantees	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Georgian	  language	  in	   state	   and	   societal	   organs,	   in	   cultural	   and	   other	   institutions	   and	  exercises	  state	  concern	  for	  its	  all-­‐around	  development.	  	  In	   the	   Georgian	   SSR,	   the	   free	   use	   in	   all	   these	   organs	   and	  institutions	  of	  Russian	  and	  also	  of	  other	   languages	  of	   the	  population	  that	  are	  used	  by	  it	  is	  guaranteed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality.	  Any	  sort	  of	  privilege	  or	  limitation	  in	  the	  use	  of	  one	  or	  another	  language	  is	  not	  permitted.734	  	  While	   the	   proposed	   version	   maintained	   a	   privileged	   status	   for	   the	   Georgian	  language	  within	   the	   republic,	   the	  mention	   of	   Russian	   and	   “other	   languages	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Legal	  Position	  of	  Soviet	  Nationalities	  and	  Their	  Territorial	  Units	  according	  to	  the	  1977	  Constitution	  of	  the	  USSR,”	  Russian	  Review	  37,	  no.	  3	  (July	  1978):	  265–72.	  732	  Though	   it	   is	  unclear	  precisely	  why	  drafters	   included	   this	   language	  clause	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  it	  was	  a	  concession	  to	  the	  three	  formerly	  (if	  briefly)	  independent	  republics	  at	  the	  time	  of	   their	   incorporation.	  Georgia,	  Armenia,	  and	  Azerbaijan	  were	   independent	  countries	   in	   the	  period	  between	   the	   Bolshevik	   Revolution	   (November	   1917)	   and	   Bolshevik	   takeovers	   –	   from	   within	   and	  without	  –	  of	  the	  southern	  Caucasus	  in	  1920-­‐1921.	  733	  In	  his	  memoir,	  Shevardnadze	  claimed	  that	  citizens	  were	  uninterested	  in	  earlier	  publication	  of	  the	  draft	  in	  republican	  press,	  Eduard	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze:	  memuarebi	  (Tbilisi:	  palitra,	  2006),	  90.	  734“proek’ti:	  sak’art’velos	  sabčot’a	  soc’ialisturi	  respublikis	  konstitutc’ia	  (żirit’adi	  kanoni),”	  komunisti	  (March	   24,	   1978),	   pp.	   1-­‐4.	   The	   1977	   Soviet	   Constitution	   contained	   similar	   wording	   in	   Article	   36	  about	  the	  opportunity	  “to	  use	  their	  mother	  tongue	  and	  languages	  of	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  USSR.”	  The	  Soviet	  version	  did	  not	  explicitly	  name	  the	  Russian	  language,	  unlike	  the	  Georgian	  draft	  version.	  
	   320	  population”	  (such	  as	  those	  spoken	  by	  prominent	  minorities	  with	  entitled	  nationality	  status	  in	  their	  respective	  territories,	  such	  as	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetians)	  overshadowed	  the	   formerly	   singular	   status	  of	  Georgian	  as	   the	   functional,	   official,	   and	   intellectual	  language	   in	   the	   republic.	   The	   draft	   therefore	   replaced	   an	   explicit	   and	   exclusive	  statement	   about	  Georgian’s	   official	   status	   in	   the	   republic	  with	   a	  diluted	   and	  more	  ambiguous	   statement	   promising	   protections	   not	   only	   for	   Georgian,	   but	   also	   –	  crucially	  –	  Russian.	  On	  paper,	   this	   change	  would	  bring	   the	   constitution	  of	  Georgia	  (and	   Armenia	   and	   Azerbaijan)	   in	   line	   with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Union	   republic	  constitutions	  in	  the	  name	  of	  consistency,	  even	  if	  Georgian	  retained	  its	  prevalence	  in	  practice.	  	  The	  publication	  of	  the	  draft	  constitution	  coincided	  with	  republic-­‐wide	  public	  Party	  meetings	  to	  discuss	  the	  “project	  of	  the	  new	  constitution.”735	  These	  discussions	  took	  place	  between	  24	  and	  27	  March,	  and	  meeting	  attendees	  expressed	  a	  variety	  of	  critiques	  about	  the	  draft.	  Among	  the	  more	  consistent	  suggestions	  was	  the	  addition	  in	  Article	  75	  of	  a	  statement	  that	  the	  state	  (saxelmcip’o,	  used	  to	  mean	  both	  “state”	  and	  “official”)	  language	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  was	  Georgian.736	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  Such	   meetings	   were	   a	   common	   feature	   of	   Soviet	   reform	   efforts,	   including	   for	   the	   1936	  constitution	  and	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU	  in	  1956.	  On	  reactions	  in	  meetings	  to	  the	  1936	  constitution,	  see	  J.	  Arch	  Getty,	  “State	  and	  Society	  Under	  Stalin:	  Constitutions	  and	  Elections	  in	  the	  1930s,”	  Slavic	  Review	  50,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  1991):	  18–35;	  and	  Fitzpatrick,	  Everyday	  
Stalinism.	   On	   closed	   Party	   meetings	   to	   discuss	   the	   "cult	   of	   personality"	   in	   1956,	   see	   Jones,	  Myth,	  
Memory,	   Trauma	   and,	   on	   this	   process	   in	   Georgia,	   Chapter	   3	   of	   this	   dissertation.	   An	   important	  distinction	  between	   the	  1936	  and	  1956	  discussions	  was	   that	   those	  held	   in	  1936	  encompassed	   the	  entire	  citizenry,	  whereas	  discussions	  in	  1956	  included	  only	  Party	  members.	  	  736	  “Obobshchennye	  predlozheniia	  i	  zamechaniia,	  vyskazannye	  grazhdanami	  na	  otkrytykh	  partiinykh	  sobraniiakh	  po	  proektu	  novoi	  Konstitutsii	  SSSR	  s	  24	  po	  27	  marta	  1978	  goda	  v	  GSSR,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  353,	  ll.	  7,	  34-­‐35,	  42,	  45,	  50-­‐51,	  58,	  60,	  63,	  86,	  90.	  
	   321	  Party	  meetings	  were	  not	   the	   first	   sites	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  proposed	  draft,	   however.	   First	   Secretary	  Shevardnadze	  wrote	   in	   a	  12	  March	  1978	   report	   to	  the	   CPSU	   CC	   that	   he	   anticipated	   problems	   regarding	   the	   language	   issue.	   First,	   he	  suggested	   revising	   the	   related	  Article	   73,	  which	  detailed	  Georgian	  membership	   in	  the	  USSR	  federal	  structure,	  to	  read,	  “Displaying	  state	  concern	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	   native	   language	   and	   the	   study	   of	   the	   Russian	   language,	   as	   a	   means	   of	  international	   communication,	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   does	   not	   permit	   any	   language	  privileges	   or	   restrictions.”	   In	   his	   opinion,	   because	   the	   prior	   three	   republican	  constitutions	   declared	   Georgian	   the	   official	   language	   of	   the	   republic,	   “the	  discrepancy	   between	   the	   new	   constitution	   and	   the[se	   older	   versions,	   CK]	   in	   this	  section	  can	  cause	  unwanted	  gossip	  and	  misunderstandings	  among	  certain	  sectors	  of	  the	   population.”	   Shevardnadze’s	   revision	   would	   serve	   to	   “help	   all	   citizens	   of	   the	  republic	   in	   the	   correct	   understanding	   of	   why	   a	   state	   language	   is	   no	   longer	  necessary.” 737 	  While	   Shevardnadze	   correctly	   predicted	   public	   dissatisfaction	  regarding	  the	  language	  issue,	  Article	  75	  proved	  a	  more	  provocative	  point	  of	  concern	  than	  the	  related	  Article	  73.	  Shevardnadze	  also	  recalled	  a	  conversation	  with	  Mikhail	  Suslov,	   the	   CPSU’s	   chief	   ideologue,	   in	   which	   Shevardnadze	   further	   explained	   the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  language	  issue:	  	  I	  explained	  that	  language	  is	  a	  special	  phenomenon	  for	  a	  Georgian	  man	  (kac’i).	   Recall	   how	   speeches	   followed	   the	   “treatment”	   of	   Stalin	   in	  1956.	   Then	   only	   a	   clear	   part	   of	   the	   youth	  was	   so	   inclined,	  whereas	  today	   all	   are	   united	   because	   indifference	   toward	   the	   Georgian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  737	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  12	  March	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  303,	  ll.	  33-­‐35.	  
	   322	  language	  is	  impossible.	  No	  Georgian	  family	  exists	  which	  will	  give	  this	  up.738	  	  The	   potential	   for	   mass	   grievance	   identified	   by	   Shevardnadze	   was	   soon	   realized	  through	  two	  practices:	  citizen	  petitions	  and	  mass	  demonstrations.	  	  In	  late	  March	  and	  early	  April	  1978,	  hundreds	  of	  Georgians	  wrote	  letters	  and	  signed	   petitions	   addressed	   to	   First	   Secretary	   Shevardnadze	   and	   the	   GSSR	  Constitutional	   Commission	   regarding	   the	   proposed	   draft	   of	   the	   republic’s	  constitution.739	  Among	   155	   letters	   (some	   which	   had	   dozens	   of	   signatories),	   only	  fourteen	   letters	  dealt	  with	   issues	  completely	  separate	   from	  the	   language	  question,	  such	   as	   housing	   or	   veterans’	   pensions.	   A	   handful	   of	   other	   letters	   focused	   on	   the	  republic’s	   flag,	   seal,	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   autonomous	   entities	   and	  republican	  structures.	  The	  vast	  majority,	  however,	  explicitly	  criticized	  the	  proposed	  Article	  75	  (and	  related	  Article	  171,	  which	  dealt	  with	  the	  language	  of	  court	  and	  legal	  proceedings)	   and	   recommended	   re-­‐inserting	   a	   statement	   from	   the	   existing	  constitution	   declaring,	   “the	   state	   language	   of	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   is	   Georgian	  (saxelmcip’o	   ena	  aris	   k’art’uli	   ena).”	  Writers	   signed	   their	   full	   names	   on	   the	   letters	  and	   in	   many	   cases	   included	   a	   mailing	   address,	   telephone	   number,	   Party	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  738	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze,	  90.	  In	  Shevardnadze’s	  account,	  discussions	  with	  Moscow	  authorities	  on	  this	  matter	  typically	  occurred	  via	  Suslov	  rather	  than	  with	  Brezhnev.	  739	  Most	  of	  these	  letters	  are	  held	  in	  a	  single	  archival	  file	  from	  the	  Georgian	  CC’s	  Organizational	  and	  Party	  Work	  Section,	  titled	  simply	  “Pis’ma	  grazhdan	  o	  vnesenii	  izmenenii	  i	  proekte	  novoi	  Konstitutsii	  GSSR,”	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   these	  are	  but	  a	  small	   sample	  of	  all	   letters	  received	  on	  this	  issue,	  and	  the	  file	  does	  not	  indicate	  whether	  the	  letters	  chosen	  were	  comprehensive,	  representative,	  exceptional,	  or	  random.	  In	  my	  close	  examination	  of	  this	  file	  alongside	  other	  material	  about	  the	  constitution	  discussions	  in	  Georgia	  and	  letters	  about	  other	   issues	  (explored	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  dissertation),	   I	  posit	   that	   these	   letters	   reflect	  a	  criticism	  widely-­‐held	  among	  Georgia’s	  citizenry	  due	  to	  their	  consistency,	  the	  prominence	  of	  mass	  demonstrations	  in	  Tbilisi	  about	  this	  precise	  issue,	  and	  the	  conciliatory	  response	  of	  Union	  and	  republic	  authorities	  to	  this	  policy	  criticism.	  In	  addition	  to	  d.	  361,	  see	  also	  letters	  in	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  355,	  d.	  355,	  ll.	  1-­‐4;	  d.	  356,	  ll.	  1-­‐2;	  and	  d.	  362,	  ll.	  1-­‐5.	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  membership	  status,	  occupation,	  or	  military	  service	  details.	  They	  ranged	  in	  age	  from	  teenager	   to	   pensioner.	   Most	   letters	   came	   from	   Tbilisi,	   but	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   also	  received	  letters	  from	  Abkhazia,	  Ajaria,	  and	  eastern	  and	  central	  districts	  of	  Georgia.	  All	  but	  twelve	  letters	  were	  written	  in	  the	  Georgian	  language,	  a	  reflection	  not	  only	  of	  the	   issue	   at	   hand	   but	   also	   of	   the	   lived	   currency	   of	   the	   language	   among	   Georgian	  citizenry	  in	  this	  period.	  The	  concentrated	  dates	  of	  the	  letters	  suggest	  a	  link	  to	  the	  Party	  discussions	  about	   the	   draft	   constitution	   held	   in	   late	   March.	   In	   addition	   to	   retroactively	  acknowledging	  his	  own	   foresight	  about	   the	   language	   issue,	  which	  should	  be	   taken	  with	  a	  grain	  of	  salt,	  Shevardnadze	  cited	  the	  public	  statements	  made	  by	  members	  of	  the	   Georgian	   Writers’	   Union	   –	   a	   government	   cultural	   body	   –	   as	   the	   impetus	   for	  action	  from	  the	  broader	  citizenry	  during	  an	  early	  public	  forum	  held	  by	  the	  Georgian	  CC.740	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  in	  this	  and	  other	  meetings,	  leaders	  encouraged	  attendees	  to	  convey	   their	   thoughts	   about	   the	   draft	   to	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   via	   letter.	   Furthermore,	  whether	  Party	  meeting	  leaders	  emphasized	  Article	  75	  or	  attendees	  raised	  this	  issue	  themselves,	  among	  the	  letters	  the	  language	  issue	  dominates	  writers’	  attention.	  The	  rather	  formulaic	  structure	  of	  many	  shorter	  letters	  signals	  that	  it	  may	  have	  been	  an	  assignment	  (from	  local	  or	  employer	  Party	  organs)	  or	  that	  a	  template	  was	  available	  to	   letter	   writers.	   Yet	   the	   coexistence	   of	   these	   form	   letters	   with	   lengthier,	   more	  personal	   explications	   suggests	   that	  while	   a	   sort	   of	   “script”	  was	   available	   to	   some,	  others	  sought	  more	  elaborate	  and	  potentially	  persuasive	  forms	  of	  argumentation	  in	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  their	  letters.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that,	  even	  if	  Writers’	  Union	  advocates	  did	  spark	  the	  petition	   (and	   eventual	   demonstration)	  movement,	   petitioners	   themselves	   did	   not	  mention	  the	  Writers’	  Union	  or	  individual	  Georgian	  writers	  in	  their	  appeals.	  Instead,	  those	   who	   penned	   more	   elaborate	   arguments	   turned	   to	   a	   combination	   of	   lived	  experiences,	  national	  pride,	  and	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  ideology	  to	  explain	  their	  stances.	  	  Most	   letters	   lauded	   the	   great	   achievement	   of	   the	   new	   constitution	   yet	  qualified	   their	  praise	  with	  one	  or	  more	  suggestions	  regarding	   the	  draft	   text.	  Many	  writers	  asked	  to	  replace	  the	  draft	  Articles	  75	  and	  171	  with	  existing	  Articles	  156	  and	  124,	  which	  preserved	  the	  provision	  that	  “the	  state	  language	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  is	  Georgian.”	   Some	   writers	   pointed	   out	   a	   logical	   incongruity	   between	   articles	   that	  articulated	  aspects	  of	  republican	  sovereignty	  (such	  as	  those	  detailed	  in	  Articles	  68	  and	  110)	  and	  Article	  75.	  Elene	  Gelovani,	  a	  self-­‐described	  housewife,	  asked,	  	  If	  Georgia	  is	  indeed	  an	  independent	  republic:	  it	  has	  its	  own	  flag,	  seal,	  why	   should	   it	   not	   declare	   the	   Georgian	   language	   as	   the	   official	  language	   in	   Georgia?	   Maybe	   they	   were	   a	   generation	   of	   wolves	   and	  were	   only	   fighting	   for	   food?!	  Respect	   for	   their	  memory	   requires	   the	  abolition	  of	  Article	  75	  and	  that	  Article	  10	  is	  amended	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  “The	  Georgian	  SSR’s	  language,	  seal,	  flag,	  anthem,	  and	  capital	  city	  is	  the	  same	  as	   in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR’s	  1937	  constitution’s	  Articles	  156	  and	  157.”741	  	  Gelovani	   took	   promises	   of	   Soviet	   federalism	   at	   face	   value	   and	   used	   the	  constitutionally	   mandated	   structure	   of	   the	   Union-­‐to-­‐republic	   relationship	   to	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  Article	  75.	  As	  insinuated	  in	  her	  allusion,	  earlier	  defenders	  of	  the	  Georgian	  language	  did	  not	  merely	  do	  so	  out	  of	  desperation	  or	  self-­‐interest,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  741	  Elene	  Gelovani	  to	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  20.	  	  
	   325	  to	  preserve	  the	  language	  for	  future	  generations	  of	  Georgians.742	  The	  significance	  of	  that	  achievement	  went	  beyond	  the	  technicalities	  of	  Soviet	  constitutionalism,	  yet	  was	  dependent	  upon	  its	  protections.	  Professor	  T’inat’in	  P’arnaozis	  asuli	  P’ič’xaia,	  a	  Party	  member	   from	   Tbilisi,	   similarly	   struggled	   to	   understand	   the	   motivation	   behind	  eliminating	   the	   official	   language	   provision,	   especially	   because	   “Soviet	   Georgia’s	  great	   and	   important	  historical	   achievement	  was	   the	  proclamation	  of	   the	  Georgian	  language	  as	  the	  state	  language,”	  a	  feat	  for	  which	  “the	  Georgian	  nation	  struggled	  for	  centuries…and	  was	  granted	  by	  this	  happy	  Soviet	  state.”743	  Language	  had	  a	  national	  significance	   that	  predated	  Soviet	  power,	  yet	  Soviet	   structures	   institutionalized	   the	  Georgian	   language	   in	   its	   preeminent	   position	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   In	   other	   words,	  language	  moved	  from	  a	  cultural	  to	  a	  civic	  issue:	  it	  had	  evolved	  from	  an	  elite	  concern	  to	  a	  broadly-­‐based,	  popular	  concern	  by	  the	  late	  1970s.	  	   In	  their	  defenses	  of	  retaining	  Georgian	  as	  the	  republic’s	  state	  language,	  other	  writers	   looked	   toward	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   ideology	   for	   explanations.	   One	   Tbilisi	  household	  placed	  Georgians	  along	  a	  national	  development	  trajectory	  and	  concluded	  that	   the	   proposed	   constitutional	   changes	   were	   “premature”	   for	   most	   of	   the	  republic’s	   population	   and	   would	   likely	   cause	   an	   “arousal	   of	   national	   feeling”	   if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  742	  Gelovani’s	  reference	  to	  “wolves…fighting	  for	  food”	  seems	  to	  allude	  to	  earlier	  struggles	  to	  protect	  Georgian	  interests.	  Unfortunately,	  she	  does	  not	  elaborate	  further	  on	  this	  point,	  but	  her	  reference	  to	  “generations”	  could	  refer	  to	  the	  “pirveli,	  meore,	  mesame	  dasi”	  (first,	  second,	  and	  third	  groups)	  of	  the	  Georgian	   national	   intelligentsia	   cultivated	   from	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   through	   the	   Georgian	  independence	  period	  (1918-­‐1921).	  See	  Jones,	  Socialism	  in	  Georgian	  Colors;	  and	  Suny,	  The	  Making	  of	  
the	  Georgian	  Nation.	  743	  T’inat’in	  P’arnaozis	  asuli	  P’ič’xaia	  	  to	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  115.	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  implemented.744	  According	   to	   the	   Mik’elaże	   family,	   the	   republic’s	   population	   was	  “not	   quite	   ready”	   to	   relinquish	   such	   key	   trappings	   of	   entitled	   rights	   as	   a	   state	  language.	  A	  certain	  N.	  Sabašvili	  proposed	  a	  compromise	  in	  which	  Georgian	  would	  be	  the	   “national”	   (erovnuli,	   rather	   than	   “official”	  or	   “state”)	   language	  and	  Russian	   the	  “interethnic	   language”	   of	   the	   republic	   (saerovnebat’a	   šoriso	   ena,	   literally	   language	  between	   nationalities),	   recalling	   lectures	   that	   insisted,	   “language	   under	   socialism	  had	  no	  political	  significance	  and	  only	  national	  significance	  remained.”745	  While	  such	  lectures	   likely	   emphasized	   the	   national	   significance	   of	   language	   in	   the	   realm	   of	  culture,	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  these	  ideas	  blended	  the	  cultural	  and	  the	  political.	  A	  group	  letter	  with	  28	  signatories	  concluded,	  knowledge	  of	   the	  Georgian	   language	   is	  necessary	   for	  all	   residents	  of	  the	   republic	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Georgian	   nation	   demonstrated	  internationalism	  when	   its	   homeland	   (mica-­‐cqali)	   in	   a	   brotherly	  way	  and	  with	   full	   trust	   adopted	  people	   of	   other	   nations,	   from	  whom	   the	  Georgian	  nation	  also	  expects	  the	  manifestation	  of	  internationalism	  in	  the	  form	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  Georgian	  nation	  and	  its	  language.746	  	  The	   internationalist	   logic	   of	   deleting	   the	  official	   language	   clause	  proved	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  in	  these	  instances:	  removing	  the	  Georgian	  language’s	  official	  status	  in	  the	  name	  of	  internationalism	  would	  allegedly	  inspire	  unhealthy	  national	  feeling,	  so	  better	   to	   retain	  Georgian	  as	   the	   republic’s	   sole	   state	   language.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  Georgians	   had	   been	   good	   internationalists	   in	   the	   past	   and	   deserved	   the	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  744	  L.	  Mik’elaże	  and	  T’inat’in	  Šalvas	  asuli	  Mik’elaże	  to	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  3	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  87,	  99.	  745	  N.	  Sabašvili	  to	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  122.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  updated	  version	  of	  the	  “national	  in	  form,	  socialist	  in	  content”	  dictum	  of	  the	  korenizatsiia	  era.	  	  746	  “sak’.	  ss	  respublikis	  mok’alak’eebis	  ganc’xadeba,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  195.	  
	   327	  respect	   from	   others.	   In	   these	  ways,	   Georgian	   petitioners	   reinterpreted	   the	   Soviet	  goal	  of	  internationalism	  to	  justify	  protection	  of	  their	  entitled	  language	  rights.	  	   While	   some	   writers	   saw	   the	   proposed	   changes	   through	   the	   lens	   of	  internationalism,	  others	  viewed	  the	  proposal	  as	  a	  move	  toward	  Russification.	  Such	  a	  shift	  encountered	  practical	  challenges,	  as	  explained	  by	  Dimitri	  Alesis	  że	  Jidališvili,	  a	  resident	   of	   Šilda	   village	   in	  Qvareli	   district	   (in	   the	  Kaxet’i	   region).	   Jidališvili	   noted,	  “State	  institutions	  and	  societal	  organs	  in	  Georgia	  chiefly	  serve	  the	  Georgian	  people	  in	   life.	   Here	   there	   are	   many	   who	   do	   not	   now	   the	   Russian	   language.”747	  Jidališvili	  suggested	   the	   term	   “mother	   tongue	   (deda	   ena)”	   should	   be	   replaced	   by	   “Georgian	  language”	  in	  Article	  75	  to	  more	  effectively	  serve	  the	  entitled	  nationality.	  The	  polite	  explications	  of	   this	  villager	  contrast	  with	  the	   imperatives	  of	  E.S.	  Melia	   in	  his	   letter	  written	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Georgian	   people.	   	   After	   “categorically	   demanding”	   that	  “batono	  eduard”	  change	  Article	  75,	  Melia	  argued,	  “The	  attempt	  of	  the	  Russification	  (garuseba)	   of	   the	   Georgian	   nation	   does	   not	   bring	   any	   good	   to	  anyone…consider…They	   dug	   up	   the	   Russians’	   savior,	   Stalin.” 748 	  If,	   for	   Melia,	  Russification	   entailed	   desecrating	   heroes,	   M.	   Čanturia	   saw	   the	   defense	   of	   the	  Georgian	   language	  as	  key	   to	   “the	   formation	  and	  national-­‐state	   sovereignty	   for	   the	  development	  of	  the	  nation	  of	  Ioseb	  Besarionis	  że	  Stalin.”749	  Both	  writers	  mobilized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  747	  Dimitri	  Alesis	  że	  Jidališvili	  to	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  1	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  37.	  748 	  Addressing	   the	   letter	   to	   “batono	   eduard”	   is	   similar	   to	   writing	   “Mr.	   Eduard”	   or	   “Eduard	  Amrosievich”	   in	   Russian,	   rather	   than	   to	   “Comrade	   Shevardnadze”	   (amxanago	   Shevardnadze).	   The	  reference	  to	  “digging	  up	  Stalin”	  most	  likely	  refers	  to	  the	  clandestine	  removal	  of	  Stalin’s	  body	  from	  the	  Lenin	  Mausoleum	  on	  Red	  Square	  in	  1961.	  The	  reference	  to	  Stalin	  as	  “the	  Russians’	  savior”	  probably	  alludes	  to	  the	  Soviet	  victory	  in	  World	  War	  Two,	  31	  March	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II)	  ,	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  88.	  749	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  160.	  
	   328	  the	   figure	  of	  Stalin	   in	   their	  appeals	   to	   the	  Georgian	  constitutional	  commission	  and	  suggested	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   Stalin’s	  meaning	   as	   a	   Soviet	   and/or	   national	   figure	  remained	  muddled	  over	  twenty	  years	  after	  the	  March	  1956	  events.	  Evoking	  Stalin	  in	  discussions	   of	  Russification	   and	  nation	  was	  not	   only	   an	   acceptable	   argumentative	  ploy	  for	  a	  Georgian	  audience	  in	  1978,	  but	  a	  comprehensible	  one	  as	  well.750	  	   Meanwhile,	   a	   group	  of	   students	   at	  Tbilisi	   State	  University	   began	   to	  discuss	  the	  draft	  constitution	  and	  started	  planning	  a	  student	  demonstration	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	   scheduled	   Constitutional	   Commission	  meeting	   on	   14	   April,	   at	   which	   time	   the	  commission	  would	  ratify	  the	  constitution.	  The	  student	  organizers	  also	  participated	  in	   the	   letter	  writing	   campaign,	   and	   a	   petition	   from	   the	   philological	   faculty	   of	   TSU	  alone	  (believed	  to	  be	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  demonstration	  movement)	  collected	  nearly	  500	   signatures. 751 	  Student	   organizers	   quickly	   attracted	   colleagues	   from	   the	  Technical	  University	   and	  other	   educational	   institutions.	  Yet	   the	   initial	   impetus	   for	  the	   letter	   campaign	   and	   student	   mobilization	   remains	   mysterious:	   the	   draft	   had	  indeed	   been	   printed	   in	   komunisti,	   and	   presumably	   a	   constitutional	   scholar	   could	  have	   identified	   the	  changes	  with	  some	  effort.	  The	  ability	  of	  most	  citizens	  –	  even	   if	  avid	  readers	  of	  komunisti	  –	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  the	  nuance	  of	  the	  proposed	  changes	  (and	  quickly!),	  however,	  seems	  suspect	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  rumor	  to	  explicitly	  seek	  out	  Article	  75.	  Even	  one	  of	  the	  professed	  organizers	  of	  the	  student	  demonstration,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  750	  Shevardnadze	  described	   this	   effort	   in	   a	   similar	  manner	   in	   his	  memoir:	   “In	   short,	   it	  was	   a	   path	  toward	  the	  loss	  of	  nationality,	  toward	  Russification.”	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  he	  “was	  from	  Ioseb	  Stalin’s	  Georgia,	  as	  was	  Lavrenti	  Beria,”	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze,	  88-­‐90.	  751	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  355,	  ll.	  3-­‐4.	  
	   329	  Tamar	  M.,	  struggled	  to	  remember	  how	  she	  first	  learned	  of	  the	  language	  article	  other	  than	  a	  student	  friend	  pointing	  it	  out	  to	  her	  in	  the	  newspaper.752	  	  So	   who	   planted	   this	   seed	   of	   mobilization,	   and	   toward	   what	   end?	   Among	  historians	   and	   contemporary	   observers	   this	   event	   has	   been	   treated	   as	  more	   of	   a	  spontaneous	   protest,	   with	   little	   discussion	   regarding	   precursors.753	  Two	   theories	  come	  to	  mind	  after	  reviewing	  archival	  documents,	  memoir	  accounts,	  and	  speaking	  with	   event	   participants	   and	   contemporaries.	   A	   member	   of	   the	  Writers’	   Union	   or	  professor	   at	   TSU	   could	   have	   initiated	   the	   rumor	   covertly	   in	   order	   to	   bring	  awareness	   to	   the	   issue	   without	   attracting	   attention	   to	   an	   instigator.	   A	   public	  meeting	  of	   the	  Writers’	  Union	   in	   late	  March	  revealed	   little	   in	   terms	  of	   specifics	  or	  motive,	  however,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  speakers	  maintained	  the	  Party	  line,	  and	  the	  group	  failed	   to	   issue	   a	   resolution	   or	   statement	   on	   the	   Article	   75	   debate.754	  While	   this	  theory	   is	   certainly	   possible,	   it	   seems	   more	   likely	   that	   the	   instigator	   behind	   the	  mobilization	   campaign	   was	   Shevardnadze	   himself.	   Not	   only	   did	   Shevardnadze	  foreshadow	  public	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the	   language	   issue	   in	   a	  missive	   to	  Moscow	  (demonstrating	  his	  own	  “foresight”	  in	  the	  process),	  he	  also	  was	  able	  to	  pivot	  rapidly	  –	  and	  without	  consultation	  –	  to	  meet	  citizen	  demands	  at	  the	  dramatic	  climax	  of	  the	  unfolding	   events.	   This	   theory	   regarding	   Shevardnadze’s	   role	   will	   be	   developed	  further	  below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  752	  Author	  interview	  with	  T’amar	  M.,	  8	  June	  2015.	  753 	  Nahaylo	   and	   Swoboda,	   Soviet	   Disunion;	   Suny,	   The	   Making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation;	   Gerber,	  
Georgien;	  Smith,	  Red	  Nations.	  754	  Writer	   Ak’ak’i	   Bak’raże	   recounts	   these	   scenes	   in	   detail	   in	   his	  memoir,	   ak’ak’i	  bak’raże,	   tomi	   IV	  (Tbilisi:	  Merani,	  2005),	  453-­‐471.	  
	   330	  Unfortunately,	  Georgian	  archival	  documents	  and	  Soviet	  press	  do	  not	  recount	  the	  details	  of	  what	  transpired	  on	  14	  April,	  so	  I	  have	  constructed	  my	  brief	  narrative	  from	  memoir	   accounts,	   contemporary	  Western	   reporting,	   and	   conversations	  with	  participants.	  On	  the	  afternoon	  of	  14	  April,	  a	  student-­‐led	  group	  of	  citizens	  gathered	  at	  Tbilisi	  State	  University	  to	  march	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Government,	  where	  the	  ratification	  meeting	  was	  taking	  place.	  By	  this	  time,	  the	  grievance	  expressed	  by	  demonstrators	  –	  a	  solitary	  demand	  to	  revise	  Article	  75	  -­‐-­‐	  came	  as	  little	  surprise	  to	  Party	  and	  security	  officials	   in	  Tbilisi.755	  According	   to	  T’amar	  M.,	   a	   student	   organizer,	  members	   of	   the	  Georgian	   KGB	   repeatedly	   encouraged	   her	   to	   call	   off	   the	   demonstration	   in	   the	   36	  hours	   leading	   up	   to	   its	   start,	   yet	   as	   they	   saw	   participants	   gathered	   in	   the	   main	  courtyard	   of	   the	   university	   following	   a	   night	   of	   questioning	   T'amar	   M.,	   the	   KGB	  officials	  relented	  and	  let	  the	  demonstrators	  proceed.756	  	  	   As	   the	  demonstration	   slowly	  proceeded	   from	  Tbilisi	   State	  University	   down	  Rust'aveli	   Avenue	   and	   acquired	   more	   participants,	   Shevardnadze	   delivered	   his	  report	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee.	  During	  the	  two-­‐hour	  address,	  Georgian	  KGB	  chief	  Alek’si	  Inauri	  updated	  Shevardnadze	  on	  developments	  on	  the	  streets.	  The	  first	  note	  Shevardnadze	   received	   informed	   him	   that	   “the	   youth”	   had	   moved	   from	   the	  university;	   the	   second,	   that	   “they	   approached	   the	   opera	   theatre.”	   The	   third	   note	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  755	  Estimates	  of	  crowd	  size	  vary	  widely,	   from	  hundreds	  to	  the	  50-­‐60,000	  cited	  by	  Shevardnadze	   in	  retrospect.	   T’amar	  M.	   could	   not	   provide	   an	   estimated	   number	   of	   demonstrators	   from	  her	   vantage	  point,	  only	   that	   they	   included	  “students	  and	  many	  other	  people	   from	  all	  walks	  of	   life…as	   far	  as	   the	  eyes	   could	   see.”	   The	  New	   York	   Times	   reported	   20,000	   demonstrators.	   Soviet	   publications	   did	   not	  report	   on	   the	   demonstrations.	   See	   “Demonstration	   Reported	   in	   Capital	   of	   Soviet	   Georgia,”	   Radio	  
Liberty	  Research	  Bulletin	  80/78	  (16	  April	  1978);	  “The	  Georgian	  Language	  and	  National	  Pride	  Prevail,”	  
Radio	  Liberty	  Research	  Bulletin	  81/78	  (18	  April	  1978);	  Craig	  R.	  Whitney,	   “Soviet	  Georgians	  Take	   to	  Streets	   to	   Save	   Their	   State	   Language,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times	   (15	   April	   1978),	   p.	   3;	   and	   Craig	   R.	  Whitney,	  “Soviet	  Georgians	  Win	  on	  Language,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  (18	  April	  1978),	  p.	  2.	  756	  Author	  interview	  with	  T’amar	  M.,	  8	  June	  2015.	  
	   331	  “was	  not	  necessary”	  because	  they	  could	  already	  hear	  cries	  of	  “deda-­‐ena!	  sa-­‐k’art’-­‐ve-­‐
lo!”	   (mother	   tongue!	   Georgia!)	   coming	   from	   the	   street.757	  	   Per	   the	   organizers’	  instructions,	   the	   demonstrators	   proceeded	   toward	   the	   House	   of	   Government	   in	   a	  peaceful	  and	  orderly	  manner,	   citing	  only	  a	   single	  demand	   for	   increased	  effect	  and	  legitimacy:	  to	  include	  a	  statement	  claiming	  Georgian	  as	  the	  republic’s	  state	  language	  in	   Article	   75.	   This	   demand	   was	   –	   by	   design	   –	   fully	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   Soviet	  grievance	   and	   boasted	   a	   constitutional	   precedent.	   Early	   in	   the	   demonstration,	  militia	  patrol	  cars	  along	  the	  route	  refused	  to	  hinder	  the	  demonstrators	  and,	  in	  one	  case,	   even	   reportedly	   handed	   a	   leader	   a	   megaphone	   to	   guide	   the	   crowd. 758	  Demonstrators	  held	  signs	  and	  recited	  slogans,	  yet	  neither	   formal	  nor	  spontaneous	  speeches	   (such	   as	   those	   witnessed	   in	   1956)	   took	   place	   among	   the	   participants.	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  address,	  Shevardnadze	  announced	  to	  the	  CC	  that	  the	  official	  language	   clause	   would	   be	   retained	   in	   the	   final	   version	   of	   the	   constitution.759	  In	  Shevardnadze’s	   account,	   upon	   hearing	   this	   news,	   “the	   entire	   hall	   (which	   fit	   750	  men)	  rose	  and	  began	  to	  applaud,	  not	  only	  applause,	  also	  crying…I	  did	  not	  see	  one	  face	  that	  did	  not	  have	  eyes	  filled	  with	  tears.”760	  Following	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Shevardnadze’s	   address	   to	   the	   CC,	   the	   news	  regarding	   the	   language	   article	   was	   broadcast	   via	   radio	   to	   the	   crowd	   outside.	   To	  reinforce	   the	   message,	   Shevardnadze,	   along	   with	   CC	   secretaries	   Soliko	   Xubeišvili	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  757	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze,	  96.	  758	  Author	  interview	  with	  T’amar	  M.,	  8	  June	  2015.	  759	  Shevardnadze	  noted	  in	  his	  memoir	  that	  in	  the	  address	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  bureau	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  discussed	  the	  issue	  and	  reached	  a	  decision,	  yet	  in	  reality	  there	  had	  been	  no	  such	  meeting,	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze,	  96.	  760	  Ibid.	  	  
	   332	  and	   Jumber	   Patiašvili	   came	   to	   the	   balcony	   overlooking	   the	   crowd,	   at	  which	   point	  Shevardnadze	  announced:	  	  Children	   (švilebo),	   don’t	   worry,	   everything	   is	   fine,	   we	   took	  responsibility	  for	  ourselves.	  This	  article	  of	  the	  constitution	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	   it	  was.	  The	  mother	   tongue	   (deda-­‐ena)	   is	   saved!	   It	  will	   have	  official	  status!761	  	  	  In	   spite	   of	   this	   announcement,	   the	   crowd	   did	   not	   disperse	   and	   proceeded	   to	   the	  Dynamo	   Tbilisi	   football	   stadium,	   where	   Shevardnadze	   again	   addressed	   the	  demonstrators.	  He	  reaffirmed:	  “I	  declare	  that	  no	  one	  touched	  the	  mother	  tongue,	  the	  mother	   tongue	   is	   preserved,	   it	   has	   official	   status.”762	  The	   demonstrators	   re-­‐traced	  their	   steps	   down	   Rust'aveli	   Avenue	   and	   dispersed,	   going	   home	   to	   hold	   sup’rebi	  (feasts)	  in	  celebration.763	  In	   his	   address,	   which	   was	   published	   in	   republic	   newspapers	   on	   15	   April,	  Shevardnadze	   balanced	   an	   adherence	   to	   the	   preexisting	   Soviet	   Georgian	  constitutions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  official	  language	  with	  an	  appeal	  for	  “our”	  youth	  in	  particular	  to	  learn	  the	  language	  of	  “the	  great	  Russian	  people,	  the	  Russian	  language”	  due	  to	  its	  status	   as	   the	   language	   of	   “modern	   world	   civilization.”	   He	   also	   stressed	   the	  importance	  of	  exercising	  care	  toward	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetian	  languages	  as	  well	  as	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	   languages	   in	  the	  republic.	  He	  subsequently	  summarized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  761	  Ševardnaże,	   p’ik’ri	   carsulsa	   da	  momavalze,	   97.	   The	   “children”	   reference	   supports	   the	   assertion	  that	   the	  demonstrators	  consisted	  primarily	  of	  university	  students	   from	  Tbilisi	  State	  University	  and	  other	  institutes.	  An	  American	  lawyer	  who	  happened	  to	  be	  in	  Tbilisi	  at	  the	  time	  reported	  to	  The	  New	  
York	   Times	   that	   some	   in	   the	   crowd	   “cursed”	   Shevardnadze	   following	   his	   address	   to	   the	  demonstrators,	  Whitney,	  “Soviet	  Georgians	  Win	  on	  Language.”	  762	  Ševardnaże,	  p’ik’ri	  carsulsa	  da	  momavalze,	  97.	  763	  Author	  interview	  with	  T’amar	  M.,	  8	  June	  2015.	  
	   333	  the	  revised	  language	  that	  would	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Georgian	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  later	  that	  day.	  764	  On	  16	  April,	  republic	  newspapers	  published	  the	  revised	  and	  final	  version	  of	  the	  constitution.	  The	  text	  of	  the	  new	  Article	  75	  read:	  The	  Georgian	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republic’s	   state	   language	   is	   the	  Georgian	  language.	  The	   Georgian	   SSR	   exercises	   state	   concern	   for	   the	   all-­‐round	  development	  of	  the	  Georgian	  language	  and	  guarantees	  its	  use	  in	  state	  and	  societal	  organs,	  institutions	  of	  culture,	  education,	  and	  others.	  In	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   the	   free	   use	   of	   Russian	   and	   other	  languages	  used	  by	   the	  population	   is	   guaranteed	   in	   these	  bodies	   and	  institutions.	  Any	   kinds	   of	   privileges	   or	   restrictions	   in	   the	   use	   of	   these	   or	  other	  languages	  are	  not	  permitted.765	  	  Therefore,	  the	  final	  version	  contained	  both	  an	  explicit	  statement	  about	  the	  official	  –	  and	   exclusive	   -­‐-­‐	   status	   of	   the	  Georgian	   language	   in	   the	   republic	  and	   space	   for	   the	  further	   development	   of	   Russian	   and	   other	   non-­‐Georgian	   languages.	   In	   meeting	  petitioners’	   and	   demonstrators’	   demands	   regarding	   Article	   75,	   Shevardnadze	   and	  the	   Constitutional	   Commission	   likewise	   created	   a	   space	   –	   albeit	   subtly	   –	   for	  promoting	   linguistic	   diversity	   and	   a	   Russian	   lingua	   franca	   toward	   the	   goal	   of	  constitutional	  consistency	  between	  Union	  republics	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  the	  draft	   article.	   Shortly	   following	   the	   concession	   to	   Georgian	   demonstrators	   and	  petitioners,	  Soviet	  authorities	  authorized	  a	  similar	  reversion	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  764 	  “Doklad	   pervogo	   sekretaria	   TsK	   KP	   Gruzii	   tov.	   Shevardnadze	   E.A.	   ‘O	   proekte	   konstitutsii	  (osnovnogo	  zakona)	  Gruzinskoi	  Sovetskoi	  Sotsialisticheskoi	  Respubliki	   i	   itogakh	  ego	  vsenarodnogo	  obsuzhdeniia,’”	  14	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  16,	  ll.	  4-­‐14,	  also	  printed	  in	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  and	  
komunisti,	  15	  April	  1978,	  p.	  3.	  765	  “sak’art’velos	  sabčot’a	  soc’ialisturi	  respublikis	  konstituc’ia	  (żirit’adi	  kanoni),”	  komunisti	  (16	  April	  1978),	  pp.	  2-­‐5;	   “Konstitutsiia	  (Osnovnoi	  Zakon)	  Gruzinskoi	  Sovetskoi	  Sotsialisticheskoi	  Respubliki,”	  
Zaria	  Vostoka,	  16	  April	  1978,	  p.	  3.	   	  See	  also	  Shevardnadze’s	  subsequent	  speech	  on	  the	  constitution,	  	  “sak’art’velos	  mšromelt’a	  c’xovrebis	  didmnišvnelovani	  nišansveti,”	  komunisti	  (16	  April	  1978),	  p.	  6.	  
	   334	  the	   Armenian	   and	   Azerbaijani	   SSRs. 766 	  The	   south	   Caucasian	   republics	   would	  preserve	   this	   unique	   feature	   in	   their	   constitutions	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   Soviet	  experiment.	  	   His	  memoir	  account,	  published	  over	  thirty	  years	  after	   the	  events	  discussed,	  attributes	   perhaps	   an	   overly	   singular	   role	   to	   Shevardnadze	   in	   the	   14	   April	   1978	  events,	  but	  as	  the	  republic’s	   first	  secretary	  who	  ultimately	  decided	  to	  re-­‐insert	  the	  language	  article,	  his	  role	  was	  central	  to	  managing	  the	  response.	  For	  as	  sentimentally	  as	   he	   recalled	   his	   actions	   toward	   the	   “children”	   and	   their	   “mother	   tongue”	   in	   his	  memoir,	  Shevardnadze’s	  explanation	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  sounded	  remarkably	   like	  that	  of	   his	   predecessor,	   Vasil	   Mžavanaże	   account	   following	   the	   demonstrations	   in	  Georgia	  in	  March	  1956:	  the	  Georgian	  CP	  had	  not	  sufficiently	  carried	  out	  ideological	  work	   among	   “members	   of	   the	   intelligentsia	   and	   certain	   sectors	   of	   the	   youth,”	  particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   understandings	   of	   the	   “national	  question.”	   Whereas	   in	   1956	   the	   deficiency	   in	   ideological	   work	   purportedly	   dealt	  with	  expunging	  Stalin’s	  “cult	  of	  personality”	  in	  the	  republic,	   in	  1978,	  the	  weakness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  766	  Similar	   demonstrations	   to	   those	   in	   Georgia	   did	   not	   occur	   in	   Azerbaijan	   and	   Armenia.	   Maike	  Lehmann	  notes	  that	  the	  Party	  discussions	  about	  the	  constitution	  in	  Armenia	  inspired	  responses	  from	  citizens	   not	   about	   language	   status,	   but	   about	   territorial	   rights	   and	   borders	   associated	   with	  Nakhichevan	   and	   Nagornyi	   Karabakh,	   Lehmann,	   Eine	   sowjetische	   Nation,	   349-­‐362.	   	   For	   a	  contemporary	   comparison	   of	   the	   three	   republics’	   constitutions,	   see	   Ann	   Sheehy,	   “The	   National	  Languages	   and	   the	   New	   Constitutions	   of	   the	   Transcaucasian	   Republics,”	   Radio	   Liberty	   Research	  
Bulletin	  97/78	  (3	  May	  1978).	  The	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	  changes	  were	  also	  reported	  in	  western	  press,	  Craig	  R.	  Whitney,	  “A	  Second	  Soviet	  Republic	  Wins	  its	  Language	  Fight,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  (19	  April	  1978),	  p.	  A5;	  and	  “Third	  Soviet	  Region	  Affirms	  Official	  State	  Language,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  (25	  April	  1978),	  p.	  11.	  
	   335	  lay	   with	   effectively	   promoting	   the	   merits	   of	   consistency	   across	   republican	  constitutions	  (since	  the	  Caucasian	  republics	  were	  the	  outliers	  in	  this	  case).767	  	  Yet	  other	  distinctions	  suggest	  that	  Shevardnadze’s	  role	  may	  have	  been	  even	  more	   decisive	   not	   only	   in	   managing	   the	   events,	   but	   perhaps	   even	   in	   facilitating	  them.	   Unlike	   the	   March	   1956	   events,	   which	   left	   a	   huge	   archival	   trail	   (by	   far	   the	  largest	  reviewed	  for	  this	  dissertation)	  in	  both	  Tbilisi	  and	  Moscow,	  the	  14	  April	  1978	  events	  themselves	  barely	  make	  an	  appearance.	  The	  extensive	  intelligence	  reporting,	  photographs,	   real-­‐time	   correspondence	   with	   Moscow,	   and	   eyewitness	   testimony	  from	   1956,	   and	   post-­‐event	   ideological	   campaign	   had	   no	   archival	   counterpart	   in	  1978.	  Moreover,	  while	  300	  people	  were	  arrested	  and	  39	  convicted	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  March	  1956	  events,	   there	  were	  no	  arrests	  or	  even	  questioning	  of	  participants	   and	   organizers	   following	   the	   demonstration.768	  The	   behavior	   of	   KGB	  and	  militia	   officials	   to	   initially	   try	   to	   prevent	   the	   demonstration	   yet	   relent	   in	   the	  event,	   combined	   with	   Shevardnadze’s	   seemingly	   about-­‐face	   in	   his	   speech	   to	   the	  commission	  itself	  suggests	  that	  he	  may	  have	  orchestrated	  the	  entire	  affair.	  But	  what	  benefit	   could	   Shevardnadze	   derive	   from	   such	   a	   scheme?	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	  Georgian	   citizens,	   Shevardnadze’s	   effort	   could	   garner	   greater	   favorability	   and	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  national	  leader,	  as	  the	  narrative	  constructed	  from	  this	  event	  was	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  767	  “Informatsiia	  ‘o	  plenume	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  E.	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  27	  June	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  303,	  l.	  29.	  768	  This	  corresponds	  not	  only	  with	  my	   findings	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   in	   the	  Party	  and	  KGB	  archives	  on	  this	   issue,	   but	   also	  with	   Shevardnadze’s	   and	  T’amar	  M.’s	   accounts	  of	   the	   events.	  While	   an	   archival	  trail	  for	  the	  constitution	  discussions	  was	  significant,	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  14	  April	  events	  themselves	  were	  absent.	  Internal	  reporting	  on	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  events	  largely	  confines	  itself	  to	  euphemism	  and	   allusion	   (rather	   than	  detail	   and	   action)	   and	   is	  much	  more	   concerned	  with	   events	   in	  Abkhazia	  than	  Tbilisi.	  
	   336	  of	   Shevardnadze	   siding	  with	   a	   popular	  movement	   against	   a	  Moscow	   policy.	  With	  regard	   to	  Moscow,	   Shevardnadze	   demonstrated	   an	   ability	   to	   effectively	  manage	   a	  situation	  of	  disorder	  without	  violence	  or	  bloodshed,	  and	  with	  little	  political	  damage.	  He	   “knew”	   his	   constituents	  well	   enough	   to	   both	   anticipate	   and	   negotiate	   a	   policy	  solution	   in	   their	   favor	   through	   Soviet	   institutions.	   A	   concurrent	   development	   in	  autonomous	   Abkhazia	   posed	   a	   decidedly	   greater	   challenge	   not	   only	   to	  Shevardnadze’s	   abilities	   as	   Georgian-­‐in-­‐chief	   and	   crisis	   manager,	   but	   also	   to	   the	  Soviet	  ethnoterritorial	  landscape	  writ	  large.	  	  
Autonomy	  and	  its	  Discontents:	  Abkhazia	  	  	   The	   reinstatement	   of	   Georgian	   as	   the	   republic’s	   state	   language	   in	   the	  constitution	   presented	   additional	   challenges	   for	   the	   republic’s	   leadership	   and	  multiethnic	   citizenry.	   Namely,	   while	   Georgian	   demonstrators	   and	   petitioners	  triumphantly	   greeted	   this	   concession,	   the	  move	   further	   antagonized	   citizens	  with	  perceived	  grievances	  in	  Abkhazia.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  20:	  Map	  of	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  
Source:	  Wikimedia	  Commons	  
	  
	   337	  An	  autonomous	  republic	  within	   the	  Georgian	  SSR,	   the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  and	   its	  entitled	   nationality,	   the	   Abkhaz,	   were	   by	   design	   afforded	   the	   same	   rights,	  protections,	   and	   benefits	   within	   the	   autonomous	   republic	   as	   entitled	   Georgians	  were	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  republic.	  This	  arrangement	  dated	  from	  1931,	  when	  Abkhazia	  was	  downgraded	  from	  union	  republic	  to	  the	  short-­‐lived	  category	  of	  treaty	  republic	  to,	  finally,	  autonomous	  republic	  within	  Georgia.	  While	  changes	  in	  levels	  of	  autonomy	  occurred	   throughout	   the	   USSR	   between	   the	   1920s	   and	   1950s	   as	   Moscow	  implemented	   its	   ethnoterritorial	   schema	   and	   incorporated	   new	   territories,	   the	  Abkhaz	   case	   remained	   peculiar	   due	   to	   the	   very	   small	   population	   of	   the	   entitled	  nationality.	   Georgians,	   Russians,	   Armenians,	   and	   (prior	   to	   their	   deportation	   in	  1949)	  Greeks	   all	   comprised	   large	  populations	   in	  Abkhazia,	  which	   complicated	   the	  implementation	   of	   “affirmative	   action”	   politics	   for	   entitled	   Abkhaz,	   relations	  between	   nationalities,	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   Tbilisi,	   Sukhumi	   (Abkhazia’s	  capital),	  and	  Moscow.	  
Table	   9:	   Population	   by	   nationality	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR	   according	   to	   the	   All-­‐Union	  
Census769	  	   1939	  (%)	   1959	  (%)	   1970	  (%)	   1979	  (%)	  Total	  population	   311,885	   404,738	   486,959	   486,082	  Abkhaz	   56,197	  (18)	   61,193	  (15.1)	   77,276	  (15.9)	   83,097	  (17.1)	  Georgian	   91,967	  (29.5)	   158,221	  (39.1)	   199,595	  (41)	   213,322	  (43.9)	  Russian	   60,201	  (19.3)	   86,715	  (21.4)	   92,889	  (19.1)	   79,730	  (16.4)	  Armenian	   49,705	  (15.9)	   64,425	  (15.9)	   74,850	  (15.4)	   73,350	  (15.1)	  Greek	   34,621	  (11.1)	   9,101	  (2.2)	   13,114	  (2.7)	   13,642	  (2.8)	  Ukrainian	   8,593	  (2.8)	   11,474	  (2.8)	   11,955	  (2.5)	   10,257	  (2.1)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  769	  Compiled	   from	   Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1939	   goda;	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	  
1959	  goda:	  Gruzinskaia	  SSR;	  Itogi	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1970	  goda;	  and	  Chislennost’	  i	  sostav	  
naseleniia	  SSSR:	  Po	  dannym	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1979	  goda.	  
	   338	  At	   least	   once	   per	   decade	   since	   1937	   (1937,	   1947,	   1956-­‐7,	   1967),	   as	   described	   in	  previous	   chapters,	   Abkhaz	   intellectuals	   and	   activists	   appealed	   to	   Moscow	   for	  protection	   of	   their	   entitled	   rights	   within	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR	   against	   a	   spectrum	   of	  perceived	  “Georgification”	  policies	  originating	  in	  the	  1930s.770	  	  As	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Georgian	  petitioners	  described	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  discussions	  surrounding	  the	  1977	  All-­‐Union	  Constitution	  and	  its	  republican	  variants	  provided	  an	  institutional	  forum	  through	  which	  a	  group	  of	  Abkhaz	  intellectuals	  once	  again	  made	  a	  lengthy	  case	  articulating	  the	  violation	  of	  Abkhaz	  rights	  in	  the	  republic.	  The	  so-­‐called	  “Letter	  of	  the	  130,”	  dated	  10	  December	  1977,	  described	  to	  Brezhnev,	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  Politburo,	  and	  M.	  Ia.	  Iasnov	  a	  decades-­‐long	  process	  of	  Georgification	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  called	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  from	  Georgia	  to	  the	  RSFSR	  –	  an	  appeal	  that	  had	  first	  been	  made	  in	  1957.771	  The	  letter’s	  signatories	  included	  Party	  members,	   veterans,	   artists,	   writers,	   academics,	   engineers,	   teachers,	   kolkhoz	   and	  sovkhoz	  workers,	  and	  workers	  in	  tourism	  and	  tea	  production.	  	  The	   petition	   cited	   five	   broad	   areas	   of	   complaint:	   first,	   appeals	   to	   the	   1921	  precedent,	   when	   Abkhazia	   was	   established	   as	   a	   Union	   republic;	   second,	   the	  allegedly	   anti-­‐Abkhaz	   policies	   during	   the	   so-­‐called	   Beriashchina	   (1936-­‐1953),	  including	   the	   closing	   of	   Abkhaz-­‐language	   schools,	   introduction	   of	   the	   Georgian	  alphabet	   for	   the	   Abkhaz	   language,	   replacement	   of	   Abkhaz	   with	   Georgian	   place	  names,	   and	   resettlement	   of	   ethnic	   Georgians	   to	   the	   republic;	   third,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  770	  On	  the	  role	  of	  intellectuals	  and	  historiography	  in	  Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  relations,	  see	  Shnirelman,	  The	  
Value	  of	  the	  Past;	  and	  Coppieters,	  "In	  Defence	  of	  the	  Homeland.”	  77110	  December	  1977,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  ll.	  2-­‐43.	  
	   339	  historiographical	   Georgification	   of	   Abkhazia;	   fourth,	   demographic	   changes	   and	  resettlement	   policies;	   and	   fifth,	   disappointment	   with	   Shevardnadze’s	   approach	  toward	  Abkhaz	  issues.	  	  Many	   of	   the	   details	   of	   these	   complaints	   had	   likewise	   appeared	   in	   earlier	  petitions,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Beria	  period	  and	  historiographical	  debates.	  Petitioners	   criticized	   the	   new	   Georgian	   leadership	   for	   attempting	   to	   equate	   the	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ajarian	  ASSRs,	  which	  had	   the	  same	  autonomous	  status	   in	   spite	  of	   the	  fact	   that	   “Ajarians	   never	   constituted	   and	   today	   still	   do	   not	   constitute	   a	   separate	  nation	  or	  nationality.	  Therefore	  Ajarian	  autonomy	  is	  not	  national	  autonomy	  and	  to	  identify	   it	  with	   the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	   is	  politically	  mistaken.”772	  Finally,	   the	  petitioners	  appealed	   to	   the	   timely	   issue	   of	   constitutional	   reform	   in	   their	   request	   to	   transfer	  Abkhazia	   to	   the	   RSFSR,	   a	   power	   not	   granted	   to	   autonomous	   republics	   in	   earlier	  iterations	  of	  the	  constitution.	  In	  their	  account,	  “Although	  the	  constitutions	  of	  Union	  and	   autonomous	   republics	   do	   not	   specifically	   stipulate	   the	   right	   of	   autonomous	  republics	  to	   freely	  secede	  from	  one	  or	  another	  Union	  republic,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  such	  a	  possibility	  is	  excluded,”	  implying	  that	  such	  a	  right	  could	  (and	  should)	  be	  granted	  to	  autonomous	  republics	  in	  the	  new	  constitutions.773	  CPSU	  CC	  head	  of	  Organizational	  and	  Party	  Work	  V.	  Brovikov	  forwarded	  the	  petition	  to	  Shevardnadze	  in	  January	  1978.774	  Because	  the	  signatories	  had	  reportedly	  not	  yet	  received	  any	  acknowledgement	  of	  their	  missive	  from	  CPSU	  authorities,	  six	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  772	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  18-­‐19.	  773	  Ibid.,	  l.	  21.	  774	  Brovikov	  to	  Shevardnadze,	  12	  January	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  l.	  1.	  
	   340	  the	   original	   signatories	   reiterated	   their	   demands	   in	   February	   and	   called	   for	   an	  exploratory	   commission	   in	   the	  CPSU	  CC	   to	   investigate	   their	   grievances.775	  Instead,	  this	  task	  was	  delegated	  to	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  Chairman	  L.V.	  Marshaniia,	  who	  discussed	  the	  commission’s	   findings	  at	  a	  22	  February	  1978	  session	  of	   the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CP	  in	  Sukhumi.776	  The	   “130”	   presciently	   predicted	   that	   their	   letter	   would	   be	   interpreted	   as	  “nationalistic”	  by	  Georgian	  and	  Abkhazian	  authorities	  and	  its	  signatories	  derided	  as	  so-­‐called	   “Abkhaz	   nationalists.” 777 	  With	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   letter’s	   key	  signatories	  at	  the	  22	  February	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  meeting,	  discussion	  about	  the	  letter	  revealed	   important	   tensions	   not	   only	   between	   the	   autonomous	   republic’s	   Party	  leadership	   and	   intelligentsia,	   but	   also	   among	   Abkhaz	   representatives	   in	   both	  groups.	   Several	   Abkhaz	   participants	   challenged	   the	   signatories’	   claim	   to	   speak	   on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  people,	  and	  other	  participants	  disputed	  a	  perceived	  claim	  that	  current	  Abkhaz-­‐Georgian	  relations	  were	  worse	  than	  those	  during	  the	  Beriashchina.	  Participants	   agreed,	   however,	   that	   the	   “national	   question”	   in	   Abkhazia	   remained	  problematic	   and	   required	   further	   efforts	   to	   improve	   the	   situation.	   B.G.	   Kekhiripa,	  one	   of	   the	   “130”	   representatives,	   continued	   to	   press	   the	   secession	   issue	  with	   the	  following	  rationale:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  775	  Tsvinariia	   V.L.,	   Damenia	   O.N.,	   Aishba	   A.A.,	   Agrba	   V.B.,	   Tsvinaria	   I.I.	   Markholia	   I.R.,	   “Pis’mo	  ‘shesterykh,’	   chlenam	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	   g.	  Moskva,	  Kreml’,”	  printed	   in	  Abkhazskie	  pis’ma	  (1947-­‐
1989),	   187-­‐189.	   This	   particular	   collection	   was	   gathered	   and	   edited	   by	   I.R.	   Markholia,	   one	   of	   the	  signatories	  of	  the	  “Letter	  of	  130”	  and	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  Abkhaz	  national	  movement	  from	  the	  1960s	  through	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  776	  “Ob	  intsidentakh,	  imevshikh	  mesto	  v	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR	  v	  marte-­‐aprele	  1978	  goda,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  6	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  304,	  l.	  5.	  777	  10	  December	  1977,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  l.	  21.	  
	   341	  Yes,	   prior	   to	   this	   letter	   I	   wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   Constitutional	  Commission	  in	  which	  my	  comrades	  and	  I	  proposed	  to	  supplement	  the	  71st	  Article	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  USSR.	  For	  example,	  in	  this	  article	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  secede	  from	  the	  USSR	  is	  preserved	  for	  every	  union	  republic,	  but	  autonomous	  republics	  do	  not	  have	  this	  right.	   I	   remember	   the	  events	   in	  Georgia	   in	  1956.	   I	  personally	  was	   in	  Tbilisi.	  So	  what,	  it	  was	  good	  then?	  Do	  you	  remember	  why	  that	  began?	  So	  now,	  if	  Georgia	  wants	  to	  leave	  the	  USSR,	  then	  the	  result	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  ask	  the	  Abkhaz	  whether	  they	  want	  to	  leave	  with	  them?	  So	  that	  is	   why	   we	   suggest	   amending	   Article	   71	   to	   give	   the	   right	   to	  autonomous	   republics	   to	   transfer	   from	   one	   union	   republic	   to	  another.778	  	  In	   spite	   of	   Kekhiripa’s	   appeal,	   more	   diligent	   Party	   and	   ideological	   work	   –	   not	  territorial	   transfer	   –	   would	   provide	   the	   preferred	   course	   of	   action	   for	   the	   time	  being,	   and	   Party	   aktivs	   throughout	   Abkhazia	   were	   informed	   of	   the	   commission’s	  findings	  in	  local	  Party	  meetings	  beginning	  on	  18	  March.	  	  	   Shortly	   thereafter,	   however,	   Abkhaz	   citizens	   began	   to	   convene	   their	   own	  unsanctioned,	  reportedly	  spontaneous	  “gatherings”	  (skhody)	  to	  discuss	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  “Letter	  of	  the	  130”.	  The	  timeline	  of	  these	  gatherings	  unfolded	  as	  follows:	  27	  March	  –	  Zvandripsh	  (Gudauta	  district)	  –	  100	  people	  28	  March	  –	  Bzyb’	  (Gagra	  district)	  –	  50	  people	  29	  March	  –	  Bzyb’	  (Gagra	  district)	  –	  400	  people	  1	  April	  –	  Abgarkhuk	  (Gudauta	  district)	  –	  1000	  people	  2	  April	  –	  Lykhny	  (Gudauta	  district)	  –	  2000	  people	  	  4	  April	  –	  Reports	  of	  an	  unhealthy	  mood	  among	  student	  sphere	  at	  Sukhumi	  	  Pedagogical	  Institute;	  Possible	  gathering	  in	  Ochamchire	  district	  	  (number	  of	  participants	  unknown)	  5	  April	  –	  Ochamchire	  –	  1500	  people779	  Traditional	  Abkhaz	  skhody	  had	  a	  longer	  genealogy	  and	  dynamic	  quality,	  as	  calls	  for	  gatherings	   spread	   from	   town	   to	   town.	  Moreover,	   the	   location	  of	   the	   largest	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  778	  “Protokol	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  Abkhazskogo	  obkoma	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  22	  February	  1978,	  printed	  in	  
Abkhazskie	  pis’ma	  (1947-­‐1989),	  233.	  779	  As	  reported	  in	  “Ob	  intsidentakh,	  imevshikh	  mesto	  v	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR	  v	  marte-­‐aprele	  1978	  goda,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  6	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  304,	  ll.	  6-­‐8.	  
	   342	  gatherings	  in	  1978,	   in	  Lykhny,	  Gudauta	  district,	  was	  likely	  not	  coincidental,	  as	  this	  had	  been	  the	  traditional	  center	  of	  Abkhaz	  national	   identity	  and	  served	  as	  the	  focal	  point	   of	   earlier	   (and	   subsequent)	   mobilization	   movements.780	  Shevardnadze	   and	  Brovikov	   first	  met	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   gatherings	   on	   3	  April,	   and	   by	   6	  April,	  Georgian	  and	  Abkhaz	  Party	   leaders	  dispersed	  throughout	  Abkhazia	  to	  gauge	  the	   population’s	   mood	   and	   speak	   to	   Party	   meetings	   in	   effort	   to	   curb	   further	  gatherings.	  Republic	  and	  local	  officials	  were	  aided	  in	  this	  effort	  by	  the	  arrival	  of	  V.P.	  Pirozhkov,	   the	   vice-­‐chairman	   of	   the	   USSR	   KGB.	   Local	   Party	   leadership	   bore	   the	  brunt	  of	  the	  blame	  at	  this	  stage,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  replacement	  of	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  First	  Secretary	  Khintba	  by	  V.B.	  Adleiba	  on	  20	  April.781	  	   Tbilisi	   authorities	   responded	   to	   the	  growing	  number	  of	   gatherings	   through	  the	  25	  April	  1978	  Georgian	  CC	  resolution	  “On	  measures	  for	  the	  further	  development	  of	   the	   economy	   and	   culture	   of	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR,	   strengthening	   of	   organized	  ideological	   development	   work	   among	   laborers	   of	   the	   autonomous	   republic.”	   This	  resolution	   evaluated	   many	   of	   the	   claims	   made	   by	   the	   “130”	   signatories	   and	  established	   a	   fifteen-­‐point	   plan	   to	   foster	   improvements	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   spheres	   in	  Abkhazia	   and	   in	   relations	   between	   Tbilisi	   and	   Sukhumi.	   These	   measures	   ranged	  from	   greater	   economic	   investment	   to	   television	   and	   radio	   programming	   in	   the	  Abkhaz	  and	  other	  languages	  to	  improving	  development	  of	  local	  cadres	  to	  revisiting	  the	  question	  of	  place	  names.	  The	  plan	  also	  made	  note	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  cooperation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  780	  On	   one	   such	   earlier	   iteration	   of	   Abkhaz	   skhody	   in	   1931,	   during	   the	   collectivization	   drive,	   see	  Timothy	  K.	  Blauvelt,	  “Resistance	  and	  Accommodation	  in	  the	  Stalinist	  Periphery.”	  781	  Khintba	   was	   transferred	   to	   the	   Georgian	   CP	   CC	   in	   Tbilisi,	   which,	   while	   a	   promotion	   from	  periphery	   to	   republican	   center,	   also	   got	   him	   out	   of	   Abkhazia,	   “Plenum	   Abkhazskogo	   obkoma	   KP	  Gruzii,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (20	  April	  1978),	  p.	  2.	  	  
	   343	  between	  Georgian	  and	  Abkhazian	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  and	  aimed	  to	  improve	  coordination	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  textbooks,	  education,	  and	  publishing.	  One	  of	  the	   most	   important	   points	   was	   the	   stated	   transformation	   of	   the	   Sukhumi	  Pedagogical	  Institute	  into	  a	  state	  university	  (Sukhumi	  State	  University),	  as	  prior	  to	  this	  Abkhazia	  had	  been	  the	  only	  autonomous	  republic	  in	  the	  USSR	  without	  its	  own	  university. 782 	  The	   areas	   for	   improvement	   specifically	   addressed	   many	   of	   the	  grievances	  cited	  by	  Abkhaz	  petitioners	  and	  demonstrators,	  yet	  overall	  the	  language	  of	   the	   resolution	   itself	   deemphasized	   the	   singularity	   of	   ethnic	  Abkhaz	   complaints,	  even	   if	   they	  were	  made	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  entitled	  nationality,	   in	   favor	  of	  highlighting	   the	   multinational	   population	   of	   Abkhazia.	   Moreover,	   the	   25	   April	  resolution	  did	  not	  address	  –	  or	  even	  acknowledge	  –	  the	  issue	  of	  territorial	  transfer	  from	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  to	  the	  RSFSR.	  	   The	   timing	   of	   the	   gatherings	   and	   Party	   response	   in	   Abkhazia	   closely	  mirrored	  the	  petition	  campaign,	  public	  discussions,	  and	  demonstrations	  in	  April	   in	  Tbilisi.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  stretch,	  then,	  for	  republican	  leaders	  to	  view	  these	  developments	  as	   closely	   linked.783	  In	   both	   cases,	   Party	   leadership	   diagnosed	   the	   problem	   as	   a	  failure	   of	   sufficient	   ideological	   work	   regarding	   the	   new	   constitution	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  782	  Protokol	  #91	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  KPG	  “o	  merakh	  po	  dal'neishemu	  razvitiiu	  ekonomiki	  i	  kul'tury	  Abkhazskoi	   ASSR,	   usileniiu	   organizatorskoi	   ideino-­‐vospitatel’noi	   raboty	   sredi	   trudiashchikhsia	  avtonomnoi	   respubliki,”	   25	   April	   1978,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   115,	   d.	   110,	   ll.	   32-­‐36.	   Also	   printed	   in	  
Abkhazskie	  pis’ma,	  279-­‐286.	  783	  See	  reports	  of	  Shevardnadze	  and	  Georgian	  CP	  CC	  secretary	  V.	  Siraże	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC,	  “Informatsiia	  o	  plenume	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  27	  June	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  303,	  ll.	  24-­‐32	  and	  “Informatsiia	  o	  rabote,	  prodelannoi	  partiinymi	  organizatsiiami	  respubliki,	  po	  vyolneniiu	  trebovanii	  25	  s’ezda	  KPSS	  i	  postanovleniia	   TsK	   KPSS	   ob	   osushchestvlenii	   KPSS	   kompleksnogo	   resheniia	   voprosov	  ideinovospitatel’noi	  raboty,”	  11	  May	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  304,	  ll.	  12-­‐19.	  
	   344	  relationship	  between	  nationalities	  in	  the	  republic.784	  Intellectuals	  and	  students	  first	  brought	  Georgian	  and	  Abkhaz	  grievances	   to	   the	   fore,	  yet	   these	  movements	  gained	  traction	  among	  broader	  sectors	  of	  the	  population	  with	  great	  speed.	  However,	  Party	  leaders	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Moscow	  were	  far	  less	  willing	  to	  accede	  to	  Abkhaz	  protesters’	  demands	  for	  transfer	  of	  the	  republic	  to	  the	  RSFSR.	  	  The	  involvement	  of	  both	  Moscow	  and	  Tbilisi	  authorities	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  “Abkhaz	   events”	   suggests	   that	   there	   was	   more	   at	   stake	   than	   complaints	   about	  uneven	  economic	  development	  or	  cultural	  rights.	  Rather,	  shifting	  republic	  borders	  per	   Abkhaz	   demands	   would	   alter	   an	   otherwise	   static	   ethnoterritorial	   schema	  throughout	  the	  USSR	  and	  perhaps	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  other	  territorial	  claims.	  In	  his	  memoir,	   Shevardnadze	   recalled	  a	   summons	   to	  Moscow	   in	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	  14	  April	   events	   to	   discuss	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   official	   language	   clause	   in	   the	  Georgian	   constitution.	   At	   Moscow’s	   insistence,	   according	   to	   Shevardnadze,	  forthcoming	  versions	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ajarian	  ASSR	  constitutions	  would	  likewise	  need	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	   change	   in	  Tbilisi.	   Upon	   arriving	   in	  Abkhazia	   to	   discuss	  said	  changes	  regarding	  the	  language	  clause,	  Shevardnadze	  reportedly	  encountered	  a	  demonstration	   of	   Georgians	   and	   Abkhaz,	   “all,	   who	   had	   a	   patriotic	   feeling.”	   He	  relayed	   the	   incident	   to	   CPSU	   CC	   secretary	   I.V.	   Kapitonov,	   who	   was	   familiar	   with	  Abkhazia,	   and	   ultimately	   three	   languages	   were	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   SSR	  constitution:	  Georgian,	  Abkhaz,	  and	  Russian.785	  Yet	  Shevardnadze’s	  memoir	  account	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  784	  In	  Abkhazia	  in	  particular,	  Siraże	  attributed	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  head	  of	  ideology	  for	  the	  past	  three	  years	  as	  an	  important	  component	  of	  this	  failure,	  ibid.,	  l.	  17.	  785	  Ševardnaże,	  p'ikri	  da	  c'arsula	  momavalze,	  97-­‐98.	  
	   345	  –	   like	   the	  25	  April	  Georgian	  CC	   resolution	   -­‐-­‐	   elided	   the	   larger,	  more	   controversial	  issue	  of	  Abkhaz	  grievances	  and	  secession.	  	   The	   involvement	   of	   Kapitonov	   illustrates	   the	   way	   Moscow	   attempted	   to	  navigate	  between	  the	  plethora	  of	  Abkhaz	  grievances	  and	  demands	  as	  articulated	  in	  the	  “Letter	  of	  the	  130”	  and	  in	  the	  various	  gatherings.	  Kapitonov	  was	  dispatched	  to	  Georgia	  in	  May	  not	  only	  to	  meet	  with	  Shevardnadze	  and	  other	  republic	  leaders,	  but	  also	   to	  speak	   to	  various	  audiences	   in	  Abkhazia.	  His	  main	  address,	  delivered	  on	  25	  May	  1978	  to	  the	  Abkhaz	  district	  Party	  active,	  announced	  that	  the	  CPSU	  CC,	  following	  the	  fifteen-­‐point	  plan	  of	  the	  Georgian	  CC,	  would	  carefully	  evaluate	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	   situation	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	   work	   to	   improve	   these	   conditions.	   786 	  The	  territorial	  transfer	  would	  not	  be	  permitted,	  according	  to	  the	  following	  logic:	  	  In	   our	   country	   we	   have	   twenty	   autonomous	   republics.	   Currently	   in	  each	  of	   them	   the	  project	  of	   the	  new	  constitutions	  are	  published	  and	  widely	   discussed…I	   should	   tell	   you,	   comrades,	   that	   not	   a	   single	  autonomous	   republic	   advocated	   for	   such	   demands	   or	   other	   such	  issues	  going	  against	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  constitutions	  of	  the	   union	   republics…We	   believe	   that	   all	   comrades	  who	   advocate	   or	  support	  the	  idea	  and	  transfer	  of	  Abkhazia	  from	  one	  union	  republic	  to	  another	   will	   understand	   the	   illegality	   of	   their	   position	   and	   will	   not	  insist	   on	   this.	   It	   will	   benefit	   neither	   the	   Abkhaz,	   nor	   the	   people	   of	  other	   nationalities	   residing	   in	   your	   republic…Everything	   related	   to	  the	   national-­‐state	   structure	   of	   the	   Union	   of	   SSRs	   is	   explicitly	   and	  unequivocally	  decided	  in	  the	  new	  Soviet	  Constitution.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	   if	   the	   constitutions	   of	   autonomous	   republics	   contained	  provisions	  that	  did	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  Basic	  Law	  of	  the	  country.787	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  786	  Protokol	  #91	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  KPG	  “o	  merakh	  po	  dal'neishemu	  razvitiiu	  ekonomiki	  i	  kul'tury	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR,”	  25	  April	  1978,	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  110,	   ll.	   32-­‐36.	  The	  CPSU	  CC	  passed	  a	  resolution	  by	  the	  same	  name	  on	  1	  June.	  On	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  resolution’s	  measures	  a	  year	  later,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  117,	  d.	  324.	  787	  “Rech’	  sekretaria	  TsK	  KPSS	  tovarishcha	  I.V.	  Kapitonova	  na	  sobranii	  aktiva	  Abkhazskoi	  oblastnoi	  partorganizatsii,”	  Zaria	  Vostoka	  (26	  May	  1978),	  p.	  1.	  	  
	   346	  Following	   Kapitonov’s	   speech	   and	   subsequent	   CPSU	   CC	   resolution,	   Shevardnadze	  resumed	  the	  process	  of	  accounting	  for	  mistakes	  made	  in	  Party	  and	  ideological	  work	  that	   resulted	   in	   both	   the	   “Abkhaz	   events”	   and	   movement	   for	   language	   rights	   in	  Tbilisi.	  In	  his	  27	  June	  report	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC,	  he	  subsumed	  both	  developments	  under	  a	   rubric	   of	   interethnic	   relations	   (mezhnatsional’nie	   otnosheniia)	   in	   Georgia,	   again	  somewhat	   overstepping	   explicit	   Abkhaz-­‐Georgian	   tensions	   to	   speak	   to	   a	   broader	  phenomenon.788	  	  	  Yet	   Kapitonov’s	   intervention	   failed	   to	   abate	   unrest	   in	   Abkhazia,	   as	   the	  gatherings	   across	   the	   republic	   in	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   turned	   into	   a	   strike	  movement	   in	   September	   that	   stopped	  work	   in	   certain	   factories	   and	   led	   shops	   to	  close.	   	   According	   to	  Abkhaz	  Obkom	  First	   Secretary	  Adleiba,	   this	   not	   only	   affected	  individual	   factory	  outputs,	   but	   also	   threatened	   the	   “normal	   functioning”	  of	   tourist	  areas	   in	   Gagra	   and	   Gudauta	   districts,	   the	   main	   locales	   for	   strike	   activity.789	  Sh.N.	  Lakoba,	  secretary	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  Council	  of	  Trade	  Unions,	  noted	  that	  while	  in	  previous	   calls	   of	   the	   skhody,	   leaders	   day	   and	   night	  went	   to	   talk	   to	   people	   to	   ally	  them	  with	   their	  cause,	  placing	  discussion	  at	   the	  center	  of	   the	  practice,	   the	  current	  state	   of	   protest	   in	   Abkhazia	   had	   devolved	   into	   unclear	   demands	   and	   ineffective	  means	  of	  expressing	  grievance,	  such	  as	  taxi	  and	  worker	  strikes.790	  	  Yet	   even	   if	   Abkhazia	   was	   in	   a	   “state	   of	   emergency”	   by	   October,	   as	   L.V.	  Marshaniia,	  secretary	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  Obkom,	  claimed,	  this	  incident	  of	  unrest	  fizzled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  788	  “Informatsiia	   ‘o	  plenume	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  303,	  ll.	  24-­‐32.	  789	  “Protokol	  13	  AbkhazObkom	  KPG	   ‘o	  nedopushchenii	   vpred'	   samovol'nykh	  skhodov	   i	   stikhiinykh	  sobrani	  v	  Abkhazii’”,	  2	  October	  1978,	  printed	  in	  Abkhazskie	  pis’ma,	  298-­‐330,	  303-­‐306.	  790	  Ibid.,	  312-­‐313.	  
	   347	  shortly	   thereafter,	   as	   the	   25	   April/1	   June	   resolution	   began	   to	   be	   implemented	   in	  earnest.	  Nearly	  a	  year	  later,	  in	  August	  1979,	  Shevardnadze	  reported	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  on	  the	  numerous	  activities	  undertaken	  in	  recent	  months	  to	  improve	  “all	  spheres	  of	  life	   in	   the	   autonomous	   republic,”	   particularly	   in	   improvement	   of	   the	   “moral-­‐psychological	   atmosphere”	   and	   economic	   development.	   Alongside	   increased	  cultural	   programs,	   discussions	   between	   Georgian	   and	   Abkhaz	   historians,	   Party	  sessions	   dedicated	   to	   kritika	   and	   samokritika,	   and	   increased	   Abkhaz	   cadre	  representation,	  however,	  Shevardnadze	  also	  described	  the	  continued	  pursuit	  of	  the	  organizers	  of	   the	   “events”	  and	  concerning	  occurrences	  of	  Georgian	   “gatherings”	   in	  response	  to	  earlier	  Abkhaz	  gatherings.	  Georgian	  leadership	  also	  remained	  reluctant	  to	  accede	  to	  one	  consistent	  demand	  made	  by	  Abkhaz	  petitioners	  and	  demonstrators	  regarding	  place	  names	  in	  the	  autonomous	  republic.	  Again,	  while	  Abkhaz	  petitioners	  sought	   to	   rename	   many	   population	   centers,	   streets,	   and	   so	   forth	   with	   Abkhaz	  names,	   Shevardnadze	   questioned	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   such	   an	   effort	   when	   affected	  populations	  would	  include	  “Russians,	  Georgians,	  Armenians,	  Estonians,	  Greeks,	  and	  representatives	  of	  other	  nationalities.”	  He	  anticipated	  “serious	  disturbances”	  among	  those	  populations	  in	  conjunction	  with	  renaming	  per	  Abkhaz	  requests,	  and	  therefore	  passed	  the	  issue	  to	  Georgian	  KGB	  chairman	  Inauri	  for	  further	  investigation.791	  As	   noted	   above,	   the	   scope	   and	   course	   of	   the	   “Abkhaz	   events”	   held	  implications	   not	   only	   for	   Abkhaz	   actors	   and	   republic	   leadership,	   but	   also	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   Abkhazia’s	   non-­‐entitled	   populace.	   Shevardnadze	   reported	   in	   an	   early	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  791	  Shevardnadze	   to	   TsK	   KPSS,	   “Informatsiia	   o	   rabote,	   provodimoi	   po	   vypolneniiu	   postanovleniia	  TsK	   KPSS	   i	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   SSSR	   po	   Abkhazskoi	   ASSR	   i	   merakh	   po	   okonchatel’noi	   stabilizatsii	  obstanovki	  v	  avtonomnoi	  respublike,”	  14	  August	  1979,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  117,	  d.	  324,	  ll.	  4-­‐10.	  
	   348	  letter	  to	  the	  CPSU	  CC	  that	  “the	  absolute	  majority	  of	  the	  500,000-­‐person	  population	  of	  Abkhazia	  reacts	  negatively	   to	   these	  events.”792	  Considering	  that	  members	  of	   the	  Abkhaz	   nationality	   comprised	   only	   17.1	   percent	   of	   the	   republic’s	   population,	  Shevardnadze’s	   assessment	   likely	   reflects	   a	   widely	   held	   concern	   not	   only	   among	  Abkhazia’s	  Georgian	  population,	  but	  also	  Armenians,	  Russians,	  and	  other	  prominent	  minority	  	  nationalities.	  	  Letters	  written	  by	  Georgians	   in	  Abkhazia	  over	   the	  course	  of	  1978	  reflected	  these	   concerns,	   which	   were	   related	   to	   yet	   distinct	   from	   their	   co-­‐nationals’	  movement	  regarding	  the	  language	  issue.793	  A	  group	  letter	  to	  the	  Georgian	  CC	  in	  June	  explicitly	  viewed	  the	  speeches	  and	  developments	   in	  Abkhazia	   in	  recent	  months	  as	  “anti-­‐Georgian,”	   threatening	   both	   national	   interests	   and	   “internationalist	  aspirations.”	  They	  expressed	  their	  concern,	  	  not	  only	  about	  the	  fates	  of	   the	  80,000	  Abkhaz	  residents	   in	  Abkhazia,	  but	  also	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  200,000	  Georgian	  residents.	  We	  care	  not	  only	  about	  whether	  feelings	  are	  triggered	  at	  present	  by	  the	  Abkhaz	  people,	  but	   also	   whether	   feelings	   is	   (sic)	   born	   today	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  Georgian	  people	  and	  what	  these	  feelings	  impulsively	  turn	  into	  actions	  in	  the	  future. 794 	  Written	  in	  Georgian,	  this	  letter	  clearly	  identifies	  Georgian	  signatories	  and	  Georgian	  interests	  at	   stake	   in	   the	  autonomous	  republic.	  Yet	  not	  all	  Georgian	  petitioners	   felt	  comfortable	   signing	   such	   letters:	   another	   petition	   in	   Georgian	   “from	   Sokhumi”	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  792	  “Ob	  intsidentakh,	  imevshikh	  mesto	  v	  Abkhazskoi	  ASSR	  v	  marte-­‐aprele	  1978	  goda,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  6	  April	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  304,	  l.	  8.	  793	  This	  perspective	  is	  typically	  absent	  from	  narratives	  of	  the	  “Abkhaz	  events,”	  which	  tend	  to	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  Abkhaz	  point	  of	  view	  and	  the	  Sukhumi-­‐Tbilisi-­‐Moscow	  relationship,	  with	  little	  to	  no	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  residents.	  	  794	  Signed,	  multi-­‐author	  letter	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  25	  June	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  ll.	  50-­‐53.	  	  
	   349	  September	   1978	   explicitly	   states	   that	   the	   writers	   withheld	   their	   names	   out	   of	  fear.795	  A	   complementary	   letter	   written	   in	   October	   to	   the	   Georgian	   CC	   took	   a	  different	   approach.	   Rather	   than	   highlighting	   specifically	   Georgian	   interests,	   the	  Georgian	  writers	  wrote	  instead	  as	  Communists	  (and	  in	  Russian).796	  In	  their	  account,	  the	  “gatherings	  and	  excesses”	  during	  the	  “Abkhaz	  events”	  took	  on	  an	  “openly	  anti-­‐Georgian	   and	   anti-­‐Soviet	   character”	   that	   differed	   from	   earlier	   demonstrations	   (in	  1957,	   1963,	   and	  1967)	   in	   its	  mass	   nature	   and	   in	   their	   demands	   to	   break	   entirely	  with	   Georgia,	   disregarding	   the	   Georgian	   population	   of	   Abkhazia. 797 	  For	   these	  petitioners,	   anti-­‐Soviet	   and	   anti-­‐Georgian	   charges	  were	   intimately	   linked.	   In	   their	  definition:	  We	   call	   them	   anti-­‐Soviet	   as	   they	   were	   directed	   against	   the	  administrative-­‐territorial	   division	   of	   the	   USSR	   as	   enshrined	   in	   the	  Constitution	   of	   the	   USSR,	   against	   the	   legal	   right	   of	   citizens	   of	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  to	  freely	  live	  in	  the	  entire	  territory	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  in	  a	  community	  of	  equal	  nationalities,	  against	  the	  socialist	  principle	  of	  democratic	  centralism	  when	  a	  privileged	  minority	  attempts	  to	  dictate	  its	   will	   to	   the	   majority.	   In	   the	   autonomous	   republic	   the	   basest	  sentiments	   of	  Abkhaz	   chauvinism	  prevailed,	   national	   exceptionalism	  and	   enmity	   between	   peoples,	   that	   are	   absolutely	   incompatible	   with	  the	   spirit	   and	   letter	  of	   the	  Constitution	  of	   the	  USSR,	  with	   the	  Soviet,	  socialist	  way	  of	  life.798	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  795	  Anonymous	  letter	  “From	  Sukhumi”	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  8	  September	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  ll.	  56-­‐57.	  796	  The	   authors	   went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   scribble	   out	   the	   “Georgian”	   in	   their	   self-­‐identification	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   letter,	   such	   that	   it	   read	   “We,	   Georgian	   Communists,	   living	   and	   working	   in	  Abkhazia…”	  to	  Georgian	  CC,	  September	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  342,	  ll.	  107-­‐118.	  797	  Ibid.,	  l.	  107.	  798	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  113-­‐114.	  For	  other	  examples	  such	  letters,	  see	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  464,	  ll.	  11-­‐16,	  67-­‐93.	  
	   350	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  letter,	  the	  petitioners	  emphasized	  that	  Abkhaz	  actions	  affected	  not	  only	   the	   republic's	   Georgians,	   but	   also	   other	   non-­‐entitled	   nationalities	   such	   as	  Russians	  and	  Armenians.	  	  However,	  this	  attempt	  to	  unite	  a	  wider	  cast	  of	  ostensible	  victims	  of	  “Abkhaz	  chauvinism”	   conflicted	   with	   the	   list	   of	   offenses	   they	   cited	   that	   were	   allegedly	  committed	   by	   Abkhaz,	   which	   took	   on	   an	   “anti-­‐Georgian”	   stance.	   Such	   incidents	  included:	  defacing	  or	  eliminating	  the	  word	  “Georgian”	  in	  public	  spaces	  and	  writing	  “death	   to	   Georgians!”	   nearby;	   productions	   by	   Abkhaz	   theatre	   troupes	   denigrating	  the	  Georgian	   language	  and	  culture;	   the	  attempted	  destruction	  of	  museum	  artifacts	  with	  the	  Georgian	  script	  on	  them;	  and	  the	  phrasing	  of	  Article	  28	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  Constitution	  to	  read	  “Citizens	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  and	  other	  union	  republics	  enjoy	  the	  same	  rights	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  as	  citizens	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR.”	  Petitioners	  read	  this	  wording	  “as	  if	  the	  Abkhaz	  ASSR	  were	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  and	  these	  rights	  were	  not	  written	  in	  a	  higher	  authority	  –	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Georgian	   SSR.”799 	  Writing	   not	   as	   nationalists	   but	   as	   committed	   Soviet	   citizen-­‐Communists,	  the	  argument	  articulated	  by	  these	  petitioners	  revealed	  the	  persuasive	  compatibility	  of	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	  interests	  by	  1978.	  	  A	   final	   example	   serves	   to	   test	   some	   of	   the	   autonomous	   and	   national	  strictures	  claimed	  by	  residents	  of	  Abkhazia.	  While	  Ajaria	  enjoyed	  the	  same	  level	  of	  autonomy	  within	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  as	  did	  Abkhazia,	   from	  1939	   “Ajarians”	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  799	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  114-­‐115.	  
	   351	  constitute	   a	   distinct	   nationality.800	  Instead,	   Ajarians	   –	   like	   Mingrelians,	   Laz,	   and	  Svans	  –	  were	  categorized	  as	  Georgians	  from	  the	  1939	  census	  onward,	  as	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Therefore,	  Georgians	  comprised	  the	  entitled	  nationality	  of	  the	  Ajarian	  ASSR	  –	  an	  anomaly	   in	   the	  Soviet	  structure	  of	  ethnoterritorial	  autonomy.	  For	   these	  reasons,	  residents	  of	  Ajaria	  had	  vested	  interests	  both	  in	  the	  movement	  to	  preserve	  the	   Georgian	   language’s	   status	   in	   the	   republic’s	   constitution	   as	   well	   as	   in	   any	  changes	  to	  the	  structures	  of	  autonomy	  within	  the	  republic.	  	  
Table	   10:	   Population	   by	   nationality	   in	   the	   Ajarian	   ASSR	   according	   to	   the	   All-­‐Union	  
Census801	  	   1939	  (%)	   1959	  (%)	   1970	  (%)	   1979	  (%)	  Total	  population	   200,106	   245,286	   309,768	   354,224	  Georgian	   127,542	  (63.7)	   178,661	  (72.8)	   236,928	  (76.5)	   283,872	  (80.1)	  Russian	   30,535	  (15.3)	   32,794	  (13.4)	   35,774	  (11.5)	   34,544	  (9.8)	  Armenian	   14,085	  (7.0)	   15,830	  (6.5)	   15,614	  (5.0)	   16,101	  (4.5)	  Greek	   7,959	  (4.0)	   5,737	  (2.3)	   6,867	  (2.2)	   7,072	  (2.0)	  Ukrainian	   6,866	  (3.4)	   5,844	  (2.4)	   7,181	  (2.3)	   5,402	  (1.5)	  	   Like	   their	   counterparts	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	   Tbilisi,	   citizens	   in	   Ajaria	   also	   held	  demonstrations	  and	  wrote	  petitions	  articulating	  their	  policy	  views	  surrounding	  the	  events	  of	  1978.	  Indeed,	  in	  reporting	  to	  Moscow	  about	  the	  unfolding	  events	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Abkhazia,	   Shevardnadze	  mentioned,	   almost	   in	  passing,	   that	   the	  project	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  However,	   unlike	   Mingrelian,	   Laz,	   and	   Svan,	   Ajarian	   remained	   a	   religious	   rather	   than	   ethnic	  distinction	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   ethnoterritorial	   autonomy	   granted	   the	   Ajarian	   ASSR.	   Due	   to	   its	  incorporation	   into	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   until	   1878,	   most	   “Ajarians”	   were	   Muslims,	   thus	  distinguishing	  them	  from	  Orthodox	  Georgians.	  I	  explain	  these	  categories	  and	  their	  amalgamations	  in	  Chapter	   1.	   	   On	   the	   fluidity	   of	   Ajarian	   identifications	   across	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   see	   Pelkmans,	  
Defending	  the	  Border.	  801	  Compiled	   from	   Vsesoiuznaia	   perepis’	   naseleniia	   1939	   goda;	   Itogi	   Vsesoiuznoi	   perepisi	   naseleniia	  
1959	  goda:	  Gruzinskaia	  SSR;	  Itogi	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1970	  goda;	  and	  Chislennost’	  i	  sostav	  
naseleniia	  SSSR:	  Po	  dannym	  Vsesoiuznoi	  perepisi	  naseleniia	  1979	  goda.	  
	   352	  constitution	   inspired	   “events	   in	   Tbilisi	   and	  Batumi,”	   the	   capital	   of	   Ajaria.802	  In	   his	  memoir,	   he	   noted	   briefly	   that	   following	   a	   Moscow-­‐directed	   visit	   to	   Abkhazia,	   he	  went	  to	  Ajaria,	  where	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  constitution	  ratification	  session,	  “the	  streets	  were	   overcrowded	  with	   students	   and	  workers,	   factories	   did	   not	  work.”803	  Yet	   these	   demonstrations,	   which	   took	   place	   on	   26	   May	   1978	   in	   Batumi,	   are	  otherwise	  unmentioned	  in	  official	  reporting	  on	  the	  Tbilisi	  and	  Abkhaz	  events	  and	  by	  historians	  covering	  these	  episodes.804	  Letters	   from	   citizens	   in	   Ajaria	   provide	   a	   more	   detailed	   picture	   of	   what	  transpired	  during	   the	  Batumi	  demonstrations	  and	   the	  scope	  of	  national	   sentiment	  and	   belonging	   among	   Ajarians	   in	   this	   period.	   According	   to	   Mamia	   Varšaniże,	   a	  Batumi	   poet	   who	   wrote	   to	   Shevardnadze	   on	   29	   May,	   a	   large	   group	   of	   students	  convened	  outside	  the	  building	  of	  the	  Ajarian	  Obkom	  building	  on	  26	  May,	  where	  the	  ratification	  meeting	  of	  the	  Ajarian	  constitution	  was	  taking	  place,	  holding	  signs	  that	  said	   “deda-­‐ena.”	  Moreover,	   “the	  word	  deda-­‐ena	  was	  often	  heard.	  Portraits	  of	  Važa,	  Ilia,	   Ak’ak’i,	   and	   Gogebašvili	   were	   held	   in	   the	   air.”805	  The	   demonstrators	   were	  reportedly	  concerned	  that,	  while	  Georgian	  was	  declared	  the	  official	  language	  in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  constitution,	  this	  provision	  had	  not	  yet	  appeared	  in	  the	  draft	  Ajarian	  ASSR	  constitution.	  According	   to	  Varšaniże,	   it	  was	  necessary	   to	  state	  explicitly	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  802	  “Informatsiia	   ‘o	  plenume	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  Shevardnadze	  to	  TsK	  KPSS,	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  303,	  ll.	  24-­‐32.	  803	  Ševardnaże,	  98.	  804	  Suny,	   The	   Making	   of	   the	   Georgian	   Nation;	   Smith,	   Red	   Nations;	   Nahaylo	   and	   Swoboda,	   Soviet	  
Disunion;	  Simon,	  Nationalism	  and	  Policy.	  805	  These	  names	  refer	  to	  poets	  and	  writers	  in	  the	  Georgian	  national	  literary	  canon	  from	  the	  mid-­‐	  to	  late	  nineteenth	  century:	  Važa	  Pšavela,	   Ilia	  Čavčavżae,	  Ak’ak’i	  Ceret'eli,	  and	  Iakob	  Gogebašvili.	   It	   is	  a	  common	  practice	  for	  Georgians	  to	  refer	  to	  other	  prominent	  Georgian	  cultural,	  intellectual,	  or	  political	  figures	  by	  their	  first	  names	  only.	  
	   353	  the	  official	  language	  provision	  in	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  constitution	  applied	  to	  the	  entire	  territory	   of	   the	   republic,	   i.e.	   in	   its	   autonomous	   areas	   as	   well.	   Such	   an	   issue	  concerned	  not	  only	  the	  student	  demonstrators,	  but	  also	  the	  middle-­‐aged	  and	  elderly	  populations,	  with	  whom	  Varšaniże	  identified	  himself.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  lavishly	  thank	  Shevardnadze	  for	  his	  support	  and	  presence	  in	  Batumi	  and	  note	  “Ajaria	  should	  not	  be	  reproached	   for	   loving	   the	   mother	   tongue.”	   Rather,	   Varšaniże	   used	   the	   parallel	  national	  sentiments	  and	  aspirations	  expressed	  by	  students	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Batumi	  to	  make	   the	   case	   for	   ridding	  Ajaria	  of	   its	   autonomous	   status	   to	   create	   a	   truly	  united	  (ert’iani)–	   rather	   than	   fragmented	  –	  Georgia.	   	  He	  concluded	  his	  missive	  by	   saying,	  “We	  are	  grateful,	  enormously	  grateful,	  dear	  Eduard!	  The	  youth	  and	  the	  people	  love	  you	  and	  believe	  in	  you.	  I	  also	  believe	  in	  you,	  the	  father	  of	  the	  Georgian	  nation…May	  the	  Georgian	  nation	  and	  the	  Georgian	   language,	   the	   language	  of	  Rust’aveli,	  survive	  for	  eternity!”	  Though	  he	  established	  his	   internationalist	  credentials	  by	  mentioning	  his	  service	  in	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	  and	  Stalin-­‐era	  youth,	  he	  wrote	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	   “great	   national-­‐patriotic	   movement	   that	   merges	   mother	   Georgia’s	   national	  interests	  (dedasak’art’velos	  erovnul	  interesebs).”	  806	  Though	  in	  a	  far	  less	  jubilant	  tone	  than	  in	  Varšaniże’s	  letter,	  Arčil	  Xuseinis	  że	  Stambolišvili,	   a	   Party	   member	   from	   K’obulet’i,	   penned	   an	   earlier	   letter	   to	  Shevardnadze	   that	   addressed	   the	   issues	   of	   language	   and	   autonomy.	   For	  Stambolišvili,	   these	   issues	   were	   linked	   because	   the	   Georgian	   language	   –	   as	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  806	  “ġia	  barat’i,”	  Mamia	  Varšaniże	  to	  Shevardnadze,	  29	  May	  1978,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  362,	  ll.	  1-­‐5.	  
	   354	  mother	   tongue	   of	   Ajarians	   –	   linked	   Ajarians	   with	   co-­‐nationals	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  republic.	  He	  asked,	  moreover:	  Is	  autonomy	  necessary	  or	  not?	  It	  is	  known	  that	  autonomy	  can	  be	  given	  to	   the	   nationalities	   in	   order	   to	   govern	   and	   ensure	   the	   further	  development	  of	   their	  own	   language	  and	   culture.	  But	  Ajaria	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  separate	  nationality.	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  question	  is	  in	  doubt	  for	  anyone.	  Ajaria	  is	  an	  indivisible	  part	  of	  Georgia	  by	  territory,	  language,	  culture,	  and	  united	  economy.	  807	  	  Stambolišvili	   wrote	   his	   letter	   in	   February	   1978,	   prior	   to	   the	   events	   in	   Tbilisi,	  Abkhazia,	  and	  Batumi.	  Yet	  he	  marshals	  a	  similar	  –	  if	  less	  ebullient	  –	  argument	  to	  that	  of	  Varšaniże	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  Ajarians	  and	  Georgians	  as	  exemplified	  by	  language	  and	  the	  corresponding	  lack	  of	  utility	  for	  Ajarian	  autonomy	  in	  a	  Georgian	  republic.	  The	  differences	  between	  the	  arguments	  of	  these	  two	  petitioners	  and	  those	  made	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   “Letter	   of	   130”	   are	   therefore	   striking,	   but	   not	   surprising.	  Whereas	   Varšaniże	   and	   Stambolišvili	   would	   prefer	   to	   do	   away	   with	   Ajarian	  autonomy	   altogether	   and	   strengthen	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Georgian	   language	  throughout	   the	   republic’s	   entire	   territory,	   Abkhaz	   petitioners	   and	   demonstrators	  aimed	  to	  elevate	  their	  autonomy	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  Abkhazia	  would	  be	  granted	  the	  right	   to	   transfer	   its	   territory	   to	   the	  RSFSR.	  The	  arguments	  made	  by	  Varšaniże	  and	  Stambolišvili	  about	  language	  and	  territory	  directly	  contradicted	  Abkhaz	  claims.	  Yet	  even	   though	   these	   Ajarians’	   letters	   aligned	   with	   Soviet	   Georgian	   goals	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  language	   and	   a	   unified	   Georgian	   identity,	   abolishing	   Ajarian	   autonomy	   remained	  perhaps	  as	  remote	  a	  possibility	  as	  elevating	  Abkhaz	  autonomy	  from	  the	  perspective	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  of	  Union	  leadership.	  While	  the	  stakes	  were	  considerably	   lower	  in	  the	  Ajarian	  case,	  revising	  the	  Soviet	  ethnoterritorial	  map	  in	  1978	  remained	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  even	  for	  an	  atypical	  autonomous	  republic	  without	   its	   “own”	  entitled	  nationality	  such	  as	  Ajaria.	   *	   *	   *	  No	  other	  republic	  saw	  as	  much	  mass	  disruption	  in	  the	   late	  Brezhnev	  era	  as	  did	  Georgia,	  yet	  in	  his	  study	  of	  “mass	  uprisings”	  (massovye	  besporiadki)	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  Soviet	  Union,	  V.A.	  Kozlov	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  events	  in	  Tbilisi,	  Abkhazia,	  and	  Ajaria	   in	   1977-­‐1978.808	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   earlier	   chroniclers	   of	   the	   state	   of	   the	  national	  question	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  USSR	  include	  the	  Georgian	  of	  1978	  in	  a	  narrative	  about	   local	   responses	   to	   central	   Russification	   policies	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict,	  aligning	   this	   case	   with	   the	   mobilization	   of	   Crimean	   Tatars,	   Germans,	   Jews,	   and	  Meskhetians;	   the	  crackdown	  on	  republic	  Helsinki	  Watch	  groups;	  growing	   tensions	  between	   Armenia	   and	   Azerbaijan	   over	   Nagornyi	   Karabakh;	   and	   dissident-­‐led	  protests	   against	   Russification	   in	   Ukraine,	   Lithuania,	   and	   Estonia.809	  Yet	   as	   this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	  political	  mobilization	  around	  the	  constitution	  among	  Georgians	  and	  Abkhaz	  does	  not	  neatly	  adhere	  to	  a	  paradigm	  of	  disruption	  and	  dissent.	  Rather,	  this	   case	   demonstrates	   two	   crucial	   components	   of	   the	   national-­‐social	   contract	   as	  realized	  under	  developed	   socialism.	   First,	   by	   the	   late	   1970s,	   the	  political	   space	   of	  developed	   socialism	  had	   expanded	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	  members	   of	   an	   entitled	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  Kozlov,	  Mass	  Uprisings	  in	  the	  USSR.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  Kozlov	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  an	  entire	  chapter	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   this	  volume	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  events	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  Disunion;	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  Policy;	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  nationality	  could	  openly	  protest	  a	  central	  reform	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  national	  interest	  and	  succeed.	  Second,	  concurrent	  and	  related	  developments	   in	  Abkhazia	  reveal	   the	  institutionalized	   hegemony	   of	   the	   Union	   republic-­‐level	   entitled	   nationality	   by	   the	  late	  1970s.	  	  From	  a	  distance,	   popular	   responses	   in	  Georgia	   to	   central	   policy	   changes	   in	  1956	  and	  1978	  appear	  similar:	  a	  central	  directive	  was	  met	  with	  popular	  protest	  in	  written	   and	  physical	   form,	   and	  Georgian	   actors	   read	   the	  proposed	  policy	   changes	  through	  a	  national	  lens.810	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  1978	  events	  and	  their	  peaceful	  resolution	  proved	  decidedly	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  violent	  fate	  of	  demonstrations	  in	  March	   1956,	   yet	   the	   content	   of	   demonstrators’	   demands	   and	   center-­‐periphery	  tensions	   still	   resembled	   one	   another	   in	   both	   cases.	   This	   narrative	   ignores	   the	  enormous	   changes	   that	   occurred	   in	   Georgia	   in	   the	   interim	   two	   decades,	   instead	  flattening	   out	   purported	   demonstrations	   of	   resistance	   to	   central	   policy.	   The	  differences	  between	  the	  1956	  and	  1978	  events	  reveal	  important	  developments	  and	  subtleties	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  national	  social	  contract.	  While	  the	  immediate	  results	  of	  the	  March	  1956	  demonstrations	  were	  dozens	  of	  deaths	  and	   injuries	   in	  Tbilisi,	   the	  rift	  ushered	  in	  the	  more	  conciliatory	  and	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  between	  Moscow	  and	  Tbilisi	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  The	  1978	  events	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  without	  this	  broadened	  cultural-­‐political	  space.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  while	  the	  1978	  concession	  to	  Georgian	  demonstrators	  looked	  like	  a	  victory	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  continued	  efforts	  to	  curb	  Georgian	  language	  use	  and	  suppress	  a	  growing	  national	  dissident	  movement	  in	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  the	   1980s	   (increasing	   most	   dramatically	   after	   Shevardnadze’s	   departure	   for	  Moscow	   in	   1985)	   showed	   this	   victory	   to	   be	   somewhat	   ephemeral.	   Viewed	   in	   the	  longer	  term,	  then,	  the	  twenty-­‐two	  years	  between	  these	  events	  emerge	  as	  a	  discrete	  period	   in	  modern	  Georgian	  history	   in	  which	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Georgian	  could	  coexist	  productively	  without	  the	  Stalin	  link	  that	  had	  previously	  blended	  these	  identities	  and	  practices.	  The	  discourses	  mobilized	  by	  Georgian	  citizens	  in	  1956	  and	  1978	  depict	  this	  shift	   in	   Georgian	   identities.	   In	   1956,	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	   –	   like	   their	   counterparts	  throughout	  the	  Union	  –	  put	  the	  issue	  of	  Stalin	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  discussions	  about	  the	  “cult	  of	  personality.”	  Yet	  particular	  interpretations	  of	  the	  denigration	  of	  Stalin	  as	  a	  Georgian	  led	  some	  Georgians	  to	  question	  the	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign’s	  impact	  on	  “the	  people”	  and	  “national	  feeling.”	  Furthermore,	  others	  attempted	  comprehend	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  5-­‐9	  March	  demonstrations	  as	  a	  tension	  between	  proletarian	  internationalism	  and	  love	  of	  the	  (Georgian)	  motherland	  (samšoblos	  siqvaruli).	  By	  1956,	  the	  image	  of	  Stalin	   as	   cultivated	   in	   the	   republic	   had	   become	   an	   integral	   component	   of	   Soviet	  Georgian	  national	  identity	  for	  many	  of	  its	  citizens.	  Over	  the	  subsequent	  two	  decades,	  a	  process	  of	  disentangling	  the	  figure	  of	  Stalin	  from	  Georgian	  conceptions	  of	  national	  identity	  coincided	  with	  the	  greater	  autonomy	  in	  practice	  afforded	  to	  Georgia	  during	  developed	   socialism.	   In	   1978,	   petitioners	   wrote	   much	   more	   openly	   and	   directly	  about	   the	   “Georgian	   people”	   and	   the	   “Georgian	   nation”	   and,	   rather	   than	   situating	  these	   collectivities	   in	   opposition	   to	   Marxism-­‐Leninist	   concepts,	   instead	   sought	  ideological	   explanations	   and	   specific	   policy	   solutions	   to	   justify	   their	   rights	   and	  
	   358	  practices	   as	   entitled	   nationals	   in	   the	   republic.	   Stalin	   and	   the	   Georgian	   language	  existed	  as	  components	  of	  national	  identity	  in	  both	  cases:	  the	  Writers’	  Union	  took	  the	  opportunities	   created	   in	  1956	   to	  advocate	   for	   greater	   support	   for	  Georgian	   in	   the	  republic,	  for	  example,	  whereas	  some	  petitioners	  in	  1978	  still	  mobilized	  the	  image	  of	  Stalin	   as	   a	   source	  of	  national	   legitimacy	  and	  pride.	  Yet	   in	   the	   two-­‐decade	   interim,	  language	   (already	   an	   important	   national	  marker)	   largely	   supplanted	   the	   image	   of	  Stalin	   among	   these	   markers	   and	   became	   the	   fundamental	   component	   of	  Georgianness	  as	  lived	  and	  propagated	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  era.	  	   The	  cultivation	  of	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  Georgian	  Sovietness	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  the	  possibilities	  afforded	  to	  a	  Union	  republic-­‐level	  entitled	  nationality	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	   era.	   In	   1978,	   employing	   widespread	   Soviet	   practices	   (petitioning	   and	  Party	   meetings)	   and	   institutions	   (the	   Party	   and	   Constitutional	   Commission)	   to	  advocate	   for	   a	   policy	   change	   in	   the	   republic’s	   draft	   constitution	   in	   the	   name	   of	   a	  Georgian	  national	  interest	  proved	  to	  be	  effective	  means	  for	  preserving	  the	  status	  of	  the	   Georgian	   language	   in	   the	   republic.	   The	   14	   April	   demonstration,	   as	   an	  unsanctioned	  mass	  meeting,	   certainly	   took	  place	  outside	   the	  bounds	  of	  acceptable	  Soviet	  practices	  elsewhere.	  Yet	  because	  demonstrators’	  demands	  were	  still	   limited	  to	   specific	   rights	   as	   inscribed	   in	   the	   existing	   constitution,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  participants	   and	   leaders	   alike	   could	   interpret	   these	   actions	   as	   taking	  place	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  Georgian	  Sovietness,	   or	   in	  other	  words,	  within	   the	  enlarged	  mental	  and	  lived	  space	  of	  the	  Soviet	  in	  1970s	  Georgia.	  So	  while	  the	  14	  April	  demonstration	  was	  a	  Georgian	  variant	  of	  Soviet	  in	  practice,	  that	  did	  not	  mean	  it	  was	  anti-­‐Soviet,	  the	  
	   359	  charge	  levied	  against	  demonstrators	  in	  1956	  and	  against	  Abkhaz	  gatherings.	  Even	  if	  the	  ultimate	  concession	   to	  Georgian	  citizen-­‐petitioners	  and	  demonstrators	  did	  not	  change	   much	   in	   the	   daily	   lives	   of	   these	   actors	   (after	   all,	   they	   sought	   to	   retain	   a	  preexisting	  provision	  rather	  than	   introduce	  a	  new	  one),	   the	  process	  and	  results	  of	  their	  advocacy	  retained	  much	  symbolic	  currency.	  For	  nation-­‐builders	  –	  even	  in	  their	  Soviet	   variant	   -­‐-­‐	   the	   symbol	   (of	   national	   language	   preservation,	   in	   this	   instance)	  could	  prove	  more	  meaningful	  than	  policy	  realities.	  	   Entitled	   status	  did	  not	  extend	  such	  possibilities	   for	  policy	  demands	   to	   sub-­‐republic	  units	   in	  practice	  by	  the	   late	  1970s,	   in	  spite	  of	   formal	  privileges	   for	  ethnic	  Abkhaz	   citizens	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   ASSR.	   The	   initial	   appeal,	   via	   the	   “Letter	   of	   130,”	  employed	  a	  similar	  discourse	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  entitled	  status	  as	  many	  of	  the	   letters	  written	  by	  Georgians	   about	  Article	  75.	   Indeed,	  most	   of	   the	   letter’s	   130	  signatories	  were	  Party	  members.	  However,	  while	  Georgian	  petitioners	  consistently	  suggested	  re-­‐inserting	  the	  language	  provision	  in	  Article	  75,	  the	  Abkhaz	  signatories	  elaborated	   a	   much	   wider	   spectrum	   of	   grievances	   and	   demands.	   Leadership	   in	  Tbilisi,	  Moscow,	  and	  Sukhumi	  at	   least	  attempted	  to	  address	  most	  of	   the	  economic,	  cultural,	   and	   cadre	   complaints	   through	   the	   25	   April/1	   June	   resolutions	   “On	  measures	   for	   the	   further	   development	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   culture	   of	   the	   Abkhaz	  ASSR,	   strengthening	   of	   organized	   ideological	   development	   work	   among	   toilers	   of	  the	   autonomous	   republic.”	   Yet	   the	  demand	  most	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  the	  Constitution	  –	  territorial	  transfer	  between	  Union	  republics	  –	  proved	  too	  extreme	  to	  be	  considered	  seriously	  by	  Union	  and	  republic	  leadership.	  The	  Abkhaz	  petitioners	  
	   360	  grounded	  this	  demand	  in	  precedent	  dating	  from	  1921,	  when	  Abkhazia	  initially	  held	  the	   status	   of	   Union	   republic.	   Acceding	   to	   such	   a	   demand	   would	   not	   only	   endow	  autonomous	   republics	  with	   greater	   rights	   than	   before,	   simultaneously	   decreasing	  the	   relative	   power	   of	   Union	   republics,	   but	   also,	   in	   the	   Abkhaz	   case,	   privilege	   the	  demands	   of	   a	   small	   minority	   over	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   autonomous	   republic’s	  population	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Union	  republic.	   	  The	  tensions	  inherent	  in	  these	  changes	  would	   have	   conflicted	   with	   the	   longer-­‐term	   trajectory	   of	   the	   Soviet	   approach	  toward	  nationality	  and	  the	  thriving	  national	  social	  contract	  achieved	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	   For	  all	   their	   appeals	   to	   constitutionalism	  and	  Soviet	   rights,	  Abkhaz	   citizens	  ultimately	   resorted	   to	  a	  more	   traditional	  mechanism	   for	  expressing	  grievance,	   the	  gathering.	   Combined	  with	   the	   later	   strike	  wave,	   these	  means	   existed	  well	   outside	  Soviet	  structures	  and	  accepted	  practices.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  citizens	  resorted	  to	  these	  measures	  only	  after	  petitions	  and	  Party	  meetings	  failed	  to	  produce	  desired	  results	  between	   December	   1977	   and	   March	   1978.	   So	   while	   the	   burgeoning	   wave	   of	  gatherings	   likely	   compelled	   authorities	   in	   Tbilisi	   and	  Moscow	   to	   address	   Abkhaz	  grievances	   in	   greater	   detail,	   the	   turn	   away	   from	   Soviet	   institutional	   solutions	   to	  lobby	   for	   policy	   changes	   undercut	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   claims	   adhering	   to	   Soviet	  structures	  and	  constitutional	  precedent	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  territorial	  transfer	  to	  the	  RSFSR.	  	  	   Since	  1937,	  Abkhaz	   intellectuals	  and	  advocates	  petitioned	  and	  mobilized	   in	  increasing	  numbers	  every	  ten	  years	  (1937,	  1947,	  1957,	  1967,	  1977-­‐8,	  and	  1988-­‐9).	  Abkhaz	  calls	  for	  cultural	  rights	  and	  charges	  of	  “Georgification”	  evolved	  into	  political	  demands	   to	   change	   the	   status	   of	   the	   territory.	   Shevardnadze	   repeatedly	  
	   361	  acknowledged	  the	  timing	  and	  dynamism	  of	  Abkhaz	  mobilization	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  most	  recent	   impasse	  and	  admitted	  that,	   in	  spite	  of	   this	  dynamic,	  Tbilisi	   leadership	  did	  not	   treat	   such	   expressions	  of	  Abkhaz	   grievance	  with	   the	   attention	   and	  dutiful	  study	   they	   warranted. 811 	  Though	   authorities	   in	   Tbilisi	   were	   responsible	   for	  addressing	   demands	   for	   access	   to	   education,	   Abkhaz	   cultural	   institutions,	   and	  economic	   distribution,	   Abkhaz	   petitioners	   consistently	   directed	   their	   letters	   to	  Moscow.	  Moscow	  authorities	   subsequently	   forwarded	  such	   letters	   to	   counterparts	  in	   Tbilisi.	   This	   triangular	   relationship	   further	   reinforced	   the	   solidifying	   Union	  republic	  hegemony	  and	   foreshadowed	  the	  geopolitical	  alignments	  and	  significance	  of	   Abkhazia	   in	   the	   post-­‐Soviet	   environment,	   as	   Abkhaz-­‐Georgian	   relations	   have	  become	  intricately	  tied	  to	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  relations.	  	  	   Both	   Abkhaz	   and	   Georgian	   mobilizations	   in	   1978	   illustrate	   nation-­‐ness	   as	  event,	  or	  how	  particular	  moments	  can	  refine	  and	   invigorate	  what	   it	  meant	   to	  be	  a	  participant	   in	   the	   national	   collective.	   Following	   Brubaker	   and	   Frederick	   Cooper,	  viewing	   the	  nation	   as	   “a	   category	  of	   practice”	   rather	   than	  a	   “category	  of	   analysis”	  permits	   us	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   nation	   “can	   crystallize,	   at	   certain	  moments,	  as	  a	  powerful,	  compelling	  reality”812	  and	  “come	  to	  structure	  perception,	  to	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  He	  made	   this	   particular	   observation	   in	   a	   June	   1978	   address,	   “Protokol	   11	   zasedaniia	   plenuma	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii	  ot	  27	   iuniia	  1978	  goda:	   ‘o	  khode	  vypolneniia	   iun’skogo	  (1976	  g.)	  postanovleniia	  TsK	  KPSS	   po	   partiinoi	   organizatsii	   Gruzii	   i	   zadachakh	   po	   uluchsheniiu	   partiino-­‐politicheskoi	   i	   ideino-­‐vospitatel’noi	  raboty,’”	  sšssa	  (II),	   f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  18,	   ll.	  4-­‐21.	  Shevardnadze’s	  explanation	  broadens	  an	  earlier	  (1976)	  accusation	  levied	  against	  the	  “former	  leadership	  (i.e.	  Mžavanaże)	  for	  mishandling	  tensions	   and	   demonstrations	   surrounding	   the	   1967	   historiographical	   debate	   on	   Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	  history,	  “Protokol	  25	  s”ezda	  KP	  Gruzii,	  22-­‐24	  ianvariia	  1976	  g.),”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  51,	  d.	  2,	  l.	  178.	  812	  Brubaker	  and	  Cooper,	  “Beyond	  ‘Identity,’”	  5.	  
	   362	  inform	   thought	   and	   experience,	   to	   organize	   discourse	   and	   political	   action.”813	  	  Petition	  and	  demonstration	  campaigns	  in	  1978	  permitted	  Georgians	  and	  Abkhaz	  to	  exercise	   nation-­‐ness	   toward	   specific	   political	   ends	   amid	   the	   broader	   discourse	  surrounding	   the	   constitution,	   a	   particular	   moment	   of	   such	   “crystallization.”	  Whereas	   March	   1956	   remained	   the	   transformative	   “event”	   for	   nationhood	   in	  postwar	  Soviet	  Georgia	  and	  continued	   to	   serve	  as	  a	  meaningful	  point	  of	   reference	  for	   citizens	   in	   the	   late	  1970s,	   the	  mobilizations	  of	  1978	  gave	  political	   form	   to	   the	  longer-­‐term	  changes	   in	  national	  experience	   that	  had	  developed	   in	   the	   interim	  two	  decades.	  The	   eventedness	   of	   nationhood	   took	   different	   forms	   among	   Georgians	   and	  Abkhaz,	   but	   both	   groups	  mobilized	   nationally	   toward	   these	   agendas.	   Beneath	   the	  veneer	  of	   the	  Soviet	   “friendship	  of	   the	  peoples,”	  nationality	  acquired	  real	  meaning	  for	   citizens	   in	   Georgia	   in	   the	   postwar	   period	   and	   revealed	   the	   tension	   between	  concurrent	  and	  responsive	  national	  mobilizations	  in	  the	  same	  territorial	  space.	  The	  hegemony	  of	  union	  republic-­‐level	  entitled	  nationalities	  over	  autonomous	  republic-­‐level	  entitled	  nationalities	  –	  and	  the	  myriad	  minority	  groups	  within	  Georgia	  –	  by	  the	  late	  1970s	  illustrates	  the	  results	  of	  longer-­‐term	  Soviet	  nationality	  policies	  initiated	  in	   the	   1920s	   and	   edited	   in	   the	   broader	  World	  War	   Two	   period,	   when	   the	   Union	  moved	  from	  a	  “chronic	  ethnophilia”	  to	  pursuing	  policies	  of	  ethnic	  consolidation	  that	  privileged	   a	   smaller	   number	   of	   “developed”	   nationalities.814	  The	   same	   structures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  813	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  7.	  814	  On	  “ethnophilia,”	   see	   “Slezkine,	   “The	  USSR	  as	  a	  Communal	  Apartment";	  on	  ethnic	  consolidation	  through	  "state-­‐sponsored	  evolutionism,"	  see	  Hirsch,	  Empire	  of	  Nations.	  	  
	   363	  that	   facilitated	   the	   primacy	   and	   possibility	   for	   Georgians	   as	   entitled	   nationals	  limited	  what	   Abkhaz	   could	   do	   in	   their	   autonomous	   republic.	   A	   specifically	   Soviet	  Georgian	   form	   of	   political	   interest	   and	   political	   identity	   had	   emerged	   that	   was	  cultivated	   and	   defended	   through	   Soviet	   institutional	   definitions	   of	   nationhood.	  815	  Or,	  in	  the	  succinct	  words	  of	  V.N.	  Merkvilaże	  (deputy	  director	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Party	  History)	  in	  1978,	  “Georgia	  has	  never	  before	  been	  as	  Georgian	  as	  Georgia	  is	  today.”816	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  815	  Adapted	  from	  Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  24.	  816	  “Protokol	  11	  plenuma	  TsK	  KP	  Gruzii,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  115,	  d.	  19,	  l.	  33.	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Conclusion	  	  	   The	  national-­‐social	  contract	  that	  reached	  its	  apex	  with	  the	  events	  of	  1978	  in	  the	   Georgian	   SSR	   did	   not	   endure	   through	   the	   1980s.	   A	   decade	   later,	   Georgian	  demonstrators	  would	  be	  killed	  on	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Government	  in	  Tbilisi	  on	  9	   April	   1989	   –	   in	   precisely	   the	   same	   spot	   that	   their	   counterparts	   learned	   of	   the	  language	   issue	   victory	   the	   decade	   prior,	   and	   less	   than	   a	   block	   from	   where	   their	  parents	  had	  witnessed	  the	  violent	  suppression	  of	  the	  March	  1956	  demonstrations.	  Meanwhile,	   decennial	   mobilization	   among	   Abkhaz	   citizens	   continued	   with	   more	  fatal	  outcomes	  for	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR,	  as	  calls	  for	  territorial	  transfer	  turned	   to	   calls	   for	   independence.817 	  Such	   demands	   necessarily	   conflicted	   with	  Georgian	   visions	   of	   an	   independent	   Georgia,	   even	   if,	   for	   new	   president	   Zviad	  Gamsaxurdia,	  that	  vision	  was	  increasingly	  one	  of	  a	  Georgia	  for	  (ethnic)	  Georgians.818	  The	  Georgia	  that	  declared	  independence	  on	  26	  May	  1991,	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Georgia	  in	  1918,	  was	  embroiled	  in	  wars	  not	  only	  to	  keep	  formerly	  autonomous	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  as	  parts	  of	  the	  Georgian	  polity,	   but	   also	   in	   a	   civil	   war	   that	   reached	   downtown	   Tbilisi	   in	   1992-­‐1993.819	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817 On	   growing	   tensions	   between	   populations	   in	   Abkhazia,	   see	   “REZOLIUTSIIA	   sobraniia	   v	   g.	  Sukhumi	   24	   marta	   1989	   goda,”	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   130,	   d.	   143a,	   ll.	   1-­‐2;	   Materialy	   o	   rezul'tatakh	  proverki	  zaiavlenii	  po	  natsional'nomu	  voprosu	  v	  Abkhazii	  i	  dr.,”	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  130,	  d.	  162”;	  and	  “Zaiavleniia	   po	   national’nomu	   voprosu	   v	   Abkhazii	   i	   dr.,”	   sšssa	   (II),	   f.	   14,	   op.	   130,	   d.	   163;	   and	  
Abkhazskie	  Pis’ma	  (1947-­‐1989):	  Sbornik	  dokumentov.	   
818 For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  rhetoric,	  see	  “sak’art’velos	  saxalxo	  p’rontis	  gamgeobis	  deklarac’ia,”	  6	  July	  1989,	  sšssa	  (II),	  f.	  14,	  op.	  130,	  d.	  165,	  ll.	  25-­‐28. 
819On	  post-­‐Soviet	  nationalism	   in	  Georgia,	   see	  Stephen	   Jones,	   “Georgia:	  Nationalism	   from	  under	   the	  Rubble,”	   Lowell	   W.	   Barrington,	   ed.	   After	   Independence;	   Making	   and	   Protecting	   the	   Nation	   in	  
Postcolonial	   and	  Postcommunist	   States	   (Ann	   Arbor:	   The	   University	   of	   Michigan	   Press,	   2006):	   248-­‐276.	   On	   the	   Georgian-­‐Abkhaz	   war,	   see	   Svetlana	   M.	   Chervonnaia,	   Abkhaziia-­‐1992:	  
Postkommunisticheskaia	  vandeiia	  (Moscow:	  Mosgorpechat’,	  1993)	  and	  Bruno	  Coppieters,	  Ghia	  Nodia,	  
	   365	  Perhaps	  Shevardnadze	  alone	  could	  restore	  order	  among	  this	  chaos,	  as	  he	  attempted	  from	   his	   re-­‐entry	   into	   Georgian	   politics	   in	   1992	   (Speaker	   of	   Georgian	   Parliament	  from	  1992-­‐95,	  President	  from	  1995-­‐2003).	  The	  independent	  Georgia	  that	  emerged	  over	  the	  next	  decade	  did	  so	  with	  conflicts	  unresolved	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia;	  and	  with	  Ajaria	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  separate	  sub-­‐state.820	  That	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	   are	   even	   further	   from	   resolution	   today,	   in	   2015,	   continues	   to	   color	  Georgian	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policies,	   particularly	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Russia.	   Ajaria,	  meanwhile,	  was	  successfully	  re-­‐incorporated	  into	  the	  larger	  Georgian	  polity	  in	  2004	  (where	  it	  retains	  autonomous	  status),	  earning	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  investment	  as	  one	  of	  President	  Mikheil	  Saakashvili’s	  (in	  office	  2003-­‐2013)	  pet	  projects.821	  Georgia’s	  hopeful	   and	   turbulent	  1990s	  had	  a	  pre-­‐history	   long	  before	  1985:	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  experience	  was	  neither	  spontaneous	  nor	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  some	  sort	  of	   ancient	   ethnic	   animosity	   endemic	   to	   the	   Caucasus	   region	   –	   two	   tropes	   that	  journalists	   and	   politicians	   alike	   somehow	   mobilized	   simultaneously	   to	   explain	  current	  events	   in	   the	  area	  (much	   like	  parallel	  coverage	  of	   the	  Balkans).	  Moreover,	  the	   official	   narratives	   of	   Georgian	   history	   propagated	   since	   the	   2000s	   likewise	  obscure	   the	  nation-­‐building	  work	  and	  experience	  of	   the	  Soviet	  project,	   consigning	  the	  seven	  decades	  of	  the	  Georgian	  SSR	  to	  mere	  “Soviet	  occupation.”	  A	   visit	   to	   the	   “Museum	   of	   Soviet	   Occupation,”	   housed	   inside	   the	   Simon	  Janašia	   Georgian	  National	  Museum	   in	   Tbilisi,	   illustrates	   clearly	   this	   narrative	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	   Yuri	   Anchabadze,	   eds.	  Georgians	   and	  Abkhazians:	   The	   Search	   for	   a	   Peace	   Settlement	   (Cologne:	  Bundeinstitut	  für	  ostwissenschaftliche	  und	  international	  Studien,	  1998).	  	   
820 For	  an	  ethnography	  of	  post-­‐Soviet	  Ajaria,	  see	  Pelkmans,	  Defending	  the	  Border. 
821 On	  Georgia’s	  post-­‐Soviet	  history,	  see	  Stephen	  Jones,	  Georgia:	  A	  Political	  History	  since	  
Independence	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2012).	  Jones	  begins	  his	  history	  in	  1985. 
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  showcases	  post-­‐Soviet	  preoccupations	  with	  museums	  as	  Andersonian	   instruments	  of	  governance.822	  The	  occupation	  museum,	  which	  opened	  in	  2006	  and	  was	  inspired	  by	  similar	  museums	  in	  the	  Baltic	  states,	  tells	  an	  uncomplicated	  narrative	  of	  seventy	  years	  of	   Soviet	  oppression:	   from	   the	  February	  1921	  violent	  Bolshevik	   takeover	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Georgia	  to	  the	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  an	  elite	  uprising	  in	  1924	  to	  the	  terror	  and	  purges	  of	  1937-­‐1938;	  and	  from	  the	  March	  1956	  events	  to	  9	  April	  1989.	  This	   uneven	   and	   condensed	   timeline	   elides	   precisely	   the	   period	   (after	   1956)	   so	  formative	   for	  Georgian	  nation-­‐making	  described	   in	  this	  dissertation.	  Following	  the	  five-­‐day	   war	   with	   Russia	   in	   August	   2008,	   the	   museum	   was	   expanded	   to	   include	  Russian	  occupation	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  related	  wars	  within	  a	  longer	  narrative	  of	  Russian	  occupation	  of	  Georgian	  people	  and	  territory.	  In	  this	  version	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	   history,	   prominently	   displayed	   in	   a	   newly	   outfitted	   building	   on	  Rust’aveli	  Avenue,	   there	  were	  no	  productive	  or	  redeeming	  aspects	  of	  membership	  in	  a	  Soviet	  community.	  	  Yet	   as	   this	   dissertation	   has	   shown,	   the	   peculiar	   Soviet	   approach	   toward	  managing	  ethnic	  difference	  gave	   institutional	   form	  to	  nationality	  as	  an	  ascribed	  as	  well	   as	   lived	   category	   among	  Georgia’s	   citizenry.	   Through	   this	   process,	   territorial	  boundaries	   and	   personal	   nationality	   categories	   came	   to	   have	   new	  meaning.	   This	  was	  true	  both	  among	  members	  of	  the	  entitled	  nationality,	  who	  gained	  the	  most	  from	  the	   Soviet	   nationality	   scheme,	   and	   non-­‐entitled	   minorities,	   who	   increasingly	  struggled	   to	  compete	   in	  a	  homogenizing,	  nationalizing	  polity.	  These	  developments	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 On	  “census,	  map,	  and	  museum,”	  see	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  Chapter	  10. 
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  were	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  Georgian	  SSR:	  indeed,	  by	  design,	  such	  processes	  occurred	  to	  varying	  degrees	  in	  each	  of	  the	  republics	  of	  the	  USSR.	  But	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  national-­‐social	  contract	  after	  1956	  meant	  that	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  nationality	  in	  Georgia	  would	   differ	   from	   that	   in	   Armenia,	   Kazakhstan,	   Estonia,	   or	   elsewhere.	   The	   more	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  toward	  national	  republics	  in	  the	  Khrushchev	  and	  Brezhnev	  eras	  allowed	   republican	   leaders	   to	   pursue	   nationalizing	   policies	  with	   the	   help	   of	   local	  Soviet	   structures	   rather	   than	   in	   spite	   of	   them,	   employing	   the	   greater	   space	   for	  discourse	   and	   practice	  made	   possible	   through	   de-­‐Stalinization	   and	   the	   developed	  socialism	  national-­‐social	  contract.	  The	   variety	   of	   national	   experience	   exhibited	   by	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   did	   not	  mean	   its	   citizens	  were	  any	   less	   “Soviet”	   than	  counterparts	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  USSR.	  And	  contrary	  to	  some	  current	  national	  re-­‐imaginings	  of	  Georgia’s	  Soviet	  past,	  to	  be	  anti-­‐Soviet	  was	   the	  exception	  rather	   than	   the	  rule	   for	   these	  beneficiaries	  of	  Soviet	  nationality	  entitlements.	  What	  Maike	  Lehmann	  has	  termed	  the	  “very	  Soviet	  hybrid	  of	  national	  and	  socialist	  elements”	  on	  display	  in	  Armenia	  during	  demonstrations	  in	  1965	  (to	  mark	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  1915	  genocide)	  I	  have	  described	  in	  this	  dissertation	  as	  the	  enlargement	  of	  “the	  Soviet”	  as	  a	  discourse	  and	  in	  practice	  among	  Georgia’s	  citizenry	  beginning	  with	  the	  March	  1956	  demonstrations.823	  This	  was	  not	  a	  hybrid,	  but	  rather	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  what	   it	  meant	  to	  be	  Soviet	   in	   the	  Georgian	  SSR	  (and	  what	   it	  meant	  to	  be	  Georgian	   in	  the	  USSR).	  Succinctly,	   this	  was	  Georgian	  Sovietness.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 Lehmann,	  “Apricot	  Socialism,"	  13. 
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  Rogers	   Brubaker	   invokes	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   “nationalizing	   state”	   to	   link	  processes	   that	  occurred	   in	   the	  aftermaths	  of	  empire	   in	  east-­‐central	  Europe	  during	  the	   interwar	   period	   and	   in	   the	   former	   USSR	   and	   Yugoslavia	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	  communism. 824 	  Yet	   in	   practice,	   the	   Soviet	   institutionalization	   of	   nationality	  equipped	   national	   republics	   and	   their	   entitled	   citizenries	   with	   the	   tools	   of	  nationalizing	   states	   through	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   empire.825	  These	   tools	   included:	  special	   rights	   and	   privileges	   for	   members	   of	   the	   entitled	   nationality;	   a	   clearly	  defined	   ethnoterritorial	   unit;	   and	   state-­‐endowed	   institutions	   to	   promote	   the	  language,	   culture,	   and	  history	  of	   the	  entitled	  nationality.	  More	   specifically,	   census,	  historiography,	  and	  map	  projects;	  efforts	  to	  project	  a	  republican	  foreign	  policy;	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  republican	  capital;	  and	  popular	  mobilization	  toward	  national	  causes	   among	   citizens	   in	   the	   Georgian	   SSR	   gave	   content	   over	   time	   to	   the	   Soviet	  imperial	   form.	   In	   this	   process,	   these	   projects	   and	   practices	   facilitated	  ethnoterritorial	  consolidation	  and	  recast	  imperial	  centers	  and	  peripheries,	  such	  that	  Tbilisi	   emerged	   as	   an	   imperial	   center	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   from	   the	   vantage	  points	   of	  Abkhazia,	   Saingilo,	   or	   Fereydan.	   Unlike	   the	   polity-­‐seeking	   nationalisms	   of	   the	  nineteenth	   century	   described	   by	   Ernest	   Gellner	   or	   Miroslav	   Hroch,	   entitled	  Georgians	  had	  to	  undertake	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  nationalizing	  work	  to	  actually	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 Brubaker,	  Nationalism	  Reframed,	  Chapter	  4. 
825 This	   builds	   upon	   arguments	   that	   the	   Soviet	   empire	   (and	   its	   application	   in	   Central	   Asia)	   in	   the	  interwar	   period	   looked	   less	   like	   a	   colonial	   relationship	   than	   one	  with	   the	   aims	   of	   a	   “modernizing	  state,”	  Khalid,	  “Backwardness	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Civilization”;	  Edgar,	  Tribal	  Nation;	  Beissinger,	  “Soviet	  Empire	  as	  ‘Family	  Resemblance.’” 
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  make	  the	  polity	  they	  were	  given	  by	  the	  Soviet	  project	  sufficiently	  Georgian.826	  While	  the	   groundwork	   for	   this	   nationalizing	   project	   was	   laid	   in	   the	   interwar	   period,	  achieving	  traction	  among	  the	  citizenry	  remained	  a	  postwar	  endeavor.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  anti-­‐imperial	  and	  anti-­‐nationalist	  ambitions,	  the	  Soviet	  empire	  proved	   to	  be	   a	   remarkably	   successful	  maker	  of	  nations.	  Yet	  nation-­‐building	   is	  not	  only	   a	   process	   of	   construction	   and	   categorization:	   it	   requires	   an	   acceptance	   over	  time	  by	   individuals	   to	   inhabit	   nationality	   and	  national	   identity.	   For	   inhabitants	   of	  Georgia,	   this	  process	  crystallized	   in	  the	  postwar	  era,	  most	   fully	  between	  1956	  and	  1978.	  The	  “Georgian”	  Georgia	  achieved	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  a	  Soviet	  Georgia,	  intricately	  bound	   to	   the	   Soviet	   experiment	   yet	   increasingly	   experiencing	   Sovietness	   in	   a	  distinct	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 Gellner,	  Nations	  and	  Nationalism,	  2nd	  Ed.;	  Hroch,	  Social	  Preconditions	  of	  National	  Revival	  in	  
Europe. 
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